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AUSTRIA IN 1848-49:

BEING A HISTORY OF

THE LATE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

IN

VIENNA, MILAN, VENICE, AND PRAGUE;

WITH

DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF LOMBARDY AND NOVARA;

A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE

REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY;

AND HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE
PRINCES OF THE EMPIRE.

BY

WILLIAM H. STILES,

LATE CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE COURT OF VIENNA.

With Portraits

OF

THE EMPEROR, METTERNICH, RADETZKY, JELLACIC, and KOSSUTH.


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


AUTUMN IN 1818-19

THE LIFE OF THE LATE

JOHN RUSSELL, ESQ.

BY THE REV. J. R. RUSSELL, ESQ.



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AUSTRIA IN 1848 AND 1849.

BOOK II.—(Continued.)

CHAPTER V.

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For at least seven centuries after the appearance of the Magyars in Europe, by whom the kingdom was founded, Hungary maintained an entirely distinct and separate existence, until, in 1526, it became connected with the Austrian crown. To understand the origin and progress of the late contest between Austria and Hungary, as well as to appreciate the precise objects for which that gallant people have battled, single-handed, against the most fearful combination of power, it will be necessary briefly to consider, first, the political condition of Hungary previous to its connection with Austria, then the nature or terms of that connection; and, finally, the subsequent conduct of the parties; or, in other words, whether the terms of that engagement have been complied with or violated. What was the political condition of Hungary previous to its connection with Austria?

Toward the close of the ninth century (889), seven tribes of Magyar wanderers, under the conduct of Almus, and of his son Arpad, entered the country near the Theiss River, and gradually won settlements for themselves in the fertile plains of Dacia.† To concentrate their strength, they chose Arpad as their

* Sometimes written Jelachich; but the author has thought that the better guide as to the spelling of proper names was the manner adopted by the parties themselves. This rule he has also adhered to in writing *Habsburg*.

† The degenerate descendants of Trajan's Roman legions, who now call them-

duke or leader, and a solemn compact was entered into between him and the heads of the tribes, to the effect that the office of chief magistrate should be hereditary in his line, and that the right of the tribes to choose their governor should never be questioned. It was, in short, a federal aristocracy, or union of clans, owing a limited obedience to a superior chief—for there appeared to have been an express stipulation made by the heads of the tribes that the ducal title, on every new accession to the leadership, should be solemnly acknowledged by the state; and that a refusal to take certain oaths prescribed, to observe the popular liberties, should be followed by rejection. The conquered territory was at first distributed only among the chiefs of the tribes; but the duke soon acquired the right of rewarding the courage of the soldiers by the investiture of lands without regard to rank. These estates were held on condition of military service; the chiefs, or possessors of them, engaged to defend the country from internal turmoil and foreign invasion, and were bound to bring into the field, at the call of the duke or Diet, a number of soldiers proportioned to the extent of their lands, but these were never to be forced beyond the limits of the country.

Geysa, the third in descent from Arpad, embraced Christianity; and his son Stephen, who attained the dukedom in the year 1000, under the proselyting patronage of the Roman See, was rewarded for his services in "extirpating the heathen," by a crown from Pope Sylvester the Second, which, manufactured as was superstitiously supposed by the hands of angels, has by the Magyars been ever preserved and held in the utmost reverence, as inseparably connected with Hungarian independence.*

selves Roumani or Wallachs, and the ancient Slavic races, who were probably the aborigines of the country, offered but a feeble resistance to these fierce invaders.

* THE CROWN OF HUNGARY.—One of the many subjects of speculation at the present moment is the fate of the Hungarian crown—not, by a figure of speech, the Hungarian monarchy, but the actual "round and top of sovereignty," the golden diadem itself. It is generally believed that Kossuth took it with him in his flight; if so, it has for a second time crossed the frontiers of Turkey. The past history of this crown is a curious one, and as full of vicissitudes as the lives of some of those who have worn it. The Magyars attach a superstitious value to the relic of their ancient monarchy; there is a legend that it was wrought by the

Thus Stephen founded the kingdom which, according to the notions of that period, he endeavored to strengthen by increas-

hands of angels for St. Stephen, who was crowned with it in 1001; history, with a more limited faith, records that it was sent as a present to Stephen by Pope Sylvester the Second. In 1072, Duke Geysa received from the Greek emperor a golden circlet or royal band for his brow; when he was afterward made King of Hungary, he joined this circlet to the diadem—so that the crown is really composed of two kingly emblems united. When the race of the Arpads became extinct, in 1301, there was a double election to the vacant throne; one party chose Robert of Anjou and Naples, the other Wenzel, the younger, of Bohemia. The cause of the latter did not prosper, and his affairs were taking an unfortunate turn, when his father, Wenzel, King of Bohemia, marched an army to Ofen, and carried off his son and the crown with him to Prague. The Hungarians then definitively elected Otto, of Bavaria, and old Wenzel, for reasons not stated, gave up the crown to him. Otto, to take possession of his kingdom, had to ride incognito through Austria, carrying the crown as a “property” with him. It was packed in a little cask, and hung at the saddle-bow of a German count, who discovered one morning that he had lost his precious charge during the night. The party had then arrived at Fischerment, below Vienna, where they were about to cross the Donau; they retraced their steps, and by great good luck found cask and crown again. In 1307, Otto went to Siebenburgen, on a visit to the Vayvode Ladislas, intending to win him over to his party; he must have failed in his attempt, for the vayvode seized the crown, and made the king a prisoner. After some time, he saw fit to let Otto go, but kept firm possession of the diadem for three years. In 1310, on threats of war and extermination, he gave it up. For more than a century after this its history is a blank; but in 1439, on the death of the Emperor Albert the Fourth, there was again a double election, the two rivals being Wladislaw, of Poland, and Ladislas, the infant son of Albert. The empress resolved to have the child crowned, and for that purpose the diadem was stolen from the Castle of Vissehrad, by one of her maids of honor, who undertook the task and succeeded. In 1441, the empress made a less dignified use of it: she pledged it to the Emperor Frederick the Fourth for two thousand five hundred guldens. It was redeemed by Mathias Corvinus, and taken back to Vissehrad; from hence, after the battle of Mohacs, it was again stolen, and again by a woman, in order to crown John Zapolya. Zapolya gave it in charge to Preny, who delivered it to Ferdinand the First; he was crowned with it in 1527, and then it fell into the hands of the Turks. As Solyman returned from the siege of Vienna, he publicly exhibited the crown to his army in Ofen, but told his soldiers it was that of the renowned Persian ruler Nushirvan; he then sent it back to his *protégé* Zapolya, on whose death it was again given up by his widow to the Emperor Ferdinand. Rhodolph the Second sent the crown to Prague; Mathias the Second brought it back to Pressburg, where, in 1619, it was seized by Bethlem Gabor; on the conclusion of the peace of Nikolsburger, he gave it up to Ferdinand the Second. The Emperor Joseph had it brought to Vienna; afterward he sent it back again to Hungary, where it remained till the taking of Pesth by Windischgrätz, when it was removed by Kossuth, and has ever since been kept at the seat of the Hungarian government; that being broken up and dispersed, the crown has resumed its wanderings. As to what has become of it, there are many rumors; it is said to be buried in a secret place. According to others, Kossuth has it in his personal possession; but

ing the power of the hierarchy and the aristocracy. He established ten richly-endowed bishoprics, and divided the whole empire into seventy-two comitats or counties, with an officer at the head of each, responsible only to the king, and invested with full military and civil power. These officers and bishops formed the House of Magnates, or Senate of the kingdom, and, with their concurrence, King Stephen (in the year 1001) granted a Constitution, the principal features of which are still preserved. On his death, without issue, the country for a time lapsed into a state of anarchy; but order was restored by the election of Wladislaw of Poland, the representative of a junior branch of the house of Arpad, in 1077. It was during this reign that Croatia and Slavonia were annexed to the Hungarian crown.*

Nothing of political interest then occurred until the first quarter of the thirteenth century, which may be regarded as a highly interesting era in Hungarian history—as marking the establishment of the rudiments of a regularly defined constitutional and representative system. Andrew the Second, the reigning monarch at this time, participated in the first crusade, in the thirteenth century, and was named, by the Pope, “King of Jerusalem;” which title has descended to all the kings of Hungary. But, while abroad acquiring titles and reputation, his power and influence at home became seriously undermined. Upon his return, the rich nobility and clergy availed themselves of his weakness to extort from him a confirmation and extension of their privileges, in a charter known as the *Aurea Bulla*† (or Golden Bull), in 1222 (seven years after the Barons of England had compelled John to grant the *Magna Charta*), the thirty-first article of which authorized any Hungarian to resist and oppose the monarch who might violate the Constitution.

This charter, which is to Hungary what *Magna Charta* is to England, except that it secures to the nobility only their rights, leaving the peasant and the subject nations precisely where they were before its adoption—a prey to the oppression

where this gift of a pope to a saint now may be, is, as M. Pulzky told the author, “the great secret.”

* King Koloman in 1095 completed the subjugation of Croatia, and its incorporation with Hungary

† For original, see Appendix, note No. 11.

both of the barons and the crown. It also guarantees to the nobles freedom from arrest, except by due course of law; perpetual immunity from all taxation whatever; the right, when their privileges are attacked, of legal resistance, without incurring the penalties of treason; and freedom from any obligation to obey the king until after his regular coronation.

After recognizing the ancient privileges of the nobility, this charter, in substance, provided that the magnates should sit as hereditary legislators in the National Diet or Assembly; and that the inferior nobility, or untitled gentry, with the body of the clergy, should be represented by members of their respective bodies; but all other classes of the community were beyond the pale of citizenship. With the progress of social civilization, there gradually arose a middle class between the nobles and their serfs; and, about a century and a half after the Golden Bull was granted, this order received a quasi political recognition, and the representative branch of the Legislature was increased by a burgess class, the deputies from the free towns and royal cities.

The form of government in Hungary is a limited monarchy, at first elective, but since 1687 hereditary, in the dynasty of Habsburg.

The principal laws of the kingdom, which, as in Great Britain, form the bases of the Constitution, are,

1st. *The Golden Bull of Andreas the Second.* Each king, upon his accession to the throne, is obliged to acknowledge and confirm it by a solemn oath, excepting the famous clause (the thirty-first) which accords to each Hungarian noble the right of a veto upon the unconstitutional acts of the king, and which, having often lighted the torch of discord in the country, was in 1687, under the reign of Leopold the First, abolished.

2d. *The four principal privileges of the Hungarian nobility*, but especially that which exempts the nobles from all taxes and from every public charge. These were enacted into a fundamental law of the kingdom, by a decree of the Diet of 1741.*

3d. *The treaties of peace—of Vienna, in the year 1606, and*

* Demain, Tableau de la Hongrie.

that of Lintz in 1645. Both acknowledge the free exercise of religion for the Protestants. These were made fundamental laws by the Diets following, and reconfirmed in 1791.

4th. *The right of succession*, which assures the crown of Hungary to the heirs male of the Archdukes of Austria, recognized and confirmed by a fundamental law of the Diet of 1687, and afterward accorded to females by the acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction of the Emperor Charles the Sixth by the Diet of 1723.

5th. The diploma of inauguration and the oath which the king takes at his coronation, and by which he engages to maintain and protect the privileges of the kingdom. This oath is each time inserted in the Hungarian Code (*corpus juris*) as a constitutional law.

The King of Hungary is clothed with complete regal authority; he alone exercises the *executive* power to its full extent; but as to the legislative power, this he exercises conjointly with the Diet of the kingdom, legitimately convoked.

The person of the king is sacred. By him are all civil appointments made; he is the temporal head of the Church—appoints to all ecclesiastical dignities, and receives the proceeds of all vacant benefices; he is the head of the army—the arbiter of peace; and with him rests the power to summon and dissolve the Diet. The Constitution requires that, within six months after his accession, the sovereign shall call together the states of the realm, and take the oath of fealty to the Constitution, and that he shall be invested with all the insignia of royalty.*

* CEREMONY OF CORONATION.—The king, in Hungarian costume, preceded by the banners of the kingdom and the barons who carry the attributes of royalty, enters the church, and, kneeling before the altar, swears to “preserve the churches, lordly prelates, barons, magnates, nobles, free cities, and all inhabitants, in their immunities and liberties, rights, laws, privileges, and in all former good and approved customs, and to do justice to all;” and, further, “to observe the decrees of the most serene King Andreas” (with the exception of the thirty-first article). After which, he is anointed with the holy oil—clothed in the garments of St. Stephen—the grand mass commences, and, at the end, the Primate of Hungary presents to the king the naked sword of St. Stephen, and the archbishop and palatine place the crown upon his head, and he is proclaimed king, amid the eljens of the people and the salvos of artillery. The ceremony in the cathedral over, the king, with the lords, magnates, and bishops, the cortège all on horseback, and with still

The next officer to the king in point of rank is the Palatine, or lord lieutenant of the kingdom, who discharges the functions of viceroy of Hungary Proper during the absence of the monarch. While the sovereign is in the country, the Palatine acts as a kind of mediator for the whole nation between king and people, with the view of preventing, on the one hand, an encroachment upon the popular liberties, and on the other an invasion of the royal prerogatives. The Palatine is elected for life, from a list of four persons presented by the king. Till the Reform Act of 1848, the administration of the kingdom was conducted through the Hungarian Court of Chancery, at Vienna.

The Diet of Hungary is divided into two Chambers, or Tables, as they are termed—the Lords and the Commons, or the Senate and Representatives of the kingdom. The first Table is that of the magnates, and may be said to be composed of three classes: first, the higher clergy; second, the barons and counts of the kingdom (magnates by office, and named by the crown); and, thirdly, the magnates by birth and title.

This House is hereditary, and the members number from six to seven hundred. Only thirty or forty, in ordinary times, are usually present. The Palatine presides over this Assembly, as well as over the highest court of justice, the Septemviral Table. The second Table consists of the deputies from the comitats, that is, the representatives of the untitled gentry, and from the enfranchised cities and towns. There is a third, and very singular element, viz., the elected representatives of those nobles who do not personally attend in the Upper House, and are called *Ablegati Absentium*. The total number of deputies does not exceed two hundred and fifty. The representatives are paid by their constituents. The speaker (whose

more pomp, proceed to the *Königsberg* (or King's Mount), a circular mound which stands on the banks of the Danube, at Pressburg, and made expressly for this ceremony. Arrived at the base of the mound, with uplifted hand he again repeats the pledges exacted of him in the cathedral; and while his nobles, and knights, and clergy, with their picturesque costumes, their costly arms and housings, gather in a mass round its base, the king gallops to the top of the hill, and cutting the air with the sword of St. Stephen, toward the four cardinal points, thereby indicates that he will defend his crown and kingdom against all enemies who may dare to attack it, come from whatever quarter they may.

official title is *Personalis presentiae Regiae in judiciis locum tenens*) is presiding officer of this House.

Formerly the two Chambers sat together, and were not entirely separated until the Diet held in 1562, under Ferdinand the first, the first monarch of the line of Habsburg.

The legislative duties of these two bodies are, according to Fessler, "to maintain the old Magyar Constitution; to support it by constitutional laws; and to assert and secure the rights, liberties, and ancient customs of the nation; to frame laws for particular cases; to grant the supplies, and to ordain the manner and form of their collection; to provide means for securing the independence of the kingdom, its safety from foreign influence, and deliverance from all enemies; to examine and encourage public undertakings and establishments of general utility; to superintend the Mint, and to confer on foreigners the privileges of nobility, the permission to colonize the country, and enjoy the rights of Hungarians."* But the election of a new sovereign, in the event of the extinction of a dynasty, or of the confirmation of a successor in the case of an ordinary demise, the election of Palatine of Hungary, the imposition of taxes, and the power of confirming or rejecting new laws proposed by the executive power, are certainly functions neither less important or less clearly within the scope of their duties and authority.

To return from this requisite digression to the narrative of the leading events in Hungarian history. On the death of Andreas the Third in 1301, the male line of Arpad became extinct; and from that period to the middle of the sixteenth century, the time of its connection with Austria, Hungary, of her own free choice, elected and called to the throne five different dynasties.

1st. Charles Martel, of the Neapolitan branch of the house of Anjou—a family which, through the female line, claimed descent from Arpad.

2d. Wladislaw, King of Poland, was called to the throne through the influence of John Hunniades, surnamed Corvinus, a Wallachian by birth—a chivalrous soldier, who, from the essential service rendered the country in defense of the front-

* Padgette's Hungary.

iers against the Turks, had acquired high reputation and great influence in the nation.

3d. Upon the death of Wladislaw, in the fatal battle of Warnau (1444), Hunniades was elected captain general, and ruled the country for ten years successfully, when, upon his death, in 1456, the Diet made choice of his son Mathias Corvinus as their king.

4th. Upon the death of Mathias in 1490, after one of the most successful and brilliant reigns in Hungarian annals, Ladislas, King of Bohemia, was, by the votes of the Diet, elevated to the throne. Ladislas was succeeded by his son Louis, a youth who fell in the battle of Mohacs in 1526, when Solyman defeated, and drove the flower of Magyar chivalry into the fatal swamp of Czetze, and the throne of Hungary became for the fifth time unoccupied. Two rival candidates now presented themselves—Count Zapolya, a powerful magnate, and Ferdinand of Austria, brother of the Emperor Charles the Fifth, who had married Anna, daughter of Ladislas and sister of Louis, the deceased monarch. Both candidates were, by different Diets, elected to the throne. A civil war ensued, in which Ferdinand was victor; and, though he had been elected by the Diet at Pressburg as early as 1526, and had at Stuhlweisenburg gone through the ceremony of coronation, it was not until 1547 that he was fully acknowledged and confirmed in possession of the throne, which has ever since been occupied by his descendants, the emperors of Germany or Austria, and kings of Hungary.

Thus originated the connection between Hungary and Austria—a connection not arising from conquest or purchase, nor, at first, considered complete or permanent, but partial and temporary, simply arising from the fact of two independent kingdoms owing allegiance to the same sovereign. Hungary, being an elective monarchy, made choice of a sovereign from the house of Austria; and the great inducement, at that time, to such an arrangement was the continued and terrible invasions of the Turks. Hungary was then the bulwark of Christendom against the encroachments of the infidel hordes. The interest which Austria, from her proximity, felt in that struggle, and the support which Ferdinand might be expected to

obtain from his brother, the emperor of Germany, were, in the minds of the Hungarian Diet, strong reasons for his promotion. The union of Hungary and Austria has erroneously been compared to that of Ireland and Great Britain; but a superficial examination is only necessary to expose the fallacy of such a parallel; the resemblance to the union of Great Britain and Hanover is the more striking, where one sovereign holds two kingdoms, both *de jure and de facto*, independent of each other; and where the crowns, after being united for four generations, were separated in the fifth, as one was settled on heirs male *or* female, the other on heirs *male alone*. In both instances the connection was one of association, and not of subjection.

What were the terms of that union? and was the independence of Hungary *de jure*, thereby impaired? The union being one only through the sovereign, the terms must be gathered from some act which may have occurred, or some document which may have been executed between the sovereign and nation on this subject. What are those acts or documents? The first act between the parties was the election of the sovereign by the Diet; second, the signing and publishing by the sovereign of the Diploma of Inauguration; third, the formal act of coronation by the nation; fourth, the solemn oath taken by the sovereign to maintain and protect the privileges of the nation.

These acts, constituting the compact between the parties, are worthy of a little more consideration.

The Act of Election by the Diet was a free and voluntary one. Ferdinand, indeed, did lay claim to the crown, under a double title—the one derived from family compacts, which secured the reversion, as was pretended, to the house of Austria; the other in right of his wife Anne, the only sister of the deceased monarch. But the Hungarians were too much attached to their rights of election to respect these compacts, or even to acknowledge his claims as husband of the princess; and Ferdinand, prudently waiving his claims, offered himself as a candidate, according to the usual mode of election.

The Diploma of Inauguration.—The day before the coronation, the king, seated upon the throne, presents, through the High Chancellor of Hungary, to the members of the Diet as-

sembled in his presence, the Diploma of Inauguration, written upon parchment, and furnished with the royal seal. As the coronation could only take place at the conclusion of a Diet, this diploma is always inserted in the Book of Decrees of the Diet before its close. The new king then swears in the diploma to the following articles :*

1. To preserve and maintain scrupulously the liberties, privileges, rights, laws, and usages of the kingdom (except the clause of the decree of Andrew the Second).

2. Not to carry out of the kingdom the Hungarian crown, but to confide it to two secular guardians, taken indifferently from Catholics and Protestants.

3. To reunite to the crown of Hungary all the countries which they formerly possessed, after the same shall have been reconquered. Afterward the following two were added :

4. To render back to the Diet of the kingdom the right of election, after the extinction of the line of descendants of Charles the Sixth, of Joseph the First, and of Leopold the First.

5. Each one of his successors shall be bound, in virtue of the third article of the law of 1791, to sanction this conservative act of the Diet at his coronation, in the space of six months after his accession, and to confirm it by an oath.†

The *formal act of coronation* and the *solemn oath* of the monarch are but public ratifications of the covenant between the sovereign and people, as formed by the act of election and the signing of the Diploma of Inauguration.

Ferdinand the Fifth, the late monarch, took but the same oath‡ which had been administered to his predecessors, and the forms and ceremonies were the same as had been adopted on every previous occasion, when Martel of Naples, Wladislaw of Poland, Mathias Corvinus of Hungary, and Ladislas of Bohemia, were successively called to the throne. The covenant or contract was identical, and the union or connection with Austria was, therefore, the same as that formed with Naples, Poland, or with Bohemia, when Martel, Wladislaw, and La-

* Such was that of Maria Theresa, Leopold the Second, and Francis the Second.—*Demain's Tableau de la Hongrie*.

† Demain, 257.

‡ For copy of Oath, see Appendix, note No. 12.

dislas were at different times elevated to the same dignity, and by which it will not be pretended that the independence of Hungary, *de facto* or *de jure*, was in any degree impaired.

From the accession of Ferdinand the First, until the Hungarian throne was made hereditary in the house of Habsburg, in 1687, seven princes had ruled over the country in the following succession: Ferdinand the First, 1526, virtually (or, by formal recognition, in 1547) to 1564; Maximilian, 1564 to 1572; Rhodolph, 1572 to 1607; all in succession of primogeniture. Mathias the Second, his brother, 1607 to 1618, when he relinquished the crown in favor of his cousin-German, Ferdinand the Second, 1618 to 1625; Ferdinand the Third, his son, 1625 to 1655; Leopold, from 1655 to 1687. During this period the situation of Hungary, in regard to its independence, underwent no change; the throne, although practically confined to the house of Habsburg, was elective by the Diet of the kingdom, and the succession of that house had been secured by the practice of the emperor-kings, in the exertion of their influence and power in procuring the election and coronation of their heirs during their own terms of office.

The policy of Leopold was most despotic; his aim was to subvert the national institutions of Hungary, and bring the country entirely under imperial sway. Mutual jealousies reigned between the sovereign and the nobles: they suspected Leopold of an intention to subvert their liberties, and he attributed to a party of the most violent kind a design to assassinate him. In the midst of these contentions, a secret conspiracy was actually formed by the intrigues of the Palatine Wesseleni, under the sanction of that clause in the Coronation Oath which authorized the nobles to associate in defense of their privileges.* The Ban of Croatia, the Governor of Styria, and many of the most powerful and talented magnates, were parties to the movement.

The conduct of the imperial court greatly increased the strength of this faction; for Leopold not only declined assembling a Diet, and filling the office of Palatine, but connived at the excesses of his troops, and encouraged the Catholics to persecute the Protestants. Discontents spread rapidly through the

* Coxe's House of Austria.

kingdom. The chiefs of the confederacy formed connections with the Prince of Transylvania, by his intervention secretly appealed to the Porte, and in 1670 assembled a Diet at Kaschau, in virtue of the law which allowed the nation to elect a Palatine if the office remained vacant for three years. This meeting enabling them to consolidate their union, they made arrangements for raising a military force, and thirteen of the counties entered into a formal association.

Meanwhile, Leopold, apprised of the progress of the conspiracy, acted with a vigor and promptitude which confounded the insurgents. Troops were dispatched into Upper Hungary against Rakoczy, and into Croatia and Styria, against the other chiefs. The leaders were all secured, either by artifice or force, and, being found guilty of rebellion, were publicly executed; the sons of the Ban of Croatia were sentenced to perpetual imprisonment; and, as a means of rooting out their family's influence, the children of the delinquents were compelled to change their names.

The emperor, emboldened by his success, immediately commenced a movement having for its object to change the Constitution of Hungary, and to render the monarchy hereditary, like that of Bohemia. He published the acts of the process, declared that the whole nation, by participating in the conspiracy, had forfeited its freedom, and summoned a Diet at Pressburg. As the majority of the nobles, instead of obeying the summons, fled into Transylvania, he issued a proclamation on the 21st of March, in which, although owing his powers as a monarch to the *election of the people*, he undertakes "to enjoin all persons to submit, without excuse or delay, to that *power which he had received from above*, and was determined to maintain by force of arms." Afterward, when Sobieski, the King of Poland, with his brave troops, had saved his capital, from which he had ignominiously fled, and had driven the Turkish hordes under Kara Mustapha from the walls of Vienna; and when new victories followed the imperial arms under the direction of the Duke of Lorraine, the Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Bavaria, and Prince Eugène, he availed himself of these successes to prosecute his long-meditated design of rendering the crown hereditary.

Taking advantage of the disaffection which still subsisted among those who had submitted to his authority, he established, for the trial of pretended conspirators, a horrible tribunal at Eperies, whose cruelties scarcely find a parallel in the proscriptions of Marius or Sylla, or the massacres of the cold-blooded Tiberius. In vain the accused persisted in their innocence—in vain those who had taken up arms appealed to the general amnesty; thirty executioners, with their assistants, found constant employment, and a scaffold erected in the midst of the town, as the place of execution, is commemorated in history by the expressive appellation of *the Bloody Court of Eperies*.* As Joseph the Second, a century after, in regard to Belgium, so now thought Leopold, “it was necessary to quench the flames of insurrection with blood.” When these long-continued and unexampled cruelties had completely broken the spirit of the nation, Leopold, in the full license of despotism, with a stroke of his pen repealed the electoral formalities of seven centuries, and abrogated a right which the Hungarians had ever regarded as the palladium of their liberties. Yet, notwithstanding the wretched condition to which Hungary was reduced—by these despotic cruelties, these foreign invasions and internal wars—the people adhered, with singular pertinacity, to the cherished privilege of electing their own monarch; and though every subterfuge employed, and every expedient offered, were unavailing to save the right, so far as regarded the male line, yet no threats, bribes, or concessions of the monarch could extort their consent to render the succession hereditary in the female line.

The Diet, thus forced, agreed to the coronation of Joseph as an hereditary sovereign, and confirmed the succession in the males, both of the German and Spanish branches; but still reserved to the nation the right of election on the extinction of the male line.

Although the Hungarians had thus temporarily parted with a most important right, viz., that of the election of their monarch during the existence of male heirs in the house of Habs-

* The executions which took place at Eperies are said to have been more few in number, and less atrocious, than those which occurred recently in Hungary, upon the instigation of Haynau.

burg, yet the independence of the kingdom, either in the estimation of the monarch or his subjects, was not thereby affected, as the subsequent history of the reign of Joseph will prove.

The popular struggle against the encroachments of the crown still continued, in the beginning of the next century, with the same zeal of purpose but uncertainty of success which had previously characterized the military efforts of the insurgents. Under the leadership of Rakoczy, they baffled all the efforts of the imperial court to subdue them. At length, the emperor, desirous of drawing his troops from Hungary, in order to employ them against France and Spain, opened a new negotiation with the insurgents. A mediation of Great Britain and the States-General of Holland, respectively represented by Lord Sutherland and the Honorable George Stepney, and Count Rechteren, ensued at Tyrnau.* The national independence of Hungary was admitted as the basis of that interference, and, in the terms of the treaty of peace, the insurgents are recognized as the "Federal States of the Hungarian Empire."

Thus in 1705, after the kingdom had been made hereditary in the male line of the Habsburg dynasty, the national independence of Hungary was admitted by the very monarch in whose lifetime and for whose benefit that step had been taken.

But these negotiations were unavailing. The overtures of Joseph for peace were rejected, and, at a grand council of the patriot Hungarians, it was resolved that they should on no pretense lay down their arms until they had first obtained their demands. They likewise declared "that the Protestant religion should be maintained in the country; that the proceedings of the Diet held at Pressburg in 1687 were illegal, and contrary to the written law of Hungary; that they must be annulled, and the ancient liberty to choose their king, whenever a vacancy occurred, restored to the people; that, without express permission of the Diet, no troops should garrison the country but those of Hungary; and that all offices of trust should be filled by Hungarians, unless the Diet specially declared that signal service to the state entitled foreigners to reward."†

The war still continued, and the patriots increased in num-

* Coxe's House of Austria.

† The same concessions asked for in 1848.

bers, as well as in the earnestness of their demands. But by the success of Prince Eugène over the Turks, at Zenta, in 1697, and which was followed by the peace of Carlowitz in 1699, the emperor was enabled to direct his entire forces against the Hungarians, and which, by the end of 1710, accomplished their entire overthrow. Joseph died in 1711, and, during the interregnum of six months, the dowager Empress Eleonora Magdalen administered power in all the hereditary states. By the treaty of Szathmar (1711), a general pacification took place in Hungary.

Charles the Third (Charles the Sixth of Germany) succeeded his brother. According to the family compact formed by Leopold, and confirmed by Joseph and Charles, the succession was entailed on the daughters of Joseph, in preference to those of Charles, should they both die without male issue. Charles, however, had scarcely ascended the throne, though at that time without children, than he revised this compact, and settled the right of succession, in default of male issue, first on his own daughters, then on the daughters of Joseph, and afterward on the Queen of Portugal and other daughters of Leopold. Since the promulgation of that decree, the empress had borne a son, who died in his infancy, and three daughters, Maria Theresa, Maria Anne, and Maria Amelia. With a view to insure the succession of these daughters, and to exclude those of his brother Joseph, he published the Pragmatic Sanction, and compelled his nieces to renounce their pretensions on their marriages with the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria. Aware, however, that the strongest renunciations are disregarded, he obtained from the different states of his extensive dominions the acknowledgment of the Pragmatic Sanction, and made it the great object of his reign, to which he sacrificed every other consideration, to procure the guarantee of the European powers.* By the powerful influence of the monarch, and the liberal distribution of court favors, the Diet of Hungary of 1723† ratified the Pragmatic Sanction, and accepted the terms of succession therein stipulated. This further concession of their

* Coxe's House of Austria.

† From this period, the affairs of Hungary were conducted by a "Hungarian Board of Chancery," established in Vienna.

rights on the part of the Diet, while it did not weaken the independence of the kingdom, brought to the throne the famous Maria Theresa in 1740. This princess, by her voluntary recognition of the ancient laws and liberties of Hungary, and by her personal qualities and misfortunes, won the hearts of the chivalrous Magyars. The fact that, in the hour of her need, with her infant in her arms, she entered the Hungarian Parliament and implored their aid, and that every sword leaped from its scabbard and every tongue exclaimed, "*Moriamur pro regio nostro Maria Theresia!*" constitutes indeed one of the noble incidents of history.

An attempt has been made, with reference to recent events, to found on the Pragmatic Sanction pretensions that might derogate from the absolute independence of Hungary; but a reference to the document will defeat any such undertaking. The Pragmatic Sanction* does not affect the ancient Constitution of Hungary; it created no new union between Austria and Hungary; it altered not the political relations of the two countries; but only provided that Hungary should accept the terms of succession therein stipulated. The first article guarantees to the Hungarians the preservation of all "documentary and other rights, liberties, privileges, immunities, customs, prerogatives, and laws already conceded and established, or to be established by the present and future Diets." The latter part of the same article contains only a single word of doubt; but upon this the apologists of the Habsburg house, availing themselves of the obscure and defective Latin of the day, attempt to found a surrender, on the part of Hungary, of her entire independence. In it the female succession of the house of Habsburg is established, "according to the form accepted in the other kingdoms and hereditary provinces of his sacred majesty, both in and out of Germany, as had been ordered, established, published, and accepted *inseparably*." Upon the Latin word *inseparabiliter* the cavilers would build up a *national* union between Austria and Hungary; but by the most obvious construction, that term has reference only to the succession of the Habsburg house—is consequently but a *personal* union; and the conclusion of the article, in explanation of the

* For Pragmatic Sanction, see Appendix, note No. 13.

phrase, fully confirms the construction, when it says, "so that (*ita ut*) the heirs of the kingdoms and provinces of the Austrian house, male or female, may be known, and crowned *also* as infallible King of Hungary," &c.

Great stress is also laid upon the last two words, *indivisibiliter* and *inseparabiliter*, in the second article, where the meaning is equally clear and free from doubt.

After defining how the succession to the throne is to be governed after failure of the heirs of Charles, and that it shall descend to the female heirs, first of his brother Joseph, and then those of his father Leopold, it asserts that "the kingdoms and hereditary provinces, in and out of Germany, are to be possessed indivisibly and inseparably, jointly, mutually, and at once, with the kingdom of Hungary." The incorporation of the two kingdoms was expressly guarded against by the words of the text, which distinctly state that they shall be ruled *in vicem, in simul et una*; therefore, the internal independence and the constitutional rights of the Hungarians were fully recognized, even had there been no enactments to that effect.

That the connection "indivisible and inseparable," here alluded to, is limited to the subsistence of the entail of Charles the Sixth, is not only evident from what precedes, but is placed beyond the power of cavil or controversy by the conclusion, which asserts that, "upon the failure of the heirs of the said line, there shall revive and come into operation the ancient and approved custom and prerogative of the Diet in the election and coronation of a king."

Nothing can be more futile than an attempt to destroy the independence of Hungary by the production of a document which sets out with a full admission of all the rights, privileges, and immunities of the kingdom, and concludes with an acknowledgment that, upon the extinction of the present dynasty, the union with Austria is at an end, and Hungary must resort to the exercise of her ancient and cherished prerogative of electing and crowning her own monarch.

The son and successor of Maria Theresa made many attempts to amalgamate or incorporate Hungary with Austria, under that system of centralization or bureaucratic rule which

has ever been the policy of the imperial court; but the nation boldly and successfully resisted them. Although Joseph had acknowledged the rights and privileges of the Hungarian states by his circular letter on the death of his mother, yet it is a historical truth that he declined the ceremony of coronation from an unwillingness to confirm those rights and privileges by a solemn oath.

That it was the opinion of Joseph that Hungary was a free and independent country, no better evidence could be desired than his efforts for its amalgamation with Austria, and his refusal to take the oath of coronation, which would pledge him to sustain that independence, and thus conflict with the most cherished object of his reign. Although the reign of Joseph the Second was short, it was sufficiently long to enable him to correct many of the errors into which imprudent zeal had betrayed him; but it was, unfortunately, only in his last days that he listened with complacency to the demands of the Hungarians—restored their Constitution, as it existed at his accession—promised speedily to solemnize the ceremony of his coronation, and, as an earnest of his intention, sent back the crown of St. Stephen, which by his wanton order had been forcibly removed from Pressburg to Vienna.

The efforts of Joseph to subvert the institutions of the country produced an excitement in Hungary, which even the death of that monarch was powerless to quell. Some of the public gazettes declared the hereditary rights of the Habsburg dynasty forfeited by their unconstitutional course. The comitats of Pesth, Zemplén, and Szabolcz called to arms, and the people every where raised the cry recently made, "We want no Austrian king!"

Joseph was followed by his brother, Leopold the Second, and the condition of affairs at the period when he came forward was such as obliged the Diet to exact of him securities against a renewal of the arbitrary proceedings to which Joseph had resorted.

For this purpose, certain articles were prepared by the Diet of 1790, in the nature of declaratory acts, implying no new concessions, but merely reasserting what the Hungarian Constitution had provided long before the first Habsburg ascend-

ed the throne, and which Leopold did not hesitate to recognize and confirm. Of these articles the following are the most important :

Article 10th. "That Hungary is a free and independent nation in her entire system of legislation and government; that she was not subject to any other people or any other state; but that she shall have her own separate existence and her own Constitution, and should, consequently, be governed by kings crowned according to her national laws and customs."

Article 12th. "That the power to enact, to interpret, and to abrogate the laws, was vested conjointly in the king, legitimately crowned, and the Diet, and that all the royal patents not issued in conjunction with the Diet are and shall be illegal, null, and void."

All these acts received the formal assent of Leopold the Second, and thus became statutes of the kingdom.

Language can not express more fully, or render more clear than it has done in Article 10th, the rights of Hungary and the nature of its connection with Austria. Comment upon it is superfluous, and misinterpretation impossible.

That clause may, indeed, be regarded as the palladium of her rights; so long as it remains a part of the Constitution of the land, the liberties of Hungary are safe; when it falls, her liberties are gone.

It seems, too, designed to meet the very crisis which has occurred.

In the first part of the clause the Hungarians designed to protect their independence from all encroachments of Austria, by forcing the monarch to acknowledge that "Hungary is a *free and independent* nation in her entire system of legislation and government;" and, as if that language was not sufficiently strong to guard against the encroachments of the imperial government, the same idea is repeated in still more forcible terms, viz., that she was "*not subject to any other people or any other state.*" In other words, deeming the positive affirmation of her rights of independence insufficient to guard against the efforts of an usurping nation, they endeavor to add to her defense by a direct and palpable denial of all right of control over her on the part of others. The latter part of the clause carries

out the same idea, and explains how it is to be accomplished, while it clearly defines the nature of the connection of the two countries, resting upon the identity of a common sovereign. "But that she shall have her own separate existence and her own Constitution, and should, consequently, be governed by kings crowned according to her national laws and customs;" or, as may be more briefly expressed, in consequence of her separate existence, a coronation "according to the national laws and customs" was an indispensable prerequisite to government. A monarch might be king *de facto* by succession, but *de jure* he was not recognized as sovereign till he had fulfilled the conditions of the Constitution, and been crowned according to her national laws and customs.

But one sovereign before the present one has ever refused to enter into the coronation compact, and to be crowned according to the national laws and customs. This was Joseph the Second, and as he died without the observance of this ceremony, he has never been acknowledged by Hungary; his name is not recorded on the list of her sovereigns, and all his acts considered illegal, null, and void.

Nor was there any thing unusual or unreasonable in such a requirement; the only safeguard for the liberties and independence of Hungary rested upon her Constitution, and the only precaution which she could adopt for the safety of that Constitution rested upon the monarch's coronation oath to preserve it.

Had the union established by the Pragmatic Sanction been a *national* and permanent one, as contended for by the house of Habsburg, would Leopold the Second, eighty years after, have so fully acknowledged and proclaimed its independence?

When Francis the Second, son of Leopold, succeeded him to the throne in 1792, there was no question as to the independence of Hungary, which had been so fully and so recently recognized by his father.

The prescribed oath was administered to him at his coronation, which was conducted in the usual manner; and in his reply to the address of the Diet, he showed no disposition to invade the constitutional rights of the Hungarians, but declared, "I shall be the guardian of the Constitution. My will

shall be no other than that of the law, and my efforts shall have no other guides than honor, good faith, and unalterable confidence in the magnanimous Hungarian nation."

For the first twenty years of his reign, involved in the wars of Napoleon, he assembled the Diet regularly; but one of its members at length had the boldness to proclaim that his only object in calling them together, was to ask for money and men, which, in their romantic generosity, they never failed to grant, although all the demands of the nation were, during that period, totally disregarded.* At length, when, in 1815, peace was restored to Europe, and the Holy Alliance formed, the Austrian cabinet, which had always flattered the hopes of Hungary when it needed her assistance, now boldly resolved to govern the kingdom without the aid of a Diet. In vain did the county Assemblies call for a convocation of the National Parliament, which the king was bound, by the laws which he had sworn to support, to summon every three years. Their addresses were not even honored with an answer.

In 1822, an attempt was made to levy imposts and raise troops by royal edicts. The Comitats (county Assemblies) refused to enforce them. In 1823, bodies of troops were sent to overawe, and then to coerce them. The county officers concealed their archives and official seals, and dispersed. Royal commissioners were appointed to perform their functions, and were almost every where resisted. The whole administration of the country, civil and judicial, was in confusion; and after a severe contest, the cabinet found it necessary, in 1825, to yield, and to summon a Diet after an interval of twelve years. The attempt of Francis to subvert the Constitution of Hungary terminated, as the similar attempt of Joseph the Second thirty-five years before, in renewed acknowledgments of the independence of Hungary and the constitutional rights of the Hungarians.†

Ferdinand the Fifth, the last king of Hungary, succeeded

* The Diets were convoked to grant supplies, and to be dismissed as soon as they spoke of grievances.

† The well-known Article 3d, of 1827, was sanctioned by Francis. In it the king reiterates his promise "*to uphold the Constitution in accordance with his coronation oath, especially in regard to Articles 10, &c., of 1790.*"

his father Francis to the throne in 1835. He not only took the same oath, acknowledging the rights, liberties, and independence of Hungary, administered to all his predecessors, but he made a more decisive step than any of his long line of ancestry toward the establishment in Hungary of a national and independent government.

On the 15th of March, 1848, a few days after the outbreak of the first Revolution in Vienna, and when the monarch conceded to the people of his hereditary states the rights and privileges which they demanded, a deputation from the Diet of Hungary appeared before the throne, asking for their kingdom liberty of the press, a responsible ministry, an annual Diet, equality of rights and duties, &c.; and these were not only granted without hesitation, but on the 11th of April Ferdinand appeared in person before the Diet at Pressburg, and there solemnly confirmed all the statutes passed by that body for carrying their wishes into effect, and their separate and independent existence into immediate practical operation.

From this hasty sketch of the political history of Hungary, it will be observed that the throne was elective from its first establishment, under Stephen, in the year 1000, to the year 1687; when, through the coercion of the Diet by Leopold the First, it became hereditary, upon certain conditions, in the male line of the house of Austria. That it remained unchanged in the *male* line until 1723, when, upon failure of the heirs of Charles the Third, through his influence with the Diet he procured their assent to the Pragmatic Sanction, which transferred the succession to the *female* line.*

That this alteration in the disposition of the throne created no change in the character of the monarchy, the Constitution and laws remaining the same, and the coronation treaty between the monarch and people being identical under the hereditary as it had been under the elective monarchy.

It results, therefore, that Hungary is not a province of Austria, but a free and independent nation, possessed of its own

* These conditions, originally laid down, and repeatedly confirmed by solemn compacts by that family on the one part, and the Hungarian nation on the other have not been adhered to by the house of Habsburg, and the legitimate deduction is, that it has forfeited all claims to the throne of Hungary.

separate and distinct Constitution and laws, and exercising alone, in case of vacancy, the power to dispose of the throne of the kingdom; that the only connection *de jure* between the two governments consists in the temporary union of the two crowns in the same person; that the said connection would be at an end to-morrow should the house of Habsburg become extinct, and might at any time be dissolved by a violation of the compact on which that connection is founded.

This historical view of the rights of the two governments, although perhaps uninteresting to many, seemed indispensable to a proper appreciation of the struggle which follows, and will enable the reader to determine whether the parties confined themselves within the strict lines of authority and duty, or whether they have willfully transcended them; whether Hungary, in the assertion of her independence, was engaged in the commission of a revolutionary or of a conservative act; and whether Austria, in invoking foreign aid to crush her own subjects, acted in self-defense, or with the most uncalled for and unauthorized tyranny.

After a struggle of about three centuries, the cabinet of Vienna, of late years, seemed to have abandoned, by overt acts, the projects of incorporating Hungary with Austria. Discouraged by the warm resistance of the Hungarians, she no longer attempted to enforce illegal edicts, but depended on effecting surreptitiously that which could not be done openly and by force. Through the exercise of the royal prerogative in appointing lords and high officers of the realm, the cabinet could command a majority in the House of Magnates; while, by endeavoring to influence the elections, it hoped to secure an ascendancy in the House of Deputies. For many years, also, the affairs of Hungary, instead of being regulated in the kingdom and by native Hungarians, were managed by a bureau or chancery in Vienna, under the direct supervision and control of the Austrian cabinet.

These attempts on the part of the imperial government to impose upon Hungary the patriarchal system of Austria, was not long in producing two parties in the country; of which one, from supporting the views of the court, was considered *Austrian*; the other, from its desire to sustain the separate

nationality of Hungary, was considered Hungarian, and took the designation of the Liberal or Patriotic party.

The Diet had been summoned for November, 1847; and, in June of that year, the Liberal party put forth an exposition of its views preparatory to the elections, which in Hungary are renewed for every triennial meeting of the Diet. In that document they declare: "Our grievances, so often set forth through a long course of years, during which we have urged and endured, have to this day remained unredressed." After enumerating some of these grievances, they proceed to state their demands.

1st. The equal distribution of the public burdens among all the citizens; that the Diet should decide on the employment of the public revenue, and that it should be accounted for by responsible administrators.

2d. Participation by the citizens not noble in legislation and in municipal rights.

3d. Civil equality.

4th. The abolition, by a compulsory law, of the labor and dues exacted from the peasants, with indemnity to the proprietors.

5th. Security to property and to credit, by the abolition of the *aviticity* (the rights of heirs to recover lands alienated by sale).

They go on to declare that, in carrying out these views, they will never forget the relations which, in the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction, exist between Hungary and the hereditary states of Austria; that they hold firmly to Article 10th of 1790, by which the royal word, sanctified by an oath, guarantees the independence of Hungary; that they do not desire to place the interests of the country in contradiction with the unity or security of the monarchy, but they regard as contrary to the laws and to justice that the interests of Hungary should be made subordinate to those of any other country; that they are ready, in justice and sincerity, to accommodate all questions upon which the interests of Austria and Hungary may be opposed, but they will never consent to let the interests and Constitution of Hungary be sacrificed to *unity of the system of government*, which certain persons are fond of citing as the leading maxim, instead of the *unity of the monarchy*.

The Diet was opened at Pressburg on the 11th of November, by the king in person,* who had come from Vienna for that purpose. On the 12th, a joint meeting, or, as they term it, a "mixed sitting" of both Houses was held. The magnates and delegates then repaired to the primatial palace to receive the royal propositions. On their return to their own Chamber, they proceeded, in conformity with the first proposition, to elect a Palatine, when the Archduke Stephen, son of the late Palatine, was determined on by general acclamation, the royal rescript containing the names of four candidates (two Catholics and two Protestants, as prescribed by law) remaining unopened.

The Archduke Stephen, it is true, was not only the choice of all the imperial family, but of most of the Hungarians themselves; but their election of him without venturing even to open the communication of the emperor, to see whether *his* name was really inscribed there, or that of the other individu-

* On the morning of the 12th of November, all the Diet, consisting of the *magnates*, or Upper House, and the *deputies*, or Lower House, in their gaudy uniforms, plumed caps, and embossed swords, assembled in the great hall of the Primate's palace, around the very throne on which the empress queen, Maria Theresa, sat when she appealed with such success to the hearts of her romantic and enthusiastic Hungarians. The galleries (the balusters of which were covered with Turkey carpets) were filled with ladies, except two small spaces, the one occupied by the diplomatic corps of Vienna, and the other by the empress and her ladies of honor, the archdukes and duchesses. The dresses of the members of the Diet were exceedingly rich and tasteful, and consisted invariably of a close frock of some brilliant-colored cloth, highly embroidered, and with buttons composed of diamonds or some other precious stones; pantaloons tight, boots outside, and reaching to the knee; while over the shoulders hung a mantle of velvet, bound around both collar and skirt with fur. The cap was also of fur, and decorated with a plume—sometimes that of the costly black heron, sometimes a single feather from the wing of an eagle or a pheasant, and not unfrequently it consisted of a lofty sprig of jewels. The general shape or cut of the dresses was the same; but as to the material, its color and its ornaments, these were regulated solely by the taste or fancy of the wearer. Many of these dresses were pointed out to the author as having cost upward of one hundred thousand florins—equal, in our currency, to fifty thousand dollars. But these were tame in comparison with that of Prince Esterhazy, who is also one of the magnates, and the value of whose dress is estimated at half a million of florins, or two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The dress, or rather the most valuable part of it, the jewels, have descended to him from an ancestor, who made, it is said, in his will, the singular provision that his other heirs, to whom he also left property, should contribute to sustain the splendor of this dress—a tax by no means insignificant, since every time it is worn the depreciation in value, arising from the loss of jewels, amounts, as is said, to many thousands of dollars.

als proposed, exhibited a degree of fawning subserviency to the throne scarcely to be looked for in a people possessed of a Constitution and characterized by the warmest aspirations for liberty.

And what rendered this craven spirit still more apparent was, that several comitats had expressly instructed their deputies to insist on the opening of the emperor's message, for fear that a failure to do so would constitute a precedent by which they might, in time, be deprived of all voice in the choice of their chief magistrate; but when the moment for action arrived—for carrying out the instructions of their constituents, and for asserting their own constitutional rights, there was not a man of them, instructed delegates and all, who had the moral firmness to open his lips in opposition to a motion made to elect the Archduke Stephen by acclamation, and without breaking the seal of the royal communication.

On the 15th, another "mixed sitting" was held, when the newly-elected Palatine was duly installed, and made a suitable speech on the occasion. On the 16th, the royal propositions, eleven in number,* were read at a dietal† sitting of the delegates.

ADDRESS TO THE THRONE.

On November 22d, the debate on the address, in answer to the royal propositions, commenced in the Chamber of Delegates (circular sitting).

The address was composed of eighteen paragraphs. From one to six, inclusive, conveyed the customary expression of

* For royal propositions, see Appendix, note No. 14.

† The delegates hold *circular* sittings and *dietal* sittings. The former are presided over by two delegates (taken in rotation), and correspond, in a great measure, to what, in parliamentary language, is called a Committee of the Whole House. The resolutions passed at these circular sittings are not valid unless confirmed at a dietal sitting, which is presided over by the Chief Justice of the King's Bench (*Tabula Regia*), or the Personal (*Personalis presentiae Regiae locum tenens*), as he is called. The *circular* sittings have, however, of late, become by far the most important, the resolutions passed at them being generally confirmed at a dietal sitting without much discussion, by the majority crying out "*Maradjon!*" Let it remain! *i. e.*, as it was decided at the circular sittings. It is only at the dietal sittings that the delegates wear their sabres and appear in the Hungarian costume.—*Blue Book*. Blackwell. Correspondence with the British government.

thanks to the throne, and were passed unanimously by both Houses.

In paragraphs sixteen and seventeen, his majesty is requested to summon a Diet annually at Pesth. These paragraphs would also have been unanimously adopted, but the word *annually* precluded the magnates of the government party from assenting to the proposal, although many of them were fully convinced that the summoning of an annual Diet was a measure imperatively required, and which could not be much longer delayed.

The fourteenth section expressed, in answer to the seventh royal proposition, the willingness of the Diet to pass measures "for adjusting the conflicting interests of Hungary and Austria." A somewhat vague expression, inserted probably to meet the views of all parties.

The contemplated removal of the intermediate customs' line between the two countries was a measure calculated to encounter the most violent opposition. The Liberal party in Hungary have always regarded this line as one of the safeguards of Hungarian nationality; and though its removal might have been advantageous to Hungary in a commercial point of view, the Liberals, regarding it only in a political sense, declared that, if it were possible, they would convert it into a wall of brass.

Paragraphs seven to thirteen relate to the *gravamina*, or so-called grievances of the nation. It was these paragraphs, especially the eleventh, which furnished the principal topic of discussion in the two Houses.

The great question of the day at this time in Hungary was, in fact, the nomination of administrators, alluded to in the eleventh paragraph, an expedient resorted to by Count Apponyi (the late chancellor) to increase the influence of the imperial government, by rendering the office of lord lieutenant of a county merely nominal, and appointing in the same administrators, to exercise all the functions of lords lieutenant.

The Conservative, or so-called Government party, desired to limit the address to the usual expression of thanks; the Opposition, or so-called Liberal or National party, contended that an allusion ought to be made to the *gravamina*, and especially to

the recent nominations of administrators of counties, which they held to be an unconstitutional measure of the most dangerous tendency.

Kossuth, delegate of the county of Pesth, regarded as the leader of the Opposition in the Lower House, made a lengthy speech on the occasion, and concluded by reading the draft of an address embodying the sentiments of his party. He was answered by Count Stephen Széchenyi, who sat in the Lower House as delegate of the county of Moson (Wieselburg), and professing, at least, not to belong to any party. The address which he proposed, after the usual expression of thanks, alluded in general terms to the *gravamina*, with the remark that the Diet would subsequently send up a representation respecting them. He agreed, however, with Kossuth, that, both on account of these *gravamina* and the numerous measures that required to be taken into consideration, his majesty should be requested to summon a Diet to meet *annually* in the city of Pesth.

On the 27th, after a six-days' debate, Kossuth's motion was carried, but only by a single vote (twenty-eight to twenty-seven); and on the 1st December this resolution was confirmed at a dietal sitting, and the address thus voted sent up to the magnates.* On the 4th of December, the address thus voted by the delegates was read in the Chamber of Magnates, and gave rise to a six-days' debate—all the amendments proposed by the Conservatives having been carried by considerable majorities.

On the 13th, the address was sent back to the delegates with a *renuncium*† in which the magnates stated that they would prefer laying before the throne the simple expression of their thanks, without alluding to the *gravamina*, especially as these *gravamina* would have to be considered and submitted to his majesty during the course of the Diet. If, however, the delegates insisted on alluding to them, they (the magnates)

* For copy of address, see Appendix, note No. 15.

† The magnates do not make what is known in parliamentary language as amendments to a bill, but state, in a so-called *renuncium*, on what points they differed from the delegates, suggest the propriety of omitting certain clauses, and of modifying others, &c.—*Blackwell*.

were of opinion that it ought to be in general terms; that the nomination of administrators was a question in which they would not enter, but were of opinion that until it could be proved that such nomination was an unconstitutional measure, it could not be called a grievance, and ought not to be alluded to. They therefore suggested the propriety of omitting altogether the eighth, ninth, and eleventh paragraphs. They further stated that, although they fully agreed with the delegates on the expediency of holding the Diet in the city of Pesth, the general wish of the nation in this respect had been already laid before the throne in several dietal representations; and (without entering into the question of annual Diets) they were of opinion that it would be more appropriate to send up a special representation on the subject than to mention it in the address, and for these reasons must also suggest the propriety of omitting the sixteenth and seventeenth paragraphs.

On the 15th, 16th, and 17th, a very stormy debate took place in the circular sitting of the Chamber of Delegates on this renuncium, in which some of the Liberal delegates undertook to compare the administrators with the district captains of Galicia, and to stigmatize them as the "salaried tools of an arbitrary government, ready, when called upon, to do the same dirty work as their Galician colleagues."

The debate was brought to a conclusion by Kossuth, who declared that, as the two Houses differed on constitutional principles, it would be a mere waste of time to continue the further discussion of the address, or to send it back to the magnates. He therefore moved that it should be deposited or dropped (*i. e.*, that no further notice should be taken of it), adding, that they would have an opportunity of expressing their thanks to his majesty for opening the Diet in one of the dietal representations.

Kossuth's motion was carried by a majority of four, twenty-five counties voting for, and twenty-one against it—two or three counties having furnished their delegates with fresh instructions, either to vote for it or to insist upon the paragraph respecting administrators being retained. The address to the throne being thus disposed of, the other proceedings of the Diet, as they progressed, may be classified as follows:

1st. *Measures recommended to be taken into Consideration in the Royal Propositions.*

- a. The alimentation of the troops stationed in Hungary (second royal proposition).
- b. Co-ordination of the royal free towns (third and fourth royal propositions).
- c. The laws relating to the mortgages of manorial estates (fifth royal proposition).
- d. Urbarial laws (sixth royal proposition).

2d. *Measures not mentioned in the Royal Propositions.*

- a. The late Palatine.
- b. Croatian affairs.
- c. General taxation.
- d. Liberty of the press.
- e. Magyarism, or measures relating to the Hungarian language and nationality.
- f. Comitatal administration question.

Of these questions, the most important, as well as those having a direct influence on the approaching struggle, were :

THE URBARIAL LAWS.

The expediency of amending the existing laws that define the mutual relations of manorial lords and their tenant peasantry, was discussed in the Chamber of Delegates, December 3d and 6th, and all parties seemed to agree that the *roboth** should be abolished. The Hungarians were fully aware of the rock on which the Poles had always struck—that, in all the efforts made by the Polish nobility for freedom, it never had occurred to them to secure the co-operation of their peasantry by relieving them from the abject servitude to which they were subjected, and the consequence was that, in every struggle which they made for freedom, the peasantry would be found on the side of the government, slaughtering the nobles to secure their own liberty.

In the early periods of Hungarian history, the peasantry

* *Roboth*, the labor devolving on peasants.

were involved in the most abject servitude. A decree of Sigismund the Second in 1405, allowing them free migration, was confirmed, and its provisions extended by a dietal act passed in 1458. This act was, however, annulled, in consequence of the sanguinary insurrection which took place under George Dozsa; but free migration was again allowed by the acts of Ferdinand the First in 1547, and Maximilian the First, 1566. The condition of the peasantry was further ameliorated by the *urbarial* regulations introduced under the reign of Maria Theresa, regulations which in 1791 obtained the force of law, and which were further extended by the acts of 1836 and 1840.

Notwithstanding these laws, the condition of the Hungarian peasantry up to this period was any thing but enviable. He might truly be said to have possessed no rights, either civil or political; for, though allowed free migration, as was boasted, he never possessed the means of removing, and was consequently, in the same manner as with the serf of Russia, as often bought and sold with the land as any horse or ox on the estate.

On him, too, fell all the burdens of the state. It is on their property that county rates are exclusively levied, and that too in the most arbitrary manner imaginable. Nobles, in general, pay no taxes, and, even when they do, they are easily indemnified by the exactions which they make upon their peasantry. If roads or bridges are to be made or repaired, it is the peasantry who are to do it, and yet they are the only persons of whom toll is ever demanded.

They are obliged to furnish all the military of the country, and their sons, as soon as they become of age, instead of remaining at home to labor for the support of their parents in their declining years, are hurried off to be enlisted in the army, either to be slain in battle or to waste away formerly fourteen now eight years of the most valuable portion of their lives, at a compensation of about four cents a day, out of which they are obliged to furnish their own meat, and every other necessary or luxury—clothing, quarters, and bread, with which they are supplied, alone excepted.

A peasant's *holding* or *session*, as it is called, varies in extent, according to the nature of the soil and local usage, but is

fixed by the *urbarial* laws at a certain number of acres in each county, the minimum being about twenty-five, the maximum sixty-five acres. A peasant may hold a whole session, a half session, or a quarter session. For a whole session, he is compelled to labor one hundred and four days in the year for the lord of the manor, besides contributing to the lord one ninth of the produce of the session *in natura*, and to the Church one tenth annually. There are various other services to which the peasantry are subjected. All the nobles or government officers have the right of impressing the horses of the serfs to take them upon their journeys—a privilege called *Vorspan*, and one which during seed-time, or harvest, or whenever particularly occupied, must be a matter of most serious inconvenience to the peasant, to abandon his crop in order to transport some idle noble or government officer wherever his fancies or his duties may direct.

But this is not all. Until the year 1835, when the Constitution of Hungary underwent a change, each nobleman possessed almost unlimited power of punishment over his peasants, and into the manner in which he might be disposed to exercise that power no one ever took the slightest trouble to inquire. In fact, by an old law of Hungary, a noble was only subjected to a fine of forty florins (that is, twenty dollars) for the killing of a *serf*; and, although this odious enactment is now abolished, a prison, with its bolts and chains, is still considered a necessary appendage to every estate, and the rod as freely used, perhaps, as in the more barbarous days of the Middle Ages.

In the discussions of the *urbarial* question, the House of Delegates was unanimously of opinion that, as the acts of the Diets of 1836 and 1840 had not been effective, a compulsory law ought to be passed by the present Diet. Several delegates contended that the law ought to be compulsory for both parties; that the peasantry should be compelled either to redeem their *roboth* for perpetuity, or to commute it into an annual money rent, in the manner specified in the above-mentioned acts of the Diets of 1836 and 1840; and that the landlords should likewise be compelled to accept this redemption or commutation. It was, however, decided that the law should only

be compulsory for the landlords, they being entitled to a full compensation for the loss which, by the change of system, they would have to sustain. A resolution was also passed to appoint a committee to draw up a bill on the subject.

These resolutions were confirmed at a dietal sitting (on the 21st of December), and a *nuncium* sent to the magnates requesting them to agree to the appointment of a dietal committee, on the conditions that the contemplated measures should be framed in conformity with the resolutions passed by the delegates.

This *nuncium* came up before the Upper House in February, and the majority of the leading magnates, Liberals as well as Conservatives, expressed their disapprobation of the principle that the measures should be coercive upon the landlords.

It was contended that if the law was coercive, it ought unquestionably to be coercive for both parties; but, under existing circumstances, the most appropriate course to be pursued would be to extend the provisions of the act of 1840; that is to say, to afford greater facilities for the commutation of the *roboth*, by the mutual agreement of the parties concerned, only rendering the law coercive for both parties in some particular cases, which the committee would have to point out in their report. It was therefore moved that, in their *renuncium*, they should express the willingness of the magnates to agree to the appointment of a dietal committee on the above-mentioned conditions, the attention of the committee to be chiefly directed to the removal of the existing obstacles in the way of commutation by mutual agreement, and, above all, to the most expedient manner of raising the capital required for the commutation or redemption of the *roboth* in a way that would afford full compensation to the landlords without ruining the peasantry. This motion, supported by the leading members of both parties, was carried without division, and a *renuncium* drawn up in conformity with the motion was read and authenticated.

The following are the acts finally passed upon the subject, and sanctioned by the emperor:

ACT 9TH.

Abolishes the *roboth*, the tithe of one ninth of the produce

to the landlord, and all other *urbarial* services whatsoever, from the day on which the act is published (April 11th). *Manorial* courts are also abolished. The landlords are to receive an indemnification, rather vaguely expressed by a high-flown Magyar phrase, viz.: "The Legislature places the indemnification of the landed proprietors under the protecting shield of the national public honor."*

ACTS 10TH, 11TH, AND 12TH.

Acts passed as supplementary to the preceding act, respecting certain *urbarial* rights enjoyed by the peasantry, such as that of cutting wood in the manorial forests, &c.; also respecting *urbarial* lawsuits, and suits brought before the manorial courts.

ACT 13TH.

Abolishes tithes to the clergy without compensation, or, according to the words made use of, simply records the fact of the clergy having voluntarily renounced taking tithes, without claiming compensation. The poorer clergy, whose incomes were principally derived from tithes, to be duly provided for.

Lay persons, who have acquired possession of tithes by contract, &c., to receive a compensation.

Next question of importance before the Diet, and having a bearing on the approaching struggle, was,

THE COMITATAL ADMINISTRATION QUESTION.

There are in Hungary fifty-five counties, forty-nine (including the three reincorporated Transylvanian counties) in Hungary Proper, and six in the *partes adnexæ*, i. e., in Slavonia and Croatia; and that all the magistrates and officers of a Hungarian county are elected triennially by the noblest (free-

* Correspondence on Hungary.--*Blue Book*.

† The word "noble" has a very different signification in Hungary from that attached to it in other countries, and is, strictly speaking, applied to designate a man enjoying certain rights and privileges; among which, that of being exempt from taxation has hitherto been the most highly prized. The Hungarian nobles may, however, be classed as follows: 1st. The titled nobles—princes, counts, barons, or the nobility, as they would be called in other countries. 2d. The untitled

holders) of the county, at a general congregation, with the exception of the *comes supremas*, or lord lieutenant. In three counties this dignity is held *ex officio*; the Palatine, the Primate, and the Archbishop of Erlau being respectively the lords lieutenant *ex officio* of the counties of Pesth, Gran, and Heves. In seven other counties the dignity is hereditary. In the remaining forty-five counties the lords lieutenant are appointed by the crown.

The office of lord lieutenant is that of mediator between the county and the crown, in the same manner as the Palatine is the mediator between the crown and the nation. He therefore, like the Palatine, holds his office for life, and, according to the strict letter of the law, is only removable for crimes and misdemeanors proved against him before a competent tribunal. He has no salary from the government, but receives a remuneration, for official expenses, of six hundred dollars per annum from the county *cassa*. The lords lieutenant are generally noblemen of rank and fortune; the office may, however, be held by a noble (in contradistinction to nobleman), who then becomes a magnate *ex officio*, and has a seat and vote in the Upper House.

For the counties in which the dignity is held *ex officio*, it has been a long-established custom to appoint administrators, or deputy lords lieutenant, as they might be termed in English. For a county in which the dignity is hereditary, it has also been the custom to appoint an administrator whenever the lord lieutenant happened to be a minor, the functions of that administrator ceasing with the minority of the lord lieutenant.

The word "county" is rather an inappropriate term to designate a *comitat*, or one of the fifty-five districts into which Hungary is divided, these districts having a much greater analogy to the Swiss Cantons, or the states of the American

nobles, viz.: *a.* Those who possess estates, or who have studied law; a class from which county magistrates and the delegates are elected, and which are in England called the "landed gentry." *b.* The half-spurred nobles, as they are termed, or those who possess only a small piece of ground, or, to use the Hungarian expression, "a house and four plum-trees." These form the mass of the electors. *c.* Landless nobles, who are consequently deprived of the elective franchise, and may be found gaining their livelihood in all capacities. The Hussars of the nobility frequently belong to this class.—*Blackwell.*

Union, than they have either to the counties of England or the departments of France. They may, in fact, almost be regarded as the independent states of a confederation under the rule of an hereditary monarch, whose constitutional authority is circumscribed within the narrowest possible limits. With such a system, it is obvious that the only direct legitimate influence which the government can exercise in a county is through its lord lieutenant.

According to a dietal act passed in the beginning of the last century, a lord lieutenant ought habitually to reside in his county, to preside over the county congregations, and perform several other duties therein specified; but this act, like too many other Hungarian laws, has remained a dead letter, a lord lieutenant being, generally speaking, a man of rank and fashion, unacquainted with business, and, until within the last ten or fifteen years, even unfamiliar with the vernacular idiom, in nine cases out of ten residing either in Pesth or Vienna, and paying occasional visits to his county, usually for the purpose of giving a splendid banquet at a restoration, as they term the election of the county magistrates.

When Count Apponyi took the seals of office and became the chancellor of the kingdom, he deemed it advisable to effect a radical change in this system of county administration. He accordingly persuaded, with two or three exceptions, the lords lieutenant who were magnates by birth to consent to the appointment of administrators, or, in other words, virtually to abandon their offices; for, although these gentlemen still retain the title of lords lieutenant, the duties of the office are *de facto* performed by administrators. It is the administrator who presides at the county congregations, corresponds with the government, and who is, in fact, the *bona fide* lord lieutenant of the county. An administrator has also a salary of three thousand dollars per annum, paid, not from a fund over which the Hungarians have any control, but from the royal treasury, being a part of the income derived from the salt monopoly, the royal mines, Hungarian customs' duties, and other sources.

This system of Count Apponyi's was a well-concerted plan, and having a tendency, if not for its object, to ingraft a kind of Austrian *bureaucracy* on the Hungarian institutions. A

talented administrator would be rewarded for his services by being made a lord lieutenant. The candidates for comital offices, a very numerous class in Hungary, would make the office of administrator, with its three thousand dollars, and the prospect of a lord lieutenancy, the highest object of their ambition; to obtain which, they would only have to renounce their ideas of Hungarian nationality and independence, and thus would the ultimate result of the system be the conversion of Hungary into an Austrian province, and the Diet into a mere registrative board, or, at most, an administrative council, similar to the Land Stände of the hereditary provinces.

When the motion for the deposition of the address was carried in the Lower House, the delegates passed a resolution to the effect that the committee on Croatian affairs should be charged to inquire into and make a report on the system of comital administration introduced by the present chancellor; but before that committee had reported, a mixed sitting of the Diet was held, on the 1st of February, for the purpose of hearing read a document which the Palatine had brought with him from Vienna, entitled "Royal Rescript respecting the measures relating to comital administration taken since the last Diet."

In this rescript his majesty is pleased to say, "It is precisely because our paternal intentions are far removed from attempting to evade the laws of the land that, in strict adherence to the sense of the Royal Rescript of May 28th, 1827 (sub. No. 6888), we hereby declare that it is our firm resolution to reserve the nomination of administrators of lords lieutenant for exceptional cases, and at the same time to maintain in full vigor the ancient comital administrative system, as well as the legitimacy of the dignity of lord lieutenant, and, as soon as the above-mentioned obstacles shall be removed, every where to replace the lords lieutenant in the full exercise of their legitimate functions."

Neither party appeared satisfied with the rescript; the Conservatives, because they regarded it as too great a concession to public opinion; the Liberals, because they saw in it nothing but vague promises, never intended to be fulfilled. In this respect, however, a difference of opinion prevailed among the Liberals.

At a circular sitting on the 5th of February, Szentiványi,

first delegate of the county of Gömör, rose and said, that although the rescript was far from being as satisfactory as he could have wished, he would nevertheless regard it as a step toward restoring that confidence between the throne and the nation which had been almost utterly destroyed. He should therefore move that they should, in their representation, express their thanks to his majesty for having at heart the maintenance of the Constitution, and for his intention of replacing the lords lieutenant in the exercise of their legitimate functions, but at the same time should state that their anxiety was far from being groundless; and that, while his majesty's promise afforded them great satisfaction, they must humbly request that this promise be realized during the present Diet, by the total abolition of the system of comitatal administration recently introduced, intimating, at the same time, that on this condition they would abstain from entering into a special examination of the national grievances, and follow the path of moderation which they had hitherto pursued, &c.

Lónyay, first delegate of the county of Beregh (also a Liberal county), said that, as he differed in some respects from the honorable delegate from Gömör, he should move that they should state in their representation that, although the numerous nominations of administrators had caused a considerable degree of anxiety to prevail, they would not dwell any longer upon the subject, as his majesty had been graciously pleased to assure them that he regarded these nominations as exceptional cases, and that it was his firm intention to replace the lords lieutenant in the exercise of their legitimate functions. Relying with confidence on this assurance, they would proceed to the consideration of the questions of social reform, &c.

These different motions did not fail to produce debate, in which Kossuth participated, and, rising amid the most enthusiastic cheering, attempted to show that the new system of comitatal administration constituted a national grievance. That the system was *anti-constitutional* in its tendency, not only on account of thirty salaried administrators, but also because those lords lieutenant who had been suffered to remain at their posts, from motives which the House would know how to appreciate, were obliged to perform duties incompatible with

their legitimate functions. A lord lieutenant was not intrusted with the administration of his county, but had merely the chief inspection over the magistrates, in whose hands this administration had been exclusively placed, both by law and long-established usage; that another anti-constitutional feature of the system was the practice, that became every day more prevalent, of transmitting the instructions, ordonnances, &c., of the government to the counties, through the Hungarian Chancery in Vienna; whereas, it was needless for him to observe that the Hungarian Vice-regal Council was the only supreme administrative authority which the counties were bound to recognize, &c. He concluded by lending his support to the motion of the delegates of Gömör.

After a few more speeches, the voting commenced; the votes in favor of the Gömör motion giving rise to loud cheers from the galleries, while those for the Beregh motion were received by groans and other signs of popular disapprobation. The final result of this stormy voting was, that each motion was supported by the votes of twenty-three counties; on which the delegate from Croatia (whose right of voting was contested by the Opposition) gave his vote in favor of the Beregh motion, which was consequently carried, to the great disappointment of the Liberals. An indescribable scene of confusion followed. Hot words passed between several delegates (in consequence of which two duels were fought the next morning), and the chairman tried in vain to restore something like order.

When the uproar had somewhat subsided, Kossuth rose and said, that it was a notorious fact that thirty counties had declared Count Apponyi's system of comital administration to be a national grievance; and how several honorable delegates could therefore reconcile it with their consciences to support the Beregh motion, he could not understand.

Simon, first delegate of the county of Soprony (Oedenburg), frankly avowed that he had voted contrary to his instructions, as those instructions were drawn up at a congregation in which the Liberals obtained a factitious majority by a party maneuver, and he was persuaded that his present vote would be approved at the next congregation, which would be held under more favorable auspices.

Szemere, in a speech which was listened to, as usual, with profound attention, commented on the Royal Rescript, phrase by phrase, in order to show that it contained no definite promise.

After a long altercation, the debate was adjourned until the following Monday (7th), without any resolution having been pronounced by the chairman. The debate was continued on the 7th and 8th, without leading to any result. On the 10th, Kossuth and the delegates of Gömör, Beregh, and Békés met in conference at the house of Szemere, when Szemere drew up a representation, which it was finally agreed should be supported by the whole Opposition. This representation was read the next day, in a circular sitting, and ordered to be printed. This representation to his majesty was a kind of combination of the Gömör and Beregh motions, or a sort of compromise between them, with the following addition: that, "relying on the sacredness of the royal word, shall await with sincere confidence the effective execution of your majesty's royal will; and we moreover declare, in a spirit of humble loyalty, that the above-mentioned measures being set aside, as incompatible with the fundamental articles 70 and 12 (1790), we trust and expect that the supreme comital administration will be exercised by the vice-regal council, in such a manner that the royal rescripts, decrees, etc., be addressed to the counties themselves; and the right which the counties possess of sending representations to the throne, as well as other comital rights and privileges guaranteed by the act 58 (1790), be fully maintained."

In the circular sitting of February 12th, the printed representation was read, and, after a short debate, in which the representation was supported by the delegates of Beregh on the one hand, and Kossuth on the other, was carried by a majority of thirteen; thirty-one counties voting for, and eighteen against its adoption. A dietal sitting was then held, when the *personal** endeavored to persuade the Liberals to strike out several phrases in the representation. He was, however, answered by a general cry of *Maradjon* (let it remain as it is)!

* *Personalis presentiae Regiae in judiciis locum tenens* (or the second judicial officer of the realm).

and was finally obliged to announce that the decision of the circular sitting had been confirmed.

Another bill* of engrossing interest before the Hungarian Diet, and one which exercised an important influence in the approaching contest, was that entitled

MAGYARISM; OR, MEASURES RELATING TO HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE
AND NATIONALITY, NATURALIZATION, &c.

The Liberals had previously succeeded in their efforts respecting Magyarism, so far that the Magyar language had been by law established as the language of the Legislature, the courts of justice, and, with the exception of the post-office and the customs, of every department of the administration. These two last they had been obliged to strike out of the bill which was passed by the last Diet on the subject, in order that it might receive the royal sanction.

These exceptions it was now proposed to embrace in the present bill, by decreeing that the Magyar be the official language of every department of the state, civil and ecclesiastical, with

* The following is the bill:

1st. Is merely the insertion of a fact, stating that his majesty had been graciously pleased to assure the Diet that care had been taken to have the members of the imperial family duly instructed in the Hungarian (Magyar) language; this assurance had been inserted in the act as a guarantee for the future.

The other clauses are imperative.

2d. Decreeing that the Hungarian (Magyar) be exclusively used as the official language of every department of the state, civil and ecclesiastical, with the exceptions mentioned in 5, 6, and 7. Official documents drawn up in any other language to be invalid.

3d. The Hungarian language to be also exclusively used for public instruction in all the schools, colleges, and universities in the kingdom.

4th. All Hungarian coins and seals of office to bear Hungarian devices and inscriptions in the Hungarian language. The vessels of the Hungarian littoral to bear exclusively the Hungarian flag (consequently not the Austrian).

5th. The three Slavic counties to be still allowed to make use of Latin, and the Hungarian littoral either of Latin or Italian for the space of six years, commencing with the close of the present Diet, but only for local (comital) affairs.

6th and 7th. The provisions of p. 2 to be only extended to the *partes adnexæ* (Croatia), in so far that the authorities of the *partes* (the Croatian authorities) will have to correspond with the Hungarian authorities in the Hungarian language, but are permitted still to make use of the Latin language for the administration of local affairs.

8th. The provisions of p. 3 not to extend to the *partes*, but the Hungarian language to be taught in all the public schools of the *partes*.

the exceptions therein mentioned; that official seals of every department of the administration bear Magyar inscriptions; that a coinage, bearing also Magyar devices, be struck for Hungary; and that vessels belonging to the Hungarian *littoral* bear the Hungarian, and not the Austrian flag.

This bill gave rise, in its progress through the House, to very warm debates, that is to say, to the usual conflict between the Magyar and Slavic races. Magyarism was said to be represented in the Lower House by the forty-six counties of Hungary Proper, and Slavism by the three Slavonian counties and Croatia, the three counties only having one vote.

Ossegovich, the Croatian delegate, defended with much zeal what he considered the rights of Croatia. He contended that under the denomination *partes* (*partes adnexæ*), which was consecrated by long usage, ought to be understood Croatia, Slavonia, and the Hungarian littoral, which formed one kingdom united with, but not dependent on Hungary, for this kingdom had its own Diet (the so-called Croatian Provincial General Congregation), and its own municipal laws and usages.

This was, of course, denied by the Hungarian delegates, who cited various documents to show that the three Slavonian counties had always formed an integral part of Hungary, and that the phrase *partes adnexæ* was only applicable to Croatia, in which sense it was to be understood in the bill then under discussion.

Ossegovich also protested against the right assumed by the Hungarian Diet to decree what language should be made use of by the local authorities of Croatia for the administration of local affairs. Such a right, he contended, belonged exclusively to the United Provincial Congregation (Diet of Croatia), and he would not suffer it to be called in question.

Both Ossegovich and the Slavonian delegates complained of the injustice of forcing the Croatian and Slavonian authorities to correspond with the Hungarian authorities in the Hungarian instead of the Latin language. The Hungarian delegates answered by accusing them of agitating for a repeal of the union, and attributing to them the secret design of forming an Illyrian kingdom, either dependent on or independent of Austria, as circumstances might dictate, which was, in fact, tantamount

to accusing them of high treason. Notwithstanding the protest of the Croatian and Slavonian delegates, the bill was passed amid a general cry of "*Maradjon.*"

The debate took place in the Upper House, on February 4th and 5th.

When the bill had been read, Bishop Lonovics rose, and, after expressing in general terms his approbation of the bill, observed that some of its provisions might perhaps be deemed too stringent; but on such a cherished and revered subject, this stringency could only be ascribed to a patriotic zeal in the sacred cause of Hungarian nationality, and in such a cause it was the bounden duty of the magnates not to suffer themselves to be surpassed in zeal by the delegates. The first clause, he said, was exceedingly gratifying, as it would serve as a perpetual testimony of the patriotic sentiments by which the imperial family was animated. Their present beloved monarch had done more for the propagation and cultivation of the Hungarian language than all the sovereigns who had ever worn the ancient diadem of St. Stephen.

Respecting the second clause, he would merely observe that the official language of the clergy should be understood to mean the language used in their correspondence with lay authorities and for public documents, and not to be applicable to their correspondence with ecclesiastical authorities, or for documents relating strictly to the affairs of the Church. It was in this sense he understood the provision, and he trusted that the delegates would give it that signification.

To the third clause the bishop proposed an amendment, with which the delegates were delighted. They had inserted an exceptional clause, purporting that the language of public instruction for elementary schools should be left to the decision of the local authorities; whereas the bishop proposed to confine this to the two lowest classes in the schools, and to make it imperative that the upper classes should be taught in the Hungarian language, which he said would be the best to Magyarize the towns that are still, in the eyes of the Hungarian, too German. To the fourth clause, with its Hungarian coins, and seals, and tricolored flag, the bishop said that he had nothing to object.

In respect to the sixth and seventh clauses, he thought that they would do well to allay the agitation that prevailed in Croatia, by showing that, while they made use of all legitimate means in their power for the propagation of the Hungarian language, they would not adopt any measures that might be deemed hostile to the nationality of Croatia.

He should, therefore, suggest that, in respect to the administration of affairs strictly local by the Croatian local authorities, the use of the Latin language should not be made imperative, but potential; the clause to be worded not that "the Latin language *shall* be used," but that "Latin language *may* be used;" which would not exclude the use of the national idiom of Croatia, though no mention ought to be made of it in the act.

Bishop Lonovics had been often interrupted in his speech by loud cheering from the galleries. Haulik, bishop of Agram, who spoke after him in defense of Croatian nationality, was as often interrupted by hisses and other signs of public disapprobation.

Count Louis Batthiányi (the leader of the Opposition) then rose and said he trusted that the House and the galleries would listen to him patiently, and abstain from hissing; for he was aware that they would be too much inclined to receive unfavorably what he was about to propose.

"I fully concur," he continued, "in the opinions expressed by the enlightened Bishop of Csanad, and approve of every amendment suggested by his excellency, with the exception of that relating to the sixth clause. Here I must differ from our patriotic prelate, for, in my opinion, it is neither reconcilable with sound sense, nor with sound policy—least of all with the principles of equity and justice—to force the Croats to make use of a dead language. Such a proceeding will be an act of tyranny still unrecorded in the pages of history, and expose us, and justly expose us, to the derision of the civilized world. Conquerors have frequently forced their own language on a subjugated people, but where shall we find an instance of a people having been compelled to make use of a dead language? I shall, therefore, propose that, for the administration of their local affairs, the Croats be permitted to make use of the Croatian instead of the Latin language." (Marks of dis-

approbation from the galleries.) "I should, I must confess," continued the count, "have hesitated in suggesting such an amendment to the sixth and seventh clauses of the bill, if I entertained the slightest fear respecting the Hungarian language and nationality; but this is far from being the case. Our language has taken firm root in the country, and is no longer in danger. Our nationality is a *fait accompli*, a bright and glorious reality. It is to the development of our Constitution, and not to our nationality, that our future efforts ought to be directed. Our nationality was for centuries a dream, a mere illusion; our constitutionality is so still. Let us, therefore, conciliate our Croatian brethren, and they will unite their efforts with ours, to work out the regeneration of our common father-land. The amendment I have proposed is a step that will surpass their most sanguine expectations, and, if it be adopted, we shall no longer be reproached for our exclusive nationalism and liberalism."

Count Anthony Szécsén (the leader of the Conservatives) expressed his satisfaction at the speech they had just heard, and was overjoyed to find that he could give his cordial support to an amendment proposed by Count Louis Batthiányi. He must, however, remark that the word "nationality" was susceptible of a distinction being made in its signification. It might be applied to designate either the language or the material power and independence of a people. It was in the former acceptation of the term that he should make use of it. After a few more remarks, Count Szécsén concluded by saying that he should vote for Count Batthiányi's amendment to the sixth and seventh clauses, and for the Bishop of Csanad's amendments to the other clauses of the bill.

All the leading members of the Opposition followed; and, after eulogizing what they termed "the truly generous amendment proposed by their noble friend Count Batthiányi," regretted to say that they could not give it their support. They, the Hungarians or Liberals, had friends in Croatia (the so-called Magyar-Croatian party), whom they must not abandon. Hungarian nationality was, they feared, not so deeply rooted in the country as their noble friend supposed.

All declared that, although they should prefer leaving the

sixth and seventh clauses as they stood, yet, to show that they were also willing to follow a conciliatory policy, they would vote for the amendment of the Bishop of Csanad.

Busan, the delegate of Croatia, said that their nationality was as much cherished by the Croatians as Hungarian nationality was by the Hungarians. Hungarian nationality was now triumphant; the Hungarian was the official language of the country, and had been spoken from the throne; and still they refused to make a just concession to the Croatians. The Croatians were grieved at the bitterness displayed against them in both Houses; but what grieved them most was, that the authorities of the Hungarian *littoral* were allowed to make use of the Italian language, whereas the vernacular idiom of the *littoral* was the Illyrian. (Cries of "No, no!") "He was not," he declared, "the person to be put down by cries of No, no." He regarded these cries as the mere negation of a fact, and he should persist in maintaining, as his colleague had done in the Lower House, that the *littoral* was an integral part of Croatia; and he presumed that, although Italian was spoken in the sea-ports, no one would pretend to deny that the bulk were of the Slavic race.

This assertion gave rise to the usual controversy respecting the true signification of the term *partes adnexæ* and Magyarism and Illyrianism were again in violent conflict.

On the second day of the debate, Bishop Lonovics said that there was no essential difference between his amendment and that of Count Batthiányi; the latter was, however, more explicit, and he should modify his own amendment by proposing that the words "the Croatian language may also be made use of" be inserted.

Count Emilius Dessewffy observed that three amendments had been proposed; one by the Bishop of Csanad, that "Latin can be used;" another, also by his excellency, that "Croatian may also be used;" and a third by Batthiányi, "that the Croatian language be used instead of the Latin." He must, however, remind the House that, while they were deliberating whether Latin ought to continue, *de jure* at least, the official language of Croatia, the Croatians had *de facto* made their own national idiom the official language for the administration

of local affairs. He thought, therefore, mention ought not to be made of any language, but that the clause should be worded "the language to be made use of for the administration of local affairs shall be left to the judgment of the local authorities."

When the Palatine had summed up the votes, he announced that the majority was in favor of the Bishop of Csanad's second amendment, with the modification of Count Dessewffy. Count Ladislaus Teleki observed that this was a contradiction; whereupon the *Judex Curiae*, Count George Mailath, observed that there was no contradiction, the Bishop of Csanad's amendment having been modified or replaced by Count Dessewffy's amendment, and it was obviously this modification, or, in other words, Count Dessewffy's amendment, that had been carried. He was, therefore, of opinion that the majority had pronounced in favor of Count Dessewffy's amendment of the sixth and seventh clauses, and of the Bishop of Csanad's amendment to the other clauses of the bill.

This decision of the *Judex Curiae* having met with the approbation of the House, a *renuncium* was ordered to be drawn up accordingly.

This *renuncium* was read and duly authenticated,* at a sitting of the 29th of February.

The Croats were thus allowed, by the action of both Houses, to continue the use of their own language, a privilege in the enjoyment of which they had not previously been disturbed.

NEWS OF THE REVOLUTION IN PARIS.

Thus progressed the legislative proceedings of the Diet of Hungary, until the 2d day of March (1848) arrived, and with it the astounding news of the Revolution in Paris, which immediately put an end to the tedious routine of dietal proceedings, and threw the city of Pressburg into the utmost consternation.

The Hungarian legislators now felt that some decisive step must be taken, and frequent conferences were accordingly held during the day by both parties. Count Stephen Széchenyi

* The authentication of a *renuncium* means that the document was read to the House, and found to be strictly conformable to the resolution on which it was founded

proposed that they should proceed in a body to the Palatine, and request him to make known their wishes to his majesty, but this proposal was not approved. It was finally decided that, on the following day, Kossuth should make a motion to the effect that, in a representation to his majesty, they should express their sentiments of loyalty and attachment to the imperial house, &c., but at the same time intimate that the system of policy hitherto pursued must be entirely changed, for which they should request his majesty to appoint, without delay a certain number of men in whom the nation could place confidence, as members of the *Vice-regal Council*; that these counselors should forthwith attend the Diet, in order that the questions under discussion might be terminated in a few weeks, without going through the tedious process of representation, royal rescript, &c.; and that the said counselors should afterward be intrusted with the execution of the laws and be responsible to the Legislature; which was, in other words, demanding a *responsible ministry*, to be composed of the *Liberal* party.*

The reason for adopting this mode of proceeding was, that *de jure*, though not *de facto*, the members of the Vice-regal Council, were responsible to the Diet for their official conduct. Should his majesty, therefore, name six members of the Liberal party as vice-regal counselors, and each of them be charged with the execution of laws relating to a special branch of the administration, Hungary would possess, under another name, a responsible ministry. At a conference held in the evening, the Conservative delegates agreed to give their tacit support to the motion; or, in other words, that the motion should be carried (without a single observation being made from either side of the House) by general acclamation.

A circular sitting was accordingly held the next morning at half past ten; Kossuth made a very animated though moderate speech. He began by alluding to a proposal previously made by the delegate of the county of Raab, respecting the

* The delegates foresaw that if they demanded, in plain language, a responsible ministry—a Minister of Finance, of War, &c.—their representation would not be adopted by the magnates, or, if adopted by them, would not be listened to in Vienna. Hence they merely request his majesty to send vice-regal counselors, &c.

solvency of the Austrian National Bank. This, he said, had now become an object of secondary consideration; what they wanted, and must have, was a responsible Hungarian Minister of Finance. This was the only way to save Hungary from being involved in the national bankruptcy with which Austria was threatened. But the time was already come when their demands must not be limited to the nomination of a responsible Finance Minister; they must tell his majesty in plain language that the only chance left of saving the empire from dissolution would be to place all the people under his sceptre in the enjoyment of constitutional freedom.

Kossuth then proceeded to show what Hungary especially required, his speech being, in fact, a mere amplification of the representation, which (he concluded by moving) should be laid before his majesty without a moment's delay. This motion, by the tacit consent of the Conservatives, as previously stated, was carried by acclamation.

This representation, thus duly sanctioned by the Lower House, was on the following day (4th) read at a sitting of the magnates, when the *Judex Curiae*, Count George Mailath (President of the Chamber in the absence of the Palatine), requested them to await the return of the Palatine from Vienna before taking so important a document into consideration, especially as a satisfactory result was only to be anticipated through the mediation of his royal highness. After a few remarks from Count Louis Batthiányi, the House assented to the proposal of the *Judex Curiae*. For several days following, the magnates held no sittings, owing to the absence of the Palatine and the *Judex Curiae* at Vienna.

On the 9th, the delegates voted that a *nuncium* should be sent to the magnates, to urge them to take the representation into consideration, and at the same time to express the marked disapprobation of the delegates at their proceedings.

As the *personal* was at Vienna, Sarközy, the Vice-Palatine, presided at the dietal sitting at which this *nuncium* was adopted by acclamation.

The Vienna conferences having terminated, most of the officials and delegates, who assisted at them, returned to Pressburg on the 11th and 12th.

The magnates were to have held a sitting on the 13th; but it was decided, at a private conference, to await the result of a petition to the Austrian Land Stände in Vienna, which it was understood would on that day be presented.

A sitting was also announced for the following morning, but was postponed in consequence of the events which had taken place at Vienna. It was, however, finally concluded, at a private conference, that both Houses should meet at three o'clock on the same afternoon (14th), and pass the representation, with an additional paragraph, by acclamation.

Long before three o'clock the galleries were taken possession of by the jurists,* and when the sitting commenced the House was crowded to suffocation.

The representation was duly voted by acclamation, together with the additional paragraph demanding, in express terms, liberty of the press, trial by jury, and annual Diets at Pesth. A *renuncium* was immediately sent to the delegates, who also passed the representation, thus amended, by acclamation. The representation was then signed and sealed, at a mixed sitting, with the customary formalities; but, instead of being transmitted in the usual manner, through the Hungarian Chancery, it was, on the following day (15th), by a numerous deputation of magnates and delegates, at the head of which was the Palatine, presented in person to his majesty.

Arrived at Vienna at the opportune moment when the emperor was acceding to the demands of his subjects of the hereditary provinces, his majesty, without much hesitation, yielded, as was understood, to the imposing delegation from Hungary, all the concessions which they sought, and, in furtherance of their views, appointed Count Louis Batthiányi prime minister, with authority to form a ministry for Hungary.

With feelings of the highest exultation, the Hungarian deputation returned to Pressburg, and proceeded at once to pass the necessary laws for carrying the royal concessions into effect.

On the 23d of March the bill respecting the ministry passed the Chamber of Magnates, when Count Batthiányi announced

* The students of law, and those who had just been admitted to the bar, and were without practice.

that he had formed a ministry (the arrangements having been completed during the night), and would make known the names of his colleagues previous to their being submitted to his majesty. This novel and not very respectful proceeding toward the emperor was a matter of necessity, produced by the receipt, on the night previous, of an estafette from the Committee of Public Safety at Pesth, stating, in plain language, that if they (the committee) were not able to announce the definite formation of a ministry within twenty-four hours, the National Guards would storm the arsenal at Buda, and summon a National Convention to meet at Pesth without delay.

The ministry thus formed consisted of the most moderate men of the Liberal party, and was composed as follows :

Premier (without *portefeuille*), Count Louis Batthiányi, more distinguished for his patriotic sacrifices and the historical and spotless name of his family than by any superiority of mental endowment.

Interior (Home Department), Szemere, a man of decided talent, and one of the most efficient debaters in the House of Delegates.

Foreign (or International) *Affairs*, Prince Paul Esterhazy, of great wealth, and formerly Austrian ambassador to Great Britain.

Finance, Louis Kossuth, the eloquent and distinguished agitator.

War, Meszaros, a colonel of hussars, then at Milan under Radetzky.

Public Works, the highly-esteemed and enterprising patriot, Count Stephen Széchényi.

Public Instruction and Religious Worship, the literary Baron Eötvös.

Trade, Agriculture, and Manufacturing Industry, Klauzal, one of the most celebrated delegates of the last Diet.

Justice, Deak, one of the profoundest jurists in the kingdom.

Immediately after the announcement of the ministry to the Hungarian Diet, Count Batthiányi hastened to Vienna to submit the bill, with the names of the ministry, for the royal sanction. He was followed by the Palatine and Deak, and joined in the capital by Prince Esterhazy.

Notwithstanding the high character of the names presented for the ministry, it was with great difficulty that the emperor's sanction* could be obtained. A strange infatuation seemed to have seized the emperor's advisers, viz., that because no blood had been shed in Hungary, a revolution had not yet taken place in that country, and that the Hungarian government must still continue, in some manner at least, dependent on the imperial cabinet. Another circumstance, which doubtless operated against obtaining the royal sanction to the ministry bill, was the idea which the Austrian cabinet had conceived, viz., that the students in Vienna had been instigated to the bold step which they had taken, and that led to the resignation of Prince Metternich, by Kossuth and other Hungarian Liberals; whereas nothing could have been more erroneous, from the best evidence which can be obtained. The revolution in Vienna took every one in Pressburg by surprise. Kossuth and Szemere, particularly, were known to have been astonished at the intelligence. The famous programme of the Liberals, in which, without the least disguise, they declared their determination to use all the efforts in their power to obtain a responsible ministry, liberty of the press, &c., at the same time recommended his majesty to grant Constitutions to the hereditary states of the empire. This programme and the representation of March the 3d, together with Kossuth's speeches in the Lower House, no doubt exercised a great influence on public opinion in Vienna; but this was the only kind of conspiracy of which the Hungarian Liberals were guilty. They were resolved to realize their views by constitutional means, and by constitutional means only.

On the 29th, the Palatine returned from Vienna, with a royal resolution respecting the ministerial bill, the principal feature of which was the adoption of the "collegial system" of having recourse to royal propositions; in other words, retaining the Hungarian Chancery in Vienna, when it is obvious that, with a responsible ministry, a chancery was superfluous.

This resolution, as might have been expected, caused the greatest dissatisfaction, and all the printed copies of it which

* His principal objections were against a separate ministry of war and finance.

the jurists could get hold of were publicly burned on the promenade.

In the discussion of the subject which took place the same evening in the Chamber of Delegates, Kossuth uttered but little; but what he did say evinced the determination of the Liberals not to give way. Count Stephen Széchenyi, who of late years had been regarded as a Conservative, made a speech that reminded the auditors of the time when he was the fiery leader of the Opposition. He concluded by announcing his intention to repair to Vienna the next morning, and to use his utmost exertions to induce them to give way. The Palatine also made a solemn declaration in the Chamber of Magnates, that he should set out in the course of the night for Vienna, and, to-morrow, either bring back the ministerial bill with the royal sanction, or resign his office.

The emperor, unable longer to resist the appeals made to him on the subject, yielded his sanction to the ministerial bill, and thus terminated that unpleasant controversy.

The following resolutions were then adopted by the Diet, and formed the basis of the future administration of the government:

The executive power to be exercised exclusively through the ministry. The ministerial body to reside at Buda-Pesth, with the exception of one of the members, who resides near the court at Vienna. The Palatine to be invested with all royal power (in the absence of the king), with the exception of the appointments of the high clerical functionaries and military officers, the high barons of the kingdom, and the disposal of the army out of Hungary. Each member of the ministry responsible for his official acts. The ministers may be impeached by decree of the House of Representatives, and are to be tried by a committee of the Upper Chamber "for any acts or decrees prejudicial to the independence of the country, to her constitutional guarantees, to existing laws, to individual liberty, or to private property; for dereliction of duty, fraud, or misapplication of money; for neglect in the execution of laws or in the maintenance of the public tranquillity and security." The right of pardon not to be exercised in case of condemned ministers but on an occasion of general amnesty.

The sessions of the Diet to be held in Pesth. The laws passed to be sanctioned by the king during the session. The President of the House of Magnates to be named by the king; the President of the House of Delegates elected by the House itself.

Perfect equality of civil rights and public burdens among all classes, denominations, and races in Hungary and its provinces, and complete toleration for every form of religious worship. The elective franchise extended to every man possessed of property to the value of three hundred florins,* or of an income of one hundred florins; to every one who has received a diploma from a university; and to every artisan who employs an apprentice.

All *corvées*, tithes, and money-payments in lieu of *corvées* abolished.

With the concurrence of both countries, Hungary and Transylvania, and their Diets, hitherto separate, were incorporated. The number of representatives which Croatia was to send to the Diet increased from three to eighteen, while the internal institutions of that province were to remain unchanged.

The whole of the acts thus passed in March received the royal assent which on the 11th of April, 1848, the emperor personally confirmed at Pressburg, in the midst of the Diet.†

The Diet was closed on the same day (11th April), and his majesty, having acceded to all the demands of the Hungarians, was received with the usual manifestations of popular satisfaction.

The last and probably most important concession—in order to obtain which the Palatine was again forced to appear before the imperial throne—was that respecting the “military frontiers.” The Diet required, as a matter of course, that the border troops should be placed under the authority of the Hungarian Minister of War. They did not pass a bill to incorporate the frontiers with the adjacent counties, leaving that to be done by their next Diet; but in the bill respecting the elective franchise, the “military frontiers” are regarded as an integral part of the kingdom, and therefore empowered to send representatives to what is now termed the National Assembly.

* A florin, in ordinary times, is estimated at forty-eight cents.

† For acts passed by the Hungarian Diet, see Appendix, note No. 16.

The Austrian government wished, first, to retain the command of the border troops; and, second, that the decision respecting the extension of the franchise to the military frontiers should be left to the next Diet. They were, however, finally obliged to give way on both points. The military frontiers are now consequently under the authority of the Hungarian ministry, and will send representatives to the Hungarian Legislative Assembly.

The ameliorations which had been effected produced the utmost satisfaction throughout the kingdom; but this bright day in Hungarian history was of short duration.

In the first place, the change was too sudden, from the restraints of a rigid government to the enjoyment of constitutional liberty, and the people,* with no knowledge or experience of rational freedom, gave way to the utmost license; while the new government, scarcely organized, was too feeble to check their excesses, or afford protection to the persons and property of the more peaceful inhabitants.

Demonstrations, consequently, occurred in various portions of the kingdom, which would have disgraced the barbarism of the darker ages, and could not have been looked for in the nineteenth century in any portion of the civilized globe.

In the Eisenburger comitat an attack was made by the mob upon the Jews, plundering and maltreating this unfortunate race without cause, and only for the gratification of a national antipathy. In the Szatmar comitat, the poor landlords rose against the rich ones, and, equally without reason, slaughtered the nobles and destroyed their princely dwellings. In Middle Szolnok, so weak were the authorities, that a sworn jury fell victims to the popular rage. At Chemnitz, and in its neighborhood, the Slavic national fanaticism became daily more dangerous. At Neusatz, the mob took down the Hungarian flag and burned it, and then raised a red one in its place; at the same time, they seized the first fiscal officer of the town, brought him into the market-place, and there cut him literally in pieces. At Kikinda, and other points, outrages occurred too horrible to relate. These isolated atrocities of the mob could

* The masses, who previously enjoyed no privileges.

easily have been quelled by the presence of an efficient military force; but at that time the number of regular troops throughout the whole kingdom did not exceed eighteen thousand men. Repeatedly did the Hungarian ministry appeal to the Austrian government for assistance to suppress this anarchy; and it was only after these urgent and repeated applications had been attended with no success that the first threats of separation escaped the nation.

But about this period there arose for Hungary a far more alarming danger, and one which operated more seriously than any other cause in producing her ultimate downfall, and that was the opposition against her in several of the provinces of the kingdom.

Among the concessions exacted of the emperor by the Magyars at the outbreak of the revolution, was the decreed connection of Transylvania with Hungary, and the subordination of that portion of the Croatian territory known as the "military frontier." It was the great error of the Hungarians, and the rock upon which their bark of state was wrecked, that while they were struggling with the imperial government for the establishment of their own nationality, they were reluctant altogether to respect the nationality of those provinces which lay within their borders. It must, however, be admitted that they subsequently, as will be seen, made every effort to retrieve this error. At six different epochs during the early stage of their differences did they invite the Croatian leader, Baron Jellacic, to an interview with the Hungarian authorities, urge him to lay before them the complaints of the Croats, and assure him of their anxious desire to adjust the unhappy dissensions which separated them.

Instead of increasing by these measures the hostility of the neighboring provinces, had the Hungarian ministers taken the necessary steps to appease that feeling, and, by respecting their different nationalities, have secured their confidence and support, they would have united in their cause a force which would, in defense of their soil, and with the peculiar advantages of the country for their mode of warfare, have been perhaps invincible by any armies which Austria, either alone or when aided by Russia, could bring against them. The popu-

lation of Hungary and its provinces is estimated at about fourteen millions; of this number a little over five millions only are Magyars, and the remainder (nearly nine millions), instead of battling with them, were, by the course of the Hungarian Diet and ministry, driven into the ranks of their opponents.

As soon as the tidings of the March Revolution in Vienna had reached Agram, the Illyrian party (*i. e.*, the southern Slavi of the Austrian empire), increasing in energy and violence, dispatched a deputation to the emperor with a petition,* which commenced by expressing "the desire of continuing as heretofore under the Hungarian crown;" concluded by asking for their own national independence, their own Diet, their own independent ministry, their national funds, National Guard, and national troops to be under their own control; in short, perfect independence of Hungarian rule.

At the same time, they demanded the appointment of Baron Jellacic, colonel of the frontier troops, as Ban. The emperor, in reply to the application, promoted the Colonel Baron Jellacic to the rank of major general, and appointed him Ban, but declared that, as to the other points, he could not act but in accordance with his Hungarian ministry.

The Baron Jellacic was not the brilliant officer and extraordinary man that the sycophants around the imperial throne have represented him. He had distinguished himself neither by strategy in the field, nor by ability in council; but, possessed of many qualities to endear him to his friends—a poet, scholar, and wit; a bold, chivalrous, and generous officer, he was highly popular among his troops. In mediæval times, the Ban might have been a gallant and adventurous knight for the troubadour's lay, or for a name in romance; but he falls immeasurably short of the position which his injudicious eulogists would claim for him, that of being "the only man that the Revolutions of 1848–9 have produced."

The only thing remarkable about Jellacic was his sudden and extensive reputation, produced not by any exalted merit of his own, but arising simply from the promotions of royal

* For Croatian Petition, see Appendix, note No. 17.

favor, and the force of circumstances in which these promotions naturally involved him. The advancement of Macbeth, as foretold him by the witches, as "Thane of Glamis," "Thane of Cawdor," and "that shalt be king hereafter," were less sudden and inconsistent than those showered upon the colonel of a Grentzer regiment, who in a few months became Field-marshal Lieutenant, Ban of Croatia, and then civil and military Governor of Hungary. Descended from a family which had rendered considerable military service to the empire, Baron Joseph Jellacic was born on the 16th of October, 1801, at Peterwardine, and educated at the Therisanium, or charity school for young aristocrats in Vienna. He is of medium height and size; his bearing is upright and military; his gait quick, as, indeed, are all his movements. His face, which is of a somewhat brownish tinge, has in it something free, winning, and yet determined. The eyes are large, hazel-colored, and full of expression. His head is bald at the top, but encircled with a fringe of jet-black hair. He leaves the impression upon the observer of a man of a mild but determined character, fully confident of his own powers. He is adored by his Croat regiments; and it is said of him, that, whether "in battle, after the most fatiguing march, in *bivouac*, exposed to pouring rain, whenever and wherever the border soldier espies his Ban, he joyously shouts his *zivio*, and, for the moment, bullets, hunger, weariness, and bad weather are nothing at all to him."

Croatia, at a distance from the Hungarian centre, and directly subject to the influence of the court of Vienna, in consequence of its military organization and of its peculiar administration, became now the focus of the anti-Hungarian movement. How far these demonstrations were the result, on the part of the Croats, of a sense of dreaded injury—in other words, in defense of their own nationality—or how far the actors were the servile instruments of the Austrian *Camarilla*, it is obviously impossible at this time to determine. That there was a party about the imperial court opposed to all concessions, and desirous still to resort to the patriarchal system, which had been overturned, there can be no doubt. Louis Gai was at Vienna at the time of the Revolution in March, and a few weeks after he is said to have declared, in an assembly at

Agram, that he was charged by high persons in Vienna to produce a counter-revolution among the Croats. The Hungarians believe that, in the opinion of this reactionary party at the capital, "the rights recognized to Hungary were regarded in the light of forced concessions which it was necessary to destroy at any cost, even at that of their blood;" and that, at their instigation, the imperial government commenced the work by stirring up a civil war in Hungary, and exciting Croat and Serb against Magyar, that it might with military force interfere and overwhelm the liberties of their nation.

The Wallachians, more properly Roumani or Romans, the descendants of Trajan's scattered legions, for a long time refused to take up the cause of the Slavi, whom they considered allied, by the tie of a common origin, to the Russians, those oppressors of the Danubian principalities. They would have preferred to be on good terms with the Hungarians, and to this end they asked only the recognition of their nationality, and the freedom that had been so fully promised in the resolutions of the Hungarian Diet to all the races inhabiting the kingdom. The moderate party among the Magyars were quite willing to assent to the just demands of a people who were the natural allies of their race. It was thus that Count Wesselenyi, a blind old man, who sat in the Diet at Pesth, remarked in the session of the 29th of May: "The horizon of my country is darker than the night of my eyes; our only means of safety consist in holding out a fraternal hand to the Roumani, and proposing an intimate alliance with them; for, like them, we too are isolated in the vast ocean of nations; our interest, as well as theirs, requires a close alliance between us; I ask you, therefore, to pass a law that the nationality of the Roumani shall be respected." Kossuth opposed the motion, declaring that he knew nothing of a Roumanic, or a Croatian people, and that he recognized only Hungarian citizens.*

The Hungarians believe, with great apparent reason, that the mission of Gai, but especially the appointment of Jellacic as Ban of Croatia, without the knowledge of the Hungarian ministry (whose assent and counter-signature they contended

* M. De Bourgong.

were necessary to give validity to the appointment), were but different means of attaining one end at which the Austrian government aimed, viz., a breach with Hungary.

On the other hand, it may be said, that the other nations, especially the Slavic, very soon began to fear that the object of the Hungarians was to obliterate and dissolve all other nationalities, and that the separation of Hungary from the Austrian central government was the first step toward it;* and it was quite natural that they should have been unwilling, as the Magyars themselves were, to surrender without a struggle their rights and liberties. Jellacic and his Croats may not have been at the onset the servile instruments of reaction, at least in an illiberal sense; they had rights to contend for, and with the Southern Slavs an equality of rights in a national point of view as regards the whole empire; but the means adopted by them to secure and maintain these rights can not be approved. They made no effort to obtain redress in a legal or peaceful manner; they did not seek to prevail by the force of public opinion, and by enlightening the people; their members, in the Hungarian Diet even, did not protest against these innovations; but their course was to draw the sword, excite to its utmost extent the blind fury of fanaticism, invade a foreign state, and restore by revolution and civil war the cherished unity of the empire.

Jellacic became now the decided head of the Croatian movement; and notwithstanding the Hungarian ministers had a right to protest against his nomination as Ban, yet, to avoid causes of difference, they acquiesced in the appointment, and invited the Ban to put himself in communication with them. Jellacic replied to the invitation of the Hungarian ministry by declaring, in a circular, the constitutional connection between Hungary and Croatia as changed, and forbidding the Croat

* About this time (14th of May) the Hungarian ministry did dispatch two envoys, Messrs. Pazmándy and Szalay, to represent the Hungarian government at the government and Parliament of Germany; and, what is equally strange, the commissions of these envoys were signed by the archduke and countersigned by the Austrian ministry at Vienna, and they were recognized by the Archduke John the regent, as well as by the government of Frankfurt. Later, Count Teleki was sent to Paris, M. Pulszky to London, and Splenyi to Turin, &c.—*Schlessinger's War in Hungary*.

magistrates from holding any communication* whatever with the Hungarian government; and declaring martial law against those of his countrymen who should make any reference to the legal connection between Hungary and Croatia. The Hungarian ministry called upon the Ban to retract these orders, but without effect.

The Archduke Palatine, in exercise of his right, hereupon addressed the Ban of Croatia, pronounced as unconstitutional his promulgation of martial law, and the trial of such offenses as were never before subjected to the decision of a court-martial, illegal. He ordered him to recall both without delay, and reminded him that he had not as yet taken his oath, and that, agreeably to the customs of the realm, he was not yet installed in the office of Ban.†

Jellacic having refused to appear personally in Ofen, as he had been summoned, and having committed various other illegalities, the Palatine charged the commanding general of Slavonia and Servia, Baron Hrabowsky, to declare all appointments made by Jellacic as illegitimate; to reinstate the former authorities, which had been removed by him; to oblige them by oath to execute the decrees of the Palatine viceroy, and ministers; to arrest all those who had participated in the dissolution of the crown and of the empire; to suspend Jellacic from his military dignity, and declare him under accusation for his treachery; and, finally, to conduct with all energy the military and civil power, and to declare publicly that, "in respect to language, right of moving, professions, trades, tithes, and feudal service, &c., the inhabitants of the military frontier stand on the same footing of equality with other Hungarians."

* The rescript from the Hungarian government, received at Vankavar, Essek, and other principal towns in Slavonia, required the authorities to attend solely to the directions which might be conveyed to them from the Hungarian Departments of State; and immediately afterward, the Ban laid his injunctions on the same functionaries, to yield obedience to no commands save those of "the Ban of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia," as he is styled in his patent.—*Consul-general Fonblanque*, c. ix., p. 71.

† When these orders of the Palatine reached Agram, on the 16th May, after much noise and confusion, the orders were about to be destroyed by fire, and were only saved at the earnest instance of the Ban. In this state of excitement, the portraits of the Palatine and his ministers were publicly burned in the open square before the council-house.

His majesty, the emperor-king, also, by a communication bearing date the 7th of May, at the instance of the Hungarian ministry, summons him to yield obedience to the crown of Hungary, and to desist from all efforts at separation. Jellacic, throwing off the mask, declared that he in no manner recognized the authority of the Hungarian ministry, which was but a usurpation of power, and convoked the General Assembly of Croatia for the 5th of June, by his own authority and contrary to the constitutional laws, which required the consent of the king.

The Illyrian party, as might have been anticipated, declared all charges imputing to the Ban violations of the Constitution as false, and pretended that the Ban had not as yet performed a single act of which his majesty and his brother, the Archduke Francis Charles, had not been immediately informed, and of which they had not entirely approved. Upon these delarations, promulgated on the authority of the Ban, the Hungarian ministry called upon the sovereign formally to contradict the reports, and to bring Jellacic to obedience. The king, acceding to his wish, in an autograph letter of the 29th of May, forbade Jellacic to convoke an Assembly, and ordered him to repair to Innspruck within twenty-four hours after the receipt of the summons. But Jellacic, far from obeying the commands of the emperor, opened the General Assembly in Croatia, composed of his own nominees, under the title of "Croato-Slavo-Dalmatian Diet." This outrage against the central authority of Hungary produced a strong remonstrance on the part of the Hungarian ministry at the imperial court, and the emperor was forced, on the 10th of June, to issue an ordinance which suspended Jellacic from all his functions, civil and military, declared him guilty of high treason, and ordered him before a tribunal.*

Jellacic at length proceeded, in company with a deputation from the Croatian Diet, for Innspruck, and in an audience of the 19th of June, he was informed, in the presence of Prince Esterhazy, the Hungarian minister residing near the court, that his majesty felt deeply offended by the disobedience of the

* For original, see Appendix, note No. 18.

Ban; that he declared the assembled Congregation at Agram illegal; that he could consider the deputies but as private individuals; that he would maintain the unity of the Hungarian crown, to which Croatia had belonged for seven hundred years; and that the Archduke John was charged with the mediation between the two countries.

The Ban of Croatia left Innsbruck, and, on his journey home, received, for the first time, the imperial ordinance of the 10th of June, in which he was denounced, countersigned by no Hungarian minister, and which was issued before he reached Innsbruck.

Upon this document the Hungarians laid great stress, and vainly supposed that such a blow, inflicted by the emperor upon the very "head and front" of that rebellious movement, must subdue all opposition, and that peace and order would soon be restored to the country. But they were imposed upon by the treachery of the court; there was no sincerity in the act; and, as subsequent events fully established, the manifesto was a mere blind for their deception.

Had the imperial court considered him in the light in which it denounced him, Jellacic would have been in the presence of his God, instead of that of his emperor; or, even if regarded as less criminal than originally charged, he would at least have been condemned to the Castle of Olmütz or Spielberg, rather than called to the imperial palace; while, on his own part, the Ban would never have ventured to disobey with such audacity, had he not been sustained secretly by the approbation and connivance of the court.* Jellacic, fully advised as to the force of the manifesto, quietly wends his way to Agram, and there, instead of returning in disgrace "deprived of his functions" and "placed before a tribunal," was carried about the streets in the arms of the people, and greeted by one of the most enthusiastic and brilliant receptions which was ever witnessed.

The Archduke John, to whom, with the consent of the parties, the emperor had submitted this controversy, now summoned this imperially-denounced traitor (whom he addressed

* That the imperial family encouraged the insurrections against Hungary was generally believed; and Jellacic himself wrote to this effect, in a letter dated the 4th of June, and addressed to the frontier regiments stationed in Italy.

as his dear Ban Baron Jellacic) to Vienna, to hold a conference with the Hungarian ministry. Count Batthiányi, on the part of Hungary, and the Ban Jellacic, on the part of Croatia, appeared, in obedience to the summons, before the Archduke John, who simply introduced the parties to each other, entreated them to arrange the matter amicably, and then left Vienna for Frankfurt to enter upon the duties of Regent of the German empire, to which, by the voice of the Diet, he had just been called. In this interview the Ban demanded, agreeably to the Croatian petition, a government quasi responsible, charged with the internal management of the country, and leaving the most important branches, viz., the departments of war, of finance, and of commerce, in the hands of the central power at Vienna. To this proposal the president of the Hungarian ministry would not accede, being unwilling to depart from the legal ground upon which the concessions of March had placed his country, the historical independence of Hungary and her sovereignty over Croatia.

The proposal of Jellacic was mere insolence and ignorance. The affairs of Hungary have at all times been managed, ostensibly at least, independently of any Viennese minister. They were conducted by an Hungarian chancellor resident at Vienna; and by the new arrangement the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs was also to take up his abode at the capital, and become the channel of communication.

The objection of Jellacic arose from ignorance; while his denial of the right of Hungary to have a finance minister, at a time, too, when the same officer in Austria was under the control of the Viennese Assembly, was to subject the fiscal affairs of Hungary to the influence of the Austrian deputies.

The pretensions of Jellacic, if sincere, were ludicrously absurd; but it is probable that the demand of terms to which they knew the Hungarians would never accede, was but a part of the plan devised to bring on a war, and thus to subjugate Hungary, an object upon which the Camarilla was now intent, and which their instrument, Jellacic, had been deputed to execute.

Upon the unsuccessful termination of the first interview, Jellacic inquired of Count Batthiányi, "Shall we meet again?"

"Upon the Drave, perhaps," replied the Hungarian minister; "I now join the army." "Not on the Drave," quickly rejoined Jellacic, "but even on the Danube."

While these events were occurring, the partial revolt of Croatia was aided by a conspiracy against Hungary in the Banat and in the counties of Bacs and Szerem, in concert with the Serbs of Serbia.

"The population of these countries," says Count Teleki, "of the Greek religion and of the Serb race, took refuge in Hungary at different periods, to escape Turkish oppression. At the time of their settling in the country, they obtained the same rights as Hungarians; but the imperial government, the enemy of religious liberty, and which at that time persecuted the Hungarian Protestants, did not allow them the free enjoyment of their form of worship. The states of Hungary succeeded, by different efforts, in ameliorating the lot of the members of the Greek Church; but it was the Diet of 1848, to which it was granted to diffuse liberty universally, which assured their legitimate rights, by pronouncing the perfect equality of all creeds. The Hungarian government, in order to become acquainted with the further demands that the Greek Church might put forward, convoked a meeting of the Greek clergy for the 27th of May, which was to be charged with the investigation of the questions of instruction and religion. The Serbs, grateful for what the Diet had done for them, declared themselves perfectly satisfied, and testified their attachment to the Hungarian people. But after a little, the influence which had agitated and divided Croatia commenced to react upon them also. Stephen Suplikacz, a colonel, like Jellacic, of a frontier regiment, put himself at the head of the Serb movement. Under the pretext of holding a meeting preparatory to that which was to take place on the 27th of May, the Serbs convoked a National Assembly for the 13th, to which a great number of the Ottoman Serbs were called. The Assembly, opened first at Ujvidek, was moved afterward to Carlowitz. The Serbs named patriarch Joseph Rajacsis, archbishop of Carlowitz, and elected Stephen Suplikacz, colonel, like Jellacic, of a border regiment, and then serving in Italy, as vayvode. Putting forth the most illegitimate pretext, they formed the Vay-

vodat of the Banat and the military frontiers, with the counties of Bacs, Szerem, and Baranya, thus being the first to violate the rights of nationality, which they invoked, inasmuch as a considerable portion of this country is peopled by Hungarians, Wallachs, and Germans. They decreed that the Serb Vayvodat should form an alliance with Croatia, and nominated a permanent committee to govern it. Finally, a deputation was commissioned to make these determinations known to the king."*

The Serbian revolt was now carried forward with great vehemence, and distinguished by the utmost atrocity. Whole towns and villages, once flourishing, were laid waste, the inhabitants, even without resistance, massacred, and lovely districts converted into a wilderness. The Hungarian government had only at its disposal a few troops, hastily assembled, and for the most part foreign soldiers or National Guards, ill armed or not armed at all, while the enemy's forces were composed principally of soldiers of the frontier regiments, perfectly disciplined.

It was at this time that the Hungarian government, intrusted with the security and lives of the people, at length determined on active hostilities; and the first efforts at civilized warfare were made on the 12th of June, 1848, when commenced the bombardment of Carlowitz, the metropolis or holy city of the Serbs. The object of this first expedition, commanded by the imperial general, Hrabowsky, and which issued from the neighboring fortress of Peterwardein, was to obtain possession of all the stores in the principal fortification, the bulwark of the Servian nation, and to disperse the crowds which had gathered in that city.

This expedition was not successful. Hrabowsky's troops penetrated, it is true, into the suburbs of the city, where they burned fourteen houses; but, owing to the brave defense of

* The Emperor of Russia, about this time, through his consul at Belgrade, made proposals to protect the Servians, as co-religionists, provided they would make to him a petition to that effect. Rajacsis, the archbishop of Carlowitz, and leading man among the Servians, declined the proposals, but advised Mayerhofer, consul general of Austria at Belgrade, of the application. Mayerhofer immediately tendered them, on the part of Austria, every assistance and concession that they might desire, if they would but adhere faithfully to her.—*Pulszky*.

the city, under Stratimirowitch,* and the arrival of re-enforcements of volunteers from the independent principality of Servia, who hastened up to the assistance of their brethren in the Austrian province, the Magyars were driven back into the fortress of Peterwardein. From this time the whole Servian race in the Banat, and the provinces bordering on this part of the Danube, rose in rebellion, and this region became the scene of a furious contest. The Theiss was frequently crossed and re-crossed by the two parties; the triangular peninsula situated at the confluence of that river and the Danube (the very spot that was, in 1697, the theatre that witnessed the splendid victories of Eugène of Savoy over the Turks, and which were followed by the peace of Carlowitz, that memorable era in the history of the house of Austria and of Europe), again, as a centre of operations, became the scene of most sanguinary conflicts.†

As the Servian insurgents continued to advance their cause in the name of the emperor-king, the Hungarian ministers requested his majesty to come in person to Pesth, on the occasion of the approaching convocation of the Diet, in order by his presence to give a positive contradiction to the enemies of Hungary. But the invitation was without effect.

On the 2d of July, the new National Assembly, returned for the first time by the suffrage of all classes of the nation, was opened at Pesth.

An immense crowd of people had early in the morning of this important day stationed themselves in all the streets, on the bridges, and places where their curiosity and interest were most likely to be gratified. The space from the royal palace to the Assembly-house was kept open by the National Guards of Pesth and Ofen, two battalions of infantry, and a troop of cuirassiers. The procession was opened by M. Perczel, the Commissioner of the Police for Hungary. He was followed by the two bürgermeisters of the cities of Pesth and Ofen, in their state carriages.

After them came the ministry, consisting of Messrs. Széché-

* Stratimirowitch had been educated at the Engineer Academy in Vienna, a young man of only twenty-five years, but of much military talent.

† One battle was fought behind the Roman intrenchments, repaired and employed by Eugène of Savoy, and still undemolished.

nyi, Mészáros, Szemere, Kossuth, Klausal, Dèak, and Eötvös, followed by a troop of mounted National Guards. The Archduke Palatine and the President of the Ministry, Batthiányi, came next, and troops of mounted National Guards brought up the rear.

Each part of the procession was received with cheers by the public. Deputations from the Upper and Lower Houses waited upon the Archduke Palatine at the foot of the great stairs of the Assembly-house, and conducted him and the ministry to the grand hall, where the Diet hold their sittings; he took his seat on the throne, and the ministers stood on his right and left.

After the tumultuous joy of the Assembly had subsided, his highness said :

“His majesty, our beloved king, intended himself to open the Diet; but the king is prevented by ill health from acting up to his own wishes, and he has therefore commissioned me to open the Diet. I herewith lay upon the table of the House the king's decree upon that subject, and another decree by which the king's sole power is provisionally placed in my hands.”

The two royal decrees were then read by one of the ministers, and the names of the king and Palatine, whenever they occurred in the text, were enthusiastically cheered by the galleries. The speech from the throne was next read by the Archduke Palatine himself. It is to the following effect :

“In the name of our beloved king, Ferdinand the Fifth, I open this Diet; for the present condition of our country, especially the disturbances in Croatia, the Lower Danube, and Slavic frontiers, makes an immediate opening of the Diet necessary. His majesty wishes for a general restoration of peace and order.

“There is reason to hope that the financial questions will be definitely, beneficially settled, by a series of laws which the ministry propose to submit to the Assembly.

“His majesty has been grieved to learn that quiet and order have been disturbed in several of his countries, at the very time that his majesty with paternal care has fulfilled all wishes for the happiness of his people.

"Malevolent individuals, by fomenting national and religious discords in Croatia, have caused an open resistance to the laws and orders of his majesty, and they have even dared to take his majesty and the members of the royal family as a pretext and authority for their lawless endeavors.

"His majesty scorns such insinuations; the king and his royal family will at all times respect the laws and protect the liberties granted to his people.

"His majesty has been happy to sanction the union with Transylvania, for his beloved Hungary will gain in strength by this union, and it will the more staunchly stand by the throne. The ministry have prepared some further laws respecting this union, which they will submit to the Diet. His majesty is grieved to inform you that his Italian subjects, with the assistance of foreign troops, have attacked his majesty's forces. The war resulting from this melancholy event has not yet been brought to a termination; but it is the king's wish that Italy, too, may soon enjoy the blessings of peace. His majesty stands in the most friendly relations with foreign powers, and hopes for a continuance of those relations. His majesty doubts not that the faithful Diet of Hungary will do all it can for the glory of the crown and the welfare of the country.

"I can assure you of the king's earnest and sincere love for you."*

This speech was followed by loud cheers and waving of swords and hats, in the midst of which the archduke and ministry left.

The Diet, rejoiced by these assurances, immediately dispatched a deputation to Vienna to entreat the king to repair to Pesth. The solicitude of the Hungarians on this subject was quite natural. The actual presence of the king in the country could alone convince the insurgent population that he spoke sincerely. All the decrees he issued, all the words he uttered, were represented to the insurgents as drawn from him by force; and

* This opening speech of the Palatine has been considered, by the friends of the Austrian dynasty, as a remarkable one, from the fact that it contains not one word of the union of the two crowns; of the rights established by the Pragmatic Sanction; of the bond between the two monarchies (*Monarchie-Verband*), which was the condition of the emperor's concessions.—*Baroness Blaze de Bury's "Germania."*

the flight of the emperor from his capital gave to these suppositions a semblance of reality. Jellacic had also thus explained the ordinance which stripped him of his offices. The Hungarians, therefore, tested the sincerity of the king when they asked his presence at Pesth. They were refused.

Meanwhile the Servian revolt gained ground. Troops were concentrated on the frontiers of Croatia, evidently for the purpose of invasion. At length the Austrian cabinet, in a communication to the Hungarian ministry dated the 29th of June, just three days previous to the speech of the Palatine, so full of amicable assurances, announced the intention of the Austrian ministry to put an end to the neutrality it had observed hitherto, and to support Croatia openly. This event confirmed the suspicions of the Hungarian government, which it had for some time entertained, that the disobedience of the foreign troops, to whom the defense of the country had been intrusted, had been ordered at Vienna; and brought home to them the conviction that the Constitution and independence of the country must be defended by force of arms.

After an eloquent and able speech from Kossuth* the Diet forthwith decreed a levy of troops, which raised the Hungarian army to 200,000 men, and opened the credit which this measure required. The two enactments passed to this effect were presented for the royal sanction by the prime minister and the Minister of Justice; but a long time elapsed before these ministers could obtain a reply. In the mean time, the situation of the country becoming daily more alarming, and the Diet being persuaded that this state of things would lead to the total ruin of the kingdom, sent a deputation to the king headed by the president of the Chamber of Deputies.† It demanded the sanction of those laws which were requisite to save the country; requested the recall of the Hungarian troops quartered out of the country;‡ and begged the king to order the foreign troops, appointed to defend the nation, to discharge their duty faith-

* For Kossuth's speech, see Appendix, note 19.

† For address of Hungarian deputation and reply of the emperor, see Appendix, note 20.

‡ Latour, Minister of War, told Batthiányi that he could send no troops into Hungary; and upon his reply that Hungary would be obliged to look to her own security, "*Then,*" replied Latour, "*I will send troops to Hungary.*"

fully ; and, finally, the king was again entreated to come into his kingdom, to restore peace and order to the country. The deputation received an evasive reply. But at the same time, and while the two ministers, Batthiányi and Deak, were still at Vienna, the king, without acquainting them, dispatched on the 31st of August a letter to the Palatine,* directing him to send several members of the Hungarian ministry to Vienna, for the two-fold object of adopting measures in concert with the Austrian ministry ; to consolidate and insure the unity of the government of the monarchy ; and to open negotiations with the Croats, in order to reconcile their interests with those of Hungary. The king declared it as an indispensable condition to every attempt for this purpose, that the Baron Jellacic should take part in the conferences, that all preparations for war should cease on both sides, and that the districts of the military frontier (which had always formed part of Hungary) should be provisionally subject to the Austrian ministry. In the same document, a communication was made to the Hungarian ministry of a note of the Austrian cabinet on the relations to be established between Austria and Hungary. It was also stated that the provisions of the law of 1848, by which the Archduke Palatine had been appointed depository of the royal authority, and chief of the executive power in the absence of the king, and that by which a responsible ministry had been conceded to Hungary, detaching from the central government of Vienna the administration of war, of finance, and of commerce, were contrary to the Pragmatic Sanction, opposed to the legal relations between Austria and Hungary, and detrimental alike to the interests of both countries.

It is a favorite plea with the Austrian cabinet and its partisans, that the concessions of 1848 were not only extorted from the emperor, but were also at variance with the spirit of the Hungarian Constitution, and with the Pragmatic Sanction in particular.†

* For copy of letter, see Appendix, note 21.

† By a letter from the Archduke Palatine to the emperor, dated the 24th of March, 1848 (discovered among his papers after he had left Pesth), it would seem that the royal word was not intended by the imperial advisers to be a real security, and that the Viennese cabinet secretly reserved the liberty of retracting it.

Is it reasonable to suppose that a hundred members of the Hungarian Diet could have had the magic power to extort concessions, by violence, of the sovereign in his own palace, surrounded as he was by eighteen thousand faithful troops, and have imposed on him in the Austrian capital laws hostile to Austria? Could the terror they inspired have been so great as to have induced him, nearly a month later (11th of April), to quit his capital and go to Pressburg, to confirm by his sanction the laws extracted of him by force? Could the spell thrown around his majesty by these hundred deputies have been such as to compel him nearly three months afterward, in his speech from the throne (on the 2d of July), formally and voluntarily to recognize them all?

If not extracted by force from the sovereign, were these confirmations of 1848 at variance with the spirit of the Hungarian Constitution or of the Pragmatic Sanction? The two concessions complained of are, first, that which conferred executive power on the Palatine in the absence of the king; and, second, that which constituted a responsible ministry for Hungary. Were these inallowable innovations? Both these questions may at once be answered by reference to the law of 1608. By the 18th Article of that law it is provided, "That when the king is kept out of the country by serious causes, and prolongs his absence, the Palatine is to be invested with full powers to govern and administer the kingdom of Hungary according to the laws and national customs."

By Article 5th of the same law, the king is obliged to name a High Treasurer of the kingdom, independent of the powers of Vienna, whose duty it is to discharge the functions of his ministry without reference to the Austrian Chamber of Finance. Besides, the demand for a separate ministry for Hungary was not a new idea, but was based on numerous statutes, that of Charles the Sixth (1715), of Maria Theresa (1741), of Leopold the Second (1790), and, more recently, of Francis in

concessions on the first opportunity; and, accordingly, the archduke proposes in that letter three methods of abrogating the Hungarian immunities—a peasant war to be excited against the nobles, a commissioner to be armed with martial law, or a temporary compromise with Count Batthiányi, the then head of the Hungarian ministry. For this remarkable letter, see Appendix, note 22.

1827. Hungary was always alive to this privilege, and did not cease to protest against its violations.

But the principal, and indeed the only plausible objection urged against the concession of a separate and independent ministry for Hungary has been that it violated that unity of the empire established by the Pragmatic Sanction. But this objection is based upon an assumption altogether untenable.

The Pragmatic Sanction, as has been already shown, created no union between the hereditary states of Austria and Hungary, but that which exists in the identity of a common sovereign. No treaty is in existence which decrees the dominion of one state over the other. Hungary is as independent of the hereditary states as the hereditary states are of Hungary. If the King of Hungary thinks proper, in concert with the Diet, to extend or modify the powers of the Diet and the Constitution, Austria and the emperor have no right to make an objection.

The independence of Hungary has been recognized, both by her relations with the hereditary states and in the recognized states of Europe. The hereditary states, for example, have been successively annexed to the Roman-German Empire and to the Germanic Confederation, but the kingdom of Hungary has never constituted a part of either the one or the other. All foreign powers have invariably given the emperor-king the double title of Emperor of Germany, afterward of Austria, and King of Hungary. In consequence of these considerations, the Austrian subjects of the emperor-king are alluded to in the Hungarian laws as *foreigners*. A mass of laws enact that *foreigners* can not take any part in the administration of Hungary, nor in her affairs; and that the king can not rule but with the assistance of Hungarian counselors. Neither the answers nor the ordinances of the king have ever borne the signature of any foreign minister. The affairs of Hungary have ostensibly never been managed but by Hungarians. By what right can it, then, be pretended to submit the decisions of the Hungarian legislative body, approved by the King of Hungary, to the approbation of an Austrian ministry? Compare these concessions, too, with the guarantees imposed upon Leopold the Second in 1790, and accepted by his successor in 1792, and

which, until recently, were the bases of the relations between Austria and Hungary.

The twenty-five articles of the Diploma of Inauguration in 1790, after generally affirming the independence of the crown, the laws and the privileges of Hungary, proceed to decree, among other enactments, triennial convocation of the Diet, exclusion of *foreigners* (that is, of Austrians) from the government, and the residence of the emperor-king, during a portion of every year, in his Hungarian dominions. They declare that the king can neither make laws nor impose taxes without the consent of the Diet, and that royal proclamations, unless countersigned by one, at least, of the boards of the Hungarian government, are null and void.

There are many other details, but these alone are sufficient to show that the demands of the Hungarians in 1848 did not, as regards Austria at least, introduce any sudden or violent innovations into the federal relations between the two countries.

It remains only to be seen whether, in the interval of nearly sixty years (1790 to 1848), Austria performed her portion of this compact, and whether Hungary has protested unreasonably and prematurely against her grievances.* This interval of more than half a century may be divided into two periods: the first comprising the wars which followed the first French Revolution, and which ended in 1815; the second beginning from that date, and terminating with the present civil convulsions.

In the former of these periods, the adage *silent leges inter arma* was once more exemplified, and the Hungarian nation was too much occupied with wars and rumors of wars to proceed regularly or zealously with constitutional or social reforms. Francis the First, when the victories of Napoleon were shattering the unity of Austria, reminded the Diet of its response to Maria Theresa at a similar crisis, and on each appeal was met with equal devotion, if not with equal enthusiasm. The chivalrous nature of the people, and their loyalty to the *Kaiser's* throne, led them not only to reject with disdain the proposals for independence made them by Napoleon, but to

* Edinburgh Review.

submit to repeated and exorbitant demands for men and money, without exacting a corresponding redress of grievances.*

For twenty years this unequal contest was continued, as has been shown, between a generous people and an exacting prince, until it became a matter of general observation and notoriety that the Diets were convoked to grant supplies and to be dismissed whenever they spoke of grievances.

With the restoration of peace in 1815, a new era began for Hungary. In spite of wars, and levies, and bad government, the kingdom had advanced in material prosperity, and it was expected that peace would afford leisure for carrying out the social and constitutional reforms which the commission of 1790 had recommended. But it was an era of brief promise and protracted disappointment. Austria, as a member of the Holy Alliance, was now more than ever determined to place Hungary upon the same footing with the hereditary states. A court party was sedulously fostered in the country and in the Chambers; Austrian officers were put in command of Hungarian regiments; the bondage of the press was rigorously enforced; new shackles were imposed on trade; the currency was depreciated; for twelve years no Diet was summoned, and nearly every article of the Constitution of 1790 was assailed by violence or evaded by intrigue. At length the arbitrary measures by which, in 1822 and 1823, the Austrian cabinet attempted the express violations of the Diploma of Leopold, were arrested by the imposing attitude of the Diet in 1825. Francis the First retracted and apologized, and from that period the operations of the Austrian government became less daring and more insidious. Such, then, have been the relations of Hungary to Austria during one of the most momentous eras in the annals of the world. Twenty years of nearly incessant war were followed by an even longer interval of almost uninterrupted peace. During the former period, Hungary was Austria's foremost bulwark, furnished her best troops, her commissariat, and her magazines. During the latter period, Austria has requited Hungary for these services and sacrifices with successive and systematic endeavors to abridge or cancel her

* Edinburgh Review.

indisputable immunities ; to degrade into a subject province “an old and haughty people, brave in arms ;” and, finally, to clog and crush its spirit of enterprise with vexatious imposts and absurd fiscal regulations. The reforms of 1848 may have been imperative in their tone, but the results of sixty years endurance can scarcely be termed *sudden*, nor the assertion of rights, sanctioned for centuries and as often invaded, be justly designated as *unseasonable* or *unconstitutional*.*

The opposition of the Austrian cabinet to the late concessions, and which displayed itself only months after the concessions were made, resulted, it is more probable, not from any constitutional scruples which should have been excited the moment the violation had been committed, but from the altered condition of the empire, consequent upon the late triumphs of the imperial arms in Italy.

When, during the months of April, May, and June, Radetzky, driven out of Milan, and pent up with his army in the fortress of Verona, the cabinet of Austria were daily expecting the tidings of his surrender to the King of Piedmont, who not only surrounded him, but with five times his force covered the entire plains of Lombardy, no dissatisfaction was manifested at the course of the Hungarians. It was only during the months of July and August, when the gallant veteran Radetzky, sufficiently re-enforced, issues from behind the walls of Verona, assumes the offensive, and by a succession of brilliant victories, drives the Piedmontese from the territory of Austria, and enters in triumph the gates of Milan ; it is then, but not till then, that we hear for the first time the cry of unseasonable and unconstitutional concessions !

The policy of Austria, for a long time as two-faced as that emblem the double-headed eagle which she bears on her standard, now unmasked itself, and the ministers boldly evinced their intention to subvert the Constitution of Hungary, subjugate the country, compel the Magyars to purchase peace at the price of their independence, and thus blend the various parts of the emperor's dominions into one undistinguished mass. On the 4th of September, the Hungarians determined

* Edinburgh Review.

by a vote of the Diet, to make one more effort with the emperor; and accordingly dispatched another deputation to Vienna, to urge his majesty to sanction the two proposed laws, and to come himself to Pesth to oppose to the rebels his royal name. The application was again refused.

On the same day, the 4th of September, the emperor, at the instigation of the Austrian ministry, signed a manifesto* recalling the decree which suspended Jellacic from all his dignities under a charge of treason, on the pretext that the accusations against the Ban were false, and that he had exhibited undeviating fidelity to the house of Austria. Jellacic was, consequently, reinstated in all his offices, although he was at the time actually encamped with his army on the frontiers of Hungary, ready to invade the country, and awaiting, perhaps, this very decree to wipe off the stigma upon him, before he proceeded to carry his designs into effect, which he did in five or six days after, about the time that it would have taken the decree to reach him.

When the tidings of this retraction on the part of the monarch of the charges against Jellacic reached Pesth, and when, about the same period, the enraged deputation from the Diet, their caps adorned with red plumes, returned with a rejection of their application by the emperor, the Hungarian ministry, which had been appointed in March, tendered their resignations.

The Palatine then, by virtue of his powers, called on Count Louis Batthiányi, president of the ministry which had just resigned, to form a new ministry.

All hope of a peaceful adjustment seemed to be at an end; but, as a last resource, a deputation of Hungarian deputies (sixteen in number, and headed by Deak) was sent to propose to the Diet of Austria, then sitting at Vienna, that the two countries should mutually guarantee their Constitutions and their independence.

Upon the presentation of their credentials, the President of the Assembly declared that the rules of the House did not permit the admission of such a deputation. One of the members desired that an exception should be made in this instance; a

* For this document, see Appendix, note No. 23.

long debate ensued upon the subject of their admission, when the Diet finally concluded, that as Hungary, since the revolution in March last, had constituted itself into a nation separate and independent from the Austrian empire, the deputation could only be considered as one from a foreign country, which they had no right or power to receive.

Commissioned to form a ministry, Louis Batthiányi took up the direction of affairs, upon the condition that Jellacic, whose troops had already invaded Hungary, should be ordered to retire beyond the frontiers.

He was answered by the king that this condition could not be accepted before the other ministry was known. Batthiányi lost no time in presenting his list at Vienna; but what affords strong proof of the treachery of the movement, Jellacic had in the interim passed the borders with his Croat and Austrian regiments, and was at that moment an invader upon the soil of Hungary.

On the 9th of September, Jellacic crossed the Drave (the boundary between Croatia and Hungary), at Zegrad, at the head of his Croat troops, and there, joined by the Austrian regiments, which had marched from various parts of Southern Hungary to put themselves under his orders, he proceeded without resistance to Kanisa.*

Jellacic, almost wholly unprovided with cavalry, issued to all regiments stationed in Hungary a proclamation summoning them to join him, and loitered about the neighborhood of Kanisa to await the results of his proclamations. The colonel of a regiment of *cuirassiers* (Hardig), who with his troops was on his way to Austria, where his Bohemians were to be exchanged for a Hungarian regiment of hussars, refused obedience to the Hungarian ministry, and submitted to the order of Jellacic.

* About this time Hungarian shepherds surprised a courier from Jellacic with letters directed to Latour, which plainly evinced the understanding which existed between the Viennese Minister of War and Jellacic. The latter, in his dispatch, *acknowledged the receipt of military stores, requested more, and solicited his public recognition by the emperor, with full authority to carry on his enterprise energetically.* But a short time before, Latour had, on a question put to him in the Diet, pledged his word of honor "that he had no official relations with Jellacic."
—*Pulszky*, 171.

At this point General Teleki, a Hungarian commander, surrendered himself with his troops to the Ban. On the entrance of the Ban into Letenye, he was received by the population with the most joyful manifestations. Here he gained an accession to his force of fourteen thousand men, with sixty-two cannons, to which the troops of Kempen, sixteen thousand men, and twelve cannons, were afterward added. Another division, Hartbell, entered Czaknthurn, with eighteen thousand men and twenty-four cannons, without striking a blow. The National Guard every where dissolved at their approach, and the united army took up the line of march from Kanisa toward Pesth.*

The die was now cast—the Rubicon passed. The Diet appealed to the heroism of the nation. The people rose *en masse*; defenders of their country flocked from all quarters. The Hungarian regiments of the line, until then shaken by the intrigues of the reactionary party, were carried away by universal enthusiasm. But the forces thus collected to resist the invasion were still without a commander-in-chief or a staff, without sufficient arms or ammunition, and, for the most part, without military discipline or organization; and the small army of five thousand disciplined troops, with a few thousand raw levies, had to retire before the overwhelming force of the enemy.

Under these circumstances, the representatives of the nation offered the command of the Hungarian forces to the Palatine Viceroy, in his capacity of captain general of the country, in order that, by the authority attached to his position and his person, he should render all hesitation in the camp impossible, and give to the movements of the army that unity and energy necessary to success.

The Palatine, after the measure had been approved by the king, accepted the command, and proceeded to Vesprim, at the north point of the Platten Sea, where the regiments which had retreated before Jellacic from the borders, and the new recruits from Pesth were concentrated. Both parties, the invaders and the invaded, appeared at this time to be acting under the countenance and direction of the emperor-king.† After joining the

* When the news of Jellacic's invasion reached Pesth, the Diet decreed the issue of Hungarian money, and the immediate increase of the army.

† " Since Jellacic crossed the Drave, enlistments for Hungary had publicly taken

army and hastily organizing it, the Palatine opened communications with the Ban, encamped at the southern side of the lake, and made an effort for a meeting.

He proceeded down the lake in a steamer adorned with the Hungarian tricolor, and, on nearing the opposite point, dispatched his adjutant ashore and summoned the Ban to a conference in the steamer. Jellacic having his allotted task to fulfill, and knowing that an interview could be attended with no useful result, declined it, with the very unmilitary excuse that his officers would not suffer him to comply with the command of his imperial highness.* The Palatine then (summoned to Vienna as an archduke by the emperor) left the army, passed

place in Vienna, with the knowledge of the Minister of the Interior. Baron Doblhof looked on the Croatian invasion of Hungary as a matter in which he was wholly neutral. He permitted the enlistment for the Hungarians, and simultaneously an enrollment for Jellacic. Lads, from eighteen to twenty-two years of age, were to be seen, some with the Hungarian, others with the Croatian 'tricolor,' drinking together at one and the same table in the tavern, and thus spending their enlistment-money together. These poor youths associated and joked good humoredly with one another; nevertheless, they knew that their next meeting was to be in opposite ranks, on the bloody field of battle."—*Pulszky*.

* Jellacic was invited by the Hungarians, on six different occasions, to a conference for the settlement of their differences:

1st. About the last of March, he was invited by the Palatine of Hungary, at Vienna, to an interview.

2d. About the same time, he was requested by Louis Batthiányi to come to Pressburg on the 11th of April, when the emperor was to be present for the purpose of approving of the laws passed by the Diet.

3d. On the 10th of May, he was summoned by the Palatine and ministry of Hungary to come to Pesth, for the adjustment of their difficulties.

4th. On the 4th of June, at Innspruck, he was invited by the Hungarian ministers, Batthiányi and Esterhazy, to a consultation.

5th. On the 4th of July, he was summoned to Vienna by the Archduke John, to meet the Hungarian ministry, and to lay their respective complaints before him.

6th. On the 27th of September, he was invited by the Palatine of Hungary to a conference on board the steamer in the Platten Sea.

The Vienna Gazette publishes the following report of what was said by Jellacic to a professor who conversed with him, in the course of a visit paid to a brother under the orders of the Ban:

"I am not an enemy of liberty. I spoke and acted for it at a time when no one in Vienna dared to open his mouth in its favor. I can not bear oppression. I have considered it a sacred duty to call the people to whom I belong to arms, because it was endeavored to oppress them. It is for liberty, and not for oppression, that I have drawn my sword. I will neither effect a reaction myself at Vienna, nor serve as an instrument in the hands of others to do so. I am not a servant of the Camarilla."

If these statements of Jellacic were sincere, why, it may be asked, did he do

through Pesth, and, on his arrival in Vienna, sent in to the Hungarians his resignation of the office of Palatine, and retired to his private residence on the Rhine, despite his enthusiastic boast that "history would not find him among the traitors of the nation." If the contest in which he was engaged was illegal and unjust, why did he enter it? and if legal and just, why did he abandon it?

In the mean time, Count Louis Batthiányi received the official notification that the ministry he proposed was not accepted by the king; and another member of the Diet, the Baron Nicholas Vay, was commissioned by the king to form a ministry. Finally, a royal ordinance,* dated the 25th of September, which was not countersigned by any minister, placed all the troops stationed in Hungary under the command of Count Francis Lamberg, as "Commissioner Plenipotentiary," and instructing him to effect at once an armistice between the contending armies in the Hungarian territory, and to make every effort to bring about "a pacification of the internal quarrels, and to restore between his Hungarian and non-Hungarian subjects that harmony which had existed for centuries, and which was assured by the Pragmatic Sanction." On the same day, the emperor issued a proclamation† to his Hungarian army, declaring that, as he was determined not to suffer, under any circumstances, a conflict between his troops under the command of the Hungarian ministry and those under the Ban of Croatia, he had directed his imperial plenipotentiary, Count Lamberg, to repair at once to the head-quarters of the Hungarian army, and to put an end to all hostilities; that he had, at the same time, sent a similar order to Baron Jellacic, in command of the Croatian forces, and that he expected their obedience, and that they would terminate the unnatural contest between troops who had sworn allegiance to the same flag, and whose duty it was to fight only for the same objects and in defense of a common country.

This effort of the emperor-king at pacification may, on his

cline all these invitations for a conference except one, and at that one, as has been seen, exhibit no disposition toward the settlement of their controversy?

* For this document in full, see Appendix, note No. 24.

† For this proclamation, see Appendix, note No. 25.

part, have been sincere and honest; but the Hungarians construed it as full of the deepest treachery. Jellacic, they said, had invaded the country, relying on meeting with no opposition from troops trained under Austrian discipline; letters of his that were intercepted revealed this deception, and the fear that was felt of seeing a collision take place. It was, they thought, to guard against this collision, to take away from Hungary her only chance of success, and to deliver her up defenseless to the enemy, that the court, conspiring with Jellacic, gave the command of the national forces to Count Lamberg, who was ordered not to allow them to act.

Jellacic's unprovoked invasion of Hungary, his refusal to meet the Palatine, whose only object could have been pacification, and his continued advance toward the capital of the kingdom after the receipt of the emperor's communication enjoining a cessation of hostilities, are all strong facts in confirmation of the suspicions of the Hungarians.

Meanwhile Jellacic with his forces advances toward the capital, the feeble Hungarian army retreating before him. Without resistance he enters, with flaming torches, the city of Stuhlweissenburg, and, after establishing himself, appoints Count Eugen Zichy, with whom he had entered the city arm-in-arm, as administrator of the comitat, an appointment which afterward cost the recipient his life.*

* Zichy was seized by Görgey's orders, brought before a court-martial, presided over by the latter, accused of high treason against the nation, and of having secreted treasures wherewith to enable the Ban Jellacic to defray the expenses of his army, and was thereupon sentenced to death, and forthwith hung. Schütte, in speaking of this event, says, "From that moment the name of Görgey was popular, and the eyes of Kossuth were now directed toward him."

THE LAST MOMENTS OF COUNT ZICHY.—We read in the *Hamburg Boersenhalle*:—"The following facts have been communicated respecting the murder of Zichy. He was traveling in company with his brother, the captain, in the direction of Weissenburg, when the carriage was stopped by our outposts. The various questions put were replied to by Captain Zichy. The outposts were on the point of letting the carriage drive on, when Count Zichy, who was of a very arrogant temper, seized his pistols. For this indiscretion the sentinels conducted him to the Loreke camp, where Major Görgey held an investigation, and then found the letters which proved a connection with Jellacic. A council of war was immediately summoned, and five hours after his seizure Count Zichy was hanging on the gallows. He retained his presence of mind to the last moment, and, as he was ascending the gallows, he said, 'I die quietly. I have always loved my country, and never was a traitor. God grant that I may be the last

The city of Pesth was now, by these occurrences, thrown into a state of the utmost excitement, and the cry of treason sounded from every lip. The treacherous behavior of Dreyhaun, the doubtful conduct of Blomberg, the surprising course of Teleki, the desertion of the Italian light horse, for fourteen years stationed in Hungary, the continual retreat of the Magyar force under Moga, the sudden resignation of the Palatine, the unpatriotic course of Zichy, and the approach of the enemy to Velenceze, only twenty miles from the capital, caused an agitation in Pesth which it is not difficult to imagine, but would be impossible to describe.

On the night of the 27th of September, the Hungarian Diet, in a public session, discussed the appointment of Count Lamberg as royal commissioner, countersigned by no minister. The debate was concluded by the adoption of a decree declaring the appointment of Count Lamberg illegal and unconstitutional; the Constitution enacting "that the ordinances, decrees, and appointments of the king are not legal but when they bear the countersignature of one of the ministers sitting at Buda-Pesth."* They called upon the authority of the country, the citizens, the army, and Count Lamberg himself, to obey this decree under pain of high treason.

On the 28th, the rumor was circulated through the city that Lamberg was in Pesth; that, in the name of the king, he had forbidden the dispatch of troops, provisions, or arms to the camp at Velenceze; that the gates of Buda were to be closed, at the order of the count; and that he was in conference with suspicious officers of high rank. The furious and excited populace rushed into the fortress of Ofen, and examined many houses in search of him; and only by the determination and promptitude of the police and National Guard were prevented from committing the utmost violence.

victim for my country, and may God bless it.' On the last step but one he remained standing, and replied to the executioner who desired him to come up, 'What, must I mount yet higher?' He then drew a small vial from his pocket, and drank off the poison which it contained, mounted the other step, and begged the executioner to bring a strong rope, upon which the latter replied, 'The one that is here is quite good enough for your excellency.' In a moment after the count was no more."

* See Appendix. Article 3d, sec. 3d, Constitution of 1848.

The unfortunate Count Lamberg, in obedience to the orders of his sovereign, left Vienna on the 27th; and on the 28th, at noon, had just arrived in Buda, attended only by his servant, in search of Count Batthiányi, to countersign his commission, and was proceeding in a carriage over the pontoon bridge across the Danube, which connects that city with Ofen, when he was recognized by a sergeant, who violently dragged him from his carriage; and by a German student and a young Hungarian from Transylvania, Kalossy by name, he was struck down.*

In vain did he exhibit to the ruthless mob his royal passport and commission—in vain did he demand to be carried before Kossuth. He was murdered on the spot, and his scarcely lifeless body dragged through the streets of the Hungarian capital. This horrible deed was the act of an infuriated mob, which the fearful excitement of the city might easily explain, but which no circumstances on earth can justify.

The Diet, it is true, expressed its sorrow at the bloody deed, and ordered criminal proceedings to be instituted against the murderers; but no criminals were taken, no investigation had, and no efficient means adopted by the representatives of the people to remove this awful stain from the national escutcheon.†

On the following day, the 29th of September, a decisive battle was fought against Jellacic, at Pacoszd, in the neighborhood of Velenceze, within twenty miles of the Hungarian capital.

The Hungarians were determined to make that spot either their Marathon or Thermopylæ: there, like the Athenians, they must repel the invaders; or, like the Spartans, they “must die there, in obedience to their country’s laws.”

The eloquence and the energy of Kossuth had collected a considerable body of troops. “It is an eternal law of God,” said he, in his proclamation, “that whosoever abandoneth himself will be forsaken by the Lord. It is an eternal law that, whosoever assisteth himself, him will the Lord assist. It is a

* Pulszky.

† One of the murderers, Kolossy, who first fled into Transylvania, afterward returned, and was caught and hung by Haynau, in November, 1849.

divine law that false swearing, by its results, chastiseth itself. It is a law of our Lord, that whosoever availeth himself of perjury and injustice, prepareth himself the triumph of justice. Standing on these eternal laws of the Universe, I swear that my prophesy will be fulfilled: it is that the freedom of Hungary will be effected by this invasion of Hungary by Jellacic. Between Veszprim and Weissenburg, the women shall dig a deep grave, in which we will bury the name, the honor, the nation of Hungary, or our enemies. And on this grave shall stand a monument inscribed with a record of our shame, '*So God punishes cowardice!*' or we will plant on it the tree of freedom, eternally green, from out of whose foliage shall be heard the voice of God speaking as from the fiery bush to Moses, 'The spot on which thou standeth is holy ground—thus do I reward the brave. To the Magyars freedom, renown, well-being, and happiness!' "

This noble invocation was nobly answered. The patriot citizens hastened to the field. Jellacic was repulsed, and the capital saved. After his defeat, the Ban asked for and obtained of the Hungarians an armistice of forty-eight hours,* on the condition that, during that time, no change should take place in the position of the respective armies. But, faithless to his engagement, he fled, abandoning to their fate the detached corps of his army, and the Croat rear-guard, ten thousand strong, marching to his assistance under the command of Generals Roth and Philipovich, and which, at Ozora, on the 5th of October, fell into the hands of the Hungarians. Sixty officers were taken prisoners; twelve cannons, seven standards, and eleven thousand muskets were the trophies of the day.

When the brutal murder of Count Lamberg reached Vienna, the emperor-king, by a new ordinance, nominated Count Adam Recsey President of the Hungarian Ministry. This ordinance had no other countersignature than Recsey's. Another ordinance,† bearing date the 3d of October, and also countersigned by Recsey, declared: 1st. The Hungarian Diet dis-

* According to Pulszky, "*three days.*"

† For this document, see Appendix, note No. 26.

solved. 2d. Its decrees which had not yet been sanctioned, annulled. 3d. Jellacic appointed royal commissioner, with full executive power throughout the entire kingdom; the civil laws suspended, and the country placed in a state of siege.

This ordinance of his majesty produced, as might have been expected, the utmost dissatisfaction and excitement among the Hungarians.

Taking their stand upon the Constitution, which enacts that royal ordinances are not legal unless countersigned by one of the responsible Hungarian ministry, and which further enacts that the Diet can neither be closed nor dissolved before the vote of the budget; convinced that the king had not the right to leave the country at the mercy of an armed enemy, to abolish the Constitution, and take the legislative power from the Hungarian National Assembly, the representatives of the nation declared the self-styled royal ordinance null and void, and the measures which accompanied it illegal and unconstitutional, both in form and substance.

The Diet further decided that it would continue its sittings, and would persist in the fulfillment of its duties. It declared Joseph Jellacic, and all those who aided him, traitors to the country; and decreed that Adam Recsey, for having countersigned an illegal ordinance, should be brought to trial, in accordance with the Constitution.*

Finally, in the absence of a ministry, the country not being able to remain without a government, the executive power was intrusted to a Committee of Defense, which had been previously formed to assist the administration of Count Batthiányi, and which, from that time, was invested with the extraordinary power which the crisis demanded.†

* For Article 3d, 1848, act 3, section 32, see Appendix, note No. 27.

† At this stage of proceedings in Hungary, a number of the high aristocracy—such as Louis Batthiányi, Deak, Széchenyi, Wesseleni, and others, called by some the *Girondists* of Hungary, and who had, up to this time, supported all the measures of the movement party—alarmed at the violence of the Diet, “indignant at the murder of Count Lamberg,” and fearful that Kossuth was hurrying the country into revolution, withdrew altogether from the struggle. They were advocates of reform, they were not yet ready for rebellion. Kossuth, on the other hand, deprived of this conservative portion of his party, was compelled to seek support from, and consequently to fall under the influence of, the more anarchical faction.

Louis Kossuth, representative of the people, and until then Minister of Finance, was named president of this committee. Descended of a poor but noble family of Slavic origin, Louis Kossuth was born the 27th April, 1802, at Monok, a small town in the Zemplén comitat, in the north of Hungary. After a university education, he commenced the study of the law. In the year 1837, he was selected by two peeresses and a magnate as the representative of their *seigneuries* in the Hungarian Diet. In that capacity he transmitted periodical letters to his patronesses, with an account of the proceedings of the Assembly. The want of any communication by the press gave great importance to these documents. They were circulated from hand to hand; copies were at first multiplied in manuscript, and afterward in lithograph. The reputation of the young jurist's epistles had already excited the suspicion of the Austrian authorities, and this last step gave them the opportunity they were seeking. The lithographed sheets came under the denomination of a newspaper, and unlicensed newspapers were prohibited in Hungary. In May, 1837, under the reactionary ministry of Palfy, Kossuth was arrested for refusing to obey a ministerial order forbidding the appearance of his manuscript journal, and for having declared that order illegal. After awaiting in confinement for two years, his trial, which had excited great interest, came on. His personal defense was eloquent and masterly; but he was found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment for three years. This increased the ferment of the country; and, after an earnest protestation by the Diet, Kossuth was released from his imprisonment, under the general amnesty of 1840, granted by Count Mailath, the successor of Palfy. On quitting his prison, he began to edit the *Pesthi Hirlap*, the first Liberal journal published in Hungary, which he continued until 1844; when, owing to some misunderstanding among the members of his party, he relinquished his connection with the press. In 1847, he was elected a deputy for the comitat of Pesth by a large majority; and in the Diet, by his fervid eloquence, skillful debating talent, and thorough knowledge of public affairs, he at once became the head of the party which had now attained the majority.

Such was his position when, a few months later, the revolutions of Europe broke forth, and his history since then is that of Hungary itself.*

After the defeat of Jellacic and his troops at Velenceze, and during the existence of the armistice of forty-eight hours, which he had sought for and obtained, contrary to the stipulations of that convention, he, instead of remaining on the spot, withdrew his forces in the night from Weissenburg to Raab. Upon the expiration of the armistice he took possession of Raab, and then marched on Pressburg. After some negotiation, the latter city surrendered to him; but he had not time to collect a tribute laid upon the town, when the Hungarian army coming up, he retreated across the Leytha into Austria, and there, about the first days of October, dispatched a messenger to the Minister of War at Vienna for additional troops to carry on his operations against Pesth. The Minister of War, Count Latour, in obedience to that call, was dispatching troops on the 6th of October to the aid of Jellacic, when the revolution broke out in Vienna, in the effort there made to prevent the departure of the troops.

Upon receiving the tidings of the outbreak in Vienna, Jellacic with his army marched to Laxemburg, in the neighborhood of Vienna, where he subsequently united his forces with those of Prince Windischgrätz in the subjugation of the capital.

* The *character* of Kossuth will be considered after his acts shall have been detailed; or, in other words, his career in Hungary concluded.

CHAPTER VI.

SECOND REVOLUTION IN VIENNA.—OUTBREAK OF THE SIXTH OF OCTOBER.—MURDER OF THE MINISTER OF WAR.—ARSENAL TAKEN AND PLUNDERED.—IMPERIAL TROOPS DRIVEN FROM THE CITY.—SUBSEQUENT SIEGE BY WINDISCHGRATZ WITH ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND MEN.—THE ATTACK DURING SIX DAYS.—BOMBARDMENT, CAPTURE OF THE BARRICADES, AND FINAL SURRENDER OF THE CAPITAL.

THE Revolution in Vienna, of the 13th March, as has been described, was followed by a complete prostration of civil authority and a suspension of military power. The emperor, not accustomed to grant concessions, nor the people to receive them, neither party knew when and where to stop. The people, intoxicated with the idea of liberty, gave themselves up to the utmost license, which the government, in its weakness, found itself unable to restrain; victories were, in consequence, won, without a blow, by undisciplined mobs over veteran troops; and the capital was abandoned to the caprices of a band of students and National Guards; while the ministers and their sovereign, who had previously exercised unlimited power, stooped now to the most abject capitulation, or sought safety in ignominious flight.

During the entire summer, the city had been abandoned to the rule of the populace, to preserve order whenever it suited them to do so, or to indulge in disorder and license whenever such a course was more compatible with their inclinations.

The aristocracy had fled, their splendid equipages and rich liveries had vanished, and even the ordinary civil dress of modern times had almost entirely disappeared from the streets.

Students, in their Calabrian hats and feathers, blue frocks, with their shirt-collars à la Byron, German ribbons dangling at their button-holes, and large cavalry swords swinging at their sides and at every step striking the pavement, were alone seen strutting through the streets, with airs as consequential as if they had been the lords of the soil.

The university and the Democratic clubs, composed of Radicals, Socialists, and Terrorists combined, and presided over by foreign emissaries, usurped the entire control of the city, and the peaceful inhabitants were subjected to a terrorism as complete, though, from the absence of the guillotine, not so bloody, as that which reigned in France in 1789.

The students quartered themselves upon the inhabitants, who were not only forced to support, but also to supply them with funds and every luxury they might demand, even in some instances, among the lower classes, it is said, to the sacrifice of their daughters' virtue.

With one hundred thousand workmen at their command, whom, by the sound of the tocsin, they could gather in an hour, and who were ever ready to execute their order, regardless of consequences, the government, it will be perceived, had been changed from the palace to the university—from a government of order and respectability to a most cruel and unmitigated despotism.

One day, an order would be issued that the German flag should be suspended from the window of every house in the city; and at another, that an illumination should take place on a certain night, in honor of some Democratic triumph; and these orders were as readily and implicitly obeyed as if they had been the ukase of a czar; for if any one ventured on disobedience, his house would be attacked, the inmates treated with indignity and violence, every window smashed, and all articles of furniture demolished.

This anarchical spirit, which had kept the city for months on the brink of a convulsion, and which would sooner or later have destroyed itself by the excess of its own violence, was fostered by the divisions of hostile nationalities; and the Hungarian Radicals, it was said, availed themselves of the disaffected state of Vienna to produce an outbreak and create a diversion in their favor, when their danger became most imminent, and Jellacic and his invading army were within a day's march of Pesth.

Hostilities between the Croats and Hungarians had been for some time progressing. The imperial commissioner, Count Lamberg, dispatched to Pesth, had been brutally murdered;

and, on the 3d of October, the Emperor of Austria issued a proclamation declaring that the Ban of Croatia should have command of all the forces in Hungary, and be constituted "Commissioner Plenipotentiary," with full powers and authority as the chief executive of Hungary. To sustain the purposes of this proclamation, and to reduce the revolting province to subjection, the emperor directed that the large military force then in Galicia should repair to the northern frontier of Hungary, and that several regiments from Vienna should be dispatched to the aid of the Ban of Croatia, now appointed military governor of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia.

Several regiments of Italian infantry had left on the evening of the 5th of October, and on the next day, the 6th, in conformity to orders, the Richter battalion of grenadiers, for many years quartered in Vienna, and who had contracted numberless ties of intimacy with the population, were to take up the line of march for the same destination.

A body of students, and portions of the National Guard and citizens of the faubourg in which they had been quartered, determined to oppose their removal, whether bribed by Hungarian agents, as many believed, or as they themselves alleged, in order that the struggle for independence then going on in Hungary might not be effectually checked, and from an apprehension that the emperor intended, in the event of success in that country, to avail himself of the army which it would place at his command, to put down the constitutional system in Austria.

For some days this regiment had shown signs of insubordination, and, worked up to resistance by an excess of spirituous liquors, "which had been purposely administered in the well-known pot-houses,"* the order to march was, on the evening of the 5th, received by them with strong indications of mutiny.

The manufacturing population of the Gumpendorf suburb, in which the barracks of this regiment were situated, became excited; and when it appeared that the grenadiers were on the verge of open revolt, a numerous deputation of the Democratic Association, composed of students, National Guards, women, and Magyars, with their national colors on their caps, march-

* Dunder's Revolution of the 6th of October in Vienna.

ed down to applaud and salute them. The grenadiers now refused to march, unless one of their comrades, who had been put under arrest the preceding day, was restored to them. Count Auersperg, then in military command of Vienna, underrating the gravity of these circumstances, neither countermanded the order, nor took the necessary precautions to enforce its fulfillment, but contented himself with replying to the committee that reported them, "Do not be alarmed; nothing will happen; the grenadiers will march off without their imprisoned comrade."

The National Guard and the disaffected began, meantime, to muster in support of the refractory grenadiers. At four o'clock, on the morning of the 6th, the peremptory order was given to march; and some other troops, less disposed to fraternize with the people, set the example; but it was two hours later before the Richter corps would move, and then, with every sign of insubordination, they broke to pieces all the implements and furniture in the *caserne*. At an early hour the alarm-drum was beaten, without authority, in the Mariahülf and Wieden, and the National Guards of those suburbs began to assemble around the Gumpendorf *caserne*, although no orders to that effect had been given either by the commander-in-chief or the district captain.

At half past five A.M., a regiment of cuirassiers arrived, companies of grenadiers from other barracks also came up, and the cavalry taking the disaffected grenadiers in the centre, about six o'clock the march began. Repeated attempts were made by the National Guard to stop the progress of the troops on their way to the rail-road; but these, by the promptness and decision of the military escort, proving ineffectual, several companies of Guards hurried off to the depot of the Northern Rail-road, and there, while awaiting the arrival of the troops, occupied themselves in tearing up the rails and destroying the telegraph.

The march of the troops was the most irregular and confused—National Guards, women, and civilians walking in the ranks of the military. As they passed along the *glacis*, the grenadiers forcing the drummers to beat, in order to attract attention to them, drew together a mob of the most threatening aspect.

The *rappel* was now beaten in the Leopold-Stadt and several other faubourgs, and National Guards without leaders, and workmen from all sides, rushed in, actuated apparently by the same motives, viz., to obstruct the departure of the troops, or, at least, to delay their advance until the Guards thought themselves strong enough to oppose effectually their passage.

When the troops reached the rail-road depôt, finding it occupied, and the rails torn up, the order was given to proceed to Gansersdorf; and they accordingly marched on through the Tabor line, with a view of crossing the bridges which span both arms of the Danube, and to enter the rail-road at Florisdorf, its first station.

Arrived at the Tabor Bridge, they found several arches of it torn up, and the lumber used to construct a barricade, which National Guards, students, and workmen had raised to prevent the passage of the troops. The battalion Richter arrived at the bridge, and the Hess division of it, headed by the major bearing the standard, passed the barricade and proceeded toward the second bridge; but the three other divisions of it refused, amid the cheers of the people.

Every instant the excitement increased. The university, now the centre of the revolutionary movement, was in commotion, and the Academic Legion marching to the rescue of the mutineers. Several students, mounting a wagon, harangued the populace, and declared that it was the will of the sovereign people to stand by the grenadiers, and that that will must be carried out, and the Camarilla and enemies of the people must be put down. While these things were transpiring, the imperial general, Breda, succeeded in collecting a small body of troops, with two cannons, and some sappers. He addressed the people, and tried to convince them that it was futile to attempt to restrain the military, who were bound implicitly to obey the orders of their commanders.

They endeavored to tear the general from his horse, and to treat him with other violence; and it was only upon his pledge to repair to the Minister of War, to receive new orders, that they suffered him to escape. During his absence, the troops were still more strongly pressed to stay; and by others the

destruction of the Tabor Bridge was carried on. The pioneers attempted to repair it, but the National Guard, students, and workmen with spears prevented.

General Breda returned with the order from the Minister of War that the troops "must proceed." He crossed the river to announce the order to the division on that side, and on his return an attempt was made to throw him from the sleeper or beam of the bridge on which he was, into the Danube.

A short time after General Breda, a deputation of National Guards, students, and citizens called upon the Minister of War with the request that he would withdraw the order of march for the German grenadier battalions—which he most energetically refused, declaring to the deputation that, if they were possessed of any military knowledge, they might readily conceive that, while he might with propriety give counter orders to troops who obeyed, that to withdraw a given order to a mutinous corps because they refused to obey that order, could not be done without a destruction of all military discipline.

About ten o'clock, the National Guard and students occupied the rail-road dam; below them, on the side of the road, stood the infantry regiment of Nassau, the pioneers, and cuirassiers, with three pieces of artillery. The battalion of German grenadiers stood upon the Great Tabor Bridge, surrounded by National Guards. The tocsin now rang in the city, the crowd became greater, and the excitement increased; the detachments of troops which remained faithful to their duty were insulted. Still the hope of the government was to reduce the grenadiers to obedience without attacking the people. But they had yet to learn the disaffection of the great mass of the National Guard.

At eleven o'clock, while the pioneers were engaged in removing the barricade and repairing the bridge, an attempt was made by some workmen and others to capture a gun. The artillery officer retreated, and a powder wagon was all that they succeeded in carrying off. The workmen made a second attack with more success; but at that moment, just as they had seized and were dragging off the gun, General Breda ordered the Nassau regiment of the line to fire, and the conflict began. The Academic Legion returned the discharge, and

Breda himself fell from his horse, pierced by two mortal wounds. Every one for a moment fled with loud cries, some over the bridges, others by the rail-road dam; while most of the Guards retreated to the cottages and trees in their rear, whence they began a murderous fire. An unarmed crowd that stood between the two fires fled in confusion, throwing the students standing on the rail-road down into the ditch; behind that ditch, and protected by it, the Academic Legion maintained a lively fire against the military. The action then became furious and general. The military attempted to take the dam by storm, but were beaten back, while it was at the same time attacked in the rear by the Guards and faithless grenadiers, who advanced over the bridge. About thirty were killed on the spot. Lieutenant-colonel Klein, of the Nassau regiment, fell at the head of his corps; but the Richter grenadiers, National Guard, and students so outnumbered the faithful military that the latter were driven back and forced to retreat, with the loss of two cannons.

To a want of decision on the part of General Breda, and his failure to make the proper dispositions for an energetic interference at the right moment, and suffering the crowd to approach so near as to obstruct the operations of the military, were ascribed, in a great measure, the repulse which the military sustained on that occasion. Their retreat was harassed by fire from the windows in the Augarten and in the Tabor Strasse. A second engagement took place between the Wrba light horse and the mob on the Carmeliten Platz; but it was not till noon that any considerable detachment of troops entered the inner part of the city.

After routing the government troops, the insurgents marched from the suburbs into the town; the two captured cannons, the trophies of their victory, upon which were laid wounded students, were carried in triumph through the Leopold-Stadt by their comrades, National Guards, and faithless grenadiers, and deposited in the square of the university.

In consequence of the proceedings at the Tabor line, all the troops of the garrison of Vienna were dispatched by degrees to Schönbrunn; and but one battalion of Nassau infantry, and three companies of pioneers, remained in the city for its pro-

tection, and for the assistance of the loyal and well-disposed Guards.

At one o'clock a party of the insurgent guards were attacked on the Stephen's Platz by a party of loyal National Guards; but, after a short fight, the latter were forced to retire into the Cathedral of St. Stephen, the doors of which were then barricaded from within. But the insurgents battered down the doors, entered the church, and dislodged their antagonists, whose leader was killed on the very steps of the altar. The battle then raged in awful confusion round the walls of the cathedral. All ranks seemed mingled in one phrensy of civil war, National Guards, citizens, even soldiers fighting on both sides, without leaders, without order, and without result. At two o'clock the operations of the loyal force, consisting of three companies of pioneers, occupying one the *Hof*, another the *Graben*, and the third the *Stock am Eisen* (fronting the square of the cathedral), became more regular. The latter, insulted by the mob and Guards, gave the signal for the commencement of the fight. From the windows, roofs, and cellars a murderous fire was poured out upon the military; and they, in turn, discharged twenty rounds of grape-shot on the crowd. They were, however, too weak to maintain their position, and were again driven back with the loss of their guns. They retreated through the *Graben*, and up the Bogner Gasse to the Hof, on which the war office is situated, the fighting continuing the while, and the grape-shot producing havoc among the crowd, as well as defacing the fine buildings on either side, and penetrating the houses in every direction, notwithstanding the doors and window-shutters were cased with sheet-iron.

One of the city gates, the *Burg Thor*, still remained in possession of the government troops. Three companies of sappers and miners, with four guns, entered this gate at three o'clock in the afternoon. They were at once attacked and totally routed, in spite of the grape and canister which they uninterruptedly fired. Many of them were captured, disarmed, and confined in the university buildings. Formidable barricades were constructed while the fight was going on. The old fortifications of the city were occupied by the artillery of the National Guard.

The Constituent Assembly, then sitting in Vienna, and which had long before assumed both legislative and executive powers, passed the day in idle communications with the ministers, and fierce international disputes among themselves. The ministers, partly from want of adequate military force, and partly from want of resolution to proceed to extremities against the people, took no decisive measures. They sent re-enforcements to the Stephen's Platz, when that spot was already in the hands of the insurgents; and the cathedral itself, with its solemn grandeur and ancient monuments, had been already desecrated, and was then streaming with Austrian blood, shed by Austrian hands. The Minister of War dispatched orders that the firing should cease; but it was too late, for the fury of an excited populace then knew no bounds, and blood alone could quench the flame which blood itself had kindled.

The cabinet remained in deliberation at the Ministry of War, situated at the corner of the square called the Hof. The tide of insurrection now rose to an unconquerable height. The nearest shots of the retiring cannons, the advancing shouts of the infuriated people, warned the ministers that all defense was rapidly becoming hopeless. The building itself still offered some means of resistance, and there were two cannons in the court; but at that crisis was issued a written order, signed by Latour and Wessenberg, "to cease the fire at all points," and given to officers for distribution.* It was in vain. The popular torrent rolled on toward the seat of government, which was destined ere long to be disgraced by atrocious crime. The Minister of War, Count Latour, prepared for defense. The military on guard in front of the War Office were withdrawn into the yard, with two pieces of artillery loaded with grape.

* The last order issued by the unfortunate Latour was intrusted to Colonel Gustave Schindler of the imperial engineers, an efficient officer, as well as a most amiable and accomplished gentleman, and one well and favorably known in the United States, from his kind attention to Americans who have visited the Austrian capital. The colonel was in the act of passing out of the great door of the War Office, which opens on to the Hof, when the mob reached that spot. Recognized by his imperial uniform, he was instantly surrounded and attacked. He received many blows over the head, inflicted by the crowd with clubs and iron bars; was most severely wounded, and would probably have been killed but for the timely interference of one of the rabble, who, riding up on horseback between the colonel and the mob, shielded him from further blows, and finally effected his escape.

The gates were closed, the military distributed to the different threatened points, and the cannons directed toward the two gates. Soon the scene of battle had reached the Bogner Gasse, immediately under the windows of the War Department; the ministers in consultation heard the cry, "*The military retreat.*" The great square of the Hof was soon cleared, the soldiers retiring by the way of the Freyung. The Guards and Academic Legion pursuing, the military commander's quarters in the Freyung are soon captured. The retiring military, not being able to escape through the Schotten-Thor as they had expected—that gate being closed and barricaded—they cut their way through the *Herrn Gasse*.

So intent were the respective combatants, either in retreat or pursuit, that the whole tempest of war swept over the Hof, and left that square for a short time deserted and silent.

But that stillness was but of short duration; a few moments only had elapsed, when a number of straggling Guards, students, and people, came stealing silently from the Graben, through the Bogner, Nagler, and Glocken Gasse, on to the Hof, and removed the dead and the wounded into the neighboring dwellings, and into the deserted guard-house in the War Department. These were soon followed by a fierce and noisy mob, armed with axes, pikes, and iron bars, which halted before the War Office, and began to thunder at its massive doors.

The officer of ordnance in vain attempted to communicate to the crowd the order of the ministry, that all firing should cease. A member of the Academic Legion, from the window over the gateway, waved with a white handkerchief to the tumultuous masses, and, exhibiting the order signed by Latour and Wessenberg, read its contents to the crowd.

But a pacification was not to be thought of; the people were too excited, their fury could only be appeased by blood; that delayed measure was not sufficient; they made negative gesticulations, and summoned the student to come down and open the portals to their admission. The tumult increased from minute to minute; the closed doors at length gave way under the axes of the mob, and the people streamed in, led by a man "in a light gray coat."

The Secretary of War having by this time abandoned the

idea of defense, on the ground either that it was useless or impolitic, no shots were fired or active resistance offered; but the orderlies, with their horses, retired to the stables, and the grenadiers into an inner court. At first only single individuals entered, and their course was not characterized by violence; then groups, proceeding slowly, listening, and searching; and, at last, the tumultuous masses thundered in the rear.

Ere long, the cry rung on the broad stair-case, "Where is Latour? he must die!" At this moment, the ministers and their followers in the building, with the exception of Latour himself, found means to escape, or mingled with the throng. The deputies, Smolka, Borrosch, Goldmark, and Sierakowski, who had undertaken to guarantee protection to the threatened ministers, arrived in the hope of restraining the mob. The numerous corridors and cabinets of the War Office (formerly a monastery of the Jesuits) were filled with the crowd; the tide of insurrection now rose to an uncontrollable height; and the danger of Latour became every moment more imminent. The generals who were with him, perceiving the peril, entreated him to throw himself upon the Nassau regiment, or the *Dutch Meister* grenadiers, and retreat to their barracks. He scorned the proposal, denied the danger, and even refused, for some time, to change his uniform for a civilian's dress, until the hazard becoming more evident, he put on plain clothes and went up into a small room in the roof of the building, where he soon after signed a paper declaring that, with his majesty's consent, he was ready to resign the office of Minister of War. A *Tecnicker*,* named Rauch, who, it was said, had come to relieve the Secretary of War, was seized and hung in the court by his own scarf, but fortunately cut down by a National Guard before life was extinct. The mob rushed into the private apartments of the minister, but plundered it merely of the papers, which were conveyed to the university. They came with a sterner purpose. The act of resignation, exhibited to the crowd by the Deputy Smolka, was scornfully received by the people, while the freshness of the writing, the sand adhering still to the ink, betrayed the proximity of the hand which had just

* A student of the Polytechnic School, for brevity, usually called *Tecnickers*.

traced it. Meanwhile, the crowd had penetrated the corridors of the fourth story, and were not long in discovering the place of Latour's concealment. Hearing their approach, and recognizing the voice of Smolka, vice-president of the Assembly, who was doubtless anxious to protect him, Latour came out of his retreat. They descended together from the fourth story by a narrow stair-way, on the right-hand side of the building, and entered the yard by the pump. At each successive landing-place, the tumult and the crowd increased; but the descent was slow, and rendered more and more difficult by the numbers which joined the crowd at every turn of the stairs. At length they reached the court below, and Count Latour, although he had been severely pressed, was still unhurt; but here the populace, which awaited them, broke in upon the group that still clustered around Latour, and dispersed it. In vain did the deputies, Smolka and Sierakowski, endeavor to protect the minister; in vain did Count Leopold Gondrecourt attempt to cover him by the exposure of his own body. A workman struck the hat from his head; others pulled him by his gray locks—he defending himself with his hands, which were already bleeding. At length a ruffian, disguised as a Magyar, gave him, from behind, a mortal blow with a hammer, the man in the gray coat cleft his face with a sabre, and another plunged a bayonet into his heart. A hundred wounds followed, and, with the words "*I die innocent!*" he gave up his loyal and manly spirit. A cry of exultation from the assembled crowd rent the air at this event. Every indignity was offered to his body; before he had ceased to breathe even, they hung him by a cord to the grating of a window in the court of the War Office. He had been suspended there but a few minutes when, from the outrages committed on it, the body fell.

They then dragged it to the Hof, and suspended it to one of the bronze candelabras that adorn that extensive and much-frequented square, and, there treated with every indignity, it remained for fourteen hours exposed to the gaze of a mocking populace.*

* Before the "Central Committee of Safety," which acted in concert with and by the authority of the Diet, appeared a man in a white jacket and apron, and

Yet all this time the soldiers stood to their post at the War Office, witnessing these atrocities, obedient to the last order of the minister himself, not to advance upon the people.

Lieutenant-general Count Theodore Latour was born at Vienna on the 15th of June, 1780, and was the only son of the imperial Master-general of Ordnance and President of the Council of War, Count Maximilian Baillet de Latour, who died in 1806, and was proprietor of the estate called the County of Latour, in the province of Luxembourg. This property was erected into a fief or entail in 1719; but the family mansion was destroyed during the French Revolution, and the property itself has passed into other hands. Educated at the Imperial Engineers' School, Theodore de Latour there received all that instruction and acquired that solid knowledge which was matured in after years, and which, at the commencement of his military career, caused him to be appointed on the quarter-master general's staff, in which duties he was enabled to render valuable service. During the period that the Austrian army was engaged in a constant succession of campaigns, Latour remained uninterruptedly on active service, and by his zeal and courage obtained rapid promotion; so that, at the commencement of what was called the War of Liberation, he had already obtained the rank of colonel. In January, 1814, he was appointed chief of the staff to the eighth army corps of the Confederation, then under the crown prince, now King of Wurtemberg. The able dispositions of Colonel Latour at the sanguinary engagements of Epinay, Brienne, Sens, Montereau, and La Ferre, were publicly acknowledged at the time, and obtained

with a long iron bar in his hand, who related, in a Viennese dialect, the following: "In the morning we were at the Wienerberg, and marched to the rail-road depôt from the Belvidere. Following the general alarm, we entered the faubourg, and erected barricades before the line. As we had finished with that, the cries for Latour became loud; we marched into the city to look for him. We first searched through the first story, and as we did not find him, then the *parterre*. Here we seized him, and I pierced him in the throat with my bar. Was not that right? The others struck him on the head with their tools; but I thought it better to hang him up. We hung him in the yard, but the rope broke. Then we dragged him out on the Hof, and hung him to the lamp-post. Was not that right?"—*Dunder's Revolution of the 6th of October*.

Notwithstanding this horrible confession made in their presence, no attempt whatever was made by the Committee of Safety for the arrest of the murderer.

for him the repeated thanks of the prince commanding and the allied sovereigns. The rank of general and many orders of knighthood were among his recompenses and honorable testimonies. During the long peace which succeeded the campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815, Count Latour filled various military offices with credit under the Austrian government.

Upon the abolition of the Aulic Council of War at Vienna, Latour, who had long attained the rank of lieutenant general, was by the Emperor Ferdinand appointed Minister of War and chief of the War Department. In this most difficult and perilous position he was enabled, by patience, firmness, and long experience, to temper the storm by which he was surrounded, and to accomplish what might have been considered impracticable. His combinations with Radetzky led to the successful issue of the late campaigns in Lombardy; for he united to the talent of conception that of execution, and with these a wonderful faculty of economizing and producing resources. A man less gifted with courage and constancy under difficulties, and readiness for extracting great results from small means, would have yielded to the pressure of events and the embarrassments by which he was surrounded.

He could have retired from an office which, it is said, he did not covet; but was withheld from so doing by his devotion to his emperor, by his disinterestedness, and by that generous, rational patriotism, which caused him to keep firmly at his post until death—a horrible, foul, and bloody death terminated his long and honorable career.

At five P.M., Smolka, with the deputation, returned. Leon Kowski re-entered the Diet with the words, "Latour is dead, and his corpse is hanging on the lamp-post on the Hof."

Howelka expressed his deep regret at the horrible deed, and at the disgraceful course which events had taken. He was answered by a deputy that if the Minister Bach, who had always ridiculed the sovereignty of the people, could be also hung up, he should witness the spectacle with pleasure.

The galleries of the House were now occupied by armed men, and one of the deputies calling the attention of the Assembly to the fact, summoned the individuals to leave the House; but, instead of sustaining their own personal safety

and freedom of action, the deputy Zimmer replied: "These arms have fought but a few months since in the streets for the liberty of the people; they have, consequently, the right to appear here. You betrayed that liberty—you may now suffer for it."

These demonstrations no longer left any doubt that the whole programme of frightful scenes announced at the barricades was about to be acted out. Latour was already hung up, armed men had forced the galleries and were opposite to the right side of the House, and actually pointing their guns at the members seated on that side; and these violations were approved by a representative of the people.

At this time, when the Assembly seemed to be completely in the hands of the mob, the minority controlling by terror the inclinations of the majority, the president, Strohbach, together with all the Bohemian deputies marked out for destruction, left the House, and saved themselves by flight.

At six o'clock, there was but one place of refuge left in the city for the troops and National Guards who took sides with the government, and that place was the arsenal—famous not only for the immense quantity of arms of all kinds which it contained, but for the valued trophies acquired in the crusades in the Holy Land, in the Turkish wars, and in the French campaigns.

All other places being in their possession, attempts were now made by the mob to carry this point by storm. They first attempted to force the gates, but failing in this, operations were abandoned until after nightfall. They next endeavored to gain entrance from the roofs of the adjoining houses, but this effort was attended with no better success, as the assailants were picked off by the sharpshooters in the arsenal as rapidly as they made their appearance.

At seven o'clock, and as soon as the shades of night afforded some concealment for their maneuvers, the attack was renewed with great vigor. Two barricades were constructed not far distant from the arsenal, and in both the streets which met and formed right angles in front of the gate, and the fire was opened from all houses within reach, both in the Renn Gasse and Wiplingher Strasse; while from the barricade on the Ho-

hen Brücke the cannons poured forth their contents against the feeble gate, the concussion in the narrow streets and lofty houses shivering to atoms all the glass of the windows, and drowning all other sounds with its deafening thunder.

Captain Castell, commanding the only company of regulars left for the defense of the arsenal, prudently waited until the enemy's shot had made in the gate an aperture sufficiently large to enable him to point out the only but well-directed cannon which he had, and the effect of a few shots was indescribable—the streets were cleared, and the captain, venturing out with a few men, took the deserted cannons, which had been brought over the barricade for the purpose of attacking the arsenal from a nearer point.

The combat deepened, the garrison swept the Renn Gasse with grape and canister, and killed and disabled a great number of the populace, whose fury increased after each unsuccessful attempt to gain possession of the building. The assailants proceeded to the civic arsenal, and demanded cannon for the loudly expressed purpose of bombarding the military arsenal. With these they proceeded on the bastions, and attacked the building in the rear.

Parliamentaires were dispatched to the arsenal both by the Diet and the students, ordering the garrison to surrender, and the combat to cease; but these were shot as fast as they approached the building, not by the garrison, but, as was generally believed, by assassins posted in the opposite houses of the Renn Gasse.

At ten o'clock, the arsenal was bombarded from four different points. At eleven o'clock, from the discharge of Congreve rockets, the building took fire, and great apprehensions were entertained that the powder magazine would explode; yet the gallant little band intrusted with its defense held out undaunted. Some well-disposed citizens attempted to dispatch fire engines to the relief of the arsenal; but the enraged mob interfered, and prevented their departure. The fire fortunately communicated only with the wood and coal depôts, and, by the untiring exertions of the garrison, was kept under control. Every species of stratagem was resorted to to obtain possession of the arsenal, but all without effect.

One of these schemes was very near consummation, and had it been carried through, would have decided at once the fates both of the garrison and the arsenal. A little after midnight, a great sound of many voices was heard in the Wiplingher Strasse, and a band of mixed persons observed marching up to the arsenal, some bearing white flags, and others torches and candles. From afar they proclaimed words of peace, and requested a parley, and the garrison was inclined to listen to the most advanced speaker. Two loaded cannons were posted in the gateway and pointed down the street, and Captain Castell, with nearly his entire force of forty grenadiers, advanced toward the doubtful band; and while there, listening to their communications, and preventing them from pressing too closely on the arsenal, the captain happening to cast a look behind, remarked a flash upon the tube of the double-loaded cannon. Amazed, he sprang toward the cannon, where he perceived a young *proletariat* searching with a burning match for the touch-hole of the gun, which in a second more would have discharged its murderous contents upon the backs of the grenadiers. An instantaneous cry directed the attention of the cannoniers to the youthful assassin, and the next moment one of them, with a rope hammer, struck him speechless to the earth. Incensed at the treachery which was attempted, Captain Castell immediately withdrew his grenadiers, and answered the faithless band by two discharges of grape, which produced great havoc in their ranks, and caused a death-like stillness through the street.

The attack and defense of the arsenal continued through the entire night. Never was more strikingly exhibited the advantage of skill and discipline over rude masses than occurred that night, when the handful of regular troops held out, with Spartan valor, against all the force which could be brought against them, and never yielded their post until next morning, when summoned to do so by their own commander, Count Auersperg, who had entered into stipulations with the Diet and common council for the surrender.

But the horrors of that awful night—the alarm-bells pealing from all the steeples in the city; the arsenal at times wrapt in flames; the uninterrupted musket-fire; the thunder of the

heavy cannons, and the streets strewed with the dying and the dead, will not soon be forgotten by the quiet and pleasure-loving inhabitants of Vienna.

While these bloody deeds were occurring around them, the transactions of the Austrian Diet, reduced, by the withdrawal of the Bohemian deputies, to the "*rump*" of a faction, were equally striking and significant, as the following short summary of the heads of their resolutions will not fail to exhibit.*

"Seven o'clock P.M.

"An executive committee, consisting of members of the left, is appointed. M. Löchner moves an address to the emperor, demanding the formation of a new and popular ministry, with Messrs. Dobblhof and Hornbostel in it; the removal of Baron Jellacic from his governorship of Hungary; the revocation of the last proclamation against the Hungarians; and an amnesty for those implicated in the riots of that day. The House accepts the motion, and sends a deputation to the emperor."

While the disfigured body of Latour still hung to the lamp-post on the Hof, and before the remains of Breda and all the rest who had fallen on that day, had been committed to the earth, while the streets were yet reeking with human gore, a pardon was demanded by the Diet for all those who might be connected with these atrocities.

"Half-past seven P.M.

"Resolved to appoint M. Scherzer Provisional Commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Vienna and the suburbs. Resolved to put a stop to the combat against the garrison of the arsenal. Resolved to instruct the military commander, Count Auersperg, to prevent the interference of the military.

"Eight o'clock.

"Resolved, with acclamation, to serve out fresh ammunition to the Academical Legion.

"Nine o'clock.

"Resolved to instruct the directors of the Southern Rail-way that they will not be suffered to convey troops to Vienna.

"Half-past eleven o'clock.

"The deputation returns. The emperor will consider about

* Wien und Buda-Pesth im Herbste, 1848, von Joh. Moshamer.

the address, and promises to appoint a popular ministry, with Dobblhof and Hornbostel in it.

“Twelve o'clock at night.

“The arsenal is reported to be on fire. Resolved to entreat the people to desist from the combat.

“Three o'clock A.M.

“Resolved to inform Count Auersperg that it is his duty not to obey any commands but those of the Diet.”

As these extraordinary scenes were occurring in Vienna, the emperor, with the imperial family, clustered together in the summer palace at Schönbrunn, were receiving from time to time, with the utmost trepidation, intelligence of the treachery and defeat of his hitherto faithful and victorious troops—the shocking triumphs of the mob—the storming of the War Department, and brutal murder of the minister; while, from the upper windows of the palace, they beheld the arsenal in flames, and listened all night long to the uninterrupted musket-fire and incessant discharges of artillery.

The small garrison of the palace was re-enforced that night by the arrival of ten companies of infantry from St. Pölten and Stockerau; but these troops, from the forced march which they had undergone, were so fatigued, that had an attack then been made upon the palace, they would have been found unfit for duty. When, at early morn, a messenger arrived reporting that the arsenal was near its fall, and that the *proletaria* would soon all be armed, the emperor lost no time in resolving to flee a second time the palace of his fathers, and to abandon his capital again to the mercies of a triumphant rabble.

At seven o'clock the next morning, the imperial family, in light carriages with baggage, took their departure, escorted by six squadrons of cavalry, twenty companies of infantry, and eight pieces of artillery, and never ceased their flight until safely inclosed within the formidable fortress of Olmütz.

The flight of the emperor was imprudent in the extreme, as he thus cast loose the reins of government when madness ruled the hour, and subjected the empire to the danger of being again dissolved into its original elements. His retinue consisted of from twenty to thirty carriages; and his military escort, of six thousand troops and four cannons, accompanied him to his

journey's end ; but his reception in the towns through which he passed drew forth no display, either of approbation or disapprobation—it was grave and silent. The National Guard of the town of Krems, where he crossed the Danube, intended, it was said, to remove the bridge across the river, in order to induce the emperor not to leave the archduchy ; but their intention was baffled. His departure from Vienna was regarded with so much indifference, and so completely failed in its effect, that the *Radical* journal of the day did not fail to tell its readers, “People, let the emperor go—let him abandon you a second time. Do not ask him to return ; on the contrary, he must pray you to allow him to return.”

At eight o'clock the brave little garrison, which, with a scarcity of ammunition, had all night long defended the arsenal amid fire and flame, surrendered it into the hands of its pledged protectors ;* and, marching unmolested through the tumultuous streets of the capital, reached in safety the encampment in the Schwartzenberg Garden, amid the enthusiastic cheers of their companions.

Scarcely had they left, when the populace, whose rage could no longer be restrained, rushed into the arsenal from every quarter, some even over the still burning ruins ; and when the yard became full to overflowing with human beings, whose horrid faces and grotesque appearance beggared all description, the doors were burst open, and a general plunder commenced. So great was the rush to obtain arms, that, notwithstanding the fire had just again burst out with all its fury, and groups of thousands surrounded it on all sides, not a man could be obtained to assist in extinguishing it, and a number of boys, from twelve to fifteen years of age, could alone be gathered to work the engine ; and they really labored with great constancy until the flames were subdued.

The four long galleries, leading into each other and surrounding an immense hollow square, were filled with arms and trophies of every description ; and so tasteful had been the arrangement of them, that that hall constituted one of the most attractive objects to the eye of the stranger that Vienna af-

* That the National Guard and Academical Legion would occupy and defend it.

forded. The two hundred thousand new muskets which it contained soon disappeared; and then followed the trophies, collected by the imperial government through many centuries, from the period of the crusades to the present day. Some strutted forth in complete suits of ancient armor; others were decorated only with helmets and gloves of mail; some brandished an ancient battle-ax, while others delighted only in a breast-plate and pike; some shouldered a Swedish blunderbuss, captured perhaps in the battle of Lutzen; and some waved a Turkish cimeter, taken probably at the siege of Vienna.

For hours the arsenal thus poured forth a rabble, in comparison with which Falstaff's regiment would have appeared a noble guard; all delighted with their spoils, and boasting of the havoc they would now make upon the military. The coat-of-mail of Libussa, the first princess of Bohemia; the buckskin shirt, in which Gustavus Adolphus received his death-wound; the swords of Eugène of Savoy, of Wurmser, and of Schwartzenberg, and thousands of other invaluable relics, disappeared. Some were subsequently purchased for a Zwanzinger;* many have been lost forever.

On the night of the 6th, all the ministers, who felt that they did not enjoy the confidence of the people, escaped by flight. The Ministers of Finance and Commerce, who were popular with the people, alone remained. Baron Wessenberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and who was at the War Office when the mob broke in, and who walked out boldly through the crowd, owed his safety, doubtless, to the fact that he was not recognized.

On the succeeding morning, the following were the proceedings of the Diet:

“7th of October, ten o'clock A.M.

“Information received of the emperor's flight from his palace at Schönbrunn. The House appoints a committee to inquire into the truth of this statement.

“Half-past eleven o'clock A.M.

“The Minister of Finance, M. Kraus, informs the House of the emperor's departure.”

* Twenty cents.

Ascending the tribune he said, "An hour since, one of the guards of the palace handed me a sealed letter, which contained a manifesto from the emperor, in nearly the following language: 'I have done every thing that a sovereign could do for the benefit of my people; I have renounced the absolute power left me by my ancestors. In the month of May, I was forced to quit the palace of my fathers, and afterward I came back without any other guarantee than my confidence in my people. A small faction—strong from its boldness—has urged things to the furthest extremity; pillage and crime reign in Vienna; and the Minister of War has been murdered. I have confidence in God and my right, and I quit the neighborhood of my capital to find means to afford assistance to my oppressed people. Let those who love Austria and her liberty, rally around the emperor.' "*"

The minister added, that he had refused to countersign, as his majesty had directed him, this unconstitutional and threatening proclamation, proceeding upon the principle that, in a constitutional monarchy, the *whole* ministry should be held responsible for every thing, and that no opportunity had been afforded of consulting his colleagues on the subject; that, after an interview with Hornbostel, Minister of Commerce, he had concluded not to publish the manifesto, as such an act would be in violation of the oath of a constitutional minister; he therefore left the matter to the decision of the high and exalted Diet. A committee was accordingly appointed to decide on the manifesto, and they reported as follows:

1st. That the ministers, Hornbostel, Dobblhof, and Kraus, should discharge, temporarily, all the functions of the cabinet, and make propositions to his majesty to complete the ministry.

2d. That a proclamation should be addressed to the people, and a memorial sent to his majesty, on the events of the previous day.

3d. Resolved, that the House invest itself with both the deliberative and executive powers, and that this resolution be communicated to the provinces by special commissioners.†

The proclamation to the people was then issued by the Diet,

* Wiener Zeitung.

† Moshamer.

in which that assembly expresses its regret at the painful events that had occurred ; its determination to remain *en permanence* ; its intention to address itself, at the same time, to the monarch, and recommend to him to remove from his council all ministers not in the confidence of the people ; and concluding by placing the safety of the city, its own inviolability, and that of the throne, under the protection of the National Guard of Vienna.

On the following day, they addressed a memorial to the emperor, in which, after making known the sentiments of unalterable affection which they feel for him, they express their surprise that he should have quitted the environs of his residence without a reassuring word, expressed in a constitutional manner, as to the object and the duration of that removal, which might tend to lessen the uneasiness of the people, inseparable from so afflicting an act. They supplicate the monarch to return to the seat of his government, in order to encourage the faithful sons of the country, and deprive the enemies of their liberty, of courage and hope ; in order that every movement of anarchy and reaction may fail, and the work of the Constitution, in which the people of Austria seek their safety and the guarantee of their future welfare, may not be retarded ; that his majesty might grant to all his people who await that return calmness and peace—put an end, according to the impulse of his noble heart, to a civil war, which, lighted up in one part of the empire, will promptly extend its devastating flame over a vast monarchy ; that he would choose, for the accomplishment of this great duty, counselors possessing the confidence of his majesty, and that of a noble people loving liberty ; and that the gratitude and the blessings of that people would be the noblest jewel in his majesty's crown.*

On the same day, the committee of students, acting by invitation in concert with the Central Committee of the Diet, made the following demands : “ 1st. That the emperor shall withdraw his manifesto. 2d. That all the ministers shall retire, and be replaced by a ministry composed by the deputy

* The Diet having assumed all the powers of government, both deliberative and executive, the following conclusions will show the folly and madness by which their movements were characterized.

Löhner of the extreme left of the National Assembly. 3d. That the army shall be subject to the civil authority. 4th. That all the regular troops shall quit the city. 5th. That the Archduke Louis, uncle of the emperor, and the Archduchess Sophia, his brother's wife, shall be banished from the Austrian states. 6th. That Marshal Radetzky shall be dismissed. 7th. That a civil government shall be established in Italy." The Diet adopted all these demands, with the exception of that relative to the banishment, which was reserved for special discussion. The manifesto of the emperor being generally understood to indicate that a concentration of troops would take place around Vienna, and the Diet, perhaps, anticipating that such a movement might interfere with the freedom of their deliberations, adopted, on the 8th, the following impotent and contradictory conclusions: "1st. The Diet, which, in its quality of constituent Assembly, can not be dissolved before the completion of its mission, also declares that it will not dissolve under the most threatening circumstances, but will remain firmly faithful to its duty. 2d. The Diet is an indivisible body; it represents all the different people of Austria, who have sent deputies to it. 3d. The Diet is, conformably to the imperial manifesto of the 6th of June, and to the free election of the people, the only legal and constitutional organ of the union between the constitutional monarch and the sovereign people, for the defense of the inviolable liberty of the people and of the hereditary throne. 4th. The Diet, being composed of the free representatives of a free people, will not impose a moral restraint on any deputy to compel him to remain. 5th. The Diet will remain with firmness on constitutional ground, to defend by legal and constitutional measures the country, the liberty of the people, and the hereditary throne. 6th. The Diet invites all its members who are absent, either with or without leave, to return to their post within a fortnight at the farthest."*

Count Auersperg, commander of the imperial forces in and about Vienna at the time of the outbreak, retired, upon the success of the insurgents, to the Schwartzenberg and Belvedere palaces (situated in the faubourg), with twelve thousand

* Moshamer,

men; and there he seems to have been bewildered, and at a loss to know what authority he should properly obey. The ministers and Diet call upon him to come into the city, and to aid in maintaining order within the walls; but really, it was supposed, under that pretext to procure his surrender to the insurrectionary force within the city. On his part, keeping up the pretense, at least, of official subordination, he professes to act under the responsible ministers, but pleads orders from the Minister of War, the murdered Latour, and avers that he only awaits the countermand of the minister's successor duly appointed; he mistrusts the armed bodies in the capital, and promises to enter if they are disarmed. Failing in the attempt to entice Auersperg into the city, and not satisfied that he should continue to occupy his strong position at the Belvedere, and from which he might at any moment, with his batteries, lay Vienna in ruins, the Diet invited him to quit his strong position. A day or two after, Auersperg receiving new proofs of the increasing enmity of the ill-disposed people of Vienna, determined on changing his position, and taking up his head-quarters at Enzersdorf, a small village in the neighborhood, demanded of the Diet all the necessary objects for his troops, as well as the privilege that his troops be allowed to remove all their effects from the barracks. The committee immediately caused the National Guard to occupy the position abandoned by the troops.

When the outbreak first occurred, intelligence was sent by a courier, who rode night and day, to Baron Jellacic, the Ban of Croatia, and who was at that time with his army in the neighborhood of Raab, in Hungary. Leaving orders for the remainder to follow as rapidly as possible, Jellacic started with that portion of his army about him for Vienna, and, by forced marches, on the ninth he crossed the Austrian frontier and took up a position at Ebersdorf, about two hours march from the capital, with twelve thousand men.

The Hungarian army, which was in pursuit of Jellacic in Hungary, as soon as they were apprised of his departure for Vienna, as well as of the remarkable events of which that city had been the theatre, followed rapidly in pursuit as far as the Austrian frontier, and there took up a position for the time.

About the same period, two members of the Hungarian Diet arrived in Vienna with an address to the Austrian Diet, to the following effect: that the Hungarian nation was penetrated with sentiments of the liveliest gratitude for the heroic devotedness with which the noble inhabitants of Vienna had risen to prevent the arrival of re-enforcements to the army of the traitor Jellacic; that it declares, before God and the universe, that it will regard the liberty of Austria as its own, and consider it its duty to contribute all in its power to maintain it; that the Hungarian nation have given the Hungarian army the most positive orders to pursue Jellacic wherever he may go; that if the Hungarian troops are obliged to pursue him on the Austrian territory, the Hungarian nation proclaims before God and men that it has not the intention to violate the Austrian territory, but that it acts in conformity with sentiments of gratitude, which make it its duty not to leave the noble inhabitants of Vienna without support against the common enemy; that the Hungarian government had given the severest orders that, in case the army should advance, its maintenance on the soil of Austria, sacred to them, should be at the expense of Hungary itself, and that it should not fall on the noble Austrian people.*

Upon the arrival of Jellacic in the neighborhood of Vienna, the Diet immediately dispatched a deputation to ascertain the objects and intention which brought him to the capital. Jellacic replied, by note, that the Diet might have confidence in the sentiments which brought him before Vienna; that he himself was ready to protect the institutions of the country, and that his intervention in Hungary was the proof of it. He added, that it would be afflicting to see Vienna become the theatre of a bloody combat, and he desired a peace which should establish order, liberty, and the happiness of the people. To this communication the Assembly replied: "The Constitutional Diet declares, that *there reigns in Vienna neither anarchy nor brutal force*. The Diet and the ministry are laboring to maintain legal order, and the people are sustaining them. The people are in arms, as is natural when two armies of enemies

* Constitution Zeitung.

threaten them. The news of the arrival of the Hungarians has been received by the Diet with acclamation. We should also regret that Vienna should become the theatre of a bloody conflict, but the presence of your excellency would be the only cause. There is only one means to avoid it, viz., that your excellency retire. The address that we have sent to the emperor proves to your excellency that we strongly desire peace.”*

It being understood that the Hungarian army were ready to come to Vienna on the call of the Diet, two days afterward the following communication from Jellacic and Auersperg, dated at the head-quarters at Enzersdorf, was presented to the High Diet: “We learn that the Diet has taken steps to establish peace by the intervention of the emperor. Above all, the Hungarians must not pass the frontier. The High Diet must prevent it, otherwise a battle will be inevitable, and the consequences incalculable. M. Pillersdorf has demanded of us to allow provisions to enter the capital; if this be granted, the soldiers must be allowed to enter it, to seek what they may require.”

The following answer of the Diet to this communication was, after some discussion, adopted and ordered to be forwarded without delay: “A deputation has gone to his majesty to pray him to accept the propositions of peace that have been made. In the hope of success, the Diet has taken measures to prevent all hostility against the troops. Yesterday it learned that his majesty had declared to Lobkowitz that the generals should not attack; but various measures adopted by your excellency—such as disarming the National Guard, the refusal to allow provisions to be brought to Vienna, &c.—accord very little with the assurances of peace of the two generals, and the promise of the emperor. As to what concerns the Hungarians, the Diet did not call them, and can not send them away; besides, the Hungarian Diet has just informed us that it has given orders to its army to pursue your excellency in whatever direction you might take. The Diet then requires your excellency to restore their arms to the National Guard, disarmed by you, and immediately to retire to your own country. It is only

* Wiener Zeitung.

there that the Diet can charge itself with mediation, and invite the Hungarian army to conclude an armistice. Then only can the Diet, invoking the propositions of peace made to his majesty, order the Hungarian army to stop. The Diet thus fulfills its duty. If the conditions it lays down be not fulfilled, its pacific power will cease, and all will depend upon the battle with the Hungarians, for which those who have rendered it necessary will be responsible."*

Up to this period in the Revolution, so strange and contradictory had been the course of those possessed of power, and so complicated the internal conflict between them, that the position of the empire was rendered not only unprecedented, but almost unintelligible.

The Diet, on the one hand, while it palliates the murder of the emperor's minister, and seeks an amnesty for the perpetrators of this brutal act, professes to remain constitutional, and pursues the flying monarch with pressing invitations to return to the palace of his fathers. While, by its decrees, the same Assembly excites all the agitation and commotion which distracts the city, in the name of his majesty it calls upon Count Auersperg, commander of the imperial troops, to come in and aid in maintaining order within the walls. While professing sentiments of unalterable affection for his majesty, they call in the Hungarians, and thus invite his majesty's rebels to invade the metropolitan province, in order to clear it of his majesty's troops. The course of the emperor, on the other hand, is not less intricate. While a serious attack is made upon his authority and throne, instead of remaining at his post, and summoning all the force of his empire to protect him in their enjoyment, he runs off and surrenders them, without a struggle, into the hands of a revolutionary rabble that had assailed them. While professing undying attachment to his beloved subjects, he promises to send against them the means for their most effectual chastisement. While willing that the efforts of the Diet toward the "formation of a Constitution, which had been commenced, should be prosecuted without disturbance or interruption," he proclaims that he will not recognize any of

* Wiener Zeitung.

their decisions subsequent to the 6th of October, and that his generals will oppose their being carried into effect.

In tracing the causes which had brought the Austrian empire thus to the very brink of destruction, both parties must bear their share of censure. The policy of the Austrian cabinet, after the revolution of March, was characterized only by indecision and duplicity. It had been a policy of shifts, expedients, and of hesitating action, in which no party could discover the expression of its sentiments or the realization of its purposes. It contributed neither to consolidate the movement in which it originated, nor to counteract the evils to which that movement gave birth. It had been faithful to no principle it professed as its own. It had not protected the interest it promised to guard. It brought the imperial authority first into contempt, and then into danger. It had been weak, timid, vain. Nor were these errors its worst. It had been deceitful and false, intriguing and delusive. No small part of its dealings with Hungary was believed to have been of this character; raising hopes which it never meant to fulfill, making promises which it had no intention to perform, it thus greatly contributed to render formidable that insurrection which was now hurrying thousands of armed men to rescue from the menacing hands of loyalty the leagured capital of sedition and treason. Without question, it was the consciousness of the insincerity with which they had been treated that aggravated the hostile passions of the Hungarians, already too prone to recognize an insult and revenge an injury. To be satisfied of the duplicity which was practiced, it is necessary only to recall the proceedings toward the Hungarians and Croats. On one day, the emperor grants to the Hungarians political government and control over the Croats; on another, the Croats are furnished with men, money, and arms, and encouraged to resist all encroachments of the Hungarians. At one time, the Ban of Croatia is proclaimed a traitor; at another, he is nominated to a high office. The extent of the emperor's complicity in those courses which condemn his administration to universal odium, it is obviously impossible to determine; but one thing is plain enough, that upon him has devolved chiefly the burden of enduring their consequences. He was com-

pelled to abandon the palace of his ancestors—in an hour of the utmost peril to surrender his capital to the mercies of an excited and triumphant rabble; and while his brave soldiery were seeking to restore the rigor of his authority in the remotest province of his empire, he was forced to show that he was unable to preserve it in his capital. Rumor, ever busy with men's names—ever claiming a right to determine men's motives, and to indicate their secret springs of action, has acquitted the emperor of any share in the errors to which unwilling reference is made; it ascribed to evil counselors, who betrayed his confidence and misled his judgment, the responsibility of the measures that had attracted to the imperial person the active hostility of his subjects. Whether this conjecture, which is not inconsistent with what is generally understood to have been the character of Ferdinand the First, be in truth well founded or not, one thing is certain that, by whoever committed, these errors brought the empire to the very verge of dissolution; a dissolution, to avoid which there was but a single course left, and that was one which the then administration seemed least likely to adopt—a sincere and vigorous policy. To save the throne of Habsburg, it was necessary that there should be no faltering now, no affected moderation that was not intended to be practiced, no apparent approval of measures to which it was determined to oppose an undeviating resistance.* The whole strength which the empire could command must be collected, and no fastidious repugnance must interfere with the employment of the only means available to the subjugation of a riotous mob, and the maintenance of legitimate authority.

The course of the Austrian Diet is still more censurable.

Besides a total ignorance of every parliamentary proceeding, and which was always involving them in the grossest absurdities, it was a body uncommonly deficient in talent. Called together as a Constituent Assembly, whose proper duty was only to prepare a Constitution for the empire, they began, in the very first days of their meeting, to assume *legislative* powers, and to make the laws necessary, in their views, to a constitutional government, which had not yet been formed.

* Galignani's Messenger.

The most patriotic and conservative portion of the Assembly were the deputies from the Slavic provinces; and although a portion of them from Galicia, with their bundas and uncombed hair, had as little idea of politics as they had of the use of beds,* yet, not understanding a word that was spoken in the Assembly, they rested secure in the ancient faith.† But such was far from being the case with the German literati of the lower order, who constituted the extreme left of the Assembly, and who, by their idle interrogations of the ministry and absurd resolutions, were consuming the time of the House, and adding to the embarrassment of a cabinet in the prosecution of the new line of duties upon which they had just entered.

Among the first efforts of this patriotic clique was their attempt to dissolve the Austrian empire, and to add the German portions of it to the German Confederation, and let the Slavic, Mongul, and other provinces, take care of themselves. Thus the first effort of those who had met to unite and consolidate the empire under one common Constitution, was a project which, had it succeeded, would have shivered the empire to fragments. They were consistent but in one respect, viz., espousing every revolutionary excess which occurred either in Austria or other parts of Europe, down to the last, surpassing them all in savage brutality, committed under their very eyes in the Austrian capital, upon a member of their own body, and minister of the very government of which they professed to constitute a part.

If not privy to the occurrences which disgraced the 6th of October, they were certainly accessories after the fact, by the commendations which they paid to the perpetrators, and the efforts which they made to shield them from the punishment which they so richly merited.

* When they first reached Vienna, and bargaining for lodgings, they complained of the extravagance of the charges; and, upon the landlords explaining that they could not furnish beds for less, these Solons of Austria are said to have replied, "Beds! We want no beds. All we wish for is the floor, covered with straw, and twenty of us can occupy one room."

† The faith of the Slavic peasant of Austria exhibits the emperor in a constant struggle in favor of the serfs against the feudal aristocracy, and laboring with sincerity for their emancipation.

Instead of sustaining the authorities of the city, and displaying their activity in arresting the murderers of Latour, dissolving the Academic Legion and those companies of National Guard who caused the struggle on the Tabor Bridge, they issued a proclamation declaring that the murder of the Minister of War, and the violent overthrow of the ministry, was "nothing more than an act of popular self-preservation resulting from regrettable circumstances;" and joined in a petition to the emperor praying "a general amnesty for all those who might be in any manner implicated in the affair."

This vile insurrectionary mob they assumed to consider and denominate as the *people*, and to allow it to take the law into its own hands, to overthrow at its will a ministry that did not please it, and to institute others according to its own liking, when a Diet existed founded on the democratical basis of the universal suffrage of the people. It proceeded to pass decrees without the number requisite for that purpose, and by the same means to assume and appropriate to themselves full executive power, until they finally placed themselves in a position of open defiance to the emperor.

The complete tools of a metropolitan rabble, they exhibited all the waywardness and inefficiency of a mob, without the ability to profit by any advantages which the suddenness or violence of their attack had opened to them in the temporary prostration of their opponents. Like children with their toys, their only efficiency consisted in pulling down and destroying; they had neither ability nor disposition to put together or reconstruct.

When by these acts of unparalleled barbarity, committed in Vienna under their knowledge, they had frightened the emperor from his capital, and then possessed themselves of all his power, they had not the moral courage to declare their independence, or take any steps to free themselves of a government which they complained of as oppressive.

Later, when they took the resolution to arm the citizens of Vienna from the rifled arsenal of the emperor, and to establish corps, and to officer them in opposition to the imperial troops; when, before the succor afforded by the forces of Windischgrätz and Jellacic had come to their assistance, and they could

with their immense force have annihilated Auersperg and his twelve thousand men, they refused the application of Messenhauser, their own constituted commander, to be allowed to take the offensive.

And still later, when a Hungarian army of from twenty to thirty thousand men had come up to their rescue and remained on the frontiers of Austria, burning for an invitation to cross and come to their relief—when Windischgrätz, with his immense force, had not yet reached the scene of action, and a well-drilled army of thirty thousand men—with proper and efficient officers to direct the movements of the hundred thousand fighting men within the city, would have been invincible by any force which Austria could at that time have brought against them, they had not the boldness to assume the responsibility of extending the invitation. Strange conclusions, indeed, both of morality and policy, which could have dictated the murder of the emperor's minister, the robbery of his arsenal, the seizing all his power, and then hesitate to take the steps most necessary for their defense, or best calculated to carry their purposes into effect.

In the mean time, the course of the Diet and Common Council of Vienna, in open defiance of imperial authority, rendering it necessary for the emperor either quietly to submit to a total deprivation of his power or to recover the same by force of arms, makes a conflict inevitable, and all parties prepare themselves for the struggle.

Wessenberg, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, follows the emperor to Olmütz, and there prepares and countersigns his proclamations. Dobblhof and Bach disappear, and, in communications having no dates to betray the places of their concealment, tender their resignations of office, which their precarious health, as they allege, will not suffer them longer to retain.

Hornbostel, as an intermediate, pendulates between the emperor and the Diet; but, doubted by the former, and of no force with the latter, he can avail nothing. He lays his ministerial honors at the feet of his monarch; but his majesty will not suffer him to resign.

Kraus, the Minister of Finance, is the only one left; upon him has devolved the business of all the bureaus, the entire

affairs of the empire; and, though a man of high integrity, is represented as feeble and careless, and but ill adapted to the gigantic task of steering the vessel of state amid the breakers which surround her.

The Bohemian members of the Diet have seceded *en masse*, and have protested energetically against the authority of a body which suffers itself to be made the instrument of a mere street mob; and subsequently sent deputations to the emperor, to request that he will either have peace restored in Vienna or remove the sittings of the Diet to some other portions of the empire, where its deliberations may be conducted without interruption. The "*Rump*" has returned the defiance; and declaring the Assembly at Vienna to be "the only legal constituent and lawgiving authority; that every attempt of deputies or individuals to assemble at another place, to pass resolutions, which alone appertains to the Diet, is illegal and of no effect; and the Diet hereby protests against resolutions so passed, and declares the authors thereof as solely responsible for the consequences."

The Diet demands the withdrawal of the imperial troops from the vicinity of the city. The commanders refuse to stir, and all hope of an arrangement has vanished. Every preparation is made to resist the anticipated attack from without; every inhabitant capable of bearing arms is summoned and provided with weapons; barricades are erected throughout the streets, and the entire fortifications surrounding the faubourgs are raised, mounted with cannons, and covered with men—students, National Guards, and workmen. During the day of the 10th of October, it being currently reported throughout the city that an attack might be hourly expected from the combined forces of Jellacic and Auersperg, the excitement became very great. National Guards from Brünn, Baden, Vöslauer, and the vicinity, were all day pouring into the city. The *Land-sturm* of the neighborhood were every where rising and rushing to the rescue of the capital. In the evening, as soon as the army of the Ban was visible from the towers, the alarm was sounded, and the whole city was under arms. And when, a little later in the night, the watch-fires of Auersperg's army were found to have been extinguished, the attack was

considered as placed beyond all doubt, and might be momentarily expected.

By the older inhabitants, that night was considered the most distracted one which Vienna had endured since its bombardment by Napoleon in 1809. In the streets, till early dawn, only armed men were seen, who, either singly, in small irregular bodies, or in regulated companies, marched in solemn silence at a measured pace. At the corner of the streets, in the open squares, and in front of the coffee-houses, stood sombre groups in animated conversation or violent altercation.

Behind and upon the barricades, armed blousemen were gathered around the watch-fires, and among them women and girls of not very respectable exterior were scattered—some sleeping upon heaps of stones, others laughing or singing. The ramparts and bastions, in particular, presented a most animated and picturesque appearance—watch-fire succeeded watch-fire, each surrounded by a motley group—*legionnaires* in their *kalabreses*, workmen in their sleeves, and National Guards. Above the gates were mounted cannon, which commanded the entrance to the city; beside them were burning torches, borne by the Burgher Artillery, scattered Academicians, or workmen. Close by were ranged whole companies, armed with every kind of weapon, whose patrols marched up and down, keeping guard with a musket or rifle, carabine or pike in hand, and almost every minute stopping some curious spectator with the incessant cry, "*Halt wir da!*"

Fortunately for the undisciplined, ill-organized mass, the night passed off without attack.

From that time they began to devote more attention to organization. The Diet issued a proclamation to quiet the agitation of the city, promising to watch with care and energy over the interests of Vienna, and have ready all means of defense in case of attack.

In the course of the 13th, the command of the National Guard was changed four times, and was at length provisionally confided to M. Messenhauser, a poet, and once an officer in the Austrian army. To General Bem, a Pole, and a man of remarkable military talent, as he afterward proved himself in Hungary, was confided the command of the Mobile Guard.

The Diet decrees two millions of florins to afford relief to poor workmen, and two hundred thousand for the maintenance of those under arms. The civil authorities promise pensions to the relatives of those who might fall. The people are so full of warlike ardor, that the absolute order of the Diet was necessary to prevent them from attacking the Croats.

To add still further to the encouragement of the citizens in their attitude of resistance to imperial authority, a deputation from the extreme left of the National Assembly of Frankfort, headed by Messrs. Blum and Froebel, reached Vienna, to afford assistance and encouragement to the struggling Viennese. They waited on the Diet, and subsequently visited the committee of students, to whom the spokesman declared that the cause of the Viennese was that of Germany, and that Vienna must triumph, or all Germany would fly to its assistance. The deputation subsequently assumed the uniform of the Academic Legion, and issued an address to the inhabitants of Vienna, expressing "high esteem and profound gratitude for the services they had rendered to liberty."*

While these things are transpiring in and around Vienna, the emperor, quietly seated under the protection of the guns of the formidable fortress of Olmütz, after returning evasive answers to the unfortunate messengers from Vienna, and refusing to accept the resignations of the ministers in that city; when the military preparations were complete, he at last throws off all disguise, and comes forward in his proclamations of the 16th and 19th October, and assumes a decided and hostile position. "In virtue of my duties," he declares, "I have forced myself, but with a bleeding heart, to resist with arms the revolt which has audaciously reared its head in my capital and in other places, and contend against it until it is overcome, until order and tranquillity shall be restored, and the murderers of my faithful servants, the Counts De Lamberg and Latour, be brought to the avenging arms of justice. To attain this object, I send from different parts of the monarchy forces against Vienna, the seat of insurrection; and I confide to my marshal, the Prince de Windischgrätz, the control of all my

* Galignani's Messenger.

troops, with the exception of those commanded by Marshal Count Radetzky. At the same time, I invest Prince Windischgrätz with full powers to accomplish as speedily as possible, and according to his views, the work of peace in my empire."

Fortunately for the Emperor of Austria, the discipline of this army, and the known fidelity of several of his other provinces, but above all, the feelings of national hostility which many regarded as the weakness, but which in fact was always the strength of the empire, enabled him to adopt this vigorous course of policy, and to concentrate an overwhelming force around the principal seat of rebellion.

The troops engaged in the reduction of the capital were almost altogether Slavic, who had no sympathies in common with the Germans; in fact, independent of widely-distinctive characteristics, the animosity between the two nations had been kept up by the selfish policy of the government, which had always sustained itself, and repressed all opposition by setting one race to reduce the other. It had bombarded Prague with German cannon, and was now about to subdue Vienna with Bohemian bayonets.

The feelings by which the Slavi were actuated in the coming contest were shadowed forth in a written address made at this time (22d of October) to the Slavic Association of Bohemia, called Slovanska-Lipa by Baron Jellacic, and in which, among other things, he declares, "As I am animated with the same love as you are for the Slavic nationality, and as you are as well as I am convinced that Slavism is the strongest support of Austria; as, on the other side, Austria is an indispensable condition for the existence of Slavism, to such an extent, that if Austria were not in existence, it must be created for that end." "It was my duty, then, as a good Slavian, to put down and destroy at Pesth the anti-Austrian party which had risen against Slavism." "But when I marched against Pesth, our common enemy made an insurrection at Vienna. This is why I have turned with my whole army against Vienna, in order to chastise the adversaries of Slavism in the capital of the empire. I have experienced a lively joy on seeing that our brothers of Bohemia, guided by the same conviction, which has only been strengthened by the departure of the dep-

uties to the Diet, were hastening to range themselves under the victorious standards before Vienna, holding out the hand of fraternity to me, and this army of brothers which I command, to conquer like heroes or to die with glory. I have been led to present myself before Vienna only to combat with the enemies of Slavism; and I flatter myself with the hope that you not only comprehend me, but will support me."* This letter was received by the Association in Prague with an enthusiasm (say the accounts) which it would be impossible to describe.

About the middle of October, Prince Windischgrätz, with a large body of troops from Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia, takes up the line of march for Vienna; and on the way from Lundenburg he issued, on the 20th, a proclamation to the people of Vienna, in which, after stating the commission with which he was vested, and the force with which he was armed for carrying its purposes into effect, pronounced the city of Vienna in a state of siege, and declared martial law.

Ten days had elapsed since the burghers of the beleagured city first looked down from the steeple of St. Stephen's on the motley host spreading itself over the spacious plain around them, and surveyed far and near, with a curiosity mingled with alarm, the uncouth garb and strange accoutrements, distinctive of the natives of those remote provinces which skirt the eastern frontier of the empire. The videttes of a Hungarian army had been in sight for nearly the same space of time; and although no exact account of their numbers was received, there was every reason to believe that a very considerable body of Magyar troops were encamped upon the frontiers, just twenty-eight miles distant, anxiously awaiting the call of the Diet, and ready to march at a moment's warning to the relief of the besieged capital.

JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS DURING THE SIEGE OF VIENNA.

Monday, October 23d. — Prince Windischgrätz, with his troops, reaches the neighborhood of Vienna on the north, crosses the Danube near Klosterneuberg by pontoon bridges, and, passing around the city, takes up his head-quarters at Hetzensdorf,

* Galignani's Messenger.

a small village about three miles from the capital on the south. The troops arriving with him increase the force around Vienna to about one hundred thousand men.

In the afternoon Prince Windischgrätz issues a proclamation summoning the city to surrender within forty-eight hours, and laying down the terms of submission. All communication with the city is cut off.

Tuesday, October 24th.—Before day a firing of artillery is heard, occasioned by an attack made on the outposts of the imperial troops by the forces from the city, but which is soon repulsed. The sentinels of both armies within gun-shot of each other; those from the city extending to the vicinity of Hietzing.

The centre of the Imperialists, under the immediate command of Prince Windischgrätz, is at Hetzensdorf, immediately behind the Palace of Schönbrunn. The left wing extends by Breitensee and Lerchenfeld, lying on the west of the city; while the right wing of the army, under Jellacic, rests on the Prater, situated on the east of the city.

Wednesday, October 25th.—This, as well as the previous day, is occupied by the imperial troops in preparations for an attack, while awaiting the answer of the city to the proclamation of the previous day, summoning the city to surrender. The troops are so drawn out and arranged as to surround the city completely. A battery is located on every eminence; as far as the eye can reach, all is one entire camp; their bright uniforms and glistening arms by day, and their extended watch-fires by night, present a martial scene of thrilling interest. On this day the prince addresses another proclamation to the citizens of Vienna, stating that pacific proposals had been made him for entering the city with his troops, and to execute the conditions prescribed; he also appeals to the loyalty of a great portion of the citizens of Vienna, and inquires whether it be possible, after all that has passed—after his troops had been fired upon without a motive as soon as they appeared—he should enter the city, which is swarming with armed men filled with evil intentions, before this multitude has been disarmed, without bringing on a murderous combat in the streets. That during several days his troops had been continually attacked,

although they had received orders not to return these attacks, except in case of extremity, which had occurred in several places. He once more asks if an arrangement is possible under the conditions proposed.

Thursday, October 26th.—The forty-eight hours given by Prince Windischgrätz having expired, and no arrangements entered into, in the morning early the firing begins. Before nine o'clock the videttes and outposts of the city forces are driven in. About ten o'clock a body of National Guards, making a *sortie* from the western part of the city, are repulsed and driven back. In the same quarter a fire is opened by the imperial artillery from the hill, back of Pensing, on to a battery constructed by the city forces in the cemetery of the Schmeltz, lying outside of the intrenchments of the city. After a short cannonade, the battery was carried by assault, and those who had manned it forced to retreat behind the fortifications of the city. The troops, discharging grenades from that battery, set fire to several houses in the opposite faubourg.* On the eastern side of the city, toward the Prater, a point against which Baron Jellacic was operating, the firing was more heavy all day; the demonstrations on the western side being mere feints to distract the attention of the enemy while the more serious attack was progressing on the other side. After a combat of twelve hours, the exterior line of the faubourg Leopoldstadt—that is, the Prater, the Augarten, and Brigittenau—were occupied by the army; but the faubourg itself, bristling with barricades, and courageously defended by National Guards and workmen, was not broken into. The firing continued until midnight. During this day a deputation from the city, headed by M. Pillersdorf, member of the Diet and late Minister of the Interior, waited on Prince Windischgrätz, demanding more humane propositions than those contained in the proclamation of the 23d, but Windischgrätz was inflexible.

“Well then,” said Baron Pillersdorf, “may the responsibility of all the blood shed fall on your head.” “I accept the responsibility,” replied the general.

* The water and gas-pipes of the city were cut off. By a vigorous attack the city forces recover possession and command of the water-pipes, but they were not able to retain them.

M. Kraus, Minister of Finance, also called, but met with no better success.

Friday, October 27th.—During this day all remains comparatively tranquil. No engagements are undertaken. Prince Windischgrätz has given orders to suspend firing at all points where it was not necessary. Not a shell was thrown into the city. It was hoped that some arrangement would be entered into which might render further hostilities unnecessary, but the day passes without any such result.

Saturday, October 28th.—The attack on the city commences on all sides with great vigor. All the batteries raised by the imperial troops, on every eminence around the city, open upon the intrenchments. At eight o'clock in the morning, the firing was particularly severe at four different points—the faubourg Leopoldstadt, Lerchenfeld, the Belvidere, and the barrier of St. Maxer. The reports of the cannonade and platoon firing succeed each other with frightful rapidity.

About nine o'clock, a large body of infantry, under the immediate command of Prince Windischgrätz, issuing from Schönbrunn, takes up the line of march, in different directions, for the city. Shortly after, a desperate engagement takes place between these troops and the forces of the city posted in the depôt of the Glognitz, or Southern Rail-road. During the fight, the depôt takes fire, and the buildings, with a number of cars and locomotives, are entirely consumed. To this attack the city forces responded with rare courage; but, being at length overpowered, are forced to retreat into the city. They are pursued by the imperial forces into the faubourg Wieden, and there the contest is continued. About the same time, a number of bombs are discharged by the batteries outside into this faubourg, eight or ten large houses are set fire to, and the conflagration spreads to an alarming extent. While these operations are progressing on the southern side of the city, the troops under Jellacic enter the faubourg of the Landstrasse, on the eastern side. They attack and take thirty barricades with the bayonets and side-arms. The Seressâners,* with their fiery-

* *Seressâners* are the wild border soldiers from Montenegro, and bearing a stronger resemblance to the Indians of the North American forests than to the ordinary troops of the European continent. The frame of such a borderer seems to

red cloaks and peculiarly grotesque costumes, inspired great terror in their opponents; and when the National Guards saw them carrying their cimeters in their mouths, and thus, with the use of both hands, mounting the barricades with all the activity of cats, they threw down their arms and betook themselves to flight. The workmen, however, stood their ground manfully; but at length the whole faubourg was compelled to lay down its arms. No students were seen; and hence it was believed that they had laid aside their peculiar costume, and put on workmen's blouses to escape detection.

The imperial troops next march into the adjoining faubourg of the Leopoldstadt, where they encounter a much more desperate resistance; but, before night, the greater part of that faubourg is also reduced to submission. Notwithstanding the desperate defense of the city forces at all points, the troops stood before night under the walls of the inner city, and along the Danube. The house of Invalids, the Mint, Custom-house, Hay-market Caserne, and the palace of Prince Schwartz-

be nothing but sinew and muscle; and with ease, nay, without appearing to be at all affected by them, he endures hardships and fatigues to which the most seasoned soldiers are scarcely equal. A piece of oaten bread and a dram of *sklikowitz* (plum brandy) suffice him, on an emergency, a whole day, and with that refreshment alone will march on untired, alike in the most scorching heat and the most furious snow-storm; and when night comes, he desires no other couch than the bare ground, no other roof than the open sky. His costume is most peculiar, as well as picturesque. There is something half Albanian in some portions of the dress—in the leggings and full trowsers fastened at the knee, and in the heavily gold-embroidered crimson jacket. But that which gives decided character and striking originality to these sons of war is the cloak. Over these giant frames hangs a mantle of scarlet cloth, fastened tightly at the throat; below this, on the breast, depends the clasp of the jacket, a large silver egg, made so as to open and serve as a cup. In the loose girdle are to be seen the richly-mounted pistols and glittering kandjar—Turkish arms chiefly; for every *Seressaner* is held, by old tradition, to have won his first weapon from the Turk. The mantle has a cape, cut somewhat in the shape of a bat's wing, but which, joined together by hooks and eyes, forms a sharp-pointed hood, resembling those of the Venetian *marinari*, but higher and more peaked. Over the crimson cap, confined by a gold band upon the brow, falling with a gold tassel on the shoulder, rises this red hood, usually overshadowing such a countenance as a Murillo or a Vandyck would delight to portray. The brilliant rays of the long dark eye repose beneath a thick fringe of sable lashes; but you feel that, if awakened, they must flash forth in fire. The brow, the mouth, and the nose are all essentially noble features; and over all is spread a skin of such clear olive-brown, that you are inclined to think you have a Bedouin before you.

burg, were occupied by the imperial forces. The contest continues both in the Leopoldstadt and the Wieden faubourgs all night.

From the discharge of grenades, Congreve rockets, and shells, the city is set fire to in many points; and so extensive was the conflagration that almost the whole of Vienna appeared enveloped in flames.

Although the brunt of the conflict during this day had been on the southern and eastern portions of the city, the batteries on the north and west kept up a slow but steady cannonade during the whole day.

Sunday, October 29th.—The firing, which had been kept up all night, ceased about eight o'clock this morning. Field-marshal Prince Windischgrätz hoped that the city, after the experience of the preceding day, would not fail to be convinced that a disorganized mass, however numerous, could not withstand a well-disciplined army, and that the city would accede to the terms of submission proposed; and he, therefore, to afford time for sober reflection, remained during this day without making an attack. Toward evening, a deputation from the municipality of the city visited Prince Windischgrätz at the imperial palace at Schönbrunn (to which point his headquarters had now been transferred), bearing with them the written declaration that the city would submit itself unconditionally; that they would accept the state of siege; and that, in accordance with this declaration, the troops would occupy the next morning the city and its faubourgs. A commission was appointed to superintend the execution of the terms. The greater part of the citizens are anxious to surrender; but some of the more desperate, particularly the proscribed—who were fighting, as it were, with halts around their necks—being unwilling to comply with the terms, threw themselves into the faubourg of Mariahülf, and again renew the conflict; but, after a struggle in which they are severely beaten, they agree to lay down their arms, and the contest ends for the night.

Monday, October 30th.—Early in the morning all is tranquil, and the report of the unconditional surrender of the city every where circulated. About eight o'clock, a heavy and brisk firing is heard in the direction of Hungary. General Messen-

hauser, commander of the city forces, perceiving from the tower of St. Stephen (where he uninterruptedly remained for the last two days) the approach of the Hungarian army, which had been for days hourly expected to come to their relief, immediately issues a summons calling the citizens again to arms, despite their engagements of surrender entered into the night before, and notwithstanding a deputation executing the terms of peace was at that moment at the head-quarters of Prince Windischgrätz.

As soon as the news of the advance of the Hungarians was spread through the city, where the people were in the act of disarming, the Guards and workmen refused to fulfill the terms of the capitulation, and fired on a body of troops unsuspectingly approaching to receive their weapons.

Arms are again resumed, and the contest continues during the remainder of the day. Prince Windischgrätz, to punish the violation of faith which had been committed, recommenced the bombardment of some of the faubourgs known as the most rebellious, and the firing was continued until nightfall.

The firing heard in the morning, in the direction of Hungary, proceeds from an engagement which took place at Schwechat, twelve miles from Vienna, between a Hungarian army of twenty-two thousand men, coming up to the aid of the city, and twenty-eight thousand imperial troops dispatched against them by Prince Windischgrätz, and intrusted to the command of Count Auersperg and Baron Jellacic.

The Hungarians had been awaiting on the frontiers, for many days, the call of the Austrian Diet. At last, on the 28th of October, Kossuth himself joined the army.* The twenty columns of fire that rose that night from amid the palaces of Vienna showed but too fearfully the need there was of a speedy aid for that devoted city; and, without waiting longer on the Austrian Diet, Kossuth gave the order to advance. It was too late, for on that very day had the fatal blow been struck, and Vienna was in the power of the Imperialists.

On the 30th of October, the Hungarians came up with the

* After Kossuth joined the army, two days were lost, one in reorganizing the army, leaving out those not disposed to cross the Austrian frontier, and the other in awaiting the return of a messenger sent to Prince Windischgrätz.

scattered detachments of the Imperialists, drove them out of Fischamend and Albern, carried Mannsworth by storm, and pushed on toward Vienna. In the mean time, the *corps d'armée*, under Jellacic, who had been directed against them, in most secure and advantageous positions awaited their approach.

The main part of the Hungarian army, under the lead of General Moga, was between the Danube and the so-called *Schwartzen Lachen*, a sluggish arm of that river, as broad and deep as the Danube itself. At the head of this body of water the Austrians, with a park of sixty guns, stood ready to receive them; while ten regiments, principally cavalry, had been sent out to gain their rear, and inclose them in the defile. So gross a blunder could not escape the military eye of Görgey, who was at that time invested with but an unimportant command, and he directed Kossuth's attention to the fact, and by an immediate retreat they narrowly escaped the trap and avoided a total defeat, in which an hour's advance would inevitably have involved them.

They were then pursued by the victorious Austrians, both that and the following day, and driven back across the frontiers into Hungary. This was the battle of Schwechat, in which Colonel Görgey, for the efficient service rendered in saving the Hungarian army from this *cul de sac*, was promoted on the ground to the rank of general.

Tuesday, October 31st.—In consequence of the bombardment of the previous day, the city on this morning declared, for a second time, its unconditional submission. A deputation from the municipality communicated to the field-marshal the fact that the greatest part of the citizens were willing to accept the proposed conditions without reservation, but that they were too feeble—in opposition to the increased power of the Radical club, the committee of students, and its instruments the armed mob—to carry their determination into effect; therefore, they request of the field-marshal his protection of their persons and their property, as the mob threatened to set the city on fire, and to bury themselves beneath its ruins.

White flags are seen suspended from the steeples of the churches in most of the faubourgs. It is understood that they

have all surrendered except the Mariahülf and the city proper. In the Mariahülf the contest continues for a time in the morning ; but the city forces, finding themselves unable to continue the struggle in the open streets, retreat behind the battlements of the inner city. In the afternoon the imperial general ordered large bodies of troops into the faubourgs, the white flags hanging from the bastions and the adjoining houses betokened their unconditional surrender ; but no sooner had the unsuspecting troops made their appearance on the open glacis, than their ranks were torn to pieces by the murderous fire of grape and musketry poured upon them from the ramparts.

How far this crime was premeditated, or how far it arose from the confusion and insubordination which reigned in the city, is now left to conjecture ; but, whoever were the criminals, the city suffered the penalty of the crime, for Windischgrätz no longer hesitated to open his fire on the city, and especially the massy iron-bolted gates of the Burg Thor. The gates were destroyed by cannon, and then stormed by two battalions, who soon effected an entrance, captured eight cannons from the enemy, and soon overpowered all opposition. During the attack on the Burg Thor, or palace-gate, the imperial residence, situated immediately in the rear of it (whether by accident or design accounts do not agree), takes fire in the roof of that portion of the building which covers the Imperial Library, cabinets of minerals and antiquities. The upper part of all that portion of the palace is destroyed, but its contents escape uninjured. The Augustin church adjoining suffers still more severely ; the renowned piece of sculpture of Canova, as well as the hearts of the deceased members of the imperial house which it contained, sustained no damage.

Wednesday, November 1st.—The conflict over, the imperial troops enter the city, take up positions on the public square, and occupy the gates and the public buildings, the barracks, Imperial Arsenal, War Office, and Imperial Palace.

The combatants of the night before, students and workmen, are nowhere to be seen. Prince Windischgrätz publishes a proclamation, in which he declares the conditions previously laid down to be null, owing to the rupture of the capitulation. He establishes new ones, among which are the city and its

faubourgs placed in a state of siege; the complete disbanding of the Academic Legion; the dissolution of the National Guard for an indefinite period; the suspension of all journals and associations; domiciliary visits for the discovery of concealed arms, &c. The Diet being in session, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, rides up on horseback to the building, and, entering, disperses the Assembly, causes the doors to be closed, and the tribunes to be occupied by the military. Military cordons are drawn by the imperial troops for miles around the city; no one can pass either in or out without the written permission of the commandant; and the most diligent search is going on in every house for arms and combatants.

The loss of property is immense, estimated at twelve millions of florins,* or six millions of dollars. Besides those portions of the city which have suffered by conflagration, in some places whole streets have been demolished by the cannon. The houses in the vicinity of those gates which were stormed, as well as the faubourgs in which the severest fighting took place, have been either completely destroyed or most seriously damaged. The loss of life, after so protracted and desperate a struggle, is much less than might have been expected.

An official dispatch gives the following statement of the loss of the imperial troops in the contests at Vienna and at Schwechat, from the 26th of October to the 31st inclusive, viz.: killed, 14 officers, 175 common soldiers, and 57 horses; wounded, 42 officers, 774 men, and 11 horses.

The loss on the other side has not been, and probably never will be ascertained. It is admitted to be much greater than that on the part of the troops; but on both sides the loss was astonishingly small for six days' fighting; but this was the result of the protected positions which the combatants on both sides occupied.

Thus ends the last siege of Vienna—a siege not carried on in the sixteenth, but in the nineteenth century; not conducted by barbarous Turks, but civilized Austrians; not waged against a foreign and infidel city, but against their own beautiful and justly admired capital.

* By some accounts, thirty millions.

After the entry of the imperial troops into the city, and their occupation of the different posts, nothing of special importance occurred except the continued search for the insurgents and their arms, which lasted for some weeks, and the trial and execution of such of the leaders as they succeeded in arresting.

The number of persons suffering capital punishment were very few (only nine) in comparison with the number implicated, or with the exaggerated reports that obtained circulation on the subject. The principal individuals were Messenhauser, commander of the National Guard, on the 10th of November; Drs. Becher and Jellinek, editors of the *Universal Gazette of Austria*; and M. Sternau, a young writer of merit. Neither his duplicity, nor the fact that he had been appointed by the Diet, the highest authority then in the city, and charged with the defense of the capital, could save Messenhauser.

Among the persons seized and tried by court-martial were two members of the Diet at Frankfort, sent thence by the deputies of the extreme left, to aid by their counsels the insurrection in Vienna. The first, Robert Blum, member for Leipsic, somewhat distinguished as a popular orator, and who had been making revolutionary speeches in the university and at other points in the city, being taken *flagranti delicto*, was, despite his supposed inviolability as a deputy, tried by court-martial, and, "on his own confession of having delivered revolutionary speeches, and opposed armed resistance to the imperial troops,"* condemned and executed on the 9th of November.

* The Vienna Gazette publishes the following official notice of the execution of Blum:

"In virtue of a decree of court-martial of the 8th of this month, Robert Blum, bookseller, of Leipsic, convicted on his own confession of having delivered revolutionary speeches, and opposed armed resistance to the imperial troops, was, pursuant to the proclamations published the 20th and 23d by his excellency the Prince de Windischgrätz, condemned to death, and executed the 9th November, 1848, at half-past seven in the morning, on the Brigitteneau."

The Breslau Gazette gives the following details:

"On the 9th, at six o'clock in the morning, the decree of condemnation was read to Robert Blum in his prison. He heroically declared that he expected it, and only demanded time to write some words to his wife. 'Support with courage the intelligence of my lot,' he wrote, 'and bring up our children in such a way that they shall not fail in what is due to their name. I die for liberty!' At seven o'clock the *cortège* arrived at Brigitteneau. Blum, who was in a vehicle escorted by dragoons, did not lose his presence of mind for a moment. Uncov-

The second, Julius Froebel, member from Schwartzburg, Rudolstadt, president of the Democratic Society at Frankfort, a man of much more depth and dignity than his colleague, was also tried and condemned to death by hanging; but, owing to some extenuating circumstances, he was *pardoned* (not, like his friend Blum, from hanging to be shot), but discharged from all punishment, and sent away from the city.

The condemnation of these officials, it was supposed by many, would produce a great sensation throughout Germany, and involve the imperial government in serious trouble; but it was not difficult to perceive that such consequences could not possibly follow. Those deputies,* if they had not, in coming to Vienna, transcended the limits of their inviolability, certainly did identify themselves with a rebellion in which they could not be properly and legitimately concerned. So far from being sent *officially* by the Frankfort Assembly, they *voluntarily* abandoned their duties as members of that body to engage in a foreign insurrection, in which they were proven to have been deeply implicated, and especially as, after the declaration of martial law, of which they were duly advised, their *civil* rights, even if they could operate as a protection in the commission of such high offenses, became by the *supremacy* of military power annulled.

General Bem, in the disguise of a coachman, escaped from Vienna and passed into Hungary, where he subsequently highly distinguished himself.†

Of the sixteen hundred persons arrested, nine only were punished with death, nine sentenced to imprisonment for a

ering his breast, he stated that he would look death in the face; but on being told that that was not possible, he himself tied the handkerchief round his eyes and knelt down. The soldiers fired, and he fell dead, struck by two balls in the breast and another in the head."

* Neither the government at Frankfort or Dresden could have punished Blum for abetting rebellion at Vienna; and the whole matter, consequently, rested with Austria.

† The manner of Bem's escape was related at Vienna in a variety of fabulous ways. Some said he passed the strictly guarded gates in the dress of an Austrian officer; others, as a sailor; again, others say he escaped in a coffin, as a corpse. From Pressburg he took the steamer, and fell asleep in the cabin, not awaking till it reached Komorn, when he heard that he was in the same boat with Kossuth, to whom he introduced himself.—*Schlessinger*.

term of years, nine hundred and ninety-six discharged, and the remainder were tried by civil tribunal. Many of the most influential instigators and participators escaped by flight before the troops entered the city.

The insurrection, although abundantly supplied with men and means, never had the least chance of success, from the total absence of that talent, character, and experience indispensable to such an undertaking. In the first place, there was no head. Messenhauser, the commander-in-chief, was in all respects totally unsuited to the station which he was called upon to occupy. He prepared no plan of defense, made no proper disposition of his troops to resist the attack, established no organization or discipline among the people uninstructed in the use of arms; he did not even make use of the means of defense at his disposal—the number of cannon might have been doubled, the manufacture of powder was wholly neglected. He had no confidence in the strength of the force subjected to his command; he despaired of the success of his cause—the defense of Vienna against so serious an attack; he thought it too difficult, nay impossible, and his whole efforts seemed directed at securing the best conditions for the city. By many he was believed to be a traitor. On the 29th and 30th, his death was called for, and but for the opportune approach of the Hungarians, and consequent distraction of the public mind, his life could not have been saved. The character of the man, and the course which he labored to pursue, can not be better illustrated than by reference to the last proclamations which he issued. In the first, dated the 29th, he states that, having consulted all those who possessed the confidence of the companies as to the possibility of holding out, he had come to the conclusion that “it would only be leading the flower of the population to the slaughter-house.” He adds that he has only been able to collect ammunition sufficient to hold out four hours longer; and that he therefore proposes a surrender, and engages to remind Prince Windischgrätz of the promises of his majesty. In the second, dated the 30th, at eight o’clock P.M., he announces that the Hungarian army had fought near Schwadorf, and had not gained the victory. He then, after praising his fellow-citizens for the disposition which they manifest of

holding out if there is the least hope, announces that the field-marshal has declared that if by eight o'clock the town has not surrendered, he will attack the still remaining suburbs with the greatest energy, and reduce them to ashes, if necessary; and then asks the National Guard to give him a written answer to the question whether they will lay down their arms or not. In the third, dated the 31st, he solemnly protests against his having ordered the aggressive acts committed by some corps Mobiles against the imperial troops during the negotiation for a capitulation on the 30th; and that, on the contrary, he had been constantly engaged in disarming the National Guard since the morning, and had some cannons removed from the bastions.

In the next place, there was no body to the Revolution. The feeling of resistance was not a general or popular one; a large majority of the Viennese were inclined to peace and loyalty, but they were completely crushed by the terrorism of the Polish committee, the students, and the workmen. Martial law had been proclaimed in Vienna, and every able-bodied man who was found unarmed, or who refused to perform military service which the committee required of him, was immediately taken up as a traitor, and tried by court-martial. Nothing was more common than the name of traitor, for they had other tests besides the performance of military duties to try the wretched citizens' devotion to liberty. Students and workmen took up their quarters in any man's house that suited their fancy, and must be treated with every hospitality. People who declined the honor of receiving these distinguished guests, who winced under the summary disposal of their goods and chattels, or demurred against giving up their wives and daughters to the brutal lusts of the rulers of the hour, were treated as enemies of public liberty. They were accused and given up to the tender mercies of martial law.

And who were these rulers of the hour, these especial champions of the movement? Were they of the better class of citizens? Were they of the substantial burghers, the owners of property? No; they were the youth of the university, to whom the only government of which they had as yet any experience was that of a college; and the *ouvriers*, or workmen in the different fabrics of the faubourgs and the vicinity, who

felt not a particle of interest either in the government or the country, who lived to-day on the earnings of yesterday, and whose only hope for the morrow rested on the earnings of to-day. To such a class, any change which might come must be for the better, as it could not possibly be for the worse. They are the bane of every government; to them the restraint of any regular authority, however free, is insupportable; and their every effort is aimed at its destruction. Like certain animals, they are brought forth by, and can exist only in an atmosphere of dissolution. Their only conception of liberty is *licentiousness*—the liberty to do any thing and every thing which their inclinations or interests might dictate; their only ideas of justice consist in an equal division of property—a doctrine which comports most admirably with their destitute condition, for, having nothing in the world to contribute, they can only be the gainers by the division. Such are the rank and file of the Communists of Germany and the Red Republicans of France.* The leaders (those who figure in their clubs and direct the movements of the animal mass) are atheists in religion as well as politics; who look upon the creation as the work of chance, society as a state of slavery; who deny a Supreme Power in the guidance of things on earth, declare religion a scarecrow to frighten the vulgar. All these men worship one idol, that of their own will and of their own caprices.† Fortunately for the United States, such a class is unknown among them; and although in the spring-tide of emigration, which has for a few years past been on the flood with us, but few of this class have been able to bear the expenses of transportation to our shores; and, even if they could, an almost inexhaustible West, where

* Chronicle.

† The various nations of Europe are attempting to solve the question in various ways. In France, since the Revolution of February, it has consisted in the planting of trees and the erection of barricades; in the assertion of the right to labor and the practical cessation of demand. Berlin and Vienna, Hungary and Lombardy, and the German states, would return much the same answer to the question as at Paris. Every man is to do what he likes—is that it? The definition would seem somewhat large. Some men are for cutting throats; others are for retaining throats uncut. A. desires B.'s horses, his side-board and plate, his realty, his chattels, his choses in action; B. desires, very naturally, to retain them for himself. The definition must at once be narrowed; B. must be shorn of his goods or A. of his liberty, there is no escape from the dilemma.—*Galignani's Messenger*.

they may settle down and acquire some substantial interest in the country and its institutions, will operate, for centuries to come, as a safety-valve to free us from the dangers of so fatal an element.

While such was the character and such the motives of the prime movers in this revolt, the considerations which incited the action of the imperial government can not, perhaps, be more correctly gathered than by reference to the following communication, bearing date at Olmütz on the 26th of October, and addressed by Baron de Wessenberg, president of the Austrian ministry, to the Austrian envoys at the German courts :

“The recent events at Vienna have been frequently erroneously interpreted in Germany. In order that the question may be correctly judged, the principal circumstances herein indicated should be borne in mind : the military operations which are at this moment taking place under the walls of Vienna have only one object—to combat anarchy and re-establish a legal state. The emperor and his government have no intention of retaking the liberties accorded, of realizing the scarecrow which the revolutionary party presents under the name of reaction, or of conquering for one of the Austrian nationalities a superiority over the other. It is not a struggle of nationalities, a transformation of the monarchy into a Slavic Austria, as the German press believes or causes to be believed ; it is a combat of order against anarchy, of legal power (without which there is no government) against terrorism, of conservation against revolution. It is a disregarding of facts, an erroneous judgment of things, to give to this combat another signification. The revolution has covered itself with a German mantle ; the German colors have become the ensign of the party of overthrow. It is not against liberty, the grandeur and the tie of Germany, which the Emperor of Austria thinks himself specially called on to protect ; it is against the party which makes an abusive use of those colors, and of different things, for the promotion of its criminal objects, that the efforts of the government and the army of his majesty are directed. I invite you to conserve this point of view, and to support it as much as possible in your circle of action. His

majesty the emperor and the government are resolved to maintain this combat by all the means in their power. These means were set forth in imperial manifestoes of the 18th and 19th, which were communicated to you by a circular dispatch. Military measures have been already employed. An army of nearly sixty thousand men, conducted in person by Field-marshal Prince de Windischgrätz, who has taken up his headquarters at Hetzensdorf, closely surrounds the capital, and I have reason to hope that these operations will soon attain their object. His majesty, at the same time, finds himself constrained to remove the Diet from Vienna, and to convoke it, for the 15th of November, at Kremsier."

The battle over, and the exciting scenes which attended it having passed away, an opportunity is now afforded for a brief consideration of the peculiar character of the conflict, of which the Austrian capital has recently been the theatre. Such a contest is exceedingly apt to be misunderstood in our country. We are so much inclined to interpret all struggles between sovereigns and subjects according to analogies afforded by our own political history, that the notion of liberties denied and Constitutions violated appears inseparable from the idea of rebellion and civil war. Such was, however, far from being the case in the instance under consideration. That the war between the emperor and his Magyar subjects happened to come to a head, or to burst forth in the Austrian metropolis, and to have assumed something of a constitutional aspect, was really but little more than accidental. When the news arrived from Hungary of the butchery of Lamberg, the Radicals of the capital, professing to sympathize with their rebellious coadjutors at Pesth, were determined that Vienna should not be outstripped in patriotism, as it was profanely termed, and therefore got up an *émeute*, which ended with the murder of Latour and the flight of the emperor.* There was nothing either national, liberal, or general in the movement. Had it been a national struggle for liberty, in which the people on the one side were struggling with the monarch on the other, we should have watched the progress of the strife with a far different eye.

* F. Pulszky, in "Memoirs of an Hungarian Lady," defends himself and the Hungarians from the charge of instigating the Revolution of the 6th of October.

But the case was quite otherwise. We have seen the mob of the capital rise against the government, murder a responsible minister of the crown without a hand being raised to avenge him, and usurp the arbitrary power of swaying at will the general administration of the empire. In the scenes which followed, the people of the empire bore no part; of *its* will, the populace of Vienna was never constituted the exponent. The Diet itself, as a Constituent Assembly, was intrusted with no such office. Were it even, which it was not, a permanent legislative body, it would by no means have followed that the passive acquiescence or reluctant participation of a mere fraction of an Assembly could have the effect of implicating the nation in the quarrel, or of converting a local riot into a general rebellion. Had they been capable of governing, they would at this moment have been supreme in Vienna. They could not govern, they merely snatched at the reins, and afterward, when the horses were at full speed, were as powerless to guide as to check their mad career.* Before the rebellion broke out, they did but obstruct and embarrass the government, which they had neither the skill nor the moral weight to direct; and, throughout the deplorable scenes which ensued, they occupied themselves in issuing manifestoes to which nobody listened, and in passing resolutions which were soon expunged from their records. The great constitutional principle of which they were the champions, was the legalization of anarchy and crime; the patriots over whom they tried to extend the shield of their protection, were the perpetrators of a dastardly and atrocious murder.

Although it is impossible not to be penetrated with the deepest commiseration for the misguided victims of this great revolt, and although few events in modern history are more terrible than this attack by the forces of the empire on that ancient and splendid city, which has been for ages the seat of the imperial government and the sovereign of Central Europe, yet our sense of justice does no more recoil from the suppression and punishment of anarchical revolt than we should from the necessary infliction of the last rigor of the law on a convicted

* Chronicle.

offender. The firmness and ability of Prince Windischgrätz, and the gallantry of the imperial troops, might have been displayed with more unalloyed glory on a foreign field and against a foreign foe; yet few of the ordinary causes of war could so imperiously claim the devotion of an army as this conquest of a faction, by which the seat of government had been successfully invaded, and society itself menaced and assailed.

The cause of liberal institutions received a heavier blow and a greater disparagement from the incapacity and extravagance of the German Radicals and the Hungarian rabble than the cannons of Windischgrätz could inflict. The unfortunate effect of these horrors and follies will be to induce a timid people, which has only seen the effects of liberty in turbulence, ruin, and bloodshed, to cling to military power as the last defense of society.

The people of Vienna have had a taste of anarchy, and are not likely soon to forget its bitterness. The commercial classes will now prefer peace under the emperor, and without a Parliament, though bought with heavy taxes to support large armies, to the unchecked excesses of the mob, until these shall either be passed out of present memory or be balanced in estimate by some present evil traceable more or less truly to the absolute form of government.*

To us, who have the happiness to live in a country where the strong but simple forms of civil justice have ever averted or adequately punished all serious disturbances of public order, these terrible outbreaks of social madness, followed by the stern retributions of military power, are, by the blessings of Providence, unknown. But in observing the course of these events upon the continent of Europe, where the law is in reality weaker, and therefore more violent than it is among ourselves, we must not be led astray by misplaced sympathies with any cause which is not that of freedom or improvement. Had the people of Vienna been less servilely docile of old to the tutelary precautions of a government which has been often startled at shadows, they would not have fallen into the snares of a few itinerant demagogues, or sunk under the yoke of a

* Galignani's Messenger.

sanguinary insurrection. The original blame, therefore, deservedly rests upon the policy of a government like that of Metternich, which left the people emasculated, demoralized—ignorant alike of their duties and their rights. Where so little had been done to make men good citizens and enlightened subjects, the base and unmeaning cry of insurrection found a ready response from ignorance and discontent.*

Upon this state of the population of Vienna the revolutionary societies confidently speculated, for none are better acquainted with the vices and weakness of a people than those who trade upon its power. They hoped to strike a fatal blow at peace and monarchical government in Europe by making themselves masters of what was once their strong-hold. As far as Vienna was concerned, they succeeded; but they had underrated the power and loyalty of the Austrian army, and the result was the severest check which the Revolution had yet received.

Of old such a triumph would have rendered a usurper absolute. Yet now the counselors of these triumphant kings and emperors instantly confess that military triumph is of slight avail, and that in these days a monarchy can be no longer based upon it. The first acts of the sovereigns are to crave pardon of their people for such terrible coercion, excusing it as salutary and necessary, but as temporary; while the most specious promises of constitutional and liberal government are superadded, to allay the terrible master of popular discontent.

The emperor will return again to his capital, surrounded by the faithful and gallant army who have encountered in his cause a warfare a thousand times more awful than any struggle with a foreign foe could have been. But he returns to a changed city and an altered people. It is not as it was. The monarchs of the house of Austria had always lived in kind and friendly intercourse with their people; if they were pressed down with an iron hand, the surface, at least, was smooth—they were treated indulgently and well. But the events of the late siege have given a rude shock to the old ties of traditional loyalty. The citizens can not look around them at their black-

* Galignani's Messenger.

ened homes and ruined churches, without being reminded that there has passed between them and their emperor that which both of them may forgive, but which neither can soon forget. Long years of internal prosperity and good government must elapse, fresh triumphs and fresh disasters must have linked together monarch and people, before the traces of the outbreak in 1848, and its terrible suppression, are erased from the hearts of the burghers of Vienna.

CHAPTER VII.

FIRST HUNGARIAN CAMPAIGN.—AUSTRIANS INVADE HUNGARY SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM NINE DIFFERENT POINTS.—THE CAPITAL ABANDONED, AND THE AUSTRIANS EVERY WHERE TRIUMPHANT.—AUSTRIANS REACH THE THEISS.—HUNGARIANS ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE, AND, BY A SUCCESSION OF BRILLIANT VICTORIES, DRIVE THE AUSTRIANS COMPLETELY FROM THEIR TERRITORY, WHILE THE DIET OF THE KINGDOM DECLARES THE INDEPENDENCE OF HUNGARY FROM THE SWAY OF THE HABSBURG DYNASTY.

ALTHOUGH the Hungarian Diet had, in the month of July, voted an enlistment of two hundred thousand men, their levy and equipment had proceeded but slowly. On the 3d of October, when the imperial manifesto, and the appointment of Jellacic as civil and military governor, produced the final rupture, the whole military force of Hungary consisted only of forty thousand men, and of these only twenty-four thousand took a decided part for the nation. Even the officers of many regiments that proved true subsequently either went over to the Imperialists or retired. By the 28th of October, fifteen thousand regular troops and eight thousand *Honvéds*,* or militia, were all that Kossuth could assemble to march to the relief of Vienna. After their repulse on the 30th at Schwechat, the Hungarian army retired within the frontiers of their own kingdom, and occupied a long line of posts from Oedenburg to Holics. A desperate conflict was now inevitable, and each party devoted itself to preparation for the struggle.

* Fifteen thousand troops of the line, ten *Honvéd* battalions, seventy squadrons of cavalry, and two regiments of Szecklers—in all, a force of thirty-six thousand men and seven thousand horses, were the foundation of the great Hungarian army. In the commencement of their difficulties, and during the insurrection in the south of Hungary, the greater part of the Hungarian troops were at this time fighting the Austrian battles in Italy. It was, therefore, necessary to raise new forces for the defense of the country; and ten battalions of volunteers were formed, of which the commanders were appointed by the king, the officers by the Palatine, Archduke Stephen. Their commissions were countersigned by the Hungarian War Office. These troops were called *Honvéds*, or "defenders of home," and, with the battalions of the line and the regiments of hussars, formed, at a later period, the nucleus of the Hungarian army.—*Klapka*.

In Hungary there was no lack of men, but in arms and ammunition they were sadly deficient. Manufactories for these were there almost unknown, for, wishing to keep the country in this respect dependent on Austria, the imperial government had always discouraged their establishment. They soon, however, arose like magic throughout the country. In every town the anvils rang with the clang of the arms which the artisans forged by night and by day. There was but little powder, and no sulphur to make it with; and this, at great cost, was extracted from copper ore. Metal was also rare, but the bells of the churches were taken to supply the necessity. Under the extraordinary energy of Kossuth, there sprang up with marvelous rapidity, at various points, founderies for cannon, armories for muskets, powder mills, and extensive saltpetre establishments, and manufactories for the production of fulminating silver and percussion caps.

Under the extraordinary expenses of the government money soon failed in the treasury; but, to supply this deficiency, paper was issued, which circulated like gold, so that in two months twenty-eight millions had already been issued.

Every where enlistment and equipment of the Honvéds proceeded, under the superintendence of the local committees of defense.

The nobles mortgaged their estates to aid with money the patriotic movement, and, heading their dependents, brought whole battalions and regiments into the field. Even women, casting aside the vestments of their sex, took arms as soldiers.* It was a great and generous movement.

It is true that many leading magnates adhered to the court at Vienna, in devotion to which they had spent their lives, and which, from a long residence, constituted their home; but there was hardly a great family of which some wealthy and influential members did not declare for their native land.† A great

* Two women, entering the ranks, reached the post of captain before their sex was discovered. Two regiments, altogether of females, were formed in the South, and tendered their services to Kossuth. Kossuth was much annoyed; but, with his great tact, he accepted them both, and ordered one regiment to the hospitals to nurse the sick, and the other to the arsenal, to be engaged in making cartridges, clothes, &c.

† About one half the high aristocracy, particularly those of the Theiss and Tran-

majority of the resident aristocracy, the numerous class of resident country gentlemen, almost without exception, the body of inferior nobles or freeholders, the peasant proprietors, and the laboring population, espoused the cause of Hungary. The Protestant clergy in the Magyar country to a man, and the Roman Catholic clergy of Hungary in a body, urged their flocks to be patient and orderly, and to obey the government charged with the defense of the country, and to be faithful and valiant in defending it.

As soon as Prince Windischgrätz had completed the subordination of Vienna, and punished the leading insurrectionists, his whole attention was devoted to preparation for the invasion and subjugation of Hungary. The army of upward of one hundred thousand men, that had just assisted in the reduction of the capital, was in a state of readiness for marching immediately against Hungary; but the preparations for so serious a campaign were necessarily much heavier than might, at the first glance, have been anticipated. The provision of the immense baggage-trains required for the transportation of all the ammunition, rations, and other necessaries, even to fuel, for so large an army, was found to be an extensive undertaking, and the scarcity of horses increased the difficulty. It was also thought advisable not to open the campaign until the severity of the winter had set in, and the roads, at other times almost impassable to heavy artillery, should become frozen, and thus rendered passable. These difficulties, with the usual Austrian tardiness, delayed for six weeks the departure of the army, which it was at first supposed would have marched in a very few days after the capture of Vienna.

On the 6th of November, the emperor issued from Olmütz a proclamation to the inhabitants of all the countries appertaining to the Hungarian crown, cautioning them against the stratagems of Louis Kossuth and his companions, and warning them that, unless they fulfilled their duties toward their king and country, they would be held as traitors to both, and the authorities be forced to treat them accordingly.

sylvania (those of the Danube country, from their connection with Vienna, were unfavorable), the untitled nobility, and clergy, sided almost unanimously with the country.

This proclamation of the emperor was followed by two others from Prince Windischgrätz, issued on the 12th and 13th of November, and directed to the people of Hungary and Transylvania, advising them of his intention, under the orders of the king, to invade the country, and proffering "protection to the faithful, pardon to the repentant, but death to the rebel." The other was addressed to the Field-marshal L. Moga, and to all imperial generals and officers in Hungary, calling upon them to return to their duty and their flag by the 26th of November, or, on failure to do so, they would be held traitors and rebels, and treated with the utmost rigors of martial law.

Wearied by contentions in which his character and feelings unfitted him to participate; distracted by diverse counsels; involved, by a series of intrigues, in conflicting engagements; dreading the new order of things, and diffident of his own ability to perform the duties it demanded of him, the Emperor Ferdinand, on the 2d of December, abdicated; and, by a family arrangement, the crown of Austria was transferred, not to the next heir, but to the second in succession.

The Emperor Francis Joseph, son of the Archduke Francis Charles and of the Archduchess Sophia, is a youth of fine and manly appearance, tall and slender in stature, upright and military in his carriage, with an intelligent countenance, but, above all, distinguished for his remarkable self-possession. He is said to be endowed with an excellent mind, and to have acquired such a knowledge of the different languages of his empire as to enable him to address with fluency any portion of his subjects in their own tongue. His character, of course, remains yet to be developed; and if the anecdote related of his conduct, when first apprised of his elevation to the throne, be not a fiction, favorable anticipations may be entertained as respects his future career. When informed that he was emperor, Francis Joseph, sinking back upon the sofa, and covering his face with his hands, exclaimed, *Meine Jugend ist hin!* My youth is over!* It was a noble exclamation for a boy of but nineteen years, for it told of duties accepted and of devotion to an arduous task. To be master in the fresh flush of

* Baroness Blaze de Bury.

youth of one of the greatest empires of the world, and to think first of the sacrifices which duty imposes rather than of the splendor which the position confers, exhibits an appreciation of the task as rarely to be met with, as it is indispensable to success in those that are born to rule.*

The crown of Hungary, as we have already seen, had been settled, by statute, on the heirs of the house of Habsburg; but no provision had been made for the case which had now arisen. The Hungarians held that their king had no power to abdicate; that, so long as he lived, he must be their king; that, if he became incapable of performing the regal functions, the

* On the 2d of December, 1848, the garrison of Olmütz was aroused at early dawn, and bidden to the Place d'Armes, where some military ceremonies, for purposes not specified, were to take place. Some said it was merely a review in honor of Prince Windischgrätz and the Ban, who had arrived in the night; but whatever it might be, some secret presentiment drove nearly the whole population to the spot where the troops were ordered to assemble. A regiment of infantry, a battalion of grenadiers, and several battalions of artillery, were ranged in line of battle; the officers, in their full-dress uniforms, with their plumed hats, and stars and crosses on their breasts, were assembled; carriages, full of ladies, were hurrying by, no one knew why, unless it might be to see the Ban; the crowd was unquiet, and it scarce knew wherefore; and the ignorance and vague curiosity of all found vent in a thousand questions. It was half past eight, and the rays of the morning sun began to illuminate the blue winter-sky; then began those strange prophetic murmurs, for whose existence no one alive can assign a reasonable cause, but which so often divine the truth; but none would give a loud current to thoughts which seemed to every one almost an offense. Suddenly, the Archduke Ferdinand d'Este dashed forward on his horse, and, calling around him all the staff-officers present, announced to them the abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand, and of his brother, the Archduke Franz Karl, in favor of the Archduke Franz Josef, the emperor's nephew. The regeneration, the new youthful age of Austria was complete; it was a great, an incalculably great measure; but the first impression was one of sadness. The first spontaneous words of the whole crowd, turn to which side one might, were words of sympathy, of affliction, of regret for Ferdinand. It would seem that suddenly his people had been struck with remorse for all he had suffered; he, so good, so gentle; he, in whose simple heart had never dwelt a thought that was not for their welfare, *der armer, guter Ferdinand!* Those were the first sounds that ran along the crowd. At the end of half an hour, a general movement announced the arrival of the new monarch; and, followed by his brothers and cousins, attended by the heroes of the late events, Windischgrätz, and the Ban, and Schlick, attired in the simple colonel's uniform, in which he was familiar to all around him, the young sovereign of Austria bounded forward, full twenty paces in advance of his suite, upon a splendid charger, whose ardor seemed but to furnish proof of its rider's graceful skill. *Franz Josef der Erste!* "the flower of Habsburg," as he has been called; the successor to the throne of Rhodolph and Maximilian, emperor-Cæsar, and but of nineteen years.—*Baroness Blaze de Bury.*

laws had reserved to the Diet the power to provide for their due performance; that the crown of Hungary was settled by statute on the *direct* heirs of the house of Habsburg, and the Emperor Francis Joseph was not the *direct* heir; and that conferring the crown on him changed the order of succession to the throne—a change never effected, even in absolute countries, by virtue of the royal will alone. Also, that the Hungarian crown was hereditary in the house of Habsburg under certain conditions, which had been originally laid down and repeatedly confirmed (particularly in 1687, 1722, 1790) by solemn compacts between that family on the one part, and the Hungarian nation on the other; that, if he claimed the crown of Hungary as his legal right, he was bound to abide by the laws or conditions upon which that right was founded; that these laws or conditions required that the person claiming the throne of Hungary should be crowned with the crown of St. Stephen, according to the ancient forms and ceremonies, within the realm of Hungary itself, and should, at his coronation, take a solemn oath to preserve inviolate the ancient liberties of the Hungarians, their Constitution, and laws. These requirements and conditions not having been complied with, the Hungarian Diet held the decree of abdication null and void. The abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand, and the accession to the imperial throne of his youthful successor, presented another opportunity of which the Austrian government might have gracefully availed itself, to terminate the differences with Hungary. The young emperor was totally uncommitted, was fettered by no engagements, involved in none of the intrigues that entangled his unwary predecessor, and which entailed so great evils upon the country. He was free to take a constitutional course in Hungary; to confirm the concessions which had been voluntarily made, and which could not now be recalled; to restore to the imperial government a character for good faith, and thus to have won the hearts of the Hungarians. The situation in which the young emperor was, by the force of circumstances, thus placed, resembled very much that of his ancestor Leopold the Second, on his accession to the throne, when a Diet had not been held in Hungary for twenty-five years—when the Hungarians, provoked by the persevering ef-

forts of his predecessor Joseph to Germanize the country, began to utter the cry, "We want no *Austrian* king."

Had he been possessed of the manly boldness, generous confidence, or great tact of his ancestor, to have gone, like him, immediately to the Hungarian capital, there to have unhesitatingly confirmed the concessions which had been granted, and which, without dishonor, could not have been recalled—with that romantic generosity so peculiar to the Hungarians, he would have been received by them with open arms; the unhappy difficulties would have been healed, and all the evils and bloodshed which have since occurred been prevented; while, supported by their loyal attachment to their king, he might have peacefully worked out such reforms in the government of his empire as the times and circumstances imperiously demanded.

Independent of its effect upon Hungary, the recent accession appeared destined to change completely the situation of things in Austria, to induce a perfect rupture with the past, and to form a new era for the monarchy.

In taking the sceptre from the hands of a prince whose deplorable infirmities of mind and body rendered his reign a most significant commentary upon the absurdity of the "divine right," he removed one great source of disaffection. But that alone was not sufficient: in the case of a simple abdication, the crown would have devolved on his brother, the Archduke Francis Charles, always known in Austria as a partisan of the system of Metternich. His ascension to the throne would not have appeared to offer to the moderate Liberal party the guarantees and hopes which it was desired to attach to the abdication of Ferdinand. It was necessary to indicate that it was not only a change of persons which was about to be effected, but that the crown was sincerely desirous of breaking with all the traditions of the past, contrary to the spirit of the times and of constitutional institutions. The Archduke Francis Joseph, too young to be bound in any respect by the past, or to be suspected of reserves or regrets for a system to which his age necessarily rendered him a stranger, was the proper person really to inaugurate the future of Austria. Even the sort of blank left in the transmission of the crown by the refusal of

his father to ascend the throne, seemed to constitute a line of profound demarcation between the past and the future.

But evil counsels and despotic ambition prevailed, and this occasion for an amicable adjustment of the differences between the countries was suffered to pass unimproved. In fact, indications warranted the conclusion that it was deemed an advantage that the emperor, unfettered by personal engagements to Hungary, was free to prosecute its subjugation, to subvert its Constitution, and to force the Hungarians afterward to accept in its place the *Charte Octroyée* of Count Stadion; but this was a course which implied a determination rather to undertake the conquest of the kingdom than to claim the hereditary succession to a throne secured and guarded by statutes.

About the same time, another opportunity presented itself for the settlement of the unhappy difficulties which distracted the two countries, but which the imperial government, in the proud consciousness of its inexhaustible strength, thought proper to disregard. At the solicitation of Louis Kossuth, President of the Committee of Defense in Hungary, the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at the court of Vienna, on the 3d of December, 1848, made application to the imperial government, with a view "to initiate the negotiations of an armistice for the winter between the two armies standing on the frontiers of Austria and Hungary, and to stop the calamities of a war so fatal to the interests of both countries."

"This application" (as Mr. Webster, Secretary of State of the United States government, advises M. Hülsemann, Chargé d'Affaires of Austria) "became the subject of a conference between Prince Schwartzemberg, the imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Stiles. The prince commended the consideration and propriety with which Mr. Stiles had acted; and, so far from disapproving his interference, advised him, in case he received a further communication from the revolutionary government in Hungary, to have an interview with Prince Windischgrätz, who was charged by the emperor with the proceedings determined on in relation to that kingdom."*

"A week after these occurrences, Mr. Stiles received, through

* Mr. Webster's reply to M. Hülsemann.

a secret channel, a communication signed by Louis Kossuth, President of the Committee of Defense, and countersigned by Francis Pulszky, Secretary of State.* On the receipt of the

* On the night of the 2d of December, 1848, when all communication between Hungary and Austria had ceased, large armies on either side guarding their respective frontiers, the author was seated in the office of the Legation of the United States at Vienna, when his servant introduced a young female, who desired, as she said, to see him at once upon urgent business. She was a most beautiful and graceful creature, and, though attired in the dress of a peasant, the grace and elegance of her manner, the fluency and correctness of her French, at once denoted that she was nearer a princess than a peasant. She sat and conversed for some time before she ventured to communicate the object of her visit. As soon as the author perceived that in the exercise of the utmost caution she desired only to convince herself that she was not in error as to the individual she sought, he told her that, upon the honor of a gentleman, she might rest assured that the individual she saw before her was the diplomatic agent of the United States at the court of Vienna. Upon that assurance, she immediately said, "Then, sir, I am the bearer of a communication to you." She then asked, "Have you a servant, sir, in whom you can rely, who can go with me into the street for a few moments?" The author replied that he had no servant in whom he could rely, that he feared they were all in the pay of the police, but that he had a private secretary in whom he reposed confidence, and who could accompany her. The secretary was immediately called, they descended together into the street, and in a few moments returned, bearing with them the rack of a wagon. This rack, which is a fixture attached either to the fore or back part of a peasant's wagon, and intended to hold hay for the horses during a journey, was composed of small slats, about two inches wide and about the eighth of an inch thick, crossing each other at equal distances, constituted a semicircular net-work. As all these slats, wherever they crossed, were fastened together with either wooden or iron bolts, with our unskillful hands an hour nearly was consumed before we could get the rack in pieces. When this was accomplished, we saw nothing before us but a pile of slats; but the fair courier, taking them up one by one, and examining them very minutely, at length selected a piece, exclaiming, "This is it!" The slat selected resembled the others so completely, that the most rigid observer, unapprised of the fact, could not have detected the slightest difference between them; but, by the aid of a penknife, to separate its parts, this slat was found to be composed of two pieces, hollowed out in the middle, and affording space enough to hold a folded letter. In this space had been conveyed, with a secrecy which enabled it to pass the severe scrutiny of the Austrian sentinels, the communication addressed to the author by Louis Kossuth.

The mysterious personage, as intrepid as she was fair, who undertook the conveyance of this dispatch, at night, alone and unprotected, in an open peasant's wagon, in a dreadful snow-storm, through the midst of the Austrian army, when detection would have been certain death, was (as M. Pulszky has just informed the author) then a single lady, has since married, and is now the Countess M.

The statement, therefore, of a person assuming the title and name of Baroness Beck, and who, in a work upon the Hungarian war, published in England about two years ago, claiming for herself the credit of having been the bearer of the dispatch referred to, is altogether without foundation. This authoress, whose char-

communication, Mr. Stiles had an interview with Prince Windischgrätz, who received him with the utmost kindness, thanked him for his efforts toward reconciling the existing difficulties," but replied in substance as follows: "I can do nothing in the matter." "I must obey the orders of the emperor." "Hungary must submit." "I will occupy Pesth with my troops, and then the emperor must decide what is to be done." "I can not consent to treat with those who are in a state of rebellion."

The course of the imperial government was fixed, and, from motives of pride as well as of policy, nothing short of the unconditional submission of Hungary, as Prince Windischgrätz stated, would at that time for a moment be listened to.

Two recent victories over his own undisciplined and ill-armed subjects had given the young emperor a confidence in the invincibility of his troops which nothing could shake. Prague, battered by the cannon of Windischgrätz, had been but a short time previously reduced to a state of the most fawning subserviency; and Vienna, besieged, not by Turks, but by an overwhelming force of Austrian troops, had just surrendered, and lay in all its agonies prostrate at his feet.

But as great an obstacle to the success of negotiations at this time arose from the fact, that the constitutional privileges of Hungary had ever been a thorn in the side of Austria; and the Schwartzemberg cabinet had arrived at the conclusion that the present was a most favorable moment to rid themselves of these troublesome encumbrances.

It was the boast of Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, when Viceroy of Ireland, that he had made King Charles, in that island, "as absolute as any prince in the world could be," and the ambition of the English statesman seems to have been the leading motive which characterized the policy of Schwartzemberg's government of Hungary.

The *Vienna Gazette*, the acknowledged organ of the impe-

acter, as well as untimely and remarkable death, was involved in so much mystery, and excited for a time so much discussion in Europe, was (as M. Pulszky represents) the servant of the Countess M., and thus became possessed of a knowledge of the incident above detailed.*

* For document containing the correspondence between M. Kossuth and W. H. Stiles, see Appendix, note No. 23.

rial cabinet, in its imprudent exultation over the triumphant commencement of the campaign, thus exposes the fixed policy of the ministry: "The Magyar tribe is now being thrown back upon its geographical territory, and the kingdom of Hungary, such as it has been, lies in its agonies, after existing for a thousand years. Its history is ended; its future belongs to Austria."

COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

On the 15th of December, Prince Windischgrätz, intrusted with the command in chief, left Vienna with the last of his forces for Hungary; and the subjugation of that country, so firmly resolved on, was then effectually and energetically commenced.

The plan of the campaign, so far as could be judged of from observation of their different movements, seems to have been arranged with great judgment, and to have been attended with thorough preparation. It consisted in invading the country, with formidable forces, from nine points at the same time, all simultaneously tending, with the utmost rapidity, to a common centre, viz., the capital of the kingdom; subduing all opposition which they might encounter, and disarming the population as they proceeded in their victorious march. That these combinations were attended with the most rapid and complete success, the following details will make manifest.

OPERATIONS OF F. M. L.* SCHLICK.

On the north, F. M. L. Count Schlick, marching with a considerable force from Galicia, entered the town of Eperies, in Hungary, on the 10th of December, amid the acclamations of its inhabitants. He occupied that and the neighboring town of Soovar, while his advanced guard (a day's march before him) at the same time, after a severe conflict, carried by storm the fortified city of Kaschau.†

* F. M. L. meant to denote Field Marshal Lieutenant, less than Field Marshal, and about the rank of General. There are but two Field Marshals in Austria, Radetzky and Windischgrätz.

† Meszaros, the Minister of War in Hungary, was in command of the Hungarians in this action. He lost eleven cannons, and drew off but eight thousand of his sixteen thousand men. It is but right, however, to say that this corps was

Leaving brigades to garrison Eperies and Kaschau, Count Schlick dispatched one brigade against Hydasnemethi, followed by a second as a reserve, as far as Enyiezke. Two attempts to retake Eperies proceeding one from Leutschau on the west, and the other from Bartfeld on the east (portions of the country which had not been disarmed), were subsequently made, but the Hungarians in both instances were repulsed with loss.

On the 28th of December, the advancing brigades of Count Schlick having united, encountered the enemy, who had taken up a position at Szikszó; and, after an engagement of a few hours, the Hungarians were routed, and the imperial troops pursued their march toward Miskolcz.

The same force met, on the 4th of January, on the heights of Pareza, a formidable army of the enemy, consisting of fourteen battalions, with thirty-three pieces of cannon and eight hundred horsemen, commanded by Meszaros, and again completely defeated them.* The troops took, on the field of battle, two officers, ten cannons, two hundred muskets, and forty horses; and the light cavalry, pursuing the retreating enemy, captured six more cannons, a thousand muskets, and many horses.†

OPERATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY UNDER F. M. L. SIMONIC.

Another wing of the imperial army, under F. M. L. Count Simonic, entered Hungary from Moravia, having forced the hostile position at Jablunka. His advanced guard, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Frischeisen, on the 11th of December came up with the enemy, occupying a very favorable position

composed almost entirely of National Guards and recruits, of whom only one fifth were provided with fire-arms. The cannons even were served by novices. The eight thousand missing were neither killed nor taken prisoners (for Schlick did not leave his defensive position to pursue them), but dispersed to their homes.

* "The forces which the Hungarians had at this time," says Klapka, "were as nothing compared with the masses of our enemies. We had some garrisons in fortresses. Görgey and Perczel had thirty thousand men on the Upper Danube. In Upper Hungary, they had an ill-trained corps of eight thousand men; and in Transylvania they could not even dispose of six thousand troops. The most efficient force was still in the Bats country and in the Banat, where they fought against the Razen (or Servians). These troops, including the blockading corps round Arad, numbered twenty thousand men."—*Klapka's War in Hungary*.

† Austrian official bulletin.

in the vicinity of Budatin. The latter were defeated, and driven back to Silein.

Proceeding on his march, F. M. L. Simonie, on the 14th of December, encountered the enemy in the strong mountain pass of Jablonitz; having dislodged, he pursued them in their retreat as far as Szered, when the Hungarians retired behind Tyrnau. At that place the enemy, availing himself of an advantageous position, and having received re-enforcements from Pressburg, gave battle on the 16th of December, and were again, after a fight of two hours, completely beaten, and seven hundred and seventy-six prisoners, forty-three horses, five cannon, one flag, and a great number of small arms, fell into the hands of the victorious troops.*

After the defeat at Tyrnau, the Hungarians retreated to Leopoldstadt, a strong fortress in the neighborhood, while F. M. L. Count Simonie occupied Tyrnau, and awaited re-enforcements from Pressburg to attack it.

OPERATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY UNDER FIELD-MARSHAL WINDISCHGRÄTZ.

Leaving Vienna on the 15th of December, Prince Windischgrätz commenced his march toward Hungary, and took up his head-quarters that night at Petronell. On the morning of the 16th, he began operations by undertaking, with the main body of the army, a general reconnoitre, from Bruck to Prellenkirchen, in hopes, in this manner, to bring the enemy to an engagement; but the Hungarians would not accept battle, and retreated at all points. On the same day, he dispatched Colonel Baron Horvath, with three thousand men of the garrison of Vienna, to penetrate the country lower down, pursuing the road over Wiener-Neustadt to Oedenburg; while another portion of the forces marched to the same point, over Hoflein, in order to cover at the same time his left wing.

These forces met on the same day, at Volka-Brodersdorf, a hostile division; and, in a short but spirited engagement, they carried the town by assault, making two officers and twenty-six men prisoners; thence continuing their route, they united

* Austrian official bulletin.

at Kingenbach, marched upon Oedenburg, and entered that place without resistance.* The enemy had withdrawn to Kapuvar.

In the mean time, Baron Jellacic, in command of the first army corps, who had been dispatched a day in advance of Prince Windischgrätz, marched from Vienna in the direction of Wieselburg (the Hungarians retiring before him at all points), and, on the night of the 16th of December, took up his head-quarters at Altenburg. The following day, the 17th, Prince Windischgrätz, with the second army corps, under the command of F. M. L. Count Wrba, crossed the River March, occupied Stampfen, attacked Neudorf, and, advancing, entered Pressburg, the former capital of Hungary, without striking a blow, the Hungarians having evacuated the city on the previous night. The same day, the 18th, Baron Jellacic, after a fight of several hours, took possession of Wieselburg.

After the capture of Pressburg, Prince Windischgrätz, with the second army corps, recrossed to the right bank of the Danube, joining the first army corps under Jellacic. They marched together on Raab, a place strongly fortified, and where it was supposed that the decisive battle would take place. During the advance of these corps, the van-guard crossed the Rabbitz without encountering any resistance from the enemy.† While these operations were progressing on the part of the Imperialists, Görgey, in command of the Hungarian army on the frontiers of Austria, finding it quite impossible to resist such a force as that opposed to him, after several unimportant actions, already mentioned, ordered a general retreat to Raab.‡ Here intrenchments were thrown up, in which the noblest ladies toiled with their delicate hands. The weather, during the early part of the winter of 1848-9, was unusually mild, and from this cause Görgey hoped to be able to maintain his ground behind the three rivers and his strong intrenchments, and to check the further progress of the enemy. But the elements decided otherwise. On the 20th of December, the weather suddenly became intensely cold. By the 25th, the ice was so thick that a body of Austrian troops crossed the frozen waters

* Austrian official bulletin.

II.

† Ibid.

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‡ Wiener Zeitung.

of the Little Danube, and took a position, with their artillery, below Raab. This circumstance rendered it necessary for Görgey to abandon the formidable fortifications at Raab, and to commence his retreat, which he conducted slowly, in order that he might form a junction with Perczel's army, which had been ordered up from the south, and thus give a decisive battle to the enemy before reaching Pesth.* The Austrian column under Colonel Horvath, which had occupied Oedenburg, by this time entered Kapuvar, in consequence of which the communication with the right wing of the army was established.

At the same time, another division of troops, from the garrison of Vienna, under Colonel Altham, marched over Güns to Steinamanger, where it united with the army corps under F. M. L. Count Nugent, which entered Hungary from the Styrian frontier, advancing over Lövo to Körmend.

OPERATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY UNDER F. M. L. NUGENT.

On the 25th of December, Count Nugent, with his force of twelve thousand men, entering the country from Styria, took possession of Körmend, and pursued the flying enemy as far as Janoshaza, whence they took the route for Pápa. By this advance, the junction of his force with that under Colonel Altham was effected.† On the 27th, Prince Windischgrätz, with a view to cut off the retreat of the enemy, crossed one army corps below and the other above the city of Raab, while he himself, in command of the reserve, marched upon the city, and was met at the river (Rabnitz) by a deputation from the town, who delivered him the keys of the city, and informed him, at the same time, that the Hungarian army had evacuated the city and all the intrenchments around it, and had retired, as they understood, with the principal force to Komorn, and with some regiments to Pesth. The Hungarians had retired so effectually, that an officer and nine men were all the prisoners made.‡

Prince Windischgrätz then immediately dispatched Major-general Ottinger, with his cavalry brigade, in pursuit of the

* Pragay's Hungarian Struggle for Freedom.

† Austrian official bulletin.

‡ Ibid.

enemy. After a forced march, Ottinger's brigade came up with the rear-guard of Görgey's army, in the vicinity of Bobolna, on the morning of the 28th of December, and attacked it without delay. Among the Hungarians, a battalion of the former imperial regiment, "Prince of Prussia," about six hundred strong, was attacked by two divisions of Walmoden cuirassiers, and the greater part of them either cut to pieces or taken prisoners. Besides the cavalry above alluded to, there were seven officers and seven hundred men (Honvéds) taken prisoners, an ammunition wagon and flag captured.*

After this affair, the first army corps, under Baron Jellacic, pursuing the road from Raab toward Stuhl-Weissenburg, when he reached Kisbír, having learned that Perczel's corps had a short time before left for Mör, immediately commenced a forced march toward that point.

After proceeding the whole night along a high, narrow causeway leading through the frozen marshes, the icy north wind which swept the plain was found so penetrating that the whole of the hussars, unable to remain on horseback, dismounted, and marched forward on foot, leading their horses by the bridle. At length, about ten o'clock the next morning, they fell in with Perczel's corps, about an hour's march beyond Mör.† The attack, on the part of the Imperialists, was executed with great gallantry; in half an hour the Walmoden and Hardeg cuirassiers broke the enemy's centre. A part of the Hungarians, particularly the regular cavalry, fought with great resolution; the contest between these cavalry regiments, which had formerly belonged to the imperial army, composed of native Hungarians, the best horsemen in the world,‡ and the squadron of heavy cuirassiers, with their cuirasses, helmets, and long *pal-lashes*,§ making the very earth shake under them, was desperate indeed. But the number of the Hungarians was much inferior to that of the enemy; their dispositions were bad; there was a want of direction, of confidence in the officers;

* Austrian official bulletin.

† Scenes of the Civil War in Hungary.

‡ Hussar, a native Hungarian word, derived from Huss, signifying twenty. Every twentieth man was formerly required to do military service, and hence was called Hussar.

§ Long swords, more like Scottish claymores than any other weapon.

and the Honvéd battalions soon sought safety in flight, leaving on the field nine cannons, and several thousand dead, wounded, and prisoners.

The engagement at Mör is still involved in mystery. By some, all the evil consequences of this disastrous check have been ascribed solely to Perczel; he might, they assert, at a much earlier day have united with Görgey; but placing an overestimate upon his own merits after the defeat of Roth, he delayed as long as possible, placing himself under the command of a younger general:* that he was not obliged to accept battle, for he had arrived at Kisbír half a day earlier than Jellacic, and might have quietly pursued his march to Buda. Nevertheless, others acquit him of the fault, and throw it wholly upon Görgey, who is said to have had the ability, but not the inclination, to unite with him, even after ordering him to make a stand at Mör, and promising him succor in case of need. There is still a third view of the question entertained by many, and that is, that Perczel is stated to have received the order from Kossuth himself to arrest the enemy's march at any cost. "Every hour of delay is not too dearly purchased, even with a defeat."†

The result, to whomsoever belongs the blame, was, that the best troops, the heroes of Freidau, were entirely dispersed,‡ and Görgey's idea of a decisive battle before the enemy reached the capital rendered impossible.

Nothing now remained for Görgey but to retire slowly beyond the Danube, and which, after an engagement between his rear-guard and the enemy's cavalry at Zeth, he crossed at Pesth, on the 3d of January, 1849.

While these events were occurring on the right bank of the Danube, the fourth column proceeding on the left bank of the river from Pressburg to Komorn,§ F. M. L. Count Wrba in

* Pragay.

† Schlessinger's War in Hungary.

‡ Perczel wrote that, immediately after the battle of Mör, his troops had so completely scattered that not two thousand could be seen; they had only concealed themselves from the enemy, which their superior knowledge of the country enabled them to do. Two days after, they gathered in their entire strength, with the exception of the few hundreds slain on the field of battle.

§ Ptolemy makes mention of the town of Chomara, and the name is by some historians derived from the Chomærians, a Scythian colony. The more general

command, on the 30th summoned that fortress (the strongest in Hungary, and which had successfully resisted all the invasions of the Turks) to surrender.* Mezthény, a former officer of the imperial government, charged with its defense by Kossuth, and preferring to support his cause to that of the Austrians, refused to yield.

opinion is, Oluptulma and his Kumanians, about A.D. 900, laid the foundation of this fortress, and named it Kumarum, whence is derived the name Komorn. It was taken and razed to the ground by the Czeck Ottokar, and was rebuilt in 1272. In 1340, it fell into the hands of the Bishopric of Gran; in 1527, it was defended by Zapolya against Ferdinand the First, and at length surrendered. In the following year it fell into the hands of the Turks; and in 1529 came again into the possession of Ferdinand, without ever having been taken by force of arms. In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, both town and fortress were gradually extended, until they acquired their present size and importance.

* Komorn is the key of Hungary: this is a phrase continually repeated, but perhaps as often misunderstood. An army may be in possession of Komorn without being master of Hungary, but can never be master of Hungary without the possession of Komorn.

In point of strength, Peterwardein may be compared with Komorn; it likewise commands the Danube, but in the less important part of its course toward the southeast; whereas Komorn commands the river not far from its entrance into the country, and has the power of preventing the passage of any vessels from Monostor to the Black Sea, thus stopping the main artery of the country at its source. Hungary has not, as yet, any internal communication of roads and railways to supply its place. This power, together with its singular position, wonderfully fortified alike by nature and art, constitute the importance of Komorn.

The old fortress lies in the pointed angle formed by the confluence of the two branches of the Danube, at the extreme eastern point of the Isle of Schütt; and in a large semicircle before the town are situated the extensive works, which sufficiently cover the open side on the west. This is called the Palatinal line—an extent of ramparts which, at the instigation of the late Palatine, was completed to a length of three thousand fathoms, at a cost of some millions of florins, according to the rules of modern science. These ramparts protect both the old and new fortress, together with the town, on the land side, leaving large open spaces between these works and the town, serviceable for encampment, parades, reviews, and pasturage. More to the north, as far as Gutta, where the Traag joins the upper arm of the Danube, a strong crown-work prevents any hostile attempt to cross the river. Other works—bastions of three, four, and five lines—cover the old fortress on the river side. But a still stronger protection than these artificial works is afforded by the Danube, in connection with the Rivers Dudvoga, Penna, Waag, and Neutra, the embouchures of which form an intricate net of rivers, extending over a tract of inaccessible marshes.

In addition to all this defense, a fortified tête de pont on the right bank, opposite to the town, was converted by the Hungarians into a second fortress, by means of extensive ramparts; and an island, formed of alluvial deposit in the middle of the stream, between this tête de pont and the old fortress, was taken advantage of by the military engineer.—*Schlessinger*.

The Austrians surrounded the fortress, but suffered to pass unimproved the favorable opportunity for taking it, which occurs but seldom, when the Danube and the Waag, which form its principal intrenchments and the chief grounds of its invincibility, were so completely frozen as to be passed any where with the heaviest artillery.

After the victory at Mör, Baron Jellacic with the first army corps, pursued the enemy as far as Lovas Bereny, on his way to Buda-Pesth; while Prince Windischgrätz, with the first army corps and reserve, advanced over Bieske and Bia also to the capital.

At Bieske, the prince was met by a deputation from the Hungarian Diet (still sitting in opposition to the orders of the emperor for its dissolution), composed of two of the former ministers of Hungary, Count Batthiányi,* and Deak, Bishop Lonovics, and Count Mailath.

The prince refused to receive a deputation from so illegal a body, but informed its members that no proposal for mediation coming from what source it might, could be entertained, and nothing short of unconditional surrender for a moment listened to.

On the 3d of January, the head-quarters of Prince Windischgrätz were at Bia, about three hours' march from Pesth; those of Jellacic at Promontorium, about the same distance, and both entered the capital together, on the 5th of January, without striking a blow. The prince immediately dispatched his son with the keys of both cities to his master the emperor at Olmütz. The remnants of Perczel's army crossed the Danube at Pesth, on the 1st of January.

Kossuth and the government left that city on the 3d, for the fortress of Debreczin, in the southeastern part of the kingdom, taking with him all the public funds and the ancient and venerated crown of St. Stephen.

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH.

Such were the operations in the northern and middle parts

* They were all detained as prisoners by Prince Windischgrätz, but were soon released, except Count Batthiányi, who was kept in confinement until his execution, on the 6th of October, 1849.

of Hungary ; and these were conducted agreeably to the rules of civilized warfare, and with comparatively little loss of life ; but such was far from being the case in the more barbarous districts of the south, which had been for many months the scenes of frightful disorder and bloodshed. The many different races inhabiting the southern districts, viz., Slavonians, Croats, Servians, Wallachians, Saxons, and Szecklers, taking advantage of the insurrection of the Hungarians, and the consequent license which completely annulled all supreme authority, had risen and massacred each other ; whole villages had been demolished ; every species of property pillaged ; the rich beggared, and the poor murdered ; until the entire country was reduced to one scene of devastation and horror. In Transylvania, occupied by Romans, Saxons, and Szecklers, the scenes of murder and rapine were remarkably numerous and frightful : in the conflict between these two races, the former, for the most part, remained true to the imperial government, while the latter espoused the cause of the Hungarians.*

At first the Szecklers, supported by some Hungarian regiments, invaded the Saxon and Roman districts with great success, destroying many villages, and, in some instances, the richest towns, ravaging the country, and murdering men, women, and children. Later, F. M. L. Puchner, with an imperial force at his command, having assumed the government of the country, and organized the military force existing among the Saxons and Romans, enlisting new regiments and raising companies of National Guards, at length acquired sufficient power to meet and oppose successfully the combined Hungarians and Szecklers ; and, by his energy and courage, succeeded in subduing all opposition in Transylvania, and in establishing the supremacy of the imperial government throughout that district. After the important and rapidly acquired advantages in Transylvania, F. M. L. Puchner marched with a force of thirteen hundred men, into the adjoining district of the Banat, where the Hungarians and their allies were still in triumphant ascendancy, and where the important fortress of Arad, manned by imperial troops, was likely to fall before the besieging force

* Allgemeine Zeitung.

of fifteen thousand men. Calling to his aid a part of the garrison of Temesvar, in the same district, F. M. L. Puchner was joined, on the 14th of December, by two columns under Major-general Leiningen, at Engelsbrunn, and the united forces marched together to the relief of Arad. The attack upon the besieging enemy was executed with great success; after an engagement which lasted several hours, under the heaviest artillery fire, in the plain of St. Miklos, the Imperialists succeeded in turning the left wing of the enemy, and, by a judicious and opportune charge, put the Hungarians to flight; they retreated over the Maros, leaving in the hands of their adversaries two hundred prisoners, four howitzers, and a cannon.* But the greatest advantage derived by the Austrians from this battle was the relief of the fortress of Arad. Still further triumphs followed the imperial arms. At Panscova, also in the same district of the Banat, Colonel Mayerhofer, on the 2d of January, encountered the enemy, and, after a brilliant engagement, the Hungarians were completely routed, a great number of prisoners taken, and the commander of the hostile forces, Kiss, escaped with difficulty, attended by only six horsemen, to Allebunar.†

By these, as well as other less important successes which attended the Austrian arms throughout the southern districts, the supremacy of imperial authority was so completely re-established as to leave apparently but little probability that the Hungarians would ever be able again to resume the offensive, especially since the troops which had so successfully penetrated the country from the north and west to the centre, were now free to move in that direction, should subsequent events render such an advance necessary.

Thus, in less than three weeks from the entrance of Prince Windischgrätz into Hungary, and when the invasion of that kingdom might be considered as effectually commenced, almost the whole country had been reduced to subjection; the capital, as well as other principal cities, taken and occupied; the imperial functionaries reinstated in office, and order, to all appearance, completely restored.

* Austrian official bulletin.

† Ibid.

The conduct of the Hungarians in not giving battle, but almost invariably retreating before their adversaries, disappointed the general expectation, and shook the confidence long reposed in their courage and chivalrous bearing. Some ascribed their course to the absence of practical talent in the administration of affairs, on account of which no properly organized system of defense had been prepared; but especially because they were possessed of no educated and skillful officers to command their forces, and the Honvéd, or militia and raw recruits of which their rank and file were chiefly composed, would not stand before the regularly organized and admirably disciplined troops of the imperial army.

But there were a few who recollected that John Zapolya and his descendants, in the sixteenth century, had held out for thirty years, invincible by any force which the Austrian monarchs could bring against them; that their course had always been to retreat to the great plains of Hungary, so well adapted for the operation of cavalry, the arm in which they were particularly efficient; and it was suggested that they now were but retiring in the same direction, and toward the banks of the marshy Theiss, where artillery, in which consisted the chief strength of their opponents, could not operate. In the eyes of such individuals, the retreat of the Hungarians seemed a matter not of compulsion but design, as clearly a settled plan of operations as the retirement of the Russians before Napoleon when he invaded their country; and that through another combination of the elements of nature with the power of man, the Austrians were destined to experience an overthrow alike unexpected and overwhelming.

Other considerations, divulged by Kossuth in his proclamation to the peasantry, besides those already mentioned, favor the opinion that the movement of the Hungarians ought not to be considered a flight, but as a strategical operation. It was disclosed that the object of the Hungarians in constructing heavy intrenchments at Raab, Wieselburg, and Pressburg, was not so much the defense of these points, as to force upon the Austrians the necessity of procuring additional cannon and additional horses; in the hope that, during the time necessary for these operations, they might be able to make a general levy in

the Slavic comitats, to drill their army, and to receive the muskets ordered from Belgium. The subsequent retreat was also a well-arranged plan, by which they expected to be able to raise the *Landsturm* in the rear of the Austrian army, and that would compel them to garrison all the towns which they might capture, and thus weaken most effectually the main invading force of the enemy.

The first measures adopted by Prince Windischgrätz, after establishing himself at Pesth, was to divide the subdued portion of the country into three military districts; placing the first under the command of F. M. L. Kempen, with head-quarters at Pressburg; the second, under F. M. L. Wrba, with head-quarters at Pesth; and the third, under Major-general Burics, with head-quarters at Oedenburg.

The next movement was an order, issued by the prince, to place in a state of siege the provinces of Galicia, Cracow, and Bukowina, to which the dispersed Hungarians were fleeing; to disarm all individuals not belonging to the regular military forces; to prohibit every where the publishing of journals, the assembling of citizens, and to observe the strictest vigilance along the entire frontiers of Hungary.

The first and second army corps were ordered to pursue the military divisions, as well as the hordes of private individuals, which fled from Pesth in every direction after the capture of the city.

These dispositions were, perhaps, sufficiently proper and correct; but the course of Prince Windischgrätz is inexplicable in delaying nearly two months at Pesth, engaged in the useless task of attempting to reorganize the disordered administration throughout the conquered comitats, instead of advancing, while the spirit of his troops was elated, and that of the Hungarians depressed, and subduing all opposition in the southern and eastern portions of the kingdom, to which the Magyar forces had retired; instead of suffering to pass unimproved the only season of the year when their artillery could be made available, and granting to their opponents time to recover from their consternation, and to gather recruits, as well as to organize and discipline their forces.*

* Means altogether unworthy, it is asserted, were employed to induce Prince

MOVEMENTS OF THE AUSTRIANS IN UPPER HUNGARY.

For a short time, at several points, unimportant successes still continued to follow the imperial arms.

In the Oedenburg and Eisenburg comitats, the corps under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Altham, having cleared that part of the country of all opposition, marched to Pápa, where he arrived on the 13th of January; thence he proceeded to Veszprém and the Bakonyer Wald, an immense forest, where some bands of Perczel's dispersed army were ravaging.*

On the same day, a brigade, under the command of Baron Neustädter, had an engagement with a hostile division at Aszód, on the left border of the Danube, in which they routed the enemy, but sustained the loss of Lieutenant-colonel Geramb. F. M. L. Czoric, who was ordered to pursue the retreating enemy under Görgey in the direction of Ipoly-Ságh, over Léva, and to press him to Schemnitz, advanced on the 13th, with eight battalions, six squadrons, and thirty-six cannons. At the same time, the column under the command of Major-general Götz advanced over Neusohl to Kremnitz.†

This officer, after the submission of the Turveyzer comitat, undertook, on the 16th, a reconnoiter of Neusohl and Kremnitz. The division sent out for this purpose met the enemy at Turezek, drove him from that position, and took Kremnitz; but the approach of night stopped their triumphant march.

On the 17th, the Hungarians advanced with fresh forces to Kremnitz, to retake, if possible, the position lost on the previ-

Windischgrätz to remain inactive. High-born, influential members of the Magyar aristocracy surrounded the marshal, and assured him that it lay in his power to terminate the war almost without bloodshed. Conciliation was the hope deliberately given, while the most unquestionable treachery was abetted and planned. "You should have seen the countesses and baronesses at their Delilah work," said an old Austrian general who was present at all these scenes; "it was maddening to see how they took the marshal in, and how he confided in the asseverations and words of honor of the whole crew, just because he could not believe that people so well born could be so false. There were *soirées*, and there was music, and flirting, and *tea*," exclaimed he, with an accent of wrathful despair—for it seemed this last was an aggravation of all the too-credulous marshal's wrongs. "Tea," he added; "a pretty time for tea, forsooth, when Kossuth was at Debreczin, and they (the countesses and baronesses) were keeping him advised of all that was going on."—*Baroness Blaze de Bury*.

* After the defeat of Mör.

† Austrian official bulletin.

ous day; the imperial troops, however, made a strong and successful resistance, and the enemy, after a battle of four hours, in which they had one hundred killed, and one hundred and seventeen men and four officers taken prisoners, were discouraged, and fled.* On the same day, F. M. L. Schlick, at Kaschau, knowing that a column of the imperial army was marching, under the command of F. M. L. Schulzig, from Pesth, over Gyöngyös, to Miskolcz, and that another, under Major-general Götz, was moving over Kremnitz and Schemnitz to Zips, and aware that the operations were more favorable in Transylvania, from the last accounts, he, in order to prevent the escape of the leaders of the insurrection, commanded Major Kieswetter, with a suitable force, to occupy Leutshau, and that a flying column, issuing from Eperies, and passing over Hanusfalva, Varano, and Homano, should unite on the 17th with the second column, and operate afterward over Sarospatak against the Theiss.†

F. M. L. Schlick, having left at Kaschau the brigade Deym, marched with the main body to Tallya, where he expected to gather all his forces, and to advance from thence against Tokay, and afterward against Debreczin. F. M. L. Simonik, who, after the capture of Tyrnau, was for some weeks occupied in besieging the fortress of Leopoldstadt, in the same vicinity, at length commenced, on the 2d of February, its bombardment with sixty and thirty-pound shells, and which produced so tremendous an effect, that in an hour that formidable fortress surrendered at discretion, although in possession of an abundant supply of ammunition and provision.

F. M. L. Simonik then marched, under the orders he had received, to Komorn, and commenced the siege of that fortress.

MOVEMENTS OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMY IN UPPER HUNGARY.

Upon the evacuation of Pesth, the Hungarian army, as well with a view to deceive the enemy as for the defense of the different portions of country, was then separated into two divisions. While Perczel, with ten thousand men, marched toward the Theiss, Görgey, with the larger portion of the troops, took

* Austrian official bulletin.

† Ibid.

the direction of Waitzen, for the purpose of leading off the enemy from Debreczin, occupying the mountain cities, carrying off every where the government stores,* and disjoining, if possible, the Austrian generals Götz, Jablonovski, Deym, Ramberg, and Schlick.

As soon as Görgey reached Waitzen, he issued a proclamation, on the 5th of January, in which he declared that the Hungarian army fought for nothing else than for the laws of 1848, and for the legitimate king, Ferdinand the Fifth; and that it would defend the fatherland independently of any other authority.† This was, in fact, a repudiation of Kossuth and the Committee of Defense, and constituted the first overt act in his treasonable career.

Görgey now marched, in three columns, through Upper Hungary. Guyon commanded the rear, and, by his fortunate and heroic maneuver at Ipoly-Ságh, on the 10th of January, 1849, he covered the whole baggage train, and saved it thus from the pursuing enemy.‡

Near this place is a wooded height, on the summit of which are situated a chapel and a convent. At its foot extends a narrow ravine, separating the fenced convent garden from the hill on which the chapel stands; and in this garden Guyon had posted a strong division of Honvéds, with some cannon. He ordered loop-holes to be pierced in this boarded fence, for his fusileers and artillerymen, and then had these holes pasted over, so as to act as a screen.

The ravine was to serve as a trap for the Imperialists, and the stratagem succeeded. Their pioneers passed the ravine, and not a sound betrayed the vicinity of the enemy; but no sooner had the chief detachment reached the middle of the defile, than the guns opened a fire upon them from the whole line of fence, and several hundred Imperialists fell. Their vanguard was destroyed, and Görgey's rear-guard, under Benyicky, with their trophies of victory—a cannon and several hundred prisoners—followed the main body of the army, which was

* Not only was all the gold in this region, but the government stores, gunpowder, etc.

† For this document in full, see Appendix, note No. 29.

‡ Pulszky's *Adventures of a Hungarian Lady*.

advancing by forced marches in the direction of Kremnitz and Schemnitz.*

Görgey himself however, on the 21st of January, met with a decided check from F. M. L. Czoric, who, with a division of the second army corps, came up with him in the plateau before Schemnitz. The Austrians, commencing the attack, carried the village of Windschacht by storm, and drove the enemy from all points. The next morning, after a short fight with the hostile rear-guard, the Austrians entered Schemnitz. In this battle the Hungarians are reported to have sustained a loss of sixty killed, one hundred and twenty wounded, five hundred prisoners, twelve cannons, and ten mortars.† The loss of the Imperialists, by the official bulletin, was put down at two officers and six men killed, and thirteen wounded. Notwithstanding this repulse, the remarkable maneuvers of Görgey about this time deserve to rank beside the boldest and most splendid achievements of almost any period of history, not excepting the passage of the Little Bernard by Hannibal, the Great Bernard by Napoleon, or, that which perhaps exceeds them both, the crossing of the more lofty Splügen by M'Donald. In the depth of a severe winter, he led his troops and artillery over the Carpathians; one while appearing on the frontiers of Galicia; at another, escaping to the mountain towns and villages. His situation soon became extremely critical; pressed as he was on all sides, and making his winter marches and counter-marches over fields and mountains of ice and snow, he found himself, in his native country of Zips, suddenly shut in on three sides; while Hamerstein, in Galicia, was marshaling all the disposable troops to the frontier, to oppose his fourth and last exit.‡

Guyon, at the head of the northern column, was more successful, and carried off the gold and silver stores of the government from the mining districts, and, from Neusohl, the supplies of gunpowder. He reached the county of Zips without serious difficulty. At Neudorf, the Austrians took him by surprise in the night of the 2d of February; but, after a bloody struggle in the streets, the Hungarians were victorious, and

* Schlessinger's War in Hungary.

† Austrian official bulletin.

‡ Schlessinger.

dispersed the enemy.* Guyon then advanced to the county of Sáros; here he found himself opposed by a division of Schlick, which occupied the defiles of the steep heights of the Branyiszko. This rugged pass, which from its elevation was deemed impregnable, was the only road from Leutshau to Kaschau, and the sole outlet for Görgey and his troops, by which their connection with the army of the Theiss could be effected, and Guyon did not hesitate to storm it. Attacking it from the valley below, and encountering a dreadful battery at every turn in this mountain road, he was obliged to sacrifice one fourth of his heroic troops before all the defiles were carried.

Guyon ordered four of his battalions to lay down their arms: and for five whole hours they climbed up steep foot-paths, known only to the natives of the country, carrying the dismantled cannon piecemeal on their shoulders, or dragging them, together with the necessary ammunition, after them by ropes.

From eight o'clock in the evening till one o'clock in the morning this heroic band were winding up the steep mountain paths, making their way over rocks and snow-drifts, beset with incredible difficulties and hardships, in a cold winter's night; while the rest of the troops, at the entrance of the pass, were continually making feigned attacks, to divert the attention of the Austrians, and prevent the silence of the night betraying the movement of the troops engaged in the ascent.

It was past midnight when the first cannon-shot came thundering from the heights down into the dark valley. This was the signal for a general attack. Ten successive times did the troops stationed below advance to the assault, braving death, while from above the shot thundered into the depths of the ravine.† The Austrians witnessed with terror and dismay the destruction of their ranks: they abandoned one intrenchment after another, fighting as they retreated, and in the utmost confusion attempted to gain the opposite outlet of the pass. A great portion of their artillery and a third part of the troops were lost in this retreat; the slaughter was unprecedented; and, the next morning, Görgey's van-guard passed through the

* Pulszky.

† Schlessinger's War in Hungary.

defile which Guyon and his brave troops had unclosed to them. This obstruction removed, Görgey reached Eperies on the 6th of February, and re-established his communications (interrupted for four weeks) with the troops of the Theiss and the government at Debreczin.*

OPERATIONS ON THE THEISS.

While these occurrences were transpiring in the mountain districts, Prince Windischgrätz began to dispatch his forces toward the Theiss. The rail-road was reopened to Szolnok, and this important point was occupied by Ottinger's brigade. In this position, the Austrians were attacked on the 23d of January, and, owing to the negligence of their commander, suffered one of the most signal defeats that occurred during the whole war. The Hungarians, under Perczel and Damjanic, availing themselves of the frozen river, surrounded the vanguard of Ottinger, that held the bridge over the Theiss. The *Csikoses*† contributed greatly to the success of this surprise.

* When, through Guyon's messenger, Görgey was advised of the gallant achievement, and that the pass was now clear for the outlet of his troops, he is said to have remarked, with the utmost indifference, "Guyon was a great fool for his pains."—*Pulszky*.

† *Csikos*.—The *Csikos* is a man who, from his birth, some how or other finds himself seated upon a foal. Instinctively, the boy remains fixed upon the animal's back, and grows up in his seat as other children do in the cradle. The young *Csikos* soon feels himself at his ease on his cradle. The boy grows by degrees to a big horse herd. These herds range over a tract of many German square miles—for the most part level plains, with wood, marsh, heath, and moorland: they rove about where they please, multiply, and enjoy freedom of existence. Nevertheless, it is a common error to imagine that these horses, like a pack of wolves in the mountains, are left to themselves and nature, without any care or thought of man. Wild horses, in the proper sense of the term, are in Europe at the present day only met with in Bessarabia; whereas the so-called wild herds in Hungary may rather be compared to the animals ranging in large parks, which are attended to and watched.

The *Csikos* has the difficult task of keeping a watchful eye upon these herds. He knows their strength, their habits, the spots they frequent; he knows the birth day of every foal, and when the animal, fit for training, should be taken out of the herd. He has then a hard task upon his hands, compared with which a grand-ducal wild-boar hunt is child's play; for the horse has not only to be taken alive from the midst of the herd, but of course safe and sound in wind and limb. For this purpose the celebrated whip of the *Csikos* serves him.

This whip has a stout handle, from one and a half to two feet long, and a cord which measures not less than from eighteen to twenty-four feet in length. The cord is attached to a short iron chain, fixed to the top of the handle by an iron

They were close at hand before Szolnok when the trumpet of the Austrian cuirassiers sounded to horse, the generals barely saved themselves by flight, the officers rode off mostly without saddles, and the common soldiers were cut down in the stables before they could mount; eighteen hundred were made prisoners, and the remainder escaped to Czegléd.*

It was no battle, but the loss to the Austrians was greater than in a regular encounter, where the cannonade continues from morning to night. Subsequently, General Ottinger, re-

ring. A large leaden button is fastened to the end of the cord, and similar smaller buttons are distributed along it at distances, according to certain rules, derived from experience, of which we are ignorant. Armed with this weapon, which the Csikos carries in his belt, together with a short grappling-iron or hook, he sets out on his horse chase. Thus mounted and equipped, without saddle or stirrup, he flies like the storm-wind over the heath, with such velocity that the grass scarcely bends under the horse's hoofs; the step of his horse is not heard; and the whirling cloud of dust above his head alone marks his approach and disappearance. Although familiar with the use of a bridle, he despises such a troublesome article of luxury, and guides his horse with his voice, hands, and feet—nay, it almost seems as if he directed it by the mere exercise of the will, as we move our feet to the right or left, backward or forward, without its ever coming into our head to regulate our movements by a leather strap.

In this manner, for hours, he chases the flying herd, until at length he succeeds in approaching the animal which he is bent on catching. He then swings his whip round in immense circles, and throws the cord with such dexterity and precision that it twines around the neck of his victim. The leaden button at the end, and the knots along the cord, form a noose, which draws closer and tighter the faster the horse hastens on.

See how he flies along, with outstretched legs, his mane whistling in the wind, his eye darting fire, his mouth covered with foam, and the dust whirling aloft on all sides. But the noble animal breathes shorter, his eye grows wild and staring, his nostrils are reddened with blood, the veins of his neck are distended like cords, his legs refuse longer service—he sinks exhausted and powerless, a picture of death. But at the same instant the pursuing steed likewise stands still and fixed, as if turned to stone. An instant, and the Csikos has flung himself off his horse upon the ground, and inclining his body backward, to keep the noose tight, he seizes the cord alternately with the right and left hand, shorter and shorter, drawing himself by it nearer and nearer to the panting and prostrate animal, till at last, coming up to it, he flings his legs across its back. He now begins to slacken the noose gently, allowing the creature to recover breath; but hardly does the horse feel this relief than he leaps up, and darts off again in a wild course, as if still able to escape from his enemy. But the man is already bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh; he sits fixed upon his neck as if grown to it, and makes the horse feel his power at will, by tightening or slackening the cord. A second time the hunted animal sinks upon the ground; again he rises, and again breaks down, until at length, overpowered with exhaustion, he can no longer stir a limb.—*Schlessinger*.

* Schlessinger.

enforced by Prince Windischgrätz, advanced again upon Szolnok; but the Hungarians, so far from giving battle, as was expected, retreated across the Theiss.

F. M. L. Schlick, after his defeat of the Hungarians under Meszaros, on the heights of Pareza, on the 4th of January, was, as had been stated, marching upon Tokay, met the enemy at Szanto, and drove him back to Tokay.

The members of the Hungarian government, in their flight from Pesth to Debreczin, hearing this sad intelligence, immediately dispatched General Klapka to take command of the defeated army of Meszaros, now driven by Schlick to the neighborhood of Tokay. The defeated Hungarians, encouraged by the presence of Klapka, and under his directions, immediately took up a favorable position at Tokay, Tarczal, and Bodroy-Keresztur. Schlick attacked these positions separately, on the 22d, 23d, and 31st of January, and was by the Hungarians under Klapka, in three distinct battles, successively repulsed.* The advance of the Austrians on Debreczin was not only prevented, but they were driven back upon Kaschau and Eperies. Schlick, who had considered Görgey as buried alive, drew his sabre in a fury, when a major, on the 6th of February, brought him the news to Eperies of the defeat at Branyiszko. "Dogs that ye are—all of you dogs!" he exclaimed; "that pass I would have held against a hundred thousand men!"† He instantly decamped from Eperies, to escape Görgey's superior forces, and took the route to Kaschau. There he heard that Klapka was advancing, who, since the battle of the 31st of January, had lost sight of him, and he was now fixed in the same position as Görgey had been the very evening before. But Schlick was as familiar with the northern counties of Hungary as his enemy, and by masterly maneuvers he succeeded in escaping—by Jaszo, Rosenau, and Rima-Szombat—to Losoncz, and subsequently effected a junction with the main Austrian army. Of the army which he led from Galicia, not one fourth returned, and yet he might boldly claim the gratitude of the emperor. No other of the Austrian generals would have saved a single horse's shoe—probably not his own person—

* Klapka's War in Hungary.

† Schlessinger.

from the hands of the Hungarians amid the defiles of the Carpathians.*

During the operations on the Theiss, Perczel had so clearly displayed his inability to command, that he was compelled to retire, and his place supplied by General Dembinski, a Pole, who, about the 1st of February, arrived at Debreczin from Paris, and was, by Kossuth, shortly after invested with the command-in-chief of the Hungarian armies.

Dembinski, about sixty years of age, had received a military education at the Academy of Engineers in Vienna, had accompanied Napoleon in the Russian campaign, and, though quite young, been promoted to the rank of captain at Smolensk, by Napoleon himself. In the Polish Revolution of 1830, he had especially distinguished himself, and from commander of a battalion and chief of the Mobile Guard of Cracow was, by his brilliant services, advanced to the rank of general of division and governor of the capital.

The appointment of Dembinski to the chief command of the Hungarian armies, notwithstanding "he was called the first strategist of his age,"† was an unfortunate one for the Hungarians; for, whatever may have been his military merit, the Hungarian officers were jealous of the promotion of a foreigner over them, they censured and decried all his operations, and ascribed the failures which they experienced to "his absurd dispositions, extreme forgetfulness, and obstinacy," and to his "wretched selection of a general staff." His deportment, too, was calculated to increase rather than allay the prejudice of the Hungarians. To Klapka, who commanded a wing of the army under him, and who presumed upon suggestions relative to their military operations, Dembinski wrote, "You are to have views upon nothing; you have only to execute what is prescribed to you." Görgey was, at a later day, favored with a similar epistle. These, as was most natural, destroyed that confidence between officers so essential to success, brought down upon their author the enmity of the army, and to his "blunders and obstinacy" they did not hesitate to ascribe the

* Schlessinger's War in Hungary.

† Ibid.

frequent escapes which Schlick made from the certain defeat which awaited him.*

This was doubtless, too, in part the cause that the necessary harmony was wanting in all the after operations, and that the battle of Kápolna, which soon followed, and which was the first general engagement that took place, did not fully answer previous expectations.

The escape of Schlick was doubtless owing to a want of concert on the part of the Hungarian commanders, as the following events most clearly exhibit. Several of the Austrian generals were dining, on the 14th of February, in Sagó Gömör. Suddenly cannons resounded from the north, in the direction of Aggtelek. The startled officers hastened to ascertain the cause; in half an hour the whole corps was in battle array. The third column of Görgey was fully expected. His outposts had, in fact, fired the shots which occasioned the alarm; but the Hungarians had retired again. The Austrians had scarcely encamped, when repeated shots were heard from the opposite side. General Dembinski, who had been at Miskolcz, had in time been apprised of the movements of the Austrians, and now came, with eight thousand men, to take Schlick in the rear. The Austrians were panic-stricken. Eye-witnesses related that even officers ran about crying aloud, "We are surrounded—we are lost!" A violent cannonade ensued for several hours, but no close attack was made by Dembinski; he obviously awaited Görgey. The night silenced the cannonade. On the following morning the enemy had disappeared. Schlick had escaped with his corps to Rimaszombath, thence to the mountain of Heves and to the plain of Kápolna, where at last, with his troops decimated by the Hungarians, as well as by the restless marches, he joined the main corps of Windischgrätz. Already then, in many quarters, the suspicion was entertained that Görgey, jealous of Dembinski, had intentionally failed to support him, and had, on this account, neglected to urge the pursuit of Schlick, who might easily have been destroyed by the co-operation of the Hungarian commanders.†

* Pragay's Hungarian Struggle for Freedom.

† Pulszky.

FURTHER OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH.

Turning more to the southern districts, Major-general Count Nugent, intending to advance against Fünfkirchen on the 25th of January, ordered Major-general Baron Dietrich with his strong brigade to Kaposvar, to clear by this advance the comitats of Simegh and Barany of the roving bands of the enemy, while he marched against the Hungarians in the neighborhood of Fünfkirchen. The order was successfully executed by Baron Dietrich in taking possession of Kaposvar, and General Nugent himself, on the 29th, marched upon and took up his headquarters at Fünfkirchen without encountering any resistance, as the enemy, four thousand strong, with ten cannons, had abandoned the place on the 26th for Eszek.

Subsequently, Count Nugent pursued the enemy, retreating over Nemegyei to Eszek, and detached a division against Mohacs to occupy that place, and thus put himself in communication with the Serbians operating on the left bank of the Danube.

At the same time, F. M. L. Dahlen, organizing the frontier troops, and advancing on the right bank of the Danube against Eszek, after an engagement on the 18th with the enemy before Vershetz, takes possession of that town and Ziesidorf. Later, Major-general Frebersburg, who had for some time surrounded the city of Eszek, with the view of taking the formidable fortress which it contains, on the 30th of January attacked the faubourgs of the city, carried three of them by storm, and then summoned the fortress to surrender; but this summons the Hungarians would not obey until the arrival of Count Nugent, with his forces united to those of the besiegers, which rendered further resistance hopeless; and that strong fortress, with four thousand five hundred men, six hundred and fourteen cannons, seventy-four horses, four hundred oxen, and three thousand four hundred florins, surrendered to the Imperialists.*

In Transylvania, the Hungarians under General Bem (a Pole, who was commander of the Mobile Guard during the bombardment of Vienna), being driven from the Bukowina by

* Austrian official bulletin.

Colonel Urban, invaded the district of Transylvania, and, proceeding over Klausenburg to Hermanstadt, attacked that city on the 21st of January, held by F. M. L. Puchner in command of the imperial troops. The fore-posts of the Austrians opened upon the enemy, and were answered by six and twelve-pounders with such effect, that F. M. L. Puchner ordered an attack with the bayonet upon the hostile batteries. The storming column and squadron of cuirassiers, protected by cannon, advanced and threw the enemy out of his position, and subsequently the fight began along the whole line. After an engagement of seven hours, the Hungarians were forced to retreat, and were pursued by the Imperialists to Stolzenburg. Five cannons, four munition wagons, arms of all kinds, some provisions, and prisoners, were the result of this victory. From Stolzenburg Puchner withdrew his forces back to Hermanstadt; while Bem, with twelve thousand men and twenty-seven cannons, there took up a strong position under the cover of the castle.

On the 5th of February, Bem, with the view of making another attack on Hermanstadt, marched for this purpose to Salzburg, and planted his force on the heights near that town. F. M. L. Puchner, advised of the movements of the enemy, met him at Salzburg, and, advancing strongly upon him, Bem's forces were compelled to give way; at first they retired in order, but soon the retreat was turned into a flight. In this action the Hungarians lost seven hundred killed, and one hundred and forty taken prisoners; and lost, at the same time, thirteen cannons, ten powder wagons, and a great number of arms and baggage—among the latter that of the general himself.* The Austrians sustained a loss of seventy killed, and one hundred and sixty wounded. The imperial forces, subsequently pursuing Bem through Mühlenbach, Syasz-Varos, Deva, and Bürski, drove him over the confines of Transylvania, taking seven hundred more prisoners and four cannons, and clearing that district completely of the enemy.†

About the same time that the troops under Bem attacked Hermanstadt, another Hungarian force marched against the

* Austrian official bulletin.

† Ibid.

fortress of Arad in the adjoining district of the Banat, also in possession of the imperial troops. F. M. L. Glaser, in command of the fortress, ordered out two battalions of Peterwardein Grentzers to take the first houses of Alt-Arad, and afterward advanced the battalion of Leiningen and one of Illyrian Banat, to storm the positions of the Hungarians. After a desperate and bloody fight, the enemy were driven from all the intrenchments raised by them on the right bank of the Maros, and all the cannons therein (twenty-three pieces) taken.*

CAMPAIGN OF THE THEISS.

About the middle of February, the following dispositions were made by Dembinski for the maneuvers on the Theiss, and in Upper Hungary. The third corps, under Vécsey, and afterward under Damjanic, was to leave garrisons on the Maros, at Szegedin and Theresiopel, and to march up the Theiss to the road between Szolnok and Debreczin. The second corps, which had hitherto occupied that road, to occupy Füred, and the fords on the Theiss. The seventh and first corps, under Görgey and Klapka, were to advance on the Pesth road; on the height of Poroszlo they were to be joined by the second corps, and to proceed to Gyöngyös. Damjanic was to cross the Theiss at Czibakhaza; he was to take Szolnok, whence he was to advance, in forced marches, along the rail-road, in order to effect a junction with Dembinski, and to support that general's maneuvers against the *gros* of the Austrian army.

This was the plan of operations determined on, but the advance of the imperial army earlier than was expected prevented it from being carried fully into execution.†

While these things were occurring in the northern, middle, and southern portions of Hungary, the great body of the imperial army was gradually moving toward the scene of operations on the Theiss, and Prince Windischgrätz, having made all his dispositions relative to the conquered portions of the country, on the 24th of February left Buda for the seat of war.

On the 25th, he took up his head-quarters at Gyöngyös, and ordered Count Schlick, who had already reached Peter-

* Austrian official bulletin.

† Klapka.

vasaras, to march upon Verpeleth, and thus to effect the junction of the two army corps. On the 26th, the column of Count Wrbna marched from Gyöngyös to Kapolna; F. M. L. Schwarzenberg, with his column, from Arakszallas to Kaal.*

On the other side, Dembinski, apprised of the gradual approach of the Austrian army, resolved to hazard a decisive engagement. Klapka's corps was accordingly brought into line behind Tarna; one division, under Klapka, was transferred to Verpeleth; another, under Mariassy, to Kapolna. Schulz's brigade stood in reserve at Szolnok. Repassy's corps was ordered, on the 27th, to Kampolt; one division of Görgey's army to Kapolna, two others to Felső-Döbrö and Alső-Döbrö, to take their place in the line of battle. Two other divisions were to form a reserve.†

The battle commenced on the 26th, about noon, by an attack made by Schwarzenberg's corps on Mariassy's division, in the neighborhood of Kapolna. When Wrbna, who was not far distant, heard the first cannon shot from Schwarzenberg's division, he immediately engaged the enemy also. Mariassy held his ground bravely, first attacking the left wing, and afterward attempting to break through the enemy's centre with his cavalry; and the battle, with changing fortune, lasted till late in the night. The Austrians, driving the enemy back to Kapolna, twice carried the village, and were as often expelled, and finally left it in the possession of the Hungarians.

F. M. L. Schlick, who intended to advance on the 26th as far as Verpeleth, in order to effect a junction with the main army, could not succeed on that day, as he found the defile of Sirok occupied by the enemy. After a severe fight, he succeeded in driving back the detachment sent by Dembinski to guard the pass; but the approach of night prevented his further progress on that day. The next morning, resuming the offensive, he fell upon the right wing of the Hungarians, while Prince Windischgrätz, advised of Schlick's approach by the heavy cannonade on his left, renewed the attack by marching from Nánár and Vécs against the enemy's centre. Schlick pursued the Hungarians to Verpeleth, in which place they took position

* Austrian official bulletin.

† Pragay.

and offered a desperate resistance. This village was taken by storm, and the enemy retreated in great haste to the heights. A division of the Hungarian army was thrown into the mountains of Erlau; but the greatest part, following the centre, retired in order on the road to Miskolcz.* After several ineffectual attempts to retake the village of Kapolna, and when the brigade Colloredo advanced over Döbrö, Prince Schwarzenberg took the village of Kaal by storm, and threatened thus their right flank, the Hungarians retired and took up a position at Maklar, where the Austrians were too exhausted to pursue them.

During the day and a half which this battle lasted, there was hard fighting on both sides; the Hungarians proved themselves worthy of that high reputation for gallantry which they had enjoyed for centuries, and, had they been better directed,† would have been victorious; but the battle, notwithstanding the loss on both sides, was without result.

The failure of success on the part of the Hungarians was ascribed by some to Görgey, who led his troops merely to let them figure as spectators: the entire right wing, which he commanded, and upon whose attack the plan principally rested, remained inactive, and restricted itself to a defensive position. The troops of Damjanic and Dembinski in vain stood the fire of the Austrians, and were forced to abandon the field to the enemy.‡

The Hungarians represent the Austrian loss in dead and wounded at nearly four thousand—their own at two hundred more; while Prince Windischgrätz reports the Hungarian killed as only three hundred. Windischgrätz's force was estimated at sixty thousand, that of the Hungarians at forty thousand.

At the close of the action, some divisions of the Hungarians were posted on the heights behind Kericsend; but the greater body was ordered back the same night to Mezzökövesd, to be followed by the remaining troops the next day.

On the 28th, Prince Windischgrätz advanced along the whole

* Austrian official bulletin.

† The line of battle extended fifteen miles, and, while the Austrians were acting with their entire strength, but a few of the Hungarian divisions could come into action at the same time.—*Pragay*.

‡ Schlessinger.

line, and removed his head-quarters to Maklar, just abandoned by the retiring enemy. No sooner were the Hungarians in line, than an extensive and severe cavalry engagement took place, in which they not only maintained their ground, but compelled the Austrians to retreat with the loss of their guns. The night passed without further interruption or change in the position of the parties. The Hungarians, elated by the last success, awaited with anxiety, during the night, orders to advance, when, to their great astonishment, they received next morning the command to fall back to Poroszlo, and thence behind the Theiss.

On the 2d of March, the Hungarians, pursued by the Austrians, crossed the Theiss at Tiza-Füred. On the 3d, a council of war was held, under the presidency of Görgey, in which the assembled officers expressed their want of confidence in Dembinski, who, in consequence, resigned the same day; and upon General Vetter was conferred the principal command.*

The following were the positions of the Austrian army at this time: Tokay was occupied by the brigade under General Götz; Miskolc, by Baron Jablonovsky; F. M. L. Schlick's corps was around Erlau, and extended thence to Szolnok; while the first army corps, under Jellacic, was at Czegléd, and the second, under Prince Windischgrätz, was between Buda and Hatvan. On the part of the Hungarians, it was now determined to resume the offensive, which had for a time, under Dembinski's management, been changed to the defensive.

The plan was, that Görgey should cross the Theiss, move on the enemy at Erlau, and drive him over Gyöngyös toward Pesth; that another wing of the army, under Vetter, with Damjanic and Vécsey as their principal commanders, and Klapka, as a reserve, should march on Szolnok, and subsequently pass over Nagy-Körös, and operate on Pesth.

On the 8th of March, Görgey recrossed the Theiss, Vetter marched on Szolnok, and Aulick remained in Tiza-Füred.

Strange to say, the Austrians had taken no steps to secure Szolnok, a place of great importance from its location on the Theiss, and its connection with the left bank by a bridge.

* Pragay. Some accounts state that Görgey had Dembinski placed under arrest.

Damjanic and Vécsey, advancing on the left bank unperceived, made upon the Austrian force, at this point, an attack so sudden and irresistible, that the troops, under Karger and Ottinger, were partly dispersed and partly driven into the stream Zagyva (which empties into the Theiss at that point), with a loss of five hundred prisoners, most of their cannon, military wagons, &c. This surprise was the commencement of that brilliant series of victories, by which, in battles and skirmishes following each other in rapid succession, the Austrians were forced to vacate the capital and many of the upper districts of the country. But the greatest benefit arising from this success was the confidence with which it inspired the Hungarian troops, that they were, through the vigor and impetuosity of their movements, a match for the better-drilled and more numerous forces of their enemy.

At the same time, Görgey, upon whom (owing to Vetter's illness) now devolved the chief command, coming up with the enemy at Erlau, after a short engagement, drove him back upon Gyöngyös. At Gyöngyös, the imperial rear-guard attempted to resist the march of the Hungarians, and thus protect the flight of the Austrians; but the first attack of the Magyar troops threw this guard upon the bulk of the army, and sixteen pieces of artillery, two standards, twenty-one wagons of ammunition, and fourteen hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the Hungarians.*

A division of Görgey's army, under General Gaspar, following up the Austrians from Gyöngyös on the road to Pesth, after a running fight of six hours, drove them behind Hatvan. On the same day, F. M. L. Schlick, in obedience to the orders of Prince Windischgrätz (who had heard, at his head-quarters in Pesth, that the enemy was concentrating in large numbers between Gyöngyös and Hatvan), undertook a reconnoitre from Hatvan in the direction of Hart; but he soon found that the enemy's strength was so superior, that he preferred to retire and occupy Gödöllő, the last tenable position between Hatvan and Pesth, and to await there the arrival of re-enforcements from Vienna. Accordingly, under a heavy artillery fire from

* Pragay.

the Hungarians, the Austrians succeeded in obstructing the further pursuit of the enemy, by destroying the bridge behind Hatvan, and placed themselves in a line of defense extending from Gödöllő to Hatvan and Czegléd. Their left wing, near Hatvan, was commanded by General Schlick; their right, at Czegléd, was under Jellacic; and the centre, at Gödöllő, commanded by Prince Windischgrätz in person, who arrived from Pesth, and took up his head-quarters, on the 3d, at Gödöllő, ordering up F. M. L. Czoric as a re-enforcement to the centre, and Jellacic to maintain communication with the corps under Schlick.* The Hungarian army opposed them in a line, which extended even beyond the wings of their enemies.

After the late successes of the Hungarians, Kossuth came to the head-quarters of the army, held a review, particularly of those battalions which had distinguished themselves, thanked them with glowing eloquence in the name of their country, and summoned them to further deeds of glory and renown.†

The strength of the Austrians at Körös rendering the advance in that direction impossible, and the illness of Vetter with the fever, causing a slight change in the plan of operations, it was then resolved, in a council of war, at which Kossuth was present, that the two Hungarian armies should operate together at a common centre, and, by so doing, flank Gödöllő, that position which was the very key of Pesth, and where a small force could hold whole armies in check.

In pursuance of this plan, Vetter's corps, now under the command of Klapka, having crossed the Theiss on the 27th of March, came on the 2d of April abreast of that division of Görgey's army, under General Gaspar, advancing on the direct road from Gyöngyös to Pesth.‡ Continuing their march, Klapka in advance, Damjanic in the centre, and Aulick (who had by this time come up) as a reserve, they met on the 4th, at Tapiobieske, with the right wing of the Austrians, being the first army corps, under Jellacic, and which, in obedience to the orders of the commander, had retired from Czegléd to Tapiobieske, in order to maintain his communications with the left wing. Their scouts having all agreed that Tapiobieske was defended only by two battalions and one battery, Klapka, in

* Austrian official bulletin.

† Pragay.

‡ Ibid.

his ardor neglecting the necessary precautions, ordered his whole army across the only bridge over the Tapio, a muddy, unfordable stream, and, without proper examination, gave the orders to storm. But what was their astonishment, when every house was found to be immediately changed into a redoubt, when numberless batteries opened upon them from the mountain behind the village, and Jellacic's entire corps was lying there in ambush awaiting them.*

This sudden appearance of the enemy on all sides had so injurious an effect upon the undisciplined Hungarians, that, after a short resistance, they began to retreat, and many battalions fled in confusion to the bridge. The opportune arrival, however, of Damjanic's corps saved Klapka from a most disastrous defeat; breaking their way through the fugitives, and amid the cross-fire of the enemy from the causeway, they carried the bridge at one charge, and restored the fight. In less than half an hour, they not only recovered all advantages from the enemy, but forced them to retire from the village.† By this victory was successfully executed the first step toward that grand strategical operation of flanking Gödöllő. The next day, the Hungarians, pursuing the enemy and following up the advantages they had gained at Tapiobieske, came up with the entire first army corps, concentrated near Isaszeg. Dispositions for a general engagement were made—especially as they learned that the entire Austrian army, under Windischgrätz, was collected at that place. The main body, with a large number of cannon, occupied the heights behind Isaszeg, as also the village and forest in front.

Klapka approached by the road from Sass, Damjanic from Kapa, and Aulick formed a reserve between the two, toward the woods before Isaszeg. About noon began a murderous fire, and the charge upon the forest. The Hungarians carried the woods three times, but were as often expelled by the superior force of the Austrians. At last, re-enforced by Aulick's corps and the cavalry of Gaspar, who had come up from Jura, they bore down all resistance—not only clearing the woods at one charge, but entering the village, now wrapped in flames. When the Hungarians issued from the woods, they were exposed to

* Pragay.

† Ibid.

a severe fire of grape-shot from the heights; but, with great intrepidity, they stormed the enemy's strong-hold, and, before night, the Hungarian tricolor was planted on the hostile works, and waved gloriously in the last beams of the setting sun.* The loss on both sides, in dead and wounded, was several thousand.

Early the next morning, the Hungarians continued the pursuit, which excessive fatigue had prevented them from prosecuting on the previous night. Both Hungarian armies directing their course to Gödöllő, the right wing, under Görgey, arrived first, and, on the morning of the 6th, had an engagement with the Austrians at Gödöllő, in which eight Austrian battalions, for the most part Croats, were routed, and twenty-six cannons, seven standards, thirty-eight wagons of ammunition, and thirty-two hundred prisoners, were captured. Dembinski† reports the loss of the Austrians at five thousand, and that of the Hungarians two thousand.

As the loss of Isaszeg exposed the Austrian flank, they found it impossible to retain their position at Gödöllő, even against Görgey's division; and Klapka's corps reached the scene of action just in time to see the last columns of the retreating enemy as they left the field of battle, on the road to Pesth.

The battle at Gödöllő is mentioned in the Austrian bulletins as one of the "splendid successes" of Prince Windischgrätz, in which he had but two men killed; where "the Austrians compelled the Hungarians to retire, after taking from them six of their guns."

Nothing, indeed, can be more contradictory than the assertions of the two belligerent generals; but the greater truth of Dembinski's statements is evident from the results. If "the Austrians (who were at Gödöllő) compelled the Hungarians to retire," how happens it that the report of the action made by Dembinski, on the 7th of April, bears date at Gödöllő, while that of Prince Windischgrätz to his government is written on the same day at Pesth? The result of Prince Windischgrätz's "reconnoitering expeditions" and "splendid successes" was

* Pragay.

† Dembinski, after relinquishing the chief command, continued in the army as a subordinate general.

the expeditious arrival of the imperial army on the plain of Rakos,* in front of Pesth; its retreat over the Danube, and his recall by the emperor from the scene of his defeat. With his return to Pesth terminated his mission, and he was invited by an imperial note to Olmütz.

The Prince of Windischgrätz, although a man of high honor, personal courage, and iron firmness, yet needed the energy and enterprise, if not the military skill and experience necessary for the proper fulfillment of the responsible task which had been assigned him.

By unnecessary delay, after the capture of Pesth, devoting his attention to reorganizing the disordered administration throughout the conquered comitats, instead of pushing on and overcoming all opposition in the other districts of Hungary to which the Magyars had retired, he brought down a series of misfortunes upon a country for the prosperity and welfare of which the prince would doubtless have willingly laid down his life.

The material order was, indeed, re-established in those districts occupied by the imperial troops, but the moral pacification was not effected, and by these fruitless efforts much time was lost, of which the Hungarians availed themselves to organize and discipline their forces, as well as to gather recruits from every quarter.

In the month of January, when he had taken possession of their capital, the rivers were completely frozen, and the roads excellent. The important fortress of Komorn might then have been attacked with every prospect of success, and the imperial forces have entered Debreczin, the last strong-hold of the Hungarians, comparatively without resistance; for, at that time, the army was not only ill-prepared for such a contest, but a panic had taken possession of their troops; whereas the Austrians were full of that confidence which insures success.

Instead of following up this advantage, the marshal delayed for nearly two months at Pesth, by which time the weather moderated, the thaws of spring came on, and these rendered it impossible for him to transport his heavy artillery, ammuni-

* The same plain on which the Estates formerly assembled in Parliament, and on horseback elected their kings, &c.

tion, and provision wagons across the low and marshy districts which intervened between him and the Hungarians. When, at length, the imperial forces marched out in pursuit of the enemy, and had with difficulty reached the River Theiss, they were then successfully met by the recruited and organized troops of the Hungarians, and after that time sustained a series of almost uninterrupted reverses.

SUCCESS OF THE HUNGARIANS IN THE SOUTH.

While these successes followed the Hungarian arms in the centre of the kingdom, a no less favorable turn of fortune occurred to their interests in the southern portions of the kingdom. When General Bem first took charge of the Magyar and Szekler troops in Transylvania, the army was so feeble, as well as demoralized, that he could not oppose, with any success, the well-disciplined imperial troops, fifteen thousand strong, under General Puchner, and he was defeated, as has been shown, in several engagements.

The Saxons and Wallachs, who form the bulk of the population in Transylvania, were from the commencement averse to Magyar domination, and steadily attached to the imperial crown; while the remaining inhabitants, the Szeklers, a wild, restless, and warlike race, espousing the side of the Hungarians, placed themselves under the command of Bem. This force Bem soon organized and disciplined; and, increased by recruits, and re-enforced by some troops which had evacuated the fortress of Arad, he was in a few weeks in a condition to resume the offensive. With this army, amounting to twenty thousand men, Bem first marched against General Gedeon, who stood with six thousand Austrians and Wallachs about Bistritz, and, after defeating him in several engagements, drove him out of Transylvania by the Burgo-pass into Bukowina, and cut him off entirely from the body of the army.*

Puchner, who was at this time in the Saxon district, and who had doubtless received authority in this regard, now called for aid upon the Russian general Lüders, who was stationed in Wallachia.

* Pragay.

General Lüders, who referred the matter to his emperor, received, by order of his majesty, the reply,* that in case the towns of Hermanstadt and Kronstadt should be seriously threatened by an invasion of Hungarian insurgents, at a time when the Austrian government did not possess the means of protecting them against such great disorder, he was authorized to send a sufficient force into these two towns; but that he ought only to do so in the event of inevitable necessity, and only at the express demand of the Austrian military authorities. When, after the granting of this authority, the danger of the towns became more imminent, in consequence of the successes of the Hungarians, General Lüders, at the call of the Austrian generals, caused the two towns to be occupied by detachments under General Skariatín, of the same effective force as when in possession of the Austrian generals, viz., six thousand to Hermanstadt, and four thousand to Kronstadt. Not discouraged, Bem pushed forward, and defeated the Austrian and Russian forces repeatedly.

At Deva, near the bridge of Pisci, the Austrians were repulsed with great loss. The battle was very serious, and lasted from eight o'clock in the morning until six in the evening. The regiment of infantry was almost totally cut to pieces. After his defeat, Puchner retreated to Hermanstadt. A few days later, a false report having reached General Puchner of an insurrection in Maros-Vasarhely, he proceeded to that spot, leaving Hermanstadt in charge of the Russians. Bem immediately marched against it. Near Modessy, he met an Austrian corps, which he defeated, and then marched down with his whole force on Hermanstadt.

As soon as advised of the approach of the Hungarians, General Skariatín, in command of the Russian forces, supposing that Bem was pursued by Puchner, sallied forth from Hermanstadt, with about four thousand men, in the direction of Stolzenburg, to meet him. The fire was actively kept up, chiefly of artillery, the infantry keeping at a distance until about half past eight, when the Russians precipitately retreated through Hermanstadt, and passed on to Talmacs.

* For text of Russian circular, see Appendix, note No. 30.

The Burgher Guard of Hermanstadt, on seeing this retreat, threw away their arms, and fled in all directions. The Hungarians closely pursued the Russians through the city, as far as the faubourg Schellenburg, where they established their outposts, and then took up their quarters in the different squares of the town and suburbs.

Not an act of pillage appears to have sullied their conduct—not a house was fired.* The men, wearied with nine hours' marching and five hours' fighting, demanded and took refreshments from such of the inhabitants as remained, and bivouacked, without committing any of the horrors which rumor had hitherto attributed to the Hungarian soldiery. It was only during the engagement that it became known that Bem commanded in person. He took up his head-quarters in the house of the burgomaster (mayor), whose name, three weeks previously, was appended to a proclamation offering a price for his head. The population was immediately disarmed, and order established the following day.

Puchner, hearing of Bem's rapid movement upon Hermanstadt, hastened after him, and arrived above the town in sufficient time to be made aware of the disaster which had happened to the Russians. A complete demoralizing panic seized the imperial forces; in a few hours their numbers dwindled down from about eight to two thousand; with which number Puchner, making a detour to the south of Hermanstadt, directed his course to the Wallachian frontier, and joined the Russians at Talmacs.

Leaving six thousand men to garrison Hermanstadt, General Bem proceeded with the remainder of his troops, about ten thousand men, on Kronstadt, where he learned that a considerable part of General Puchner's corps, to the amount of eight hundred infantry, nine hundred cavalry, and forty-three pieces of artillery, had gone after their separation from their commander.

As soon as the approach of Bem's forces was known at Kronstadt, the whole Austrian force evacuated the town, and hastened to the Wallachian frontier, whither they had been preceded.

* English consul, Grant, official report.

ed the day before by the Russian troops, amounting to six thousand men. Bem's army entered Kronstadt without firing a shot. With the exception of the garrison of Klausenburg, and a few thousand Wallachs, who had retired to the mountains in small divisions under the lead of the partisan Junk; Bem, with an army of about twenty thousand men, was complete master of Transylvania.*

PURSUIT OF THE AUSTRIANS BY THE HUNGARIAN ARMY OF THE
THEISS.

Kossuth, who, with some of his ministry and deputies, had followed the army of the Theiss in its victorious advance, and were with them at this time at the head-quarters at Gödöllő, after a council of war determining their future operations, now started for Debreczin, with the view of declaring the independence of the country, which the recent triumphs encouraged them to undertake.

In order to relieve the fortress of Komorn, which had been closely pressed for many months, and at the same time hold in check, as well as continually harass the hostile army in Pesth and Ofen, the Hungarian forces were disposed as follows: the corps of Klapka, Damjanic, and Gaspar, under the lead of Görgey, were to draw off toward Komorn; Aulick, with his own corps and the division of Vienetz and Asboth, was to keep watch on Pesth.

Görgey departed for Komorn on the 8th of April, while Aulick remained behind, and, having defeated the Austrians in several different actions, obliged them to evacuate Pesth; but they left a garrison of between five and six thousand men, under General Henzi, in the fortress of Ofen.

On the 9th of April, Görgey reached and attacked Waitzen, with the full knowledge that the town was held by twelve thousand Austrians, under Generals Czoric and Götz. At the same time and in aid of this movement, Dembinski, who commanded the Hungarian forces before Pesth, leaving his vanguard on the field of Rakos, opposite to the imperial centre, occupied their left wing by an attack upon them at Szent

* English consul, General Colquhoun, official report.

Endre, by which the Austrians, under Czoric and Götz, at Waitzen, were completely cut off from the imperial left wing. The Austrians at Waitzen, in expectation of the enemy, were drawn up behind a row of sand hills in front of the town. Damjanic, who was then leading the advance, attacked them as soon as he came in sight, without waiting until the others had come up, and pushed them so hotly, in spite of a violent rain, that, when Klapka appeared on the right, they were already wavering, and soon after began their retreat. They were closely followed into the town, which was carried by storm.

The Austrians again formed on the heights outside; but F. M. L. Czoric, finding it impossible to resist the superiority of forces, as well as the impetuosity of the attack, retired on the road to Gran. General Götz, and a number of officers of less rank, lay dead upon the field. A number of cannons, military wagons, and five hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the enemy. The Hungarian loss was comparatively small.*

Leaving a battalion of Honvéd troops to garrison Waitzen, the Hungarian army the next day pursued their march toward Komorn, and, to avoid the enemy, pursuing the mountain road, saw nothing of the Austrians until reaching the Gran.

The imperial general, Wohlgemuth, commanding three brigades, fifteen thousand strong, was posted behind the Gran, as a reserve, with head-quarters at Neühäusel.

On arriving at the Gran, a stream naturally rapid, and at this time swollen, the Hungarians found the bridges destroyed, and no materials for their reconstruction at hand. Nevertheless, with portions of house-roofs and timber, they commenced the task, and, after three days, a bridge was constructed at O'Bars and Levenecz, without the slightest interruption from the enemy.

The corps of Klapka and Damjanic consumed the whole of the 18th in crossing the tottering bridge, which threatened every moment to give way beneath them, and did not reach Lök till late in the evening.

Meanwhile, F. M. L. Wohlgemuth, informed of this movement, left Kemend on the night of the 18th, to reconnoitre the

* Pragay.

positions of the enemy. On the 19th, both armies met in the neighborhood of Nagy Sarlo. The armies were nearly equal in number, commanded alike by able generals, and the battle was warmly contested from early morning until evening. At first the result of the conflict was exceedingly doubtful; but soon the Hungarians succeeded in turning the right wing, by passing between the River Gran and the town, and while Damjanic thus surrounded the town, defended by four battalions, two rockets, and four field batteries, Kanzinczy carried it by a masterly assault. The garrison defended themselves with great desperation. Every room, every cellar, every door-way had to be stormed separately; but stormed they were, and the occupants either cut down or taken prisoners; but few made their escape. When the Austrians had lost this support, they threw themselves violently, in strong columns, upon the Hungarian centre, which was almost without artillery, striving to break it through; but, about this time, a large flanking column of the enemy's cavalry breaking through their own left wing and flanking their centre, together with the opportune arrival for the Hungarians of two of their batteries, causing fearful destruction in their ranks, the Austrians were forced to retreat. When on the point of withdrawing, an oversight committed by the undrilled Hungarians was, in a moment, improved by the more disciplined troops of the imperial army, who hoped, by a rapid movement against flank and rear, to recover the ground which was lost; but the courage and impetuosity of the Hungarians was, on this occasion, an adequate substitute for skill and science, and they soon succeeded in recovering their right position without serious loss. This effort thwarted, the retreat became general, and was kept up until ten at night, on the road to Gran.* The Hungarians, on the next day, pursued their march uninterruptedly to Komorn.

The great and impregnable fortress of Komorn, situated at the confluence of the Waag and the Danube, probably the most formidable bulwark in the world, and one which, during the repeated invasions of the Turks, had never been subdued, for several months had been closely besieged, and, for weeks past,

* Pragay.

violently bombarded. Owing to the large force in this fortress, the provisions had become, it was understood, nearly exhausted, and its surrender, on that account, daily looked for. To hasten this result, the Austrians had detailed a very large force around it, to prevent the arrival of succor from any quarter; and to this operation, which diminished so materially the effective force of the Imperialists on the field, may be ascribed, in a great measure, the disasters which befell the Austrian arms on the borders of the Theiss and around Pesth.

Meanwhile, F. M. L. Welden, who had distinguished himself in the wars of Lombardy, and of late military governor of Vienna, a man of ability in his profession, and of popularity with the troops, was appointed, in place of Prince Windischgrätz, commander-in-chief of the armies in Hungary, left Vienna on the 15th of April for the scene of action, and was busily engaged in concentrating and organizing the imperial forces, with a view to prevent the further progress of the enemy.*

Under his direction, Pesth was evacuated; the first army corps, under Jellacic, dispatched to the south, over Stuhlweissenburg, to take part in the Servian war; while the second army corps, under Wr̃bna and Schlick, ascended the Danube, the one on the right and the other on the left bank, to Gran, where they were to join the fresh re-enforcements dispatched from Vienna, and aid in preventing the Hungarians from crossing the Gran, and, failing in this, to repair to Komorn, and thus prevent the relief of that long-besieged fortress, and, at all events, to sustain their communications with Vienna. After the evacuation of Pesth by the imperial troops, at the solicitation of the inhabitants, the Hungarian troops surrounding it declined to enter the city, for fear of subjecting it to bombardment from the garrison of Ofen, on the opposing heights across the Danube; but marched off to the northern part of the kingdom, to stop the advance of fresh Austrian troops which were entering, as was reported, from Jablunka.

* Welden seemed to think that the object of the Hungarians was the retaking of Pesth, and therefore first proceeded there, and prepared against it. But finding his mistake, and that the Hungarians had moved higher up the Danube, with a view of crossing the river between Pesth and Komorn, and thus cut the Austrians off from all communication with Vienna abandoned Pesth, and ascended the river toward Komorn.

On the next day (the 20th of April), Görgey reached Komorn, and by a *coup de main* soon raised the siege of the fortress.

That portion of the besiegers on the left of the Danube, attacked on one side by an army of nearly twenty thousand men, and charged, on the other, by a sally from the fortress, made by General Guyon* at the bridge over the Waag, were compelled to withdraw; and Görgey, by this communication, threw into the fortress two hundred oxen, exchanged some of his exhausted men for fresh troops from the garrison, and filled his munition wagons from the inexhaustible resources of the fortress. Having thus achieved an entrance into Komorn, it only remained now to clear the right bank of the Danube, where was placed the main body of the Austrians, and whence the bombs were constantly discharged into the town and fortress. To effect this object, the first step undertaken was that of restoring the bridge of boats over the Danube, that had formerly connected the fortress with the *tête de pont*, but had long since been shot away, and was now, in three days, despite an uninterrupted shower of bombs and balls, completed. The great body of the Austrians had by this time ascended from Gran opposite to Komorn, and F. M. L. Welden had his headquarters at Acs, between Gönyo and Szöny, four German miles from Raab.

On the same evening, eight picked battalions, led by Colonel Knezic, were ordered over the bridge. At two hours after midnight, they attacked the besieging force, under Simonic, stormed the hostile works opposite the fortress, which were already in the second parallel, captured all their defenders, and seized all their guns. Before daylight, the same battalions stormed Old and New Szöny, took many additional prisoners and large supplies of war *materiel*.

At four in the morning, the Hungarian army corps, under Klapka and Damjanic, began to cross the bridge.

At eight o'clock the action commenced between the forces of Simonic and Schlick, under the chief command of Baron

* Guyon was now in command of Komorn; sent there by Kossuth, and disguised as a peddler, he succeeded in passing through the army of the besiegers, and entering the fortress.

Welden, on the one hand, and the troops of Klapka and Damjanic, under the chief command of Görgey, on the other. The fight began on the high grounds, near New Szöny, and was the most warmly-contested battle of the whole campaign. It was soon found that the imperial forces, with all the cool and unflinching courage for which they are so justly distinguished, could not withstand the impetuosity and desperation of the Magyars, who, rushing into action with the resistless force of a tornado, swept before them every obstacle, and bore down all opposition. The further back the Austrians were driven, the better and more elevated were the positions which they successively occupied and obstinately defended, until their left wing finally entered the wood before Acs, with their centre turning toward Puszta-Herkály, and their right wing to Nagy and Kis-Igmand. It was two o'clock in the afternoon, when General Nagy-Shandor,* commander of the Magyar cavalry, received orders to flank the enemy's right wing, and drive them over the Csoncso, which would have made a general retreat necessary. But this brave general, pushing forward with too much ardor, soon brought his cavalry into a formidable cross-fire, while its flank was, at the same time, turned by Schlick's corps. A retreat in utter confusion was the result. When the Hungarian infantry at length recovered the advantages lost by the cavalry in this disaster, the fighting ceased on both sides, on account of the extreme heat, and each party encamped. During the night, the Imperialists withdrew toward the frontiers of Austria, partly in the direction of Raab and Hochstrass, and partly by the Island of Schütt. During the engagement, the Hungarians captured a number of cannon, took many prisoners, and gained possession of two camps, with more than three thousand tents and camp utensils.† The Hungarians compute the Austrian loss, in dead and wounded, at four thousand, and their own at one thousand. The Austrians report only that the result of the action was disastrous to the infantry, regiment Hesse cut to pieces, their intrenchments destroyed, and that forty thousand Hungarians contended against thirty thousand Austrians.‡ It was a matter of universal observation among the Hungarians, that the dispositions made

* The Murat of Hungary.

† Pragay.

‡ Austrian official bulletin.

by Görgey, in this action, were not characterized by that energy and military science which had previously distinguished his operations. They could not understand why it was that his choice troops, those of his former corps, together with the best artillery and cavalry, were not brought into action, but were just crossing the river, at evening, when the general staff were returning to the city after the victory. Had they, especially the cavalry, co-operated in the action, the enemy might without doubt have been destroyed, and the city of Vienna, between which and the Hungarians nothing but a routed army remained, have easily been taken. Had Görgey, at that time, availed himself of the advantages which his successful operations had secured him, or obeyed the urgent recommendation which had been given him, "to follow up the enemy with vigor," in two days they could have bivouacked in the Austrian capital, and Hungary perhaps have been, at this time, ranked among the independent nations of the world.

But Görgey contented himself with sending Gaspar's corps to Raab, and a division under Kosztolányi to the Schütt; and, after remaining eight days longer before Komorn, leisurely proceeded to the siege of Buda.

"I will show the world that I too can reduce fortresses!" said he to Damjanic and Aulick; and these words contained the leading motives that induced him, in opposition to the orders of Kossuth, to encamp before Buda with thirty thousand men, instead of pursuing Welden up to the gates of Vienna. A single order of the day, subscribed "Arthur Görgey, from head-quarters at Schönbrunn," would have been of infinitely greater importance to the future prospects of Hungary and Austria than the reduction of ten such strong-holds as Buda.* Görgey was not insensible to this fact; but the plan to advance across the frontier had been formed by Dembinski and approved by Kossuth, and this was a sufficient reason for Görgey to oppose its execution. His military talent, however, was so highly appreciated, and greatly needed in the situation in which Hungary was then placed, that it was deemed advisable not to dismiss him from the service, but to remove him

* Schlessinger.

from his command in the army in a manner most honorable and agreeable to his feelings, and appoint him Minister of War—a post wherein his services would be of equal importance to the government, while his opportunities for injury would be vastly curtailed. He accepted the appointment, but excused himself from immediately entering upon its duties, on the ground that there were no generals in the army to whom he could safely intrust the chief command.

He desired, meantime, to send General Damjanic as his substitute into the Ministry of War; and when this general, from a personal injury sustained the day before that of his contemplated departure, was prevented from going, General Klapka, of whose popularity in the army he was jealous, was prevailed on to take his place, and he left Komorn for the seat of government the same day that the three armies set out on their march to Buda.

The day following the battle of Szöny, the Hungarians under Guyon, with Gaspar's corps, pursued and overtook the Austrians at Raab; an action ensued, in which the Imperialists suffered greatly, and, with a loss of eighteen cannons, were driven from the town. About the same time, the Hungarians took Tyrnau. By this rapid succession of triumphs, the Hungarians drove the Imperialists to the frontiers of Austria in a long line, extending from Oedenburg to Pressburg, and the head-quarters removed to Laxemburg, within the Austrian frontier, eight miles from Vienna. While these things were transpiring on the frontiers of Austria, Dembinski (who had taken no part in the late actions), with the largest body of the army, marches to the north, in order to prevent the arrival of fresh re-enforcements on the part of the enemy; Vetter and Casimir Batthyányi, with a corps of twenty thousand men, march over Szolnok, south, in pursuit of Jellacic; while Bem, having conquered Transylvania, crosses over into the adjoining province, and attacks Temesvar; and with the fall of this fortress, the whole of the Banat (the granary of Hungary), and as far as the Iron Gate, submitted to his authority. In short, Hungarian authority and power was in the ascendancy every where, except in Buda alone, to which Görgey now hastened.

Görgey having reached the vicinity of Buda,* and fortified the neighboring heights, called the Blocksberg, Schwanenberg, and Adlersberg, which command it, on the 4th of May dispatched a note to General Henzi, the officer in command of the garrison, and demanded its surrender within three hours. The commander refused to surrender, and returned as further answer, that, should the Hungarians fire on him, he would immediately, from the heights of Buda, open a bombardment upon the exposed city of Pesth, lying opposite on the level banks of the Danube.

On the morning of the 5th of May, Görgey commenced the bombardment, and the garrison of Ofen, true to their threat, immediately answered the fire, and, at the same time, opened a bombardment on Pesth, which lasted until the evening of the 7th. On that day, the bombardment of Pesth was suspended, but the fire continued between the garrison of Ofen and the army of Görgey, on the surrounding heights. The bombardment of Pesth was resumed on the 14th, and a large portion of the inhabitants abandoned the city, and camped out, under tents, on the plain of Rakos, and at Stadtwaldchen, beyond the reach of the enemy's cannon, which had changed some of the finest streets, particularly the elegant rows on the river, into a heap of ruins.

After the firing against Ofen had continued uninterruptedly for a week, on the 17th, at one o'clock in the morning, the first assault was made. General Anlick was ordered to lead his troops through the Razenstadt suburb, to break through the castle gate into the park, and thence into the fortress. The breach, which was not quite practicable, was to be mounted by the first corps, under the command of General Nagy-Shandor. General Knezich and the third corps were directed against the Vienna gate and its bastions, and Colonel Kmetty had orders to take the strongly-fortified aqueduct. The Magyars reached the ramparts in several places, but, received with bombs, grenades, and red-hot balls, were repulsed with a loss of from four to five hundred, and at daybreak the fatigued troops were withdrawn.

* Buda and Ofen are but different names for the same place.

On the 19th, they made a second assault, at eleven at night. On that occasion they did not even reach the ramparts, and had several hundred killed.* But when at length the battering cannons and proper besieging materials from Komorn—which Görgey, with a negligence almost approaching guilt, had failed to bring with him, and was compelled subsequently to send for—arrived, a breach was soon effected.

When the Hungarian soldiers saw the breach which had been made, and when, on the other hand, they beheld the ruins of their much-loved capital, which the enemy's cannon had produced, and realized the disappointment which their repeated failures had occasioned, they burned with such impatience for the combat that it was with difficulty they could be restrained. They actually quarreled with each other for the privilege of joining the assaulting column, and the dispute was finally settled by lot.

At two o'clock, on the morning of the 21st of May, the assault commenced upon the breach, and, by means of ladders on all sides, the battlements upon a rock rising several hundred feet above the Danube were at length scaled. Two hundred and forty-seven cannons, and several thousand small arms vomited forth death and destruction upon the assailants; but nothing could damp the ardor of their vengeance. They crept, and clung, and sprang like squirrels, from ladder to rock, and from crag to ladder. Here and there a ball would strike a ladder, with a man grasping every round, and hurl all together into the abyss.

At seven in the morning, the Hungarians were masters of the city, and the tricolor once again floated from the battlements. Major General Henzi, the commander of the garrison, with an intrepidity worthy of his profession, was found covered with wounds, and, though alive when the Hungarians entered, died soon after. Colonel Cecopieri was killed during the engagement, and, as was supposed, by the hands of his own regiment (of Italians), who laid down their arms as soon as the first Hungarians made their appearance on the breast-works.

* Nagy-Shandor, at this time, in a conversation with Klapka, complaining of the unpractical character of the dispositions, expressed his doubts of Görgey's honesty.—*Klapka*.

The entire garrison that survived, about thirty-five hundred, were made prisoners.

The Austrians fought nobly, but Ofen not being a fortress, the five or six thousand it contained could not hold out against a besieging force of thirty thousand men, especially when one of their own regiments, if not unfaithful, exhibited no zeal during the engagement.

To the Diet assembled at Debreczin, Görgey, in imitation of the comprehensive brevity of Cæsar, communicated his victory, like the Roman general, in three words, "*Hurra! Buda! Görgey!*"*

The reason why the Austrians, in their retreat, left a garrison at Buda, although unintelligible at first, upon reflection, can not fail to be evident. Their march was too precipitate to allow of their taking away the artillery and the stores of Buda and of Pesth, which cities for a time had served as their principal depôts; they had, moreover, reason to hope that the glaring bait thus carelessly thrown out would lure the Hungarians from the chief object of their operations, and that they would not venture upon invading Vienna so long as a hostile foot remained on the soil of Hungary. Events proved the just-

* The conquest by assault of the fortress of Buda in all but plain daylight, and with storming ladders only, General Klapka thinks the most brilliant feat of this war, and worthy to be quoted with the heroic deeds of all times and nations.

The magnificent bridge was about to be blown up by the Austrians; but, being clumsily executed, the discharge took place too soon, and, instead of injuring the bridge, destroyed Colonel Alnash, the officer charged with the enterprise.

The news of the conquest of Buda wrought a sudden change in the minds of the Diet on the subject of Görgey, whose popularity, owing to his repeated failures, was decidedly on the wane. In an extraordinary sitting, a resolution was passed that the thanks of the country be expressed to the victorious general and his army, and that the grand cross of the Hungarian order for military merit be awarded Görgey. A committee of members was appointed to convey this resolution to the army. Görgey declined the proffered reward, protesting that his principles would not allow him to accept a mark of distinction; that the mania for titles and orders was already rife among the officers of his army; and that, for the purpose of calling them back to the early purity of their purposes and tendencies, he felt it incumbent on himself to set them the example. Such were his words; but it was his hatred to Kossuth, it was supposed, by which he was actuated.—*Klapka*.

Klapka thinks Buda might and should have been taken by a *coup-de-main*. Had such a course failed, it might, without detriment, have been suffered to remain; and that, isolated as the garrison was in the heart of a hostile country, it was incapable of injury.

ness of their calculations. Buda attracted, and for a time paralyzed their military forces; and turning aside, like the deluded Atalanta, to seize the golden apple, the Hungarians neglected to press on the heels of the flying enemy; they lost the race, and the Austrians saved their capital at the cost of a noble and most intrepid garrison.

During the period that these serious and extensive *military* operations were progressing between Austria and Hungary, two proceedings of a *civil* nature were carried on by their respective governments, no less important in their character, or influential in regard to the interests of the empire.

First, the granting by the monarch of a Constitution for the Austrian empire; second, the declaration by the Diet of Debreczin of the independence of Hungary.

CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRIA.

After summoning, in consequence of the March Revolution, a Constituent Assembly, for the purpose of forming a Constitution for the empire of Austria, and after that Assembly had been, with the interruption of a few weeks only, in session, from July, 1848, until March, 1849, the emperor discovers that "the task of framing the Constitution was beyond the limits of the Diet's vocation;" unceremoniously supersedes the dilatory Diet of Kremsier, and promulgates to his empire the Constitution of the 4th of March.

It is true that the proceedings of the Assembly were, beyond all question, tardy in the extreme; the tone of its discussions speculative and impracticable in the highest degree; and the whole affair an exemplification of the absurdity of expecting a practically free Constitution from the hands of those who had never enjoyed a day's freedom, and who were profoundly ignorant of political principles. But to dismiss the Diet of Kremsier, on the ground of its incompetency to make a Constitution for those countries not represented in it, and then to present such an instrument for the empire, in which it is provided that the countries not represented at Kremsier shall be excluded from its operation, seems an absurdity still more glaring; or, in other words, a most bungling excuse for resuming the authority accorded to his subjects, and affording the amplest ev-

idence of how easy will be the task, when he desires it, to recall the privileges granted in the Constitution.*

This Constitution, or, more properly speaking, *Charte Octroyée*, vouchsafed by the Emperor of Austria to his subjects, as it at present stands on the records of Europe, is but a project or plan to which the government has pledged itself, but which it has not as yet exhibited either the disposition or ability to carry into effect. It is only, in its present form, a general declaration of rights applicable to the people of Austria, with a political organization for the empire, considered as an imperial federation of states with a central government and Parliament at Vienna. Provincial Diets, with a local administration for local affairs in the respective communities, are also proposed; but these, despite the repeated applications of the different provinces, have not yet been promulgated.

So far as respects *form*, the newly-proposed Austrian system seemed fair enough. The mere *outlines*, except as respects an hereditary monarchy, appear to have been an imitation of the United States government. The affairs of the several provinces were to be managed by local Diets, while the general interests of the empire were confided to a Legislature composed (with the emperor himself) of two Chambers, answering to the American Senate and House of Representatives. The members of the first are delegated by the local Diets, those of the second chosen by a direct election on an uniform population basis. The former sit for ten, the latter for five years. The elective franchise is guarded by a tax-paying qualification—the voting *viva voce*. The emperor, who acts through a cabinet of responsible ministers, possesses all the usual prerogatives of a constitutional sovereign, including an absolute veto on the decisions of the Chambers. He is also clothed with the

* Which now (1st of January, 1852) he has done by the following decree:

“We, Francis Joseph, by the grace of God Emperor of Austria.

“In consequence of our ordinance of the 20th of August last, our council of ministers and our council of the empire have applied themselves to a thorough examination of the Constitution of March 4, 1849, and seeing that it results from the deliberations which have taken place, that this Constitution is not adapted to the position of the Austrian empire, and can not be executed in its entire arrangement, we consider it our duty, as the sovereign, after having well considered all these reasons, to abrogate the said Constitution of March 4, 1849.”

power of proroguing and dissolving the Chambers at pleasure ; but, in case of dissolution, a new Diet must be convened within three months.

The Constitution, too, professes to secure all the essential elements of freedom. It promises most freely all those sacred rights for which constitutional countries have struggled, viz., the right of religious freedom, of personal liberty, that of the press, of associations, and of instruction. But it does not require a very acute observer to perceive, that as with the system or plan of government which has been recommended, so with the possession of these sacred rights, the *form* alone has been preserved ; the *substance* is altogether wanting. The rights are granted by the Constitution ; but laws are subsequently to be made to restrain their efficient operation. The emperor's decree, preceding the Constitution, and in which all its essential elements are most boastfully paraded, affords an admirable index of the whole proceeding, and in this it will be discovered that there is not a single right granted which does not carry with it an accompanying reservation.

DECREE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

“ We, Francis Joseph the First, by the grace of God Emperor of Austria, &c., &c., ordain for the provinces of the empire of Austria hereafter named ; that is to say, the Archduchy of Austria, Upper and Lower ; the Archduchy of Salzburg ; the Duchy of Styria ; the kingdom of Illyria, composed of the Duchies of Carinthia and Carniola, of the county and principality of Goritz and Gradiska ; the Margravate of Istria and the city of Trieste, with its territory ; the county and principality of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg ; the kingdom of Bohemia ; the Margravate of Moravia ; the Duchy of Upper and Lower Silesia ; the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, with the Duchies of Aussihurtz and Zador ; the Grand Duchy of Cracow ; the Duchy of Bukowina ; and, finally, for the kingdom of Dalmatia, as follows, with the advice of our council of ministers, in acknowledgment and for the protection of the political rights guaranteed by the constitutional form which we have adopted. 1. Freedom of religious belief and the private exercise of forms of worship are guaranteed to all and ev-

ery one. The enjoyment of civil and political right is independent of religious belief; *but* religious belief can not alter the duties of citizens. 2. Every church or religious society legally acknowledged has the right of exercising its worship publicly and in common; it orders and directs its own affairs; it remains in the possession and enjoyment of its establishments, and the funds for carrying on its worship, for education, and for works of benevolence; *but*, as well as every other society, it must be subject to the general laws of the state. 3. Science and instruction in it is free. Every citizen has a right to establish foundations for education, and therein give instruction, *provided* he has legally proved his qualifications. Domestic education is not subject to this restriction. 4. Instruction shall be given to the people in public establishments; and in the provinces, where the population is mixed, the nationalities forming the minority shall receive necessary succor for the cultivation of their languages, and for instruction in them. Religious instruction in the schools shall be given by the respective churches and religious societies. The state has only the right of superintending the general instruction and education. 5. Every one shall have the right of freely publishing his opinions, in writing or by speech, in print or in any other manifestation, with his signature. The censorship can not be re-established. *A law shall be published for suppressing abuses of the press.* 6. Every one has the right of petitioning. Petitions under a collective name can *only* emanate from authorities or corporations legally recognized. 7. Austrian citizens have the right of assembling, and of forming associations, the object, the means, or the forms of which are not contrary to the laws, nor dangerous to public order. *The law regulates this right;* and the conditions on which may be acquired the rights of an association, and the exercise or loss of these rights, is also determined by the law. 8. Liberty of person is guaranteed. No arrest of person can be made, *except* in cases of *flagrante delicto*, *otherwise* than in virtue of the warrant of a judge or other judicial authority. Every warrant for arrest shall be shown to the person against whom it is issued at the time of his being arrested, or within twenty-four hours after. 9. The police is bound to set every one who has been

arrested at liberty within forty-eight hours, or *to deliver him up to the competent tribunal*. 10. Every one's house and home is inviolable. No domiciliary visit or seizure of papers can be made, *except* in the cases and under the forms determined by the law. 11. Letters are inviolable. No seizure of letters can be made, *except* in time of war, or in virtue of an order issued by a judge. 12. In times of war or internal disturbances, the provisions of 5th and 11th sections may be temporarily suspended in certain places. This point shall be specified by a law. 13. Our council of ministers is charged with drawing up the ordinances, which are to be issued provisionally, for the execution of these provisions, until organic laws have been promulgated. Given in our capital this 4th day of March, 1849. (Signed) FRANCIS JOSEPH.

"Countersigned by the Ministers."

The more this charter is examined, the more apparent becomes the fact that the leading idea which influenced its production, and which prevails through all its branches and departments, is the consolidation of the empire. The primary object in view is not to give liberty to the people, but unity to the empire; and, as the instrument itself declares, to consolidate and form "the constitutional, hereditary, free, independent, and indissoluble monarchy of Austria."

The only effort in the accomplishment of this great end seems to have been to fulfill, at least in *form*, the pledges previously given by the monarch to the people in the first revolutionary outbreak; and this fact is therein pompously and boastfully alluded to. A great merit is attempted to be acquired from that circumstance, as though monarchs were either not in the habit of performing, or were not to be expected to execute the pledges which they might be pleased to accord.

To Count Stadion, Minister of the Interior, is ascribed the authorship of this Constitution. Between him and his colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a rivalry seems to have existed, having for its object to determine, not who could do most to advance the interest of his country or of his age, but who could do most to please their youthful, imperial master. And while Schwartzenberg, taking for his model the Earl of

Strafford, endeavored, like the English statesman, to "make his monarch as absolute as any sovereign in the world could be," Stadion, selecting his prototype from the opposite side of the Channel, labored, like the French minister, "to extend the powers of the crown by overthrowing the privileges of the great vassals," and to become for Austria what Richelieu was for France, "the founder of a united empire."

Richelieu's task, however gigantic, and with a colossal mind to perform it, was not to be compared, either in the state of the materials or that of the times, with the labor of Stadion. Richelieu's was an age of great violence on the part of authority, and of small resistance on the part of the subject class. Richelieu crushed the citizens with cannons, and sent their noble leaders to the scaffold. Stadion, by the arm of a Windischgrätz or a Haynau, might do the same. But the age had passed by when such a chastisement could be effectual; and, even if effectual in other countries, would be of no avail in such a country as Austria, where it could produce no brotherhood of feeling between the Slovak on the Carpathians and the Lombard in his rice-field.

It was a task which abler men in better times had tried and failed; where Kaunitz and Metternich had long labored in vain, and finally, abandoning in despair, had resorted to the opposite policy, "*divide et impera*."

The capital difficulty, as will at once be perceived, of framing a general Constitution for the Austrian empire, lies in a proper combination of the element of federalism with that of national unity. The empire is a mass of conflicting nationalities, too distinct from each other to be compacted together by administrative centralization into a smooth uniformity of surface; on the other hand, so curiously intermingled that it would be difficult for any one race, without injury to the rest, to break off from the mass, and carve out for itself a separate national existence. The problem is, how to combine the greatest possible elasticity with the greatest possible strength; to bestow powers of local self-government sufficiently ample to protect all their provincial interests, without permitting the bond of union which confines the whole from being regarded as "a rope of sand;" in other words, to keep that whole so bal-

anced about a common centre of gravity as to be adequate to the preservation of the general interests, without causing that bond to be considered as a galling yoke.

The most remarkable characteristic of the Austrian Constitution is that there is no hereditary chamber. The nobility are stripped of all right to hereditary legislative powers.

In comparison with her former system of government, the Constitution was a great advance toward liberal sentiments; but for it the government of Austria deserves "only the credit of submitting frankly and without reserve to what had become a political *necessity*."

In those portions of the empire where the people had never possessed or enjoyed political freedom, where their only safety lay in dependence on the unlimited power and unrestrained will of the monarch, this Constitution could not have been other than an acceptable gift. But far different was the case with those provinces (particularly Hungary) where the population had not only lived under a Constitution for centuries, but had enjoyed an independence of Austria in all but the union of the crowns in the person of the same monarch. It was unfortunate for the imperial government (as has been seen) that the young emperor, coming to the throne as he did wholly uncommitted on the subject, did not avail himself of so favorable an occasion to reconcile the difficulties existing between his government and the Hungarians; which noble duty, by a proper regard for the constitutional rights of the Magyars, might, doubtless, have been effected. But even had he failed in this, another opportunity now presented itself, by which he might still have avoided the evils and dangers that threatened his empire, by the addition of a *single* word to the Constitution then promulgated. That instrument contains a clause, that "a special statute (when the province shall be pacified) will fix the Constitution of Venetian Lombardy and the relation of those countries with the empire." The simple insertion of the word *Hungary* in that clause, and in that connection, and which, upon every principle of justice and policy, should have been done, would have spared, certainly at that time, and perhaps eventually, the vast amount of blood and treasure which its neglect did not fail to occasion.

But blindly adhering to an opposite course, and not only including Hungary (a kingdom then in the utmost revolt) under the operation of the new charter, but by the terms of that instrument virtually annulling its Constitution, he drove the Hungarian aristocracy at once from the support of the Austrian government, to which many of them were at that time inclined, and forced them to the side of the Liberals; in short, united the whole nation as one man, and inspired it with such a spirit of determined resistance as enabled it, in a few weeks, to overwhelm its adversaries, and to expel them almost completely from the soil of Hungary.

The following are the clauses of the new charter which conflict with the independence and constitutional rights of Hungary:

1st. "No custom duties can be established under any title in the interior of the empire, and wherever they already exist they are to be suppressed as immediately as possible."

By this clause, not only is Hungary prevented from levying duties on foreign importations—an important attribute* of sovereignty, a strong mark of independence which she has always enjoyed—but by it she is robbed of a large portion of her revenue, and deprived of all control over her financial interests.

2d. "All the countries subject to the crown are to be represented by Diets, in all affairs declared by the Constitution of the empire to be the affairs of the country."

This clause virtually requires of Hungary a surrender of all sovereignty and independence. The Constitution of the empire, which Hungary had no voice in forming, is to determine what are and what are not the affairs of Hungary, and over which their special Diet will have jurisdiction.

With such unlimited authority as that clause confers, can it be difficult to determine what subjects the emperor will take control of himself, what others he will confer on the Diet of the empire, and, lastly, what he will suffer the stripped Hungarians to retain?

3d. "The Constitution of the kingdom of Hungary is maintained, but all the parts of it not in harmony with the Constitution of the empire are abrogated."

* Which even the sovereign states of *this* confederacy do not enjoy.

After, by the preceding clause, stripping Hungary of her most important and sacred rights, that act would be of no avail without a repealing clause to render null and void all the portions of the Hungarian Constitution by which those rights are sustained. This is, therefore, to the Austrian government a most important and indispensable provision.

4th. "Equality of rights of all nationalities, and the language of each country, are guaranteed by special institutions in the relations of public and civil life."

Not content with robbing Hungary of her rights and privileges, the object of this clause is to deprive her of those provinces which exist within her limits, and which are her just acquisitions. It is also designed to diminish the strength of Hungary, not only by depriving her of these essential parts of her kingdom, but by releasing them from her control to raise them in opposition to her. Instead of equal rights of all nationalities, this paragraph would be more properly translated, equal annihilation to all.*

5th. "The internal organization of the Constitution of Transylvania to be on the basis of complete independence of the kingdom of Hungary."

Not only has the *Charte Octroyée* deprived Hungary of her rights and privileges, and of all her nationality, but it takes away from her the province of Transylvania, the largest and most important of her dependencies, one which was acquired by conquest upward of five centuries before the connection of Austria and Hungary, and acknowledged by the emperor as late as the 11th of April, 1848. But this clause is still more significant, in showing that not one of the provinces or kingdoms of the empire shall be allowed a voice in their "internal organization" and Constitution. The coronation oath of the monarch, which fourteen kings in succession have taken, not only contains an express engagement, on the part of the sovereign, not to consent to any diminution of the Hungarian territory, but even makes it incumbent on him by every effort to reannex to that kingdom such portions as, in the progress of events and course of time, may have been torn from it.

* Westminster Review. Making a new vavvode of Servia, and giving it a separate administration.

Nor was this Austrian charter more acceptable to the other portions of the empire. The great merit claimed for it, of respecting the various nationalities, and which the deluded Croats were induced to believe would render it so much more desirable to them than the Hungarian Constitution, was exactly the characteristic which it was found, on closer examination, especially to need. The great demand through all the Austrian provinces has long been for "national administrations." None, except Hungary, ever enjoyed this privilege. There was no one of their ancient liberties which the Hungarians, Croats, and Transylvanians prized so much as that of being governed by natives of their own country; and that the foreigner, by which title they designated the German, should have no authority over them. When Metternich was driven from power, one universal demand for national government arose throughout the provinces. All asked for *employés* who should speak the language of the country, know the condition of the people, have a kind feeling for the province they were to officiate in, and a substantial interest in its prosperity. But the new Constitution guaranteed no *national* government; on the contrary, that instrument declares, "*Throughout the Austrian empire there is but one citizenship, viz., Austrian.*" This sentence gives to the Austrian government the power of continuing the old system at their pleasure, of appointing to office strangers to the country where they are to have rule, unwelcome to its inhabitants, in opposition to their national feelings, in derogation of their national rights, and destructive of all prospects of harmony and peace. This single paragraph contains the lurking principle of the centralization of power, and the destruction of provincial individuality. Here, too, is the root of the almost universal opposition which the new Constitution experienced.

The *non-German* states of the Austrian empire had declared their hostility to the new Constitution by deeds as well as words. The *Bohemians*, whose deputies had hitherto voted in the Vienna Diet with the ministers, were foremost in the opposition. The charter has had the effect of uniting the hitherto irreconcilable parties of German, Bohemian, and Czecks. Scarcely any thing but the insult which that instrument offers

to all their national feelings and traditions could have been attended with a similar result.

In Servia, the charter caused a burst of indignation, and a union with remonstrating and revolting Hungary. The Austrian ministry at Olmütz had so far yielded to the Servians as to ask them to send deputies to that city to confer upon the points of which they complained.

The Croats, who probably, in all their manifestations, include one third of the population of the Austrian empire, had most decidedly shown their opposition to the new Constitution by refusing to publish it; and they demanded in its place the confirmation of the resolutions which were passed by their own Diet in 1848. The Ban Jellacic himself, the pet of the emperor and the ministry, supported the Croatian protest with the whole weight of his personal influence. He was a personage not to be offended, for his services could not be dispensed with; and the ministry of Count Stadion has modified the charter according to the wishes which, in the name of his countrymen, the Ban had expressed.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

Although, as early as the 29th of June, 1848, the Austrian government, as we have seen, in a communication to the Hungarian ministry, announced that it was about to put an end to the neutrality it had previously observed in the contest between Hungary and Croatia, and to support Croatia openly;* and although, on the 9th of September, 1848, the Croats, thus supported by Austria, crossed the River Drave, and invaded, in a most hostile and barbarous manner, the territories of Hungary; and although, on the 15th of December, Austria, with her own troops, entered Hungary at nine different points at the same time, taking both her capitals, subduing and disarming the population, and suppressing all Hungarian authority wherever they encountered it, it was not until after the promulgation of the *Charte Octroyée*, annulling, in the most essential

* It is not true, therefore, as has been stated, that "the Magyars declared the throne vacant only because Ferdinand had taken part with the *rebels*." If so, the declaration of independence would have taken place on the 29th of June, 1848, instead of the 14th of April, 1849.

points, the Constitution of Hungary, that the Magyars thought proper to *declare their independence* of the house of Habsburg.

Agreeably to the Hungarian Constitution, the king, upon his installation, was required to take an oath to sustain the Constitution and liberties of the Hungarian people; when, instead of complying with this prerequisite, Francis Joseph declares his resolution not to accept the crown of Hungary, by issuing his royal charter, which virtually *destroys* the Hungarian Constitution, then, and not until then, did the Magyars express a determination to throw off all allegiance to the reigning dynasty.*

These acts would seem to evidence, if proof were necessary, the great reluctance which Hungary felt at a separation, and the sincerity of her assertion, when she declared, in her address to the throne, that it was "the firm wish and need of Hungary to remain indissolubly connected with the empire."

Owing to the existence of war, which prevailed at this time to the direst extent between the two countries, all communication having been cut off, a few weeks doubtless elapsed before intelligence of the new Constitution promulgated by the emperor penetrated Hungary. It was just one month and ten days after the new charter had made its appearance, and immediately upon the turn given to affairs by the victories of Szolnok, Tapiobieske, Isaszeg, and Gödöllő, that Kossuth and his associates, then at the head-quarters of the army, as has been

* It was for this reason, and not, as has been asserted, because the *Charte Océroyée* gave equality of rights to the Croats, that Hungary declared her independence. Count Teleki, in his note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, says that the fact of the Russian intervention, solicited in the name of the emperor-king of Hungary, is what, above all other things, led the National Assembly to declare its independence of the house of Habsburg.

Pulzsky, on the contrary, asserts that the Russian intervention was not known at Debreczin at that time. Schlessinger mentions, as an inducement to the step, that "Kossuth, while at the camp, received information of these secret cabals (going on at Debreczin during his absence with the army), which the zeal of his friends exaggerated and described as of the most formidable character. He resolved to put an end to them by burning the ships of his enemies behind their backs. His fear was greater than the danger, and this fear will explain the reason why the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed before the campaign had attained its object." Another reason assigned for bringing forward the declaration at this time was, that the officers of the army required the measure, to assure them that the Diet would not make its peace with Austria and sacrifice the army.

seen, left for Debreczin, to take the proper measures for declaring the independence of their country.

On the 14th of April, 1849, the representatives of the Hungarian nation met in the Protestant church in Debreczin. Kossuth, in an eloquent address, reported the late victories, presented the rights and claims of Hungary, the abuses and perfidy of Austria, and called upon the Diet and the assembled people, in the name of their country and their God, to shake off the fetters that had bound them for three centuries, and to take their place among the independent nations. The following propositions were then unanimously adopted :

1st. Hungary with Transylvania, as legally united with it, and the possessions and dependencies, are hereby declared to constitute a free and independent sovereign state. The territorial unity of this state is declared to be inviolable, and its territory to be indivisible.

2d. The house of Habsburg-Lorraine having, by treachery, perjury, and levying of war against the Hungarian nation, as well as by its outrageous violation of all compacts in breaking up the integral territory of the kingdom, in the separation of Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, Fiume, and its districts, from Hungary ; further, by compassing the destruction of the independence of the country by arms, and by calling in the disciplined army of a foreign power for the purpose of annihilating its nationality ; by violation both of the Pragmatic Sanction, and of treaties concluded between Austria and Hungary, on which the alliance between the two countries depended, is, as treacherous and perjured, forever excluded from the throne of the united states of Hungary and Transylvania, and all their possessions and dependencies, and are hereby deprived of the style and title, as well as of the armorial bearings belonging to the crown of Hungary, and declared to be banished forever from the united countries, their dependencies and possessions. They are, therefore, declared to be deposed, degraded, and banished forever from the Hungarian territory.

3d. The Hungarian nation, in the exercise of its rights and sovereign will, being determined to assume the position of a free and independent state among the nations of Europe, declares it to be its intention to establish and maintain friendly

and neighborly relations with those states with which it was formerly united under the same sovereign, as well as to contract alliances with all other nations.

4th. The form of government to be adopted for the future will be fixed by the Diet of the nation.

But, until this point shall be decided on the basis of the foregoing fundamental principles, which have been recognized for ages, the government of the united countries, their possessions, and dependencies, shall be conducted, on the personal responsibility, and under the obligation to render an account of all acts, by Louis Kossuth, who has by acclamation, and with the unanimous approbation of the Diet, been named Governor (*Gubernator*), and the ministers whom he shall appoint.*

An eye-witness of this assembly states that the scene in that plain, unadorned house of prayer was the grandest one in the whole of the Hungarian Revolution. Never was Kossuth's eloquence more electrifying than when dictating the letter of renunciation of allegiance to the Habsburg dynasty; his glowing patriotism vied with his impassioned eloquence. The farewell curse thundered from his lips like a cataract; and, as the people beheld the history of their centuries of suffering, the deceptions practiced on them, and their unrequited and thankless sacrifices unrolled before them, and held up to their view like so many warning spirits, their hearts' blood stirred with feverish excitement; they trembled with irrepressible emotion. The thrill of present joy, the intoxicating presentiment of future freedom could alone adequately recompense the sufferings, the bootless struggles of ages, or efface the remembrance of past griefs. A shout of exultation broke from that immense assembly, and, swelling in its course like an avalanche, it was caught up by the multitude that thronged the streets without, and echoed far and wide throughout the country.†

"The declaration which the Hungarians issued," it has been urged, "was not so much a declaration of their own independence as a protest against the independence of Croatia and Slavonia; its object was not to justify their rebellion against Austria, but to accuse Croatia of rebelling against Hungary."

* For Declaration of Independence in full, see Appendix, note No. 31.

† Schlessinger's War in Hungary.

The truth is, as has been made evident, the Hungarians were contending for their ancient constitutional rights, altered and adapted to the demands of an advanced age; and this fact is sufficiently obvious, when it is admitted by writers on both sides that "the Constitution (of Austria), treating them as rebels, with a dash of the pen erased all the ancient constitutional rights of Hungary, and, consolidating her with the empire of Austria, raised the Slavi to a political equality with their masters." And was not the promulgation of a Constitution which treated them as rebels, and which, with a dash of the pen, ignored all their ancient constitutional rights, sufficient to justify a declaration of independence? What more could the most submissive desire by way of justification? What right had this "*liberal*" Constitution, as it is sometimes characterized, to treat them as rebels? They had not yet declared their independence; they had done nothing but defend their "*ancient constitutional rights*."

What were the causes which impelled our American fathers to declare their independence of the mother country? The colonies at that time were dependencies of Great Britain, and not constitutionally independent of her, as Hungary was of Austria; and even *then* the most serious charge which we could bring against the British government, and which we conceived fully justified the bold experiment of our fathers, was "the taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments." And what were these charters, of but few years' duration, granted by Great Britain herself, in comparison with those ancient constitutional rights, enjoyed by Hungary upward of five hundred years before her connection with Austria, and acknowledged by Austria for upward of three hundred years after that union?

But the Hungarians did no more than declare their independence of the house of Habsburg; they did not proclaim a republic, but simply left it to the Diet to establish the future form of government in all its details. This circumstance is by some cited against the cause of the Hungarians; and the opinion is sought to be enforced that their struggle was not for national independence, nor for the establishment of liberal in-

stitutions, but only "to preserve the distinctions and immunities of the nobles."

To support this conclusion, a misinterpretation is given to the fourth resolution of their declaration. That resolution they interpret as follows: The form of government to be adopted for the future shall be fixed by the Diet of the nation; but until this point shall be decided, *on the basis of the ancient and received principles which have been recognized for ages* (that is, as they construe it, acknowledging the absolute supremacy of the Magyar race in the country which they conquered, and where they have been lords of the soil and the dominant nation for eight or nine centuries), the government of the united countries, &c.

No unprejudiced mind, upon the perusal of the manifesto, can give to it this construction. There is not one word in the whole manifesto upon the subject of "acknowledging the absolute supremacy of the Magyars;" but the burden of the complaint is, that "*the house of Austria has publicly used every effort to deprive the country of its legitimate independence and Constitution, designing to reduce it to a level with the other provinces, long since deprived of all freedom, and to unite all in a common sink of slavery.*"

A more correct translation of the resolution, however, would obviate the necessity of discovering the meaning of the passage, since no such phrase occurs in the original. The most approved translation of the fourth resolution is as follows: "The Diet of the nation shall establish the future form of government for the country, in all its details; but, until this shall have been established, in conformity with the *above* or foregoing fundamental principles, Louis Kossuth, who has been, by acclamation and the unanimous approbation of the members of the Diet, named governing president, shall, together with the ministers, hereafter to be named by him, upon his own and their personal responsibility, and, under an obligation of accountability, govern the country in its whole extent."

The translator, by giving to *főnebi* (above or foregoing) the meaning of *former*, has perverted entirely the whole sense of the resolution. *Főnebi*, in the Hungarian language, signifies *above*, and refers to *space*; while *előbbi* signifies *former*, and

refers to *time*. Had the Hungarians intended to allude to their former principles, would they have neglected the obvious use of *elöbbi*, which would have conveyed their meaning, and have adopted *főnebi*, which did not express their intention?

By the correct translation of the word *főnebi*, the whole difficulty is obviated, and the sense of the fourth resolution placed beyond all cavil, viz., "that, until this point shall be decided on the foregoing principles (*i. e.*, as declared in the first resolution, "that Hungary is a free, independent, sovereign state, its territorial unity inviolable, and its territory indivisible"), its government shall be conducted," &c.

What were these "distinctions and immunities of the nobles," which it is supposed the Hungarians made such efforts to preserve? A species of the feudal system did prevail in Hungary, until the year 1847, and the condition of the peasantry was indeed, as has already been described, deplorable; but were these orders or distinctions regulated by and dependent upon the races? were the lords all of Magyar, and the peasants altogether of Slavic origin?

The wealthy nobility of Slavic origin, scattered through all the counties of Hungary, with their countless estates, surrounded by thousands of serfs, and in their princely mansions rolling in luxury and Oriental magnificence, would be somewhat surprised to see themselves characterized as vassals, and be certainly at a loss to divine in what style lords can live, if their condition be regarded as one of abject slavery.

A reference to the statistics of Hungary is only necessary to place this question beyond controversy. In the *Magyarország Leirása* of Fényes, the names of the largest proprietors in each comitat are given; and by this it appears that in that of Pesth, one of the most purely Magyar counties, as well as that embracing the capital of the kingdom, out of five names given as the largest proprietors, three are of Slavic origin.*

All of Slavic origin, then, were not serfs. Nor is there any more correctness in the belief that all of Magyar descent were lords.† The mass of the peasantry, in general, were of the

* Christian Examiner.

† The following facts will show that the Magyars are not exclusively the nobles. "In the Slovak county of Zólyom there are but two hundred Magyar in-

same race as their lords. In the Slovackian counties of the north, for example, they were Slovacks; in the Magyar counties of the centre, they were Magyars; and in the Slavic counties of the south, they were Slavi. This was but the natural result of the feudal system. In the early settlement of the country, the officers or petty chieftains, down to the lowest, received estates, the size of which was to be proportioned to their rank and to the number of men whom they had commanded. These men, the common soldiers, with their families, were to live on the estates of their officers, to labor for them, and support both themselves and their former commanders. The descendants of these officers form the present Hungarian nobility; the Magyar peasants are the offspring of the common soldiers or privates.*

The nine or ten millions of Slavi in the kingdom of Hungary were not then in the condition of abject slavery, as has been conceived, but were for the most part inhabitants of distinct provinces, having their own administrations and institutions; and though, as originally conquered provinces, they were somewhat under the control of the Hungarian government, yet their condition was almost the same as that of the Magyars. Possessed of their respective governors and Diets,† they made their own laws, and had a representation in the general Diet of Hungary.

Have they been, as has been supposed, enslaved for centuries, and was that the cause of their recent conflict with the Hungarians? The only manner in which oppression is complained of by the Croats was as regards their language and their ancient rights.

habitants; there are in the county two thousand one hundred and fifty-two nobles. If we take it for granted that the two hundred Magyars are all nobles, there remain one thousand nine hundred and fifty-two Slovack nobles in this one county. In the Slovack county of Turócz, in which more than a tenth part of the population is noble, there are but two hundred Magyars; the number of nobles in this county is four thousand eight hundred. In the Slavic county of Pozsega, which has no Magyar population, there are six hundred and thirty-eight nobles. In the Slovack county of Trencsén, in which there are but one thousand five hundred Magyar inhabitants, the nobility number nine thousand eight hundred and thirteen."—*Christian Examiner*.

* F. A. Fessler's *Geschichten der Ungarn*.

† Transylvania had always a Diet of her own. Croatia and Slavonia united formed another.

In respect to the language, where has been the oppression? In 1805, in the Diet in which the Slavi were represented, all the native languages, even that of the Hungarians, were excluded, and the Latin adopted in their stead, for all public discussions.

It is not more than twenty years since the Hungarian language was applied to the public business of Hungary, and only in the year 1844 that an act was passed making it obligatory on the Deputies of Croatia to speak Hungarian in the Diet of Hungary after the expiration of six years from that time. How then, as regards language, can it be said that they have been oppressed for *centuries*? and where is the injustice of this last step? Some common medium of communication was found indispensable for those living under the same government; that being admitted, what more natural and reasonable determination on this point was there than the adoption of that language that was spoken by the greatest number of people, and this was the Magyar; for, although there were as many as nine or ten millions of Slavi, there were not more than about two millions speaking the same language, a number about half that speaking the Hungarian.

The use of the Croatian language in all the business of the country was guaranteed, and the Hungarians undertook even to address the Croats in their own tongue. In the Diet of 1847-8, in the month of February, before the Revolution of France, Count Louis Batthyányi, as we have seen,* in a speech received with acclamation by the Upper Chamber, and by the public universally, put forward the right of the Croats to use not only the Latin language, but their native tongue in all the internal affairs of their country, and this proposition was adopted by both Chambers of the Hungarian Diet. If the Hungarian government was then disposed to grant them what they asked before the events of March and April, how much more had the Croats a right to expect justice after those events, since peace was the principal condition of the development of Hungarian improvement. Such was the tyranny exercised by the Hungarians over the Slavi for centuries in the way of language. What was the oppression as regarded

* Chapter V.

their ancient or political rights? Before the Revolution no complaint was heard, notwithstanding Croatia of all the provinces was most subject to Austrian influence, and where the Vienna cabinet had for a long time been intriguing to create sources of dissatisfaction against the liberal tendencies of the Hungarians.

With the results of the Revolution of 1848 the Croats at first expressed their unqualified satisfaction. In fact, the conquest made by the Diet of Pressburg had been extended to Croatia, as well as throughout the length and breadth of the kingdom. Her ancient municipal rights, confirmed and secured by the Hungarian Diet of 1715, were in no manner assailed. They paid less taxes than the Hungarians, and at the same time were not liable, as were the Hungarians, to have the army quartered upon them. While the old feudal offices were abolished in Hungary, the dignity and power of the Ban of Croatia were preserved. The powers of the General Assembly of Croatia were increased in granting to it the right to regulate the number of deputies that should be sent to the Hungarian Diet, according to population. Until then Croatia was only represented in the Diet by three deputies, that number was now increased to eighteen* for the three counties, and their powers considerably enlarged. Croats were called to fill the state employments, and particularly to hold the new offices which had just arisen from the creation of two Croat departments in the Hungarian ministry. The Croatian peasantry having received the same rights as the Hungarian, like them also received land, and Hungary agreed to indemnify the Croatian nobles, in the same manner as the Hungarian nobles, out of her own treasury.† Finally, the Hungarian government and Diet solemnly declared that if Croatia had any demands to make, they would undertake to investigate them carefully, and accede to them so far as was consistent with the national honor and the integrity of the crown.

In consequence of these concessions, the Croats enjoyed greater privileges than the Hungarians, inasmuch as all Croats are considered as Hungarians, while a considerable portion of the Hungarians are excluded from Croatia.

* A large representation for 1,400,000 inhabitants. † Count Teleki's pamphlet.

This is the worse than Egyptian bondage which the Croatians* have suffered for the last eight centuries at the hands of the Magyars.

If the Slavi of Hungary were laboring under the intolerable servitude which some have endeavored so earnestly to show, how does it occur that that model of propriety and patriotism, "the gallant Ban of Croatia," should, as has been stated, "in July, 1848, have made overtures to Kossuth and his co-ministers, to make common cause with them against Austria, and offered to insure entire Hungarian independence on certain conditions," "which the Magyars indignantly rejected."

If their slavery was of the "abject character" sometimes affirmed, how can we explain the facts, that Kossuth the Slovak was the head of the Hungarian government; Vukovich, a Servian, Minister of Justice; and Duschek, a Slavonian, Minister of Finance?

It was not, therefore, for the maintenance of their "feudal institutions," and consequent supremacy over the Croatians, that the Magyars struggled for independence of Austria, since no such oppression of the Croatians existed; and because six months before the war began there existed no feudal institutions to maintain.†

Was it for the preservation of "the immunities of the nobles" that Hungary engaged in the contest?

The principal and most obnoxious immunity of the nobles of Hungary was their exemption from taxation of every kind, even to that of tolls over roads and bridges; but this had been swept away by an act passed eighteen years before.

The first blow at this immunity of the nobles, the first inroad upon this great privilege, was the work of Count Stephen Széchenyi, one of the wealthiest and most influential magnates of the kingdom, as well as one of the purest patriots and best reformers of any age or country. The manner of its accomplishment was an act, passed by the Diet of 1836, for the

* The Croatians are the only ones here spoken of, because they were the only ones who preferred any complaints; the other Slavic provinces never uttered a murmur.

† The act emancipating the serfs was passed in the month of March; Jellacic's invasion of Hungary did not take place until September.

construction, at a cost of eight millions of florins, of a magnificent bridge across the Danube, connecting the two cities of Ofen and Pesth; the object of this splendid structure being not so much to facilitate the intercourse between the two cities as to break in upon this exemption of the nobles from taxation, as it was one of the stipulations of the charter, that all persons who crossed on this bridge, of whatever rank, should be liable to the payment of toll. Thus then, as early as 1836, through the efforts of one of the principal nobles, did the Diet of Hungary, composed altogether of nobles or the representatives of nobles, destroy in principle this their cherished immunity—their entire exemption from all public contributions.

But the movement did not end here, the principle thus effectually invaded by the Diet of 1836 was still further encroached upon, at each successive meeting of that body, by efforts made toward obtaining a further relinquishment by the nobles of their privilege of exemption from taxation. As illustrative of this fact, as well as in justice to Louis Kossuth, the leader of the Revolution, who has been charged with the selfish advocacy of the privileges of a caste, the following extracts from his speeches, in the Diets of 1841 and 1844, are inserted, and can not fail to interest the reader, not only as part of the history of the times, but as specimens of eloquence remarkable for their force both of language and illustration.

On the 2d of January, 1841, Kossuth exhorted the magnates of Hungary to renounce their cherished privilege of exemption from taxation. "If they—the nobles," said he, "renounce narrow-heartedness, lovelessness, and unnationality; if they feel that to do justice is not a sacrifice, but the best guaranty for obtaining justice; if, then, on the peaceful path of national prosperity and constitutional development, they will carry forward the white with the wreath-of-hope-adorned banner of steady national progress; then the nation trustfully will hail them as its leaders, and will, with two-fold spirit and excitement, follow on the paths of peace those old historic names whom on the battle-field it has of yore so often followed, and will gladly illumine the glory they thus acquire with the halo that encircles the brows of their ancestors. But should there be among them men who believe that the glorious name inherited from

their ancestors is an indestructible entail, which empowers them to indulge in inactive repose, or even entitles them to maintain their personal advantages against right and justice, and their private interests against the welfare of the nation; should men be found who, in their blind over-estimation of self, try to stay the wheel of the world, or to impede that steady progress which statesmanship guides, which the general want requires, and which national inspiration promotes, then, verily, the nation will do its duty. 'With you, through you, if you will; without you, ay, against you, if it must be!'"*

In 1844, addressing the same body, he said, "Like a second Sibyl, Fate stands before the nobles of Hungary, holding nine books in her hand. The first three books contain the secret how the national and constitutional independence of the country can be maintained, and by means of liberty be raised till it flourish; and that in such a way that a nobility, as the first-born of the nation, be intrusted with the office of leader on the constitutional path. In the second three books is recorded how well-being, mated with constitutional life, can be made general throughout the land, but without nobility. And finally, the last three books teach the secret how to create material well-being in the land, but without liberty or constitution. To purchase these nine books is to-day yet in the power of the nobility. The price exacted is renunciation of exemption from taxation. If the nobility delay to pay this price, the first three books fly into the fire, and with them the secret of the political future of the nobility. But the price of the remaining books is still the same. If the nobility further hesitate, the second three books vanish in smoke, and with them the secret of the constitutional future of the country; but the price of the last three books, which only offer brutish, material well-being, still remains the same. If the nobility again demur, the last three perish forever; and even then we must pay the price demanded for the nine; but in return we shall obtain only one vast grave, not even moistened by a tear of pity from free nations."†

* Mit euch, durch euch, wehn ihr willt; ohne euch, auch gegen euch, wenn es sein muss!

† Ludwig Kossuth, by J. E. Horn.

The first step taken in 1836 was followed, four years after, by a passage through the Diet of several other bills tending to a further abolition of the immunities of the nobles; and in 1844, at the like instigation of Count Széchenyi (sustained by Kossuth), a law was passed, giving to the peasants a right of holding land and of filling office. The reforms completed by the last Diet of Pressburg (1848), full six months before the commencement of hostilities, established civil equality and liberty throughout the kingdom of Hungary. Political rights from that moment became the lot of every Hungarian, without distinction of race or creed. The public direct taxes, of which until then the nobles bore no part, are now divided among all the inhabitants, in the proportion of their revenues; all seigniorial privileges, lay as well as ecclesiastical, completely abolished; and, "what never took place in any other country at any time, the nobility made to the peasants a free grant of the portions of land they held."* "Thus, certainly," says Count Teleki, "there were many families ruined and fortunes shattered; but it was necessary to take advantage of the first day of liberty which shone upon their native land, and to assure to it a morrow."

There is another error relative to the causes of the war, which Austria, to blind the world as to her own arbitrary course, and to prevent its sympathies from being enlisted on the side of oppressed Hungary, has diligently circulated to entrap the unwary. It is that of regarding the late struggle in the Austrian empire as a *war of races*, carried on between Magyar and Croat, instead of being, as it really was, a long-continued and systematic effort on the part of Austria to subdue Hungary, break down the constitutional privileges, and place her on a footing with the other provinces of the empire.

There was a conflict between races, it is true; no disturbance can arise in Austria without such a conflict; not only owing to the many nations of which the empire is composed, but because the policy to "divide and govern" has always been the mode by which Austria has been enabled to hold together

* Count Teleki's pamphlet.

her different parts, and maintain the supremacy of the little duchy over the whole.* This conflict between the races was not the *end*, but only the *means*. When did this war of races commence? Not until July, 1848, for at that time, as has been asserted by some who sustain this view of the question, "the gallant Ban of Croatia proposed to the Hungarians to join them against Austria." And when did the struggle between Austria and Hungary begin? Upward of three hundred years ago, from the very first connection of the two countries.

The struggle could not, therefore, be characterized as a war of races; its nature, if we have failed to show it in these pages, was most clearly stated in the British Parliament by Lord Palmerston, in 1849, as follows: "It is most undeniable, that Austria, by the course of policy she has pursued, has identified herself with obstruction to progress. It is equally undeniable, that Hungary has been for centuries a state which, though united with Austria by the link of the crown, has nevertheless been separate and distinct from Austria by its own complete Constitution. It is no less true, that the question (*i. e.*, the immediate question irrespective of results) now to be fought for on the plains of Hungary is this, whether Hungary shall continue to maintain a separate nationality as a distinct kingdom, and with a constitution of its own; or whether it is to be incorporated, more or less, in the aggregate Constitution that is to be given to the Austrian empire."

It was not, then, a war of races; and it is equally wide of the truth to believe that the Croats, Slavs, &c., were contending for liberty. Such an idea was never asserted by them, and doubtless never for a moment seriously crossed their imaginations. They have never at any time desired any government more free than that of Austria; in fact, the ground always taken to his countrymen by their leader Jellacic was that the Hungarians aimed at their deliverance from the Austrian yoke, and that the duty of the Croats was to prevent them from escaping its galling servitude.

* The strength of absolutism consists in the want of union of its opponents. To prevent or to impair such union is, therefore, the policy of the school of which Metternich, during his continuance in power, was always the head.

In all the negotiations held by the ministry or Diet of Hungary with Jellacic for a satisfactory settlement of the whole question between Croatia and Hungary, the Ban, waving all merely Croatian questions, plainly and invariably intimated that he would treat on no other basis than the submission of the Hungarians to the Austrian government.* But the unavoidable answers to two questions will prove conclusive on this point. Are the Croats at this moment dissatisfied with their present political condition? No; for not a murmur has escaped their lips, while their leader Jellacic delights to revel at Vienna in all the luxury and splendor of the imperial court. Has their condition become ameliorated by the struggle? No; for the recall by the emperor of the Constitution which he had given, so far from enhancing their freedom, has only deprived them of the little which they possessed. If, then, the Croats were struggling for liberty—if they have not only failed to obtain it, but lost even the little which they possessed, whence comes their present satisfaction and content? Circumstances, then, would seem to warrant the conclusion that Jellacic and his Croats, so far from contending for liberty, were the servile instruments of the Austrian government, to prevent the Hungarians from carrying into effect their purposes of maintaining their chartered independence.

The very circumstance, if true, which has been adduced, viz., the proposal of Jellacic to espouse the Hungarian cause, and engaging, on certain conditions, to effect her entire independence,† furnishes abundant and incontrovertible evidence of the hireling nature of his services; and proves that, failing to sell himself to one of the parties, he immediately turned about, and bound himself body and soul to the other, and, in consideration of a slight modicum of court favor, sold the liberties of his country.

The Hungarians, it is true, did not establish a republic;‡

* The absurdity of the intervention of the United States for the independence of Hungary can not be more forcibly illustrated than by the consideration that, of the fourteen millions of inhabitants in Hungary, nine millions desire no more free or better government than that under which they now live.

† The authenticity of this statement, however, the author is inclined to doubt.

‡ The weight of testimony would seem to have disclosed opposition to the adoption of a republican form of government. All the high nobility, it is natural to

they may never have intended to adopt such a form of government; that question was very properly as well as wisely deferred until after their independence had been achieved; but are they, on this account, less entitled to the sympathy of the American people? Is our sympathy with a people struggling to escape the yoke of arbitrary power to be dependent upon the form of government they may chose to establish when they have effected their freedom?

The Hungarians were contending for free institutions and popular government, and this not only their acts exhibited, but they did not hesitate to avow. Szemere, one of the Hungarian government, in the last session of the Diet, in July, 1849, states:

"There are three fundamental principles on which our Revolution rests, as upon so many pillars. The first principle, the reformation of our form of government. Hitherto the country, in regard to its government, was under tutelage. It was necessary then to introduce the parliamentary form of government, that the people might govern themselves, that the nation might direct its own fate.

"The second principle—the security of individual rights. It was necessary to abolish distinctions, to proclaim an equality of rights and obligations; that this principle being established, merit might be regarded, and not name and arms; that capacity might be rewarded, and not a long line of ancestry; that the prince, the count, the noble, might resign their dignities, and all who dwell in the country enjoy that equal dignity which is implied in the names *freeman, free citizen*.

suppose, would have been loth to part with their titles and other evidence of exalted birth. A large party in the country, embracing at one time both Kossuth and Görgey, were in favor of elevating the Duke of Leuchtenburg to the throne. Kossuth, after the battle of Kápolna, lost through the disaffection of the Hungarian commanders, said to Görgey, privately, "Brother, confess to me what thou desirest and wouldst have. Let me into the secret of thy wishes, and I will labor to satisfy them. Wouldst thou be dictator of Hungary? Thou shalt be it through me. Wouldst thou possess the crown of power? Thou shalt have it; only save our country!" But perhaps the greatest truth is expressed by the author of "Revelations of Russia," in his letter to M. Pulszky, when he says, "I need not tell you that Batthyányi and Kiss were the only decided aristocrats, as Szemere was the only republican, mixed up on the Hungarian side in this struggle, the remainder, whatever their tendency of opinion, occupying themselves as little with such questions as with geological theories."

“The third principle—the free development of nationalities. The free development of its nationality should be allowed to every race. Nationality is not an end, but a means for the perfecting of the man and the citizen. This development of nationalities should be limited only by a regard to the unity of the state, and to a prompt and exact administration of the government.”

Popular government, security to individual rights, and a free development of nationalities, are all essential elements of freedom, and without which a republic could not exist. These are the *substance*; the republic is but the *form*.

Is there no freedom without a republic, and does it always exist under such a form of government? Who can dispute the assertion, that vastly more liberty is to be found, at this day, under the monarchy of England than under the republic of France. The one diffuses her liberal and enlightened institutions throughout her extended empire, on which the sun never sets; the other, while she stifles at home all freedom, both of opinion and of action, can find no more worthy object for the exercise of her military power abroad, than to crush, by force of arms, a young and feeble republic.

CHAPTER VIII.

SECOND WAR OF RADEZKY AND CHARLES ALBERT.—THE KING DENOUNCES THE ARMISTICE.—RADEZKY INVADES PIEDMONT.—THE BATTLES OF MORTARA AND NOVARA.—THE KING, DEFEATED IN BOTH BATTLES, ABDICATES, AND HIS SON, VICTOR EMANUEL, THE DUKE OF SAVOY, ELEVATED TO THE THRONE, CONCLUDES A TREATY OF PEACE WITH MARSHAL RADEZKY.

AFTER the Lombardian campaign in the summer of 1848, when, as we have seen, Marshal Radetzky defeated Charles Albert in seven battles, and drove him and his invading army across the Ticino into Piedmont, at the request of the king, an armistice was entered into between the belligerents on the 9th of August, and hostilities immediately ceased. The terms of this arrangement, granted by Marshal Radetzky at the intercession of the mediating powers, were as liberal as could have been expected, at a moment when there was no obstacle to the advance of the imperial forces to Turin, and their dictation, within the walls of that capital, of such a treaty of peace as would have severely punished their recent assailant, and thrown upon Sardinia the expenses of the war. And if the ambassadors of France and England did not, by inducing the Austrian commander to abstain from taking advantage of a conquered foe, incur certain moral obligations with regard to its future course, the government of Austria certainly acquired thereby the confident expectation that the truce thus demanded would be employed for a different purpose than to refit a broken army, and prepare for the horrors of a fresh campaign. But such was the infatuation of the Italian party, that this very convention of General Salasco, which saved the north of Italy from instant occupation, was received with indignation by the people, who, after the signal defeat of their troops, looked for, and would have been satisfied with, such terms only as Charles Albert could have dictated on the ruins of Verona, with a French army at his back.

Encouraged, perhaps, by the injudicious pledges of foreign governments, the defeat of the King of Piedmont in the field had not been interpreted as it should have been, chiefly against the influence of those whose moderate support occasioned such a result. The moderate politicians had lost influence by the failure of the champion of monarchy, and the field was more open than before for the entrance of the Republicans. The ministry of Gioberti becoming too conservative, he himself "Austrianized," as was said; their services were dispensed with, and their places supplied by a ministry of a more genuine republican stamp, and whose first address was in every word an exhortation to hostilities.

The continual pressure on the people of a war expenditure, without any of the advantages of war; the dangers arising from the prolonged excitement of the people; the evident hopelessness of reconciling, by any mediation, claims so directly opposed as those of Sardinia and Austria; and, finally, the chance of accelerating the effects of mediation by arms, were all advanced as reasons for action, and doubtless were all substantial; but, as usual, prudence, on this occasion, only furnished arguments for the previous tendencies of feeling.

In a dispatch to his government, written by Mr. Abercrombie, the English minister at Turin, only four days before the denunciation of the armistice, he thus notices the failure of his efforts: "The deplorable infatuation which prevails upon the question of the realization of the kingdom of Upper Italy, of fighting the Austrians and driving them from Italy, has completely warped judgment and good sense."

"The yoke, it was argued by the people of Piedmont, which we strove so hard to break last year, is heavier than ever on the necks of our brethren in Lombardy. We went to war either to free them or without excuse, and there is now no hope of obtaining any thing for them except by force; nor are we at peace with Austria now, but have eighty thousand men ready to assail her." It is not in human nature that such thoughts as these can have failed to produce their effect; the war party naturally gained strength, and with it the political party most eager for the renewal of the contest, and the conclusion was readily arrived at, that it was treason to talk of

peace with the foreigner; there was one condition of peace and one only, that no "Tedesco"* should govern south of the Alps.

Another great obstacle to a pacific course arose from the position of Charles Albert himself, which, though created by his own acts, was not the less one of inextricable embarrassment. The choice of 1848 had become all but the necessity of 1849. If it had been ever right to assist the Lombardians to drive out the Austrians, was it less right to assist them now, when their own vote had given them the additional claim of subjects on his protection? How could "the Sword of Italy,"† as he styled himself, the king of North Italy, the champion of Italian independence, with an army of eighty thousand brave men, ready to move at his command, deliberately and uncompelled renounce, without having gained a single advantage, a cause to which he was so deeply pledged? Charles Albert was possessed of all that taste for arms and thirst for military glory, which has ever distinguished the princes of Savoy from Amadeus the First, the brave defender of the pass of Mont Cenis in the eleventh century, to Prince Eugène, the hero of Zante and the champion of Christendom against the Turks, in the eighteenth century. The Prince of Carignan, the late king of Piedmont, had served in the Spanish invasion as a volunteer, under the Duc d'Angoulême, and was present at the storming of Trocadero. With the blood of such heroic ancestry in his veins, and the remembrance of his former military exploits in his mind, the present king could, therefore, ill brook defeat, much less submit without a struggle to the signal chastisement he had received.

But a resort to war was not alone a matter of feeling with the unhappy monarch—it was one of judgment. It was to prevent the certain overthrow of his government at home that he risked the chances, desperate as they were, of subduing a government abroad. The Republicans had attained power in Piedmont, and nothing short of the liberation of Lombardy could now prevent the declaration of a republic. His embarrassing situation is graphically pictured by the king himself

* Tedesco, the ancient name given to the Germans by the Italians in the days of bitter hostility between the races.

† Spada d'Italia.

in an audience given the ambassadors of France and England, when they sought in vain to dissuade him from his purpose. "Gentlemen," said he, "war is the desire of the nation; I must yield to this desire, if I would not expose my crown to greater dangers. I begin the war to escape the republic. If you, gentlemen, can not guarantee to me my crown, I dare not delay to employ the last measure remaining to me—the war."

These were the true reasons which induced the denunciation of the armistice; but not being of a nature to allow publicity, they differ materially from the causes advanced in a public manifesto issued on the 14th of March by the Sardinian ministry, and by them distributed to the different cabinets of Europe.

The following arguments comprise the substance of that lengthy and plausible document: That the vow of the Italian Revolution was for the restoration of national independence. The Italian governments could not oppose the desire of the people merely in obedience to the presumed rights of Austria. The Italian governments could not recognize Austria's right of possession to the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and further believed that her pretensions founded on treaties were not less groundless.

The Sardinian government did not shrink from the responsibility of having commenced the war of Italian independence.

Having first entered upon this war, consulting only the right and will of the nation, Sardinia had contracted more particularly the obligation of continuing it, since the fusion of the Lombardo-Venetian provinces, and of the duchies, with the Sardinian states, so unanimously willed by the people of those states.

But the days of misfortune came; Sardinia, betrayed by fortune, was obliged to bend to the necessities of the moment, and an armistice was concluded between the two armies.

The strong and unanimous protests which arose on all sides against the armistice and its consequences, convinced the Sardinian government that the thirst for national independence could not be allayed in the Italian people, either by the misfortunes they had suffered or those they were threatened with,

till the last effort had been made. Some hoped that an honorable solution of the Italian question might be obtained by the observance of that military convention; but the Sardinian government soon became aware that such hope was vain, with the pretensions of Austria and her manner of interpreting and executing the said stipulation.

Austria had in several ways violated the express stipulations of the armistice, as well as the international condition of those countries which she was only to occupy in a military way, both according to the articles of the armistice and the obvious intention of the mediation.

She violated them by retaining one half of the park of siege-artillery of Peschiera, under the pretext that the Piedmontese troops had not evacuated Venice, but in reality to place Sardinia in the impossibility of recommencing the war.

She violated them by hostilities against Venice by sea and land, although the cessation of hostilities was sanctioned also for that wonderful city.

She violated them by the political restoration of the Duke of Modena, by all the government acts, and by prescribing government measures, which she published in the Lombardo-Venetian provinces and in the duchies.

She violated them by the excessive war taxes imposed upon various classes of emigrants, according to lists compiled in hatred and rage, and by the intimation to all emigrants to return within a very short time to their former abode, on pain of having all their property put under sequestration, a measure equivalent to confiscation.

She violated them by the edict of the 5th of January of this year, in which an imperial commissioner directed that deputies of the Lombardo-Venetian provinces should be elected and sent to Vienna to consult about the political reorganization of those provinces. She violated them by all those arbitrary laws, by all those fraudulent intrigues, calculated to give color to the assertion that the Revolution was completely stifled in the provinces occupied by her, and that the desire and love for the old state of things had been reawakened.

She violated them, at the same time infringing the eternal principles of right which regulate every civil compact, and

treating with contempt the sacred feeling of humanity, by allowing her marshal and his lieutenants to have recourse in the territories occupied by them to the most atrocious exercise of violence, to the most outrageous rapine and most provoking insolence.

We, therefore, come to this necessary conclusion, that Austria has only seen in the benevolent interposition of the mediating powers an expedient to aggravate Sardinia with excessive charges, to ruin the occupied provinces, to drive the generous populations to desperate attempts, and to sow seeds of discord through the whole peninsula.

In such a state of things, the Sardinian government has felt it its duty seriously to consider its own condition of right and fact, its relation with the mediating powers, and the general condition of Italy, for the purpose of taking a course consistent with its honor and its most legitimate rights.

After all these considerations, the Sardinian government saw that there was but one course open to it; it had no choice but war, and it decided accordingly.*

Such were the proclaimed views of the Sardinian government, and the motives which impelled it to the recommencement of hostilities; but, to a proper appreciation of the controversy, it will be necessary, *audire alteram partem*, to refer to the views of the Austrian government, and the light in which they regarded the conduct of Sardinia, in the denunciation of the armistice.

The following are, in substance, the opinions of the imperial government, as soon as advised of the renunciation of the armistice, as published on the 18th of March, 1849.

"The armistice concluded on the 9th of August last with Sardinia has been renounced by that power, and consequently Austria must a second time draw the sword in defense of her just rights.

"In this war, now unhappily inevitable, she has the world for witness, that she had already done every thing to avoid it that her honor and her duty permitted.

"When, in the month of August last, the glorious imperial

* Piedmontese Gazette, March 14, 1849; Galignani's Messenger, March 19, 1849.

arms had obtained several decisive victories over the Piedmontese army, it was King Charles Albert who proposed the establishment of a permanent peace. It depended on the will of the imperial government to pursue the enemy to the utmost, and to dictate peace to him on his own territory. But Austria, animated by a sincere love of peace, gave to the world a new and irrefragable proof of her moderation, by checking the march of the victorious armies to the frontiers of Piedmont, in order to show that she had only taken up arms for the legitimate defense of the integrity of her territory. The armistice was, therefore, granted to the King of Sardinia, and a plenipotentiary named to open negotiations for peace.

“After a sanguinary conflict of six months, attended with the greatest sacrifices, the valiant armies of Austria defeated the enemy, and the conqueror restrained himself to demanding, independently of a just war indemnity, only what belonged to him through God and his right. No one will deny that such conduct bore the impress of the highest moderation, and the formal love of peace. The conduct of Sardinia, since the conclusion of the armistice, has been in opposition to this mode of proceeding.

“The Sardinian fleet, which, according to article fourth of the armistice, was to have quitted Venice immediately to return to the Sardinian States, did not withdraw until a late period, and not definitely. It has never quitted the Adriatic Sea, and is there at this moment. The manifest violation of the armistice on the part of Sardinia has alone placed Venice in a state to resist the imperial arms.

“Not content with this, Sardinia went further, by granting openly, and with the armistice in force, to this rebel city considerable sums in monthly payments. In the capital of Piedmont, there was formed a Lombardian *consulta*, composed, in a great measure, of the members of the government expelled from Milan. The court of Turin regarded it as a legal authority, and furnished it with the means of keeping up under its protection and its eye discord and hatred on the neighboring Austro-Italian provinces, and raising all imaginable obstacles to the efforts made by the imperial government to re-establish tranquillity and calm the public mind. Magyar emissaries

and Polish refugees were also well received and protected at the court of Turin. Their object evidently was to establish a close fraternity between the Italian Revolution and the criminal party which had lighted up civil war in our country; to bring about the dissolution of the Austrian monarchy. The official language of the Sardinian government was always in accordance with this manner of acting, which denoted the most hostile intentions.

When, at the commencement of the last month, the Legislative Assembly commenced its labors at Turin, Austria heard with indignation that the king had announced, in a solemn speech, a kingdom of Upper Italy, and had, without disguise, excited the Austro-Italian provinces to rise again and revolt against their legitimate government.

"Whatever may be the results, Austria can testify that she did not provoke the war, which the pride of her enemies force her to sustain. Austria has not been guided by ambitious views, has never coveted a foreign crown, has wished only to preserve that which belongs to her, and to defend against unjust pretensions the integrity of the monarchy acknowledged by solemn treaties,"* &c.

Hostilities were thus resolved on by the government of Sardinia, but never was a people so ill prepared, both morally and physically, to engage in such a conflict with one of the great military powers of Europe.

At the moment of the commencement of the war, the army might be said to have been without a general; the government without a Minister of War; and the troops in a state of the utmost moral and material inferiority.

The infantry regiments were totally devoid of men accustomed to war; special permits had been given a large number of the old soldiers† to return to their homes, and new recruits, not inured to service, were enrolled in their places. The reorganization of a fourth battalion for every regiment was ordered; and the recruits, instead of making up these new battalions, were divided among the old companies. In conse-

* Galignani's Messenger, March 23, 1849. Wiener Zeitung, March 18, 1849.

† Those who had survived the last campaign had been so much discredited and abused by the prints, that it was not possible to get them to serve.

quence of this, a general *dislocation* of the corps of officers took place; soldiers were then separated from their officers, and officers from their men, to the total destruction of that mutual confidence so essential to the *morale* of an army. This change, which so completely disorganized the whole infantry, took place between the 11th and 14th of March. On the 15th, and after notice of the renunciation of the armistice had been given, and when the movements of concentration had commenced, the commanding general, who had been made answerable by the Chambers for the success of the campaign, ordered the re-establishment of the old corps. This measure, which was executed in great haste, served but to create still greater confusion. Owing to the sudden increase of the army by the accession of recruits, it became necessary to double the number of officers, and it proved difficult to fill the post of sergeants from the list of orderlies. These newly-promoted sergeants were totally deficient in military instruction, and were consequently inefficient in the administration and discipline of their companies. The greater part of the officers recently promoted were in the same condition.* A great number of Lombards, Tuscans, Neapolitans, and other foreigners, had been enlisted into the corps of officers; and while the majority of these young men were totally ignorant of all that concerned the service, their promotion, through favor, over the heads of experienced and native officers had created the greatest jealousy and dissatisfaction.

In the introduction of that crowd of officers from all parts of Italy and other countries, the Piedmontese military character had been lost, without being replaced by any equally martial and efficient.

Nearly all the generals and staff officers were unacquainted with their brigades, regiments, and battalions. General Peron, who was killed on the field of Novara, received the command of his division just three days before the battle, and was a perfect stranger to the regiments under his orders. The new laws of promotion, therefore, had only created discontent, without procuring able officers. The chief command, after having

* Le Spectateur Militaire.

been tendered to and declined by many distinguished French generals, was conferred on a Polish officer, Chrzanowsky, to whom the war of 1831 against the Russians had given, as it had to many others, a certain reputation, which was due less to their talents than to the general sympathy then felt for unhappy Poland. Chrzanowsky possessed a knowledge of the art and theory of war, and a familiarity with the details; and this was the only superiority he enjoyed over the Piedmontese generals, like Bava and Sonnaz, who had held commands in the last campaign. But he had not the real knowledge and qualities necessary for the head of an army; he was not sufficiently imbued with the great principles of war, while he wanted decision and vigor in resolution, and activity and vigilance in execution. To command an army or to govern a state, it is equally indispensable to have a profound knowledge of the character of those whom the leader is thus called upon to direct; but Chrzanowsky was a stranger to the manners, and even to the language of the country; he did not seek to know his army, or to be known by it; and how could his men have confidence in one whose name they could scarce pronounce, and of whose great deeds and capacity they had never heard? Of a character cold, and an exterior neither imposing or military, there was nothing in him which could possibly excite the least enthusiasm in the minds of his soldiers; he never showed himself, but passed his time in his cabinet, engaged in the details of organization, which completely absorbed him, and in which consisted his principal merit as a commander-in-chief.

The commissary's department was confided to inexperienced hands, sufficient means of transportation were needed to convey the military stores, so that provisions were wanting in the very first days of the campaign.

The reorganization of the medical department was greatly neglected, and only the day before the recommencement of hostilities the medical officers received orders concerning their further destination, and many did not join their divisions until after the battle of Novara.

The service of the trains was insufficient for the wants of the army. A corps of militia had been organized for the pur-

pose of increasing the means of transportation, but its bad organization rendered it almost useless.

The artillery had always justified its reputation, and for the reason that it had been subjected to less changes than the other corps; but they, like the cavalry, were entirely too few in number, and thus created great disproportion in the army. The corps of engineers consisted almost entirely of new soldiers, and their *parc*, as well as that of the pioneers, was defective. On the day of the recommencement of hostilities, orders were given to employ the horses of the artillery in the *parc* of the pioneers, and the *parc* of the artillery was served by the horses of the militia trains.

Besides these defects, a strong germ of demoralization was already going on in the ranks of the army. The political complexion of affairs had greatly changed; the enthusiasm of the "holy war," which had urged them throughout the last campaign, was extinguished; the sad recollections of Milan, which had produced such painful impressions on the troops, were not yet effaced; the holy father now disavowed the standards which he had blessed during the preceding year, and who could say, thought the superstitious soldier, that the Almighty himself had not withdrawn his favor and support.

Although the Piedmontese army labored under these defects in composition and organization, a still greater obstacle to success arose from the disposition and direction of the troops. Of the hundred and thirty-five thousand men forming, as was said, the total effective force, one hundred thousand only (and this was already a large calculation) were fit for active service; and this force was, at the moment of entering upon the campaign, reduced by sickness and other causes to about eighty thousand men.

But the greatest difficulty of all consisted in the fact that this force, instead of being concentrated on the most important points, was spread over a wide extent of country, stretching from Arone to Sarzane,* and separated by formidable rivers and mountains.

Opposed to this ill-composed army and incompetent officers

* The same error was committed the preceding year on the Mincio.

was the Austrian, one of the most efficient and best-disciplined armies in Europe.

As to their infantry, it presented an incontestible superiority to that of the Piedmontese; recruited with great care, it was composed of large and able-bodied men, who had served in the ranks five or six years, were accustomed to discipline, familiar with all the details of the service, and, for the most part, injured to war.

The artillery and cavalry, though not physically superior to those of the Piedmontese, possessed in a high degree that in which their enemy was deficient—discipline, and without which their service was comparatively unavailing. The officers of the different arms, particularly those of the staff, were vastly better instructed than those of the Piedmontese; and the soldiers, if inferior in martial spirit to their more impetuous foes, were actuated by a courage firm and indomitable, and which, under their chiefs, was of more consequence than the wildest bravery.

Nothing can exhibit in a more striking degree the force of good military institutions, than the comparison between Austrian and Italian troops.

Austria, with men of a nature less energetic, of a character cold, of a spirit heavy, knew how to make better soldiers, more formidable armies, and to become a more powerful empire; while Italy, whose inhabitants were individually quite equal, if not superior to the Germans and the people of the north, possessed always the worst armies of Europe, and formed, in general, the most weak, inefficient, and ill-governed of the continental nations.

The same care and attention was bestowed by the Austrians to the minutest details of the service; their trains, horses, weapons, and, in short, all accoutrements, were ample, and in the finest order. The commissary's department was most admirably served, so that each Austrian soldier carried in his sack from two to three days' bread; while the Piedmontese, on their own soil, were left to perish of hunger, or to subsist by plunder, as they did not fail to do after the battle was over.

The one hundred thousand men which composed the Austrian army, when reduced by a deduction of invalids, amount-

ed to about eighty thousand, formed six *corps d'armée*, each of sixteen to eighteen thousand men. Each of these corps, complete in troops of all arms, was composed of two divisions; this organization in corps and divisions, of an effective not too extensive, was preferable to that of the Piedmontese, in rendering the Austrian army more manageable, and easier of command.*

These fine corps were commanded by Generals Wratislaw, D'Aspre, Appel, Thurn, and Woher, all officers of experience in war, and having, at the same time, able generals of division under them.

By far the greatest advantage possessed by the Imperialists in the contest was that of being under the command in chief of one who (if Wellington be excepted) may, without injustice to any other, be called the most distinguished captain of the age. Joseph, Count Radetzky, was born at Trebnitz, in Bohemia, in 1766, and began his military career as private cadet in the regiment of Francis's cuirassiers in 1784. Gradually rising through the grades of regular promotion, in 1799 he obtained the rank of lieutenant colonel of the general staff, a post in which he was enabled to render the allied armies important services in their struggles with Napoleon, especially on the battle-fields of Leipsic, of Culm, and of Brienne. In 1805, he commanded, as major general, a cavalry brigade in the army in Italy. Having distinguished himself on the famous battle-field of Aspern,† under that distinguished general, the Archduke Charles, he was raised to the rank of field-marshal lieutenant. In 1813, he acted as chief of the general staff in the grand army of invasion under Prince Schwartzberg, a position which required not only the qualities of a soldier, but the intelligence of the diplomatist and minister. General of cavalry in 1829, he was appointed to the command in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom in 1832, and in the year 1836 was promoted to the dignity of field-marshal, the highest rank in the service.‡

Although he had previously held high commands, and dis-

* *Compagne de Novare*, by the author of Custozza.

† The only battle in which Napoleon, on an open plain, and with a superior force, was ever compelled to retreat.

‡ Blackwood's Magazine, 1851.

charged important functions in the wars against Napoleon, yet never, before the campaign of 1847, had he been intrusted with the full command before an enemy. Then it was, at an age when the great proportion of mankind have passed from this transitory stage, or, if they still linger on the shores of time, are imbecile or unfit for active life, and especially for a career in arms, that he really commenced to make for himself a name, and to wreath his brow with undying laurels.

One of the brightest pages of Austrian history will record the deeds and triumphs of the old hero of '83, the idol of his army, the determined soldier of an empire which seemed crumbling into atoms, the one prop of Austria in Italy, doing his duty, whoever might fail in theirs, unmoved by the political storms which surrounded him; master of the ground he stood on, and determined to preserve that, at least, though all the rest be lost in the vortex of revolution, and though at the end there should remain no crowned master to reward him for the effort.

Radetzky's proclamations and addresses are models both of sentiment and style. Nowhere is more complete justice rendered to the merits of the Sardinian officers, to the bravery of the Savoyard troops, to the courage of the princes who led them on, than in the official reports of Radetzky. While most of the Piedmontese generals and officers found fault with each other, in the marshal's reports alone was ample justice done to his antagonists. "The Piedmontese and Savoyards," said he, in his official report, "fought like lions; and the unfortunate Charles Albert threw himself madly into the thickest of the danger upon every possible opportunity. His two sons also fought with brilliant courage."

The enthusiasm of the army for Radetzky knows no bounds; a kind of tender familiarity, tempered by veneration, renders the manifestation of their sentiments for him inexpressibly touching. Upon one occasion, the anecdote is related, as the marshal passed down the ranks, he perceived a soldier bare-headed. Riding up to him, "Where's your *chako*,* friend?" asked he. The man looked confused, and avowed he had no

* Cap.

Feldziechen,* and therefore was ashamed to cover his head. "Is that all?" rejoined Radetzky, smiling; and, taking off his own hat, he divided the little verdant branch it bore, and, "There, my friend," said he, tendering one half to the soldier, "take that." The man pressed it to his lips, and, with tears in his eyes, "Herr Marshal," answered he, with deep emotion, "not even to go to my children, should I ever have any, shall it ever leave me. In my grave, upon my heart, there is its place," and an irrepressible burst of applause from all around approved the feeling. Many of the soldiers who died of their wounds after the battle of Novara seemed almost paid for the sacrifice of life by a shake of the hand from Radetzky, and, by a proud glance of the eye, seemed to say, "I die content."

The marshal's great readiness to recognize the merit of others particularly distinguishes him. Of his quartermaster-general, Hess, who served him through the Italian campaign, he wrote to his wife, "If *I* have all the glory, *he* has all the merit."

He was a boy of sixteen when Maria Therese died, and followed the whole of the two first campaigns against the Turks, serving under Laudohn at the siege of Belgrade, and acting as aide-de-camp to Field-marshal de Lacey. What Hess was to him he was to De Lacey first, and afterward to Schwarzenberg.

Radetzky has served five sovereigns of the house of Austria (Joseph the Second, Leopold the Second, Francis the First, Ferdinand the First, and Francis Joseph), and two emperors of the name of Joseph, between whom lie three generations, has he seen in the thick of the *mêlée*; Joseph the Second on the Turkish frontiers, and Francis Joseph in Italy. Few can boast of such a well-filled life; and, whatever danger threatens, Austria may feel secure, so long as she can, with the poet, say to her octogenarian champion,†

"In deinem Lager ist Oesterreich"‡—*In thy camp is Austria.*

Agreeably to the stipulations entered into between the bel-

* A small sprig of green (usually oak), with which Austrian soldiers are required, on all gala occasions, to decorate their caps.

† Baroness Blaze de Bury.

‡ Grillparzer.

ligerents upon the close of the late campaign, notice was to be given of the denunciation of the armistice eight days before the recommencement of hostilities; and, as the King of Piedmont seemed to have a peculiar fancy for opening the war on the 20th of March, a major of engineers (De Cordona) was hurried off on the 12th in all haste, to serve the notice on Radetzky, even before their own commander, at his head-quarters at Alexandria, had received the slightest intimation on the subject.

The Piedmontese ministry, in their remarkable prudence, had failed to advise their own general sooner, for fear that their intentions might possibly be communicated to Radetzky, and their army taken by surprise, but at the same time did not hesitate to commence a war, and declare a levy *en masse* of the Lombards and Venetians, notwithstanding their treasury was entirely empty, and no means of replenishing it either provided or even suggested.

The news of the denunciation of the armistice, although generally expected, struck with profound astonishment the country people throughout Piedmont, but failed to produce the slightest change in the disposition of the army. At Rome, in Tuscany, and other parts of Italy, it produced the utmost excitement, and a great exaltation in words; they elevated to the skies the names of Charles Albert and Piedmont, but no one proposed to offer any more substantial proofs of their approbation. The war-message, as soon as delivered to the old marshal at Milan, spread with telegraphic rapidity through the city, to the infinite delight of the garrison and the great consternation of the inhabitants.

Eight bands of music played in the evening the national anthem before the Villa Realle (the quarters of Radetzky), which was responded to with loud vivats in honor of the emperor and the venerable general by the assembled crowd. The same sentiment of joy again manifested itself in the theatre Della Scala, when the national hymn was again loudly called for and sung, amid the most enthusiastic applause of the audience.*

* When the armistice was denounced by Sardinia on the 12th of March, one would have supposed that to the garrison of Milan had been promised some over-

Marshal Radetzky, on the same day, issued a stirring order to his troops, advising them that their "fondest desire had been fulfilled, the armistice had ceased," summoning them "to follow their old leader from victory to victory," and concluding with the inspiring injunction, "forward, then, soldiers! Turin is the watch-word; there alone shall we find peace."*

Radetzky, without expecting so sudden a resumption of overwhelming joy. Through all ranks the news flew like wild-fire, and on all faces only an enthusiastic anticipation of glory was to be read. "Toward evening," says an eye-witness, "the court of the Villa Realle (the residence of Radetzky) was crowded with soldiers and their officers. Torches lighted up with their red glare the house itself and the surrounding trees, and cast their flickering rays upon the gold embroidery of the uniforms and upon the glittering arms. Eight bands of music, followed by crowds of soldiers, marched into the court from different sides, and, animated by spontaneous and simultaneous enthusiasm, gave a serenade to the marshal, to thank him for promising the troops that they should go to Turin. 'Turin must be taken! Father Radetzky has said it; and what he has said is as good as done!' These were the words upon every lip, accompanied by thundering vivats. At last, when the field-marshal came forth upon the balcony and looked around with his good-natured intelligent eyes, and spoke words of heartfelt kindness to his children, the air was positively rent by acclamations, and the phrensy of delight would not cease. Over many a bronzed cheek did I watch the tears of emotion roll, and though I have often witnessed such scenes, often heard the outbreak of popular feeling, never again shall I probably behold such enthusiasm as this. With such an army, victory is sure. Of all those thousands of hearts, there is not one that does not beat in unison with the heart of the leader; and, confident and trusting, they have but one will, to conquer with him, or with him suffer defeat, but in good or evil fortune to bear together all."

* The following order of the day was published at Milan, on the 12th:

"Soldiers! your most ardent wishes are fulfilled. The enemy has denounced the armistice. A second time he stretches out his hand to grasp the crown of Italy. But let him be taught that six months have not in any degree lessened your fidelity to your emperor and king, or your bravery in supporting him. Having come forth from the gates of Verona, flying from victory to victory, and driven the enemy back within his frontiers, you generously granted him an armistice. While declaring that he was preparing to make pacific propositions, he was arming himself for renewing the war. We are all armed, and that peace which we generously offered him we will gain by force in his own capital. Soldiers! the conflict will not be long. It is the same enemy whom we have beaten at Saint Lucia, Somma Campagna, Custoza, Volta, and before the gates of Milan. God is with us, for our cause is just! Up once more, soldiers! follow your chief, who has grown gray in arms, to war and victory. I shall be a witness of your exploits. It will be the last inspiring act of my long life, as a soldier, if in the capital of a disloyal enemy I can decorate the breasts of my brave comrades with the insignia of their valor, gained by blood and glory. Let our war-cry then be, 'Forward, soldiers, to Turin!' It is there that we shall find the peace for which we fight. Long live the emperor! Our country forever! RADETZKY."

tilities, was nevertheless not taken by surprise, as the cabinet of Turin had been led to believe. Had he even supposed that the armistice was the end of the war, the accession of a democratic ministry would have undeceived him; while the language of the Piedmontese press, the recent Lombard emigration, and their partiality for the new cabinet, all indicated that a declaration of war would not long be postponed. Besides, Piedmont abounded in spies in the pay of Austria, many of them figuring in the highest circles, and from whom the projects of the government, however secretly concocted, were not concealed.

Nevertheless, the position of Radetzky, at the moment of the denunciation of the armistice, seemed difficult, and was, in truth, embarrassing; but he took his course boldly, and his able dispositions completely confounded the unfortunate Chrzanowsky.

The former was surrounded by many dangers, but he occupied himself with one alone, the most important, and which, if successfully overcome, would relieve him from all difficulty. If he evacuated Lombardy and the duchies, concentrating all his forces on the Ticino, crossing into Piedmont, giving battle immediately to the Sardinian army, he could destroy it—all would be finished—for, Piedmont vanquished, all the other insurrections would end with it.*

This plan, marked by the ability and boldness of its conception, was not less distinguished by the success and brilliancy of its execution. The Austrian army in Lombardy was composed of six corps: one rested upon the Mincio, the Adige, and in the Venetian kingdom; the five others, leaving garrisons only in the citadel of Milan, and in Brescia, Bergamo, Modena, at the *tête de pont* at Brescello, and in the citadel of Placentia (ten thousand men in all), were directed to repair forthwith to the confluence of the Ticino and the Po.

All orders had been given with so much promptitude and secrecy, and all the precautions so well taken, that, in the night of the 19th to the 20th, the army was all concentrated around Pavia, ready to take the offensive the very moment the armis-

* Campagne de Novara.

tice should expire, without the enemy's having any idea of the great concentrating movements that were progressing throughout all the roads of Lombardy. Radetzky, it is true, had said, like Scipio of old, that he would carry the war into the enemy's country; but every one refused to credit the assertion. The best method, at times, to distract or divert the attention from the true object, is to divulge one's projects; and principally from the fact that the marshal had announced his intention to take the offensive, by the most public and repeated declarations, persons in general, and the Piedmontese staff in particular, chose to remain perfectly incredulous.

The marshal had left Milan on the 17th, by the route of Melegnano and Lodi, to take up his head-quarters at St. Angelo, in the midst of his troops, arriving from all quarters; and the Milanese, seeing him issue with his troops from the Roman gate, readily conceived that he was retreating on the Adda, and this circumstance confirmed the Piedmontese in their error.*

The city of Milan had been left without troops, but the citadel in the suburbs placed in a state of defense, and provided with three thousand men and one hundred and sixty cannons pointing against the devoted city.

Marshal Radetzky was advised with sufficient exactness of the position of the Piedmontese forces, and knew that in debouching from Pavia he would cut their line in two, isolate all that portion of the troops on the right bank of the Po, and that, in bearing down rapidly against the principal mass, he could, in a single battle, terminate the campaign. Expedition was necessary for the execution of this plan, and it was not neglected.

On the morning of the 20th, two bridges were constructed by the pioneers over the Ticino, below the permanent bridge at Pavia. At eleven o'clock the corps of D'Aspre entered the isle opposite Pavia by the three bridges, and at twelve the armistice expired.

The troops then advanced in three columns on the road to Garlasco, crossing the Gravillone at three different points;

* Campagne de Novara.

that of the right waded the stream, the centre passed over the bridge of boats on the route between Pavia and Piedmont, and the left over a bridge of their own construction below.

All this was accomplished without encountering the slightest obstruction from the enemy. The division of Ramorino, which ought to have occupied La Cava, and overlooked the Gravillone, had remained on the right of the Po, in the vicinity of Casteggio, and had sent four battalions only on the left bank; one toward Zerboló, another to La Cava, and two at Mezzana-Corte, to guard the bridge. The battalion of Zerboló, cut off from Mezzana-Corte, retired in disorder toward Mortara; that which was at La Cava, and which approached the Gravillone, after exchanging a few shots with the Austrian corps, retreated in great haste toward Mezzana-Corte.

D'Aspre advanced in the direction of Garlasco, followed by D'Appel, who was succeeded by Wratislaw, marching to the right toward Zerboló; while Thurn, who crossed the fourth, proceeded to the left, toward La Cava. The reserve passed also on the same day; and at night the whole army encamped within the territory of the enemy, the right at Zerboló, the centre at Gropello, the left at Dorno, and the reserve a little beyond the Gravillone.

One brigade of reserve rested at Pavia, to cover the rear of the army; two others, which did not pass that day, one belonging to the corps of Wratislaw, was stationed near Magenta, to deceive the enemy with the idea that a complete *corps d'armée*, or some considerable mass of troops, remained at that point, and which descended toward Bereguardo, to cross the Ticino during the day of the 21st, and rejoin its corps. The other, which made part of the reserve, was not to have reached Pavia until the 22d. The total force of Austrians now in Piedmont, entering and about to enter, was sixty-nine or seventy thousand, with two hundred and ten cannons; and Chrzanowsky was not able to bring in opposition a greater number.

While the Austrian army entered so tranquilly into Piedmont from Pavia, the Piedmontese army awaited it near Bufalora, or believed it to be in retreat on the Adda.

On the morning of the expiration of the armistice, the five divisions destined by Chrzanowsky either to cross or to defend

the Ticino, were at their posts.* The division of the Duke of Genoa in advance of Tre cate, with one advanced guard near to the bridge of Buffalora; the division Perrone to the left, at Romentino and Galliate; the division Bes to the right, at Cerano and Castel Novo; the division Durando to the right also, but more in the rear around Vespolate; the division of reserve near Novara, on the road to Mortara. The brigade Solaroli was stationed on the extreme left, between Oleggio and Bellinzago, connected to the division Perrone by four battalions. At last the Lombard division, under the orders of Ramorino, which ought to have been at La Cava, with an advanced guard on the Gravellone, to keep clear the route to Bereguardo, where they would meet a part of the cavalry of the division of Bes, and four battalions placed under Vigevano to relieve these two divisions.

Ramorino had been ordered to suffer nothing to prevent his ascertaining the amount of the enemy's force by which he might be opposed, and, if not too considerable, to endeavor to get possession of Pavia on the morning of the 21st, and, if successful, to take the route immediately for Lodi. If, on the contrary, the Austrians debouched in too great force from Pavia, he should retard their march as much as possible, without endangering his command, and retire upon Mortara or upon Nazzaro; from either place he could easily reunite himself with the army, which, apprised by the cannonade, could advance immediately between Trumello and Mortara by the two par-

* General Chrzanowski, the commander-in-chief of the Piedmontese army, addressed to it the following proclamation, dated Alexandria the 14th:

"Soldiers! the days of the truce have passed away, and our wishes are granted. Charles Albert again comes to place himself at the head of your brave ranks. The armistice is renounced, and the days of glory for the arms of Italy are about to recommence. Soldiers! this is the supreme moment! Soldiers! march to the battle, which must be to certain victory. Following the example of your princes who fight in your ranks, and the voice of your king who leads you on, march, and prove to Europe that you are not only the bulwark of Italy, but the avengers of her rights. At the approach of your arms the oppressed populations will change their complainings into cries of joy, and our brothers, once more saved, will fly into your arms, participating in the intoxication of the triumph gained. Soldiers! the greater your alacrity may be, the more prompt will be your victory. The braver the battle, the sooner you will return into the bosoms of your families, crowned with laurels, and proud of having a free, independent, and happy country!"

allel routes extending in this direction. It has been seen that Ramorino entirely neglected these orders of the general commander, and remained beyond the Po, while the general supposed him to be at La Cava.

At mid-day the division of the Duke of Genoa was in mass opposite the bridge of Buffalora; no troops were to be seen thence to the river; nothing was heard from the direction of Pavia, and they remained in ignorance of the Austrians on the Lower Ticino.

About one o'clock it was determined to make a recognizance as far as Magenta. The king wished to cross first with a company of riflemen, and to have the honor of being the first to tread upon the soil of the enemy. They arrived at Magenta without encountering an enemy, or, in fact, seeing any, except at a distance a few pickets of cavalry. The enemy, it was evident, was not in this quarter, and the irresistible conclusion was, that he could only be either on the Adda or toward Pavia, and that Milan was just as free as the Upper Ticino.

In either case there was but one course to take, and that was to cross with the whole army at once between Milan and Pavia, and to advance immediately in the direction of Lodi.* This was precisely the maneuver which the Austrians were at that moment executing; but the commander of the Piedmontese had neither the intelligence nor the decision of Radetzky, and the absence of the enemy, instead of increasing his confidence, only augmented his irresolution.

He left the Duke of Genoa at Magenta, recrossed the Ticino with the king and his staff, ordered back the division Perrone, which he had advanced to the bridge to assist in the recognizance, and returned himself to Trecate to search or to await news.

* On the 17th of March, five days after the armistice had been denounced, Prince Eugène of Savoy issued a proclamation throughout the Lombardo-Venetian provinces, not only calling on the subjects of Austria to take up arms against their sovereign, but trying to force them into doing so by the following passage: "Each man who, within the space of five days after the promulgation of this decree, does not enroll himself upon the lists opened for that purpose, will be looked upon as a deserter, and punished as such according to the laws established against deserters in the part of the country to which he belongs. No plea for exemption from service will be admitted, except bodily infirmities positively preventing from bearing arms."

The inhabitants of Magenta having received the Piedmontese very coldly, refusing them quarters and provisions, and affording them no intelligence as to the movements of the enemy, the king dreading a similar reception at Milan, his ardor to engage the enemy upon the soil of Lombardy diminished, while his anxiety to know that they had not penetrated into Piedmont increased. On returning to Trecate, nothing could be ascertained; all were in utter ignorance of the movements of the enemy. One general, who felt the gravity of their situation and the value of time, kept all in readiness for action around him, while he himself rode as rapidly as possible toward Vigevano, to know as quickly as he could any thing of interest which may have transpired. The Polish commander of the Piedmontese in the mean time does nothing; with the coolest resignation he awaits intelligence, and sleeps tranquilly until eight o'clock. At nine an officer of the staff of Bes hastens to announce the passage of the Austrians, and the absence of Ramorino; and a little after, he receives, through his spies, confirmation of the intelligence of the concentration of the whole army of the enemy in the direction of Pavia.

The tardy announcement of the approach of the Austrians, and the absence of the Lombard division from the post assigned, were without doubt both disastrous circumstances for the Piedmontese; but they were not entitled to the importance which it was desired to be attributed to them. With a little activity, or with some modification of the projected maneuvers, and by casting themselves before the enemy, it was easy to repair one of these disadvantages; and as for the other, the absence of the Lombard division, not much confidence was placed on those troops, and it is not probable that their co-operation would have changed much the course of events.

Ramorino, delivered over to a council of war, has been condemned to death and executed, but his blood can not wash away from the skirts of the commander-in-chief the gross negligence with which he was justly chargeable. Why did he not order the occupation of La Cava before the 20th? Why confide a post of any importance to an officer in whom he could place no confidence? Why remain many days without communicating with him, and assuring himself that his orders

would be obeyed? Why not have kept up a constant and efficient guard along the whole line of the Ticino to the Po, on the 19th, and even on the 20th, in the morning? Why did he not establish a telegraphic communication by signals or by relays of cavalry, to report promptly, instead of awaiting to be apprised of the enemy's presence by the report of his cannon?

Despite of all that had occurred, the project of Chrzanowsky of throwing himself before the enemy between Trumello and Mortara, remained still practicable, provided it was executed with great promptness and decision—for such were the traits of the enemy with whom he had to contend.

The country in which war was about to decide the fate of Italy, at least for a season, was a narrow strip of land comprised between the Ticino and the Sesia, inclosed on the south by the Po, and bounded on the north by the Alps, near the Lake Majora—its length about sixty-eight English miles, its breadth about twenty-five. It cuts perpendicularly the route from Milan to Turin. The Sesia runs an equal distance from both capitals, both situated on the left bank of the Po, about ninety miles apart—washing the walls of Verciel, which it leaves on the right, empties itself into the Po between Casale and Valence. The Ticino, whose course has been already indicated, runs, for a great distance, nearly parallel with the Sesia. Novara occupies the centre of this strip of land; below Novara is Vigevano, Mortara, and La Cava, which command the passage of the Ticino in the vicinity of Pavia, and that of the Po at Mezzana-Corte; above is situated Momo, Borgomanero, and Avona. It is a country but slightly broken, but covered and cut up by small rivers and canals, of which the general direction is parallel to those of the Ticino and the Sesia.

One of these lines of water, a canal called Roggia Biraga, passes about two or three miles below Mortara, and divides the two routes from that city to Pavia and to Vigevano. It was behind this canal, toward the road to Pavia, between Trumello and Mortara, that Chrzanowsky proposed to concentrate all his forces, and await the enemy; and he could have accomplished it without difficulty by marching without delay; but he lost time, and the combinations which he made of his troops were most unfortunate. Durando and Bes were the only corps

placed under orders to move during the night; the former to advance before Mortara, the latter before Vigevano. The Duke of Savoy, Perrone, and the Duke of Genoa, were not to take up the line of march until the next morning; nor Solaroli, who had to descend from the bridge of Buffalora. These dispositions, slowly and irresolutely made, indicated that Chrzanowsky, at the moment when he took them, doubted whether the Austrians would ever abandon the Ticino and advance toward the Sesia; and that, if they should, he believed they would be checked by the heads of columns during the day of the 21st, and that concentration could take place during the morning of the 22d. Durando arrived late in the morning at Mortara, where he was joined, in the afternoon, by the Duke of Savoy. Bes, on his part, was at Vigevano at daybreak, and took up a good position in advance at La Sforzesca, and pushed an advanced guard as far as Borgo St. Siro, to observe the passage of the Ticino at Bereguardo.

On the morning of the 21st, the Austrian army advanced, as they had done on the previous day, in three columns, the left flank from Dona to Mortara, the centre from Gropello to Gambolò, and the right column from Zerbolò to Vigevano. This last, consisting of the second corps and the van-guard division under Wohlgemuth, arrived about one o'clock at Borgo St. Siro, where it discovered the Piedmontese van-guard (which, as has been seen, was sent forward by General Bes) sustained by the brigade Strassaldo, which formed the head of the column of Wratislaw, which reached the spot about the same time, and attacked the enemy.

The Piedmontese, too feeble to confront such superior forces, gradually gave way, but slowly, and continually fighting. At St. Vittore they found two battalions, placed intermediately there to afford them support; and both together retired in good order to La Sforzesca. Bes, advised of the arrival of Durando at Mortara, recalled the brigade from Casale, but this brigade lost the way, and did not arrive in time. Nevertheless, Bes, with another brigade, two squadrons of cavalry, a battery, and some riflemen, resisted the enemy successfully, although more numerous, and checked all his attacks against La Sforzesca, which he endeavored to turn.

Repelled several times by the bayonets of the seventeenth and twenty-third infantry, and charged then by the cavalry, which threw them into disorder, the Austrians gave way, leaving a number of prisoners in the hands of the enemy; but, opportunely re-enforced at this time by a part of the brigade Gorger, which had been left the day before in Lombardy, and which, agreeably to orders, were to cross at this time the Ticino at Bereguardo, they were enabled to maintain their positions.

During this time, Wratislaw, having arrived with the great bulk of his corps at Gamboló, sent over a column in the evening to attack the Piedmontese detachment placed on the route of Vigevano; but this attack was without success, and that column soon retired. The partial success had raised the spirits of the troops, and dispelled the disheartening impression produced by the unexpected entrance of the Austrians and the treachery of Ramorino.

Up to this point in the engagement the tide of war had been favorable to the Piedmontese—they had met the enemy, and had been able to sustain themselves before them; but, in order to have completed their triumph, they should have attacked the enemy at Gamboló, as they would have had time the same evening, after the arrival of their troops; or, what was still better, they should have placed themselves immediately behind La Biraga, in order to facilitate the movement of concentration on the following day; but Chrzanowsky, not holding in sufficient estimation the value of time, and content with the advantages obtained, postponed until the next day what should have been done the same evening, and retired to rest, only to be awakened at midnight and hear of the dreadful tidings from Mortara.

While this engagement was proceeding in the vicinity of Vigevano, the Austrian centre column, consisting of the division under the Archduke Albert, and the second army corps under General D'Aspre, marched directly upon Mortara; and at five o'clock in the afternoon, the engagement commenced between them and the Piedmontese sent up for the defense of that town.

Chrzanowsky, in directing Durando and the Duke of Savoy

to Mortara, had not given them any precise instructions ; he had simply ordered Durando there to reconnoitre, and in case of attack to take a position defensive in advance of the city ; and the duke, to cover the right of Durando's division and the city which might be turned on that side. Later, he sent them other instructions, which were no more explicit than the former, and which only tended to confusion ; but a greater difficulty resulted from a want of knowledge of the country on the part of the troops, and particularly the staff. About three o'clock the division of Durando began to advance, and to take up a position about fifteen hundred yards only from the city, about a mile and a half short of the position which he should have taken, but which the rapid approach of the enemy at this time rendered it impossible for him to occupy. About half past four o'clock the corps of D'Aspre appeared in sight, advancing on the road from Garlasco, preceded by a party of cavalry and a cloud of riflemen, amounting in all to about fifteen thousand men, with forty-eight cannons.

D'Aspre, having been ordered to occupy and then to pass by Mortara, on seeing the town covered by the Piedmontese, did not desire, notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, to postpone operations until the next day ; and therefore made as rapidly as possible his dispositions for battle.

The division of the Archduke Albert, which marched in advance, was formed into columns of attack on both sides of the road ; the other rested in reserve, except a few detachments sent toward the cemetery and the convent (where Durando's division was stationed), to observe and retain the enemy upon those points.

The combat commenced by the discharge of four-and-twenty pieces, placed in front of the columns of attack ; this fire was directed against the centre of Durando's division, and against an elevated spot of ground, where Durando, the Duke of Genoa, and La Marmora, to give an example of firmness to the troops, remained for a long time at this dangerous post, although their presence would have been useful at other points. The Piedmontese artillery, feeble at this point, could not sustain themselves against such great disadvantages ; and a portion of the Queen's brigade (composed mostly of youths of eighteen, who

had seen but two months' service), overcome by the violence of the attack, were thrown into disorder.

These difficulties, however, they were enabled to repair, and the whole Piedmontese army maintained a sufficiently bold front, when, just at the approach of night, D'Aspre gave orders for a vigorous charge at all points.

This severe attack could not be resisted. The Piedmontese immediately gave way, and retreated precipitately into the city, where every thing was soon involved in the utmost confusion. It was night, the inhabitants were fleeing for safety in every direction, the artillery and baggage encumbered the streets, and the enemy continued to advance, and to combat pell-mell to the very entrance of the city.

The Austrians hesitated a little to penetrate into Mortara. A single battalion, with two pieces, under the orders of Colonel Benedeck, was all that entered at first; but they were afterward joined by a second battalion. The great bulk of the Austrian army remained without the city, and a part of it combated for a time against the extreme right of the Piedmontese, on the side of St. Albin's, and which still continued to resist.

Benedeck stripped the city, took the horses and equipage of the Duke of Genoa, a great quantity of baggage, and established his two battalions upon the principal place and in the grand street, which leads from the gate of Pavia to that of Verciel.

The Austrians were then masters of Mortara, having put to flight an enemy vastly superior in numbers, without sustaining much damage; but their triumph did not end here. A singular circumstance, which occurred subsequently, tended to render it vastly more important. At the moment of the attack, which broke the Piedmontese centre, the battalion which was at St. Albin's, vigorously attacked also, had lost the convent; then, with the assistance of another battalion, they retook it, but both having subsequently lost it again, took position in the rear, and continued to hold front against the enemy, who were endeavoring to surround them. La Marmora, beholding the danger which threatened these troops, hurried to them, and met at the Round Point of St. George the two

battalions of Cuneo, which the Duke of Savoy had sent. He made them rest there in reserve; and, placing himself at the head of four or five hundred fugitives whom he rallied, advanced toward St. Albin's. But the enemy's sharp-shooters, in ambuscade behind the trees in that neighborhood, kept up so constant and deadly a fire, that it was impossible to make head against them. Deceived by this fusilade, as well as by the obscurity of the night, the battalions of Round Point fired upon this detachment of their own troops of St. Albin's, which was then forced to beat a retreat before the Austrians. The error was, however, soon discovered, the combat re-established and continued for some time, and the enemy, making no further advance, at length ceased altogether.

For some time the conflict appeared over in Mortara, and nothing being heard thence, or on the road to Garlasco, La Marmora, who had sent to ascertain what was passing in those quarters, was informed that the city was in the possession of the Austrians. It was now eight o'clock. La Marmora, thus outflanked, hesitated, knowing nothing of the spot in which he now found himself, ignorant of the road which led to Castel d'Agogna, and judging that a retreat across the fields would be impracticable, resolutely determined to pass through the city, conquer it, and take the road to Novara, along which many of the scattered forces had already fled.

He forms his troops in column, places the artillery in the midst, the battalion which had defended St. Albin's following in the rear, and marches boldly upon Mortara, leaving his soldiers ignorant of the presence of the enemy in the city. The column enters the city by the gate of St. George, situated to the left of that of Garlasco, through which the enemy had entered. He finds the streets encumbered with vehicles, the dead bodies of men and horses every where strewed around; all the houses closed and lights extinguished; the darkness was profound; the Austrians whom they met, and who had believed the hostilities long since terminated, could not conceive whence had sprung this apparition of a hostile corps now charging upon them. La Marmora, to encourage his troops, sounded a charge, the Austrians beat the *rappel*, and a column, as if rising from the earth, debouches upon the public square and

into the grand street, and there in close combat, breast to breast, the firing commences, amid a confusion frightful in the extreme. The Piedmontese were ignorant what route across the city to take which was not bristling with hostile bayonets, and the Austrians, on their part, unable to conjecture the extent of the enemy's force, were exceedingly disturbed.*

But these demonstrations, however dreadful, could not shake the courage or disturb the coolness of Benedeck; with the rapidity of lightning, he concludes that the foe by which he is so unexpectedly opposed is but the troops of St. Albin's retarded and cut off, he promptly rallies his entire force, bars the issues of the public square and grand street, summons the Piedmontese to surrender, assuring them that they were completely surrounded, and that all resistance was vain. The Piedmontese made a vigorous effort to disengage themselves, and although there was but a small force opposed to them, still less on the right or on the left (for the great body of the Austrians remained without the city); but the ignorance of these facts, the obscurity, the confusion, the defeat of the day, all induced the belief that they were surrounded by forces innumerable. In such case, a true soldier would not have hesitated to attempt to open a passage for himself, let it cost what it might; in such a conclusion there was one chance of escape, one glimmer of hope, while military pride prompts its possessor to confront any danger, and to meet death rather than dishonor. But these troops were too young, too little inured to the trials and dangers of war, not to be overpowered by the perilous situation in which they were involved, and, totally unnerved, they lay down their arms to the number of eight hundred.

La Marmora, however, who marched at their head, escaped with only fifty men, and was enabled to gain in safety the Castel d'Agogna, where he found the division of the Duke of Savoy, with which was also Durando, who, at the moment of the overthrow, became separated from his own corps, and was never able to rejoin them.† The loss of the Piedmontese in this engagement, in which the regular fighting did not last

* Author of Custoza.

† Ibid.

more than three hours, was five hundred killed or wounded, twenty-five prisoners, six staff, sixty sub-officers, and five cannons; that of the Austrians was not more than three hundred men *hors de combat*.*

This affair, partial though it was, produced such an effect, that it may be said to have decided the fate of the campaign. It was a proof of what intrepidity and energy in war can effect, and what terrible disasters, on the contrary, follow in the train of negligence and feebleness.

All the chances were in favor of the Piedmontese: more numerous, less fatigued, and with the choice of position. But on one side there was the boldness and promptitude of execution of D'Aspre, and the coolness and energy of Benedeck; on the other hand, there was the indefinite order of Chrzanowsky, his want of energy, and improper dispositions, the timidity of his lieutenants, and the want of firmness in the troops. These circumstances rendered his condition most disastrous, and deprived the Italians of that victory which was almost within their grasp.

On the evening of this day (21st), while the Piedmontese had three divisions near Vigevano, two others in retreat from Mortara to Novara, and one brigade on the bridge of Buffalora, the Austrian army occupied the route from Pavia to Mortara, extending on the right as far as Gambol6, on the left to St. George. D'Aspre was at Mortara, Appel at Trumello, the reserve at Gropello, Wratislaw at Gambol6, Thurn at St. George.

The generals beaten at Mortara had not apprised Chrzanowsky of what occurred with the promptitude which circumstances required; and it was only known through the accidental arrival of two of La Marmora's staff, who, not being able to find their way back, escaped to Vigevano, which they reached about one at night, and announced the total defeat they had sustained. This disaster, and the advanced position of the Austrians, not only rendered the projects of Chrzanowsky impossible, but placed the Piedmontese army in a most perilous situation.

The retreat upon Verciel being cut off, the only course left

* Austrian official bulletin.

them appeared to be to concentrate their forces as rapidly as possible, and then give battle.

Novara was the spot where this concentration of the Piedmontese forces could be most expeditiously executed, and it was there that Chrzanowsky resolved to test the fate of his army. To accomplish this it was necessary to hasten, as the enemy at Mortara and at Gambolò were not farther distant from Novara than the Piedmontese at Vigevano. Chrzanowsky, therefore, placed his troops in motion before day, and arrived at Treccate about noon, where he left in position until the next morning the division of the Duke of Genoa; the other division reached Novara in the evening. Arrived there, they found the division of Durando, and that of the Duke of Savoy, which, after making a considerable detour, had arrived at Novara in the night; at length the brigade Solaroli had come from Romentino, and the concentration was then effected.

To the south of Novara, between the rapid streams of Agogna and Terdoppio, there rises a kind of undulating plateau, on which is situated the village of La Bicocca, about a mile from the city, and occupying its highest point. At the foot of the hills of La Bicocca, that is to say, on the left when turning the back on Novara, the ground falls rapidly toward the Terdoppio, and is cut up by two small canals. To the right, from thence to the rivulet Arbogna, which runs a little distance from La Bicocca, it is a little broken, and presents only some small elevations toward the centre, but is covered with vines and trees disposed in long lines, scattered houses, and separated also by a canal running parallel to the Agogna.*

It was in this position that Chrzanowsky awaited the Austrians. The front of the battle line extended between Cortenova and La Bicocca, on a space of three thousand yards, and followed the cord of the *sector* of which Novara is the summit. Three divisions, placed in two lines, occupied this space; two other divisions were in *échelon*, in reserve, behind the wings of the line of battle. A part of the first division occupied the right wing, which was covered by a canal running parallel to the Agogna, of which the extreme right inclines toward Tor-

* Spectateur Militaire.

rione Quartara, and forms a kind of bastion, which had been used for defense. The remainder of the division, placed a little in the rear, covered the farm of Citadella, supporting its left by the farm of Rasario and the road to Torrione.

The second division occupied the centre, and was placed between the road to Torrione and the hamlet of La Bicocca, situated on the great road from Novara to Mortara.

The third division formed the left, and occupied the important point *à cheval* on the great road. The division of reserve was placed behind the right wing, between Novara and the road to Verciel.

The fourth division, placed behind the left wing, occupied the cemetery of San Nazzario.*

On the 22d, the Austrian army, at different points, took up the line of march toward Novara. The second army corps, under the command of D'Aspre, marched directly from Mortara on Novara, followed by the third and the reserve corps; the fourth and first army corps moved in a parallel direction against the line of retreat of the enemy.

On the morning of the 23d, about eleven o'clock, the Austrians commenced the battle by an attack, executed by the second army corps, on the left wing of the Piedmontese at Bicocca. At first, the Piedmontese, making but a small display of forces, the Austrians were under the impression that it was but a rear-guard to protect the retreat of the army; and the Archduke Albert, in command of the van-guard, hurried rapidly forward with his division, followed at some distance by the division under F. M. L. Count Schaffgoth. But speedily the error was detected, when the fire became general along the whole line, and it was evident that the whole Piedmontese army of fifty thousand men was before them. A bloody engagement here took place; the Piedmontese regiment Savona, posted in the first line, was obliged to give way; but the brigade of Savoy coming to its assistance, was enabled to cover the lost ground. In the mean time, the division of the archduke being obliged to bear for some hours the entire brunt of the battle, the attack of the whole Piedmontese army, al-

* Le Spectateur Militaire.

though performing prodigies of valor (the archduke himself mingling in the thickest of the fight, and showing himself worthy of his heroic sire*), suffered greatly until the arrival of support. Shortly, the division of Schaffgoth entered the line of battle; but the number of the enemy was still so great, that this incomparably small force would have been able to offer but a short resistance. The field-marshal, informed of the situation of these forces, immediately ordered up the third army corps and the reserve to advance in all haste to the support of D'Aspre. But before the third army corps and reserve, then some miles in the rear, could reach the scene of action, the situation of the Austrian army was perilous indeed. Pressed upon by such overpowering numbers, their ammunition became exhausted; to replenish which they were obliged temporarily to retire (about a hundred steps).

The first and fourth corps had been dispatched by Marshal Radetzky to the other side of Agogna, to attack the right hostile flank. Both armies fought with determined courage, and the prospect of victory on either side for some time hung in the balance; the Piedmontese believe that they must have triumphed, had the Austrian right flank been attacked before its reserve arrived. For a time the Austrian fire slackened on the left, and the whole weight of their forces was directed on a hamlet called La Citadella, which was taken and retaken several times. Here some of the hardest fighting of the day took place; and on the Sardinian side, the brigades Casale, Acqui, and Parma particularly distinguished themselves.

About four o'clock, the third army corps, under F. M. L. D'Aspre, consisting of fourteen battalions, arrived on the field. Seven battalions immediately entered the line of battle, while the other seven followed the centre as a reserve.

At this period of the action, a fresh attack was directed by the Austrians with redoubled fury against Bicocca, which they succeeded in wresting from the Piedmontese. The loss of this position decided the fate of the day; and although the Duke of Genoa, with the division which he led, made the most gallant efforts to re-establish the fortunes of the fight, they were unavailing.† The Sardinian position being thus turned, the

* Son of the Archduke Charles.

† Austrian official bulletin.

weight of the Austrian line was directed against the enemy's right and centre; and when at this time (six o'clock), the fourth army corps, under Count Thurn, arrived and took up its position on the road to Verciel, and a concentrated attack was then made upon the enemy at all points, they could resist no longer, but retreated in the utmost confusion—some troops to Memmo, others to the mountains, and the great bulk of them into the city of Novara, which during the night was plundered and set fire to by their own troops.

The loss sustained by the Piedmontese was four thousand men killed or wounded, two generals killed, and sixteen killed or wounded staff officers, from two to three thousand prisoners, and twelve cannons.

The loss of the Austrians, which fell almost entirely upon D'Aspre's corps, was about three thousand killed or wounded, and each regiment of the first line of battle from ten to twenty high officers killed and wounded.*

The numbers lost on either side vary but little; but that is by no means the criterion by which the importance of the battle is to be measured. The Piedmontese army was not only defeated and demoralized, but it was beyond all possibility of restoration. Piedmont was vanquished, and the fortunes of Austria a second time triumphant. Piedmont disarmed, the possession of Lombardy assured, and peace become certain—such were the results to Austria of this short campaign.

If personal gallantry could redeem the errors of an insincere and tortuous policy, Charles Albert might be held to have expiated his misdeeds that day on the field of battle. He exposed himself to the enemy's fire on every point where the danger was greatest.† He remained during the day within musket range of the enemy on the point of the Bicocca, three times taken and retaken. During the night, he continued to direct the defense, now reduced to the town of Novara; and to General Durando, who in vain tried to take him by the arm and lead him away, he replied, "General, it is my last

* *Le Spectateur Militaire*.

† The Duke of Savoy, after exposing himself to all the dangers which his division encountered, twice repaired to the principal point of action when his troops were not engaged. The Duke of Genoa, after having three horses shot under him, led his troops on foot.

day; let me die." He had sent to demand an armistice of Marshal Radetzky, who had consented to accord it only upon the condition that his troops should occupy the country between the Ticino and the Sesia, and to hold the citadel of Alexandria, and leaving it to be understood, at the same time, that he could not confide in the engagements of the king to these terms, but would require the Duke of Savoy as a hostage.

When the king discovered that the army could hold out no longer, and that the terms of peace laid down by Radetzky were such as could not be submitted to, he, at nine o'clock, sent for the Dukes of Savoy and Genoa, the commander-in-chief, minister Cadorna, and the lieutenant generals and commanders of divisions at that time in Novara; and when they had all assembled at the Bellini Palace, sad but calm, the king advanced with dignity, and said, "Gentlemen, fortune has betrayed your courage and my hopes; our army is dissolved; it would be impossible to prolong the struggle. My task is accomplished, and I think I shall render an important service by giving a last proof of devotedness, in abdicating in favor of my son, Victor Emmanuel, duke of Savoy. He will obtain from Austria conditions of peace, which she would refuse if treating with me."

The persons present burst into tears, but no emotion was visible in the face of Charles Albert; and all the efforts of the Duke of Savoy to shake his resolve were vain. The king embraced him and the Duke of Genoa, and all the persons present. He thanked them for the services they had rendered him, and said, "Gentlemen, I am no longer your king. Be faithful and devoted to my son, as you have been to me." He then withdrew to write to the queen, and charged the Duke of Savoy to deliver the letter of adieu with his own hand.

At half past one o'clock, an individual wrapped in a traveling cloak, and preceded by a valet out of livery, left the palace. He entered a carriage in waiting for him in a neighboring street, the postilion received orders to take the road for Porta Stura, and in a few hours Charles Albert had bid adieu not only to his crown, but his kingdom forever.*

* The spirit of the age and the lessons of experience were not altogether lost upon this prince, whose real character seems but recently to have been apprecia-

The next morning, just as the necessary measures had been taken by Marshal Radetzky for the pursuit of the enemy, *parliamentaires* arrived at the camp from the new king, applying for a truce, and requesting an interview.

The interview took place in a cottage near Vignale, between Radetzky and the young king, and an armistice entered into upon the terms previously laid down by Radetzky, viz., occupation by Austrians, with twenty thousand men, of the country between the Ticino and Sesia; joint occupation, with Piedmontese, of the fortress of Alexandria; disbanding by Piedmont of Lombard and other troops in her service. Negotiations for a permanent peace between the two countries to be entered on without delay, and upon the following bases: The *statu quo* territorial divisions of Italy, as established by the treaties of 1815, and by consequence the renunciations by Piedmont of all pretensions to the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom or the duchies; the reimbursement to Austria of all the expenses of the war; stipulations, or a treaty of commerce, removing all the causes which had at various times threatened the peace of the two powers. The armistice was signed on the evening of the 24th of March, 1849.*

On the succeeding day, Marshal Radetzky issued to his troops the following proclamation:

“Soldiers! you have well redeemed your word. You have

ted. We can desire no better evidence of his sincere love of country and benign projects than the fact that, many years since, when comparative tranquillity prevailed in Europe, he was accustomed to hold long and confidential interviews with our representative at his court, for the purpose of eliciting information as to the means and method of gradually ameliorating the institutions, not only of Sardinia, but of Italy. He long cherished the hope of giving her national unity, of combining from all her states an efficient army, and thus expelling the Austrians from the soil. This he believed to be the first step toward a constitutional government. Popular education and military training he more or less encouraged in his own dominions, with this great ultimate object in view; and he certainly possessed the most efficient native troops, and the best-founded popularity, among the Italian princes. Since his death, impartial observers concur in deeming him far more unfortunate than treacherous; a reaction has justly taken place in the public estimation of his motives and career; and no candid inquirer can fail to recognize in him a brave ruler, who gave a decided impulse to liberal ideas, advanced the Italian cause, and became one of its voluntary martyrs.—*Christian Examiner*.

* For a copy of the armistice, see Appendix, note No. 32.

undertaken a campaign against an enemy in numbers your superior, and you have ended it victoriously in five days. History will not gainsay, that never was a braver, truer army than that over which my lord and sovereign, the emperor, appointed me to command. Soldiers ! in the name of your emperor and of your country, I thank you for your valorous deeds, for your devotion, for your truth. With sadness my looks repose upon the graves of our brethren, the glorious fallen, and I can not declare the expression of my gratitude to the living without giving a deeply-felt remembrance to the dead. Soldiers ! our most persevering enemy, Charles Albert, has descended from the throne. With his successor, the young king, I have concluded an armistice, which guarantees to us the speedy conclusion of peace. Soldiers ! with joy you were witnesses to it—with joy have the inhabitants of the country every where received us ;* beholding in us, far from oppressors, saviors against anarchy. This expectation you must fulfill, and, by your severe observance of discipline, show to the world that the warriors of Austria's army are as terrible in war as they are honest and gentle in peace, and that we have come to protect, and not to destroy."

On receiving the intelligence of Charles Albert's abdication, Prince Eugène of Savoy-Carignani, lieutenant general of the kingdom, issued the following proclamation :

"I have to communicate to you a painful intelligence. The king, Charles Albert, after having with intrepidity confronted the enemy's balls, seeing the reverse sustained by our armies, has been unwilling to bend to ill fortune, preferring to crown his life with a new sacrifice. On the 23d he abdicated in favor of the Duke of Savoy. The gratitude of the people and our respectful attachment to him will be eternal. Let us ral-

* Through every Piedmontese village the passage of the Austrians was hailed with the cry, "*Evviva Radetzky !*" and "*Evvivani i nostri liberatori !*"

The campaign concluded, the victorious army (with the exception of one corps) leaves the Piedmontese territory. The first *corps d'armée* returns to Milan ; second marches to Modena and Parma ; third to Como, Brescia, and Bergamo ; fifth corps takes position in Piedmont under the armistice. The first *corps de réserve* to Pavia.

ly round the new king, worthy emulator of his paternal valor in battle, and upright guardian of the constitutional franchises granted by his august father. Long live King Victor Emmanuel!

EUGENE DE SAVOIE.

"Turin, 26th March."

This document was speedily followed by another proclamation from the new King of Sardinia, which is as follows:

"Citizens,—Fatal events and the will of my august father have called me prematurely to the throne of my ancestors. The circumstances in which I assume the reins of government are such that, without the most efficacious support from all, I could with difficulty accomplish my only vow, the welfare of our common country. The destiny of nations is matured in the designs of God; man owes all his efforts to second them; we have not failed in this duty. Our present task must now consist in maintaining our honor safe, in healing the wounds of the public fortune, in consolidating our constitutional institutions. It is to this task I conjure all my people to apply; I prepare myself to swear to it solemnly, and I expect from the nation, in return, assistance, love, and confidence.

"VICTOR EMMANUEL.*

"Turin, March 27."

While these successes attended the Austrian cause in Pied-

* The loss of the battle of Novara and the abdication of Charles Albert, though apparently great misfortunes, have resulted in signal benefits. After securing peace from their adversaries, chiefly by a pecuniary sacrifice, the king and citizens of Piedmont turned their energies toward internal reform with a wisdom and good faith which are rapidly yielding legitimate fruit. Public schools were instituted, the press made free, the Waldenses allowed to quit their valleys, build churches, and elect representatives; the privileges of the clergy abolished, and the two bishops, who ventured to oppose the authority of her state, tried, condemned, and banished; the Pope's interference repudiated; the right of suffrage instituted; rail-roads from Turin to Genoa, and from Alexandria to Lago Maggiore constructed; the electric telegraph introduced, liberal commercial treaties formed, docks built, and cheap postal laws enacted. In a word, the great evils that have so long weighed down the people of the Italian peninsula—unlimited monarchical power, aristocratic and clerical immunities derived from the Middle Ages, the censorship of the press, the espionage of the police, and intolerance of all but the Catholic religion—no longer exist in Sardinia.—*Christian Examiner*.

mont, events of a different character were occurring in some of the Lombardian cities which they had just left. Brescia, the second city of Lombardy, with forty thousand inhabitants, was completely evacuated when an Austrian army had been raised for the invasion of Piedmont, and but five hundred men guarded the citadel.

The city had been already most strongly agitated, on account of her partiality for the Piedmontese, when (the 23d) the day of the battle of Novara, the arrival of a number of refugees determined them to improve the occasion of the withdrawal of the Austrian garrison to rise and strike for independence. The commandant of the citadel, surprised in the city, was made prisoner; the couriers from Milan and Verona were stopped, and the baggage of a regiment plundered. They endeavored to take the citadel, but the garrison easily repulsed all attacks, and cannonaded the city.

The insurgents, extending themselves beyond the town, advanced to the Castle of St. Euphemia, which they occupied; but the few troops established in the neighborhood were enabled to put them to flight, and forced the insurgents to shut themselves up in the place.

General Haynau, in command of the troops at that time blockading Venice, informed of the disturbances in Brescia, soon arrived with between three and four thousand troops, and on the 30th of March, Brescia was attacked by the garrison of the citadel, by the troops which were under the walls of the city, and by those of Haynau just arrived at the scene of action.

This unfortunate city, abandoned to its own forces, could not long resist, and would have submitted; but, deceived by certain insensate agitators, who dealt only in delusions, issuing forged proclamations of Chrzanowsky of the successes of the Piedmontese over the Austrians, calling all the people to arms, and assuring them that their friends and allies, the Piedmontese, would soon be seen on the Isonzo, they resolved to resist to the last extremity.

Conscious of their deficiency in military science and resources, the Brescians barricaded their streets and intrenched themselves in their houses, and, despising the summons to sur-

render, awaited the enemy's attack. The gates of the city were captured without the discharge of a gun; but then the contest commenced. A part of the town being in flames, the people endeavored in vain to escape over the walls, and were driven into a corner between the Porta St. Giovanni and Porta Piler. In this corner, fired at all points (for every house from which a gun was discharged was, agreeably to the orders of the Austrian general, to be set on fire at once), it is believed that a considerable body of the insurgents must have been burned to death. But the massacre did not end with the combat, though, when all resistance was over (says the official bulletin, which itself leaves no doubt as to the sanguinary character of this deplorable engagement), "the bodies of the insurgents lay in heaps in the streets and houses."

The most hideous incident of this terrible slaughter is reserved for the closing paragraph of the bulletin: "*All prisoners taken with arms in their hands were shot publicly!*"

The province of Brescia, now a heap of ruins, was mulcted to the amount of two millions of florins, and one million compensation money for the widows and orphans of the slain, for the wounded, and for the troops engaged.*

The imperial general who was guilty of these atrocities, so disgraceful to the age, and who publicly avows them in his report to the government, so far from being dismissed and dishonored, was in a few months promoted to a higher station, and intrusted with the command of all the Austrian troops engaged at that time in the subjugation of Hungary, where he was enabled to perpetrate deeds of enormity in comparison with which the treatment of the Brescians dwindles into comparative insignificance, and which has justly covered him with the unmitigated execration of the civilized world.

* Austrian official bulletin.

CHAPTER IX.

SECOND HUNGARIAN CAMPAIGN.—INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA.—JOINT INVASION OF HUNGARY. — THE DEFEAT OF BEM IN TRANSYLVANIA, AND OF DEMBINSKI AT SZOREG AND TEMESVAR.—THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT.—THE DICTATORSHIP OF GÖRGEY.—THE SURRENDER OF VILAGOS.—THE FLIGHT OF KOSSUTH, AND THE DOWNFALL OF HUNGARY.—CHARACTER OF KOSSUTH.

AFTER the brilliant succession of victories that attended the conclusion of the first Austrian invasion, and by which the Imperialists were driven from the soil of Hungary, nothing but the scattered remnants of a defeated army intervening between them and the capital of the empire, the Magyars did not, as we should have supposed, bring about a cessation of hostilities, by advancing upon Vienna and dictating their own terms from the emperor's palace. A march of forty miles was all that was necessary to accomplish the grand object at which they aimed. As was said of the United States on a similar occasion, they had "pushed on until independence was within their grasp;" they had "only to reach forward to it, and it was theirs."*

But a division of counsel, treachery in the camp, a want of that boldness in action which characterizes those born and bred under the light of freedom, or perhaps all these causes combined, so operated that Hungary, instead of being at this day a free and independent nation of Europe, is deprived of her Constitution, robbed of her quasi independence, and reduced to a level with the hereditary provinces of the Austrian empire.

Nor did the Austrian government, on the other hand, attempt to meet the Hungarians with any terms of reconciliation, when a mere recognition of the constitutional rights of the kingdom as established for ages, and which Austria might

* Applied to John Adams by Webster, in his eulogy on the lives of Adams and Jefferson.

have acknowledged without dishonor, would have been quite sufficient to secure a lasting peace between them.

It might have been supposed that a legal acknowledgment of the positive obligations of their Constitution was no extravagant price to pay for the services and loyalty of twelve millions of subjects ; and that, even if so regarded, the boon would not have been too great for a nation that had refused with disdain the independence proffered it by Napoleon,* and which had so often, by its bravery, saved the Austrian throne from annihilation ; and we should have imagined that the Habsburg dynasty would not hesitate, as in days of former embarrassment and distress, to have thrown itself into the arms of its own magnanimous Hungary, or, as they styled her, that "all-beloved, most valiant, most loyal, and most illustrious nation."

The real policy of Austria would have been to foster the ancient Constitution of Hungary, developed by changes adapted to the exigencies of the time ; to have imparted to all her provinces institutions in conformity with the spirit of the age, and not less liberal than those enjoyed by Hungary ; and to have rallied around her the heterogeneous people which compose her empire by the watch-words of self-government, civilization, and free trade, in opposition to Russian despotism, barbarism, and restriction. But, unhappily, the Austrian statesmen then at the head of the government were incapable of embracing such an enlightened course of action.

They feared Russia much, but they feared liberal opinions more ; as the least of the two evils, conquest was preferred to conciliation, and the intervention of Russia was asked. It will be unnecessary to record the acceptance on the part of Russia of such a task ; the Czar would surely not have declined, when openly sought to perform, with the assent of the monarch and in the eyes of the world, that which for years he had been laboring to effect clandestinely and by intrigue.

* In 1809, after Napoleon had subdued the armies, and possessed himself of the capital of the Austrian empire, he issued a proclamation summoning the Hungarians to secede from the house of Habsburg, and to elect a king on the Rakos Field, as their fathers had done before them. But the loyal Hungarians indignantly rejected the invitation.

On the 1st of May, 1849, the Austrian journals published the following official proclamation :

“The insurrection in Hungary has, within the last month, grown to such an extent, and its present aspect exhibits so unmistakably the character of a union of all the forces of the revolutionary party in Europe, that all states are equally interested in assisting the imperial (*i. e.*, Austrian) government in its contest against this spreading dissolution of all social order. Acting on these important reasons, his majesty the emperor’s government has been induced to appeal to the assistance of his majesty the Czar of all the Russias, who generously and readily granted it to a most satisfactory extent. The measures which have been agreed on by the two sovereigns are now being executed.”

The demand for assistance made by the Emperor of Austria on the Czar was neither rejected or delayed ; no inquiries were propounded, no preliminaries entered into ; and though it was only in the last days of April that the Austrians were driven out of Hungary,* it was as early as the 8th of May that a proclamation was published at St. Petersburg, concluding as follows : “In the midst of these disastrous events, the Emperor of Austria has addressed himself to us, demanding assistance against the common enemy. We shall not refuse the aid demanded. After having invoked the great leader of battles and the lord of armies to protect our just cause, we have issued orders to our army to commence its march, to put down the insurrection, and annihilate the reckless men who also threaten to disturb the quiet of our province. If God be with us, none can resist us. Of this let us be persuaded : let every man in our kingdom, which is under God’s protection, every Russian and faithful subject, feel, hope, and speak thus, and Russia will fulfill its sacred calling.” Some German journals, discussing the direct interest of Russia in this contest, spoke of a cession of part of Galicia as the price of her succor against the Hungarians ; others mentioned a compensation more definite and tangible, a port on the Adriatic, Catarro, which, sep-

* The Russian intervention was officially announced on the 29th of April. Resolution by Austria to make war on Hungary was supposed to have been determined in concert with Russia.—*Blackwood*.

arated from the rest of Dalmatia by an intervening portion of Turkish territory, is therefore of little consequence to Austria; but the indirect interest which Russia has in the preservation, in the states around her, of those absolutist principles upon which her existence depends, and the destruction (by the corruption of Austria and extinction of Hungary) of the only real barrier to her encroachments on Western Europe or on Constantinople (the great aim of Russian ambition since the days of Catharine), are motives which so forcibly appeal to her self-interest as to render the hypothesis of a definite remuneration quite gratuitous, and easily accounted for the ready sacrifice of Russian gold and Russian soldiers. That such was the opinion even of the Czar himself, a subsequent proclamation issued by him clearly evinces: "I have placed at the disposal of the Emperor of Austria eighty thousand men, besides the corps which have already entered Transylvania. All the troops are paid and kept up at *my* expense, and I claim no indemnification."

On the 12th of May, a proclamation of the Emperor of Austria appeared, and which concluded as follows:

"It is in conformity with our desire, and in accordance with our wish, that the Russian armies have appeared in Hungary, in order to terminate promptly, and by all the means in our power, a war which devastates our fields. Do not regard them as enemies of our country, but as friends of your king, who second him in his firm project of delivering Hungary from the heavy yoke of bad men, domestic and foreign. The Russian troops will observe the same discipline as my troops, they will protect persons and property, and with the same vigor labor to put down the revolt, until the blessing of God shall bring about the triumph of the good cause."*

COMMENCEMENT OF THE SECOND CAMPAIGN.

After a short time occupied in preparation, the second campaign for the subjugation of Hungary at length vigorously commenced. The combined armies opposed to the Hungarians amounted to nearly four hundred thousand men—two

* Wiener Zeitung.

hundred and thirty thousand Austrians and one hundred and sixty thousand Russians—and were distributed as follows:

The first army corps, composed of Austrians and Russians, under the command of General Haynau, entering Hungary at Pressburg, advanced into the country over the island of Schütte, with the intention of taking the capital of Buda-Pesth.

The second army corps, entirely Russian, under Prince Paskevitch, coming in from the Galician frontier on the north, at Dukla, passed through Bartfeldt, Eperies, Kashau, and Miskolcz, with a view to capture the capital of Debreczin.

The third army corps, consisting of Russians and Austrians, under Field-marshal Puchner, penetrating Transylvania from the north, carried Bistricz by storm, and moved upon Klausenburg.

The fourth army corps, entirely Russian, under General Lüders, entering Transylvania from the south, through the Pass of Tömös, took Kronstadt, and marched upon Hermanstadt.

The fifth army corps, composed also exclusively of Russians, making their entrance into the country at Orsova, marched with a view of joining the Austro-Croatian army under Jellacic, operating in the territory formed by the confluence of the Danube and the Theiss.

Before the commencement of the second campaign, Baron Welden tendered to the emperor his resignation of the command of the imperial forces in Hungary, on the ground of ill health; and on the first of June there appeared in print the emperor's "hand-billet" to the general, in which his majesty, deeply deploring the necessity of the step, is induced to comply with the desire of the general, who had repeatedly expressed a wish to resign his post on the ground of ill health. For the present, his majesty offered to restore him to his command at Vienna, the post he had vacated. The imperial note concluded by nominating F. M. L. Haynau to be commander-in-chief of the army of Hungary and Transylvania. General Welden, although regarded as an able commander, lost immensely in public opinion after the fall of Buda, a disaster he might have avoided by sending timely succors of troops, of which he had abundance at his disposal. The fault was in

trusting too much to the neutral and inoffensive attitude observed by the inhabitants of Pesth, and in neglecting to fortify the surrounding eminences which overhang and command it. The post there, if worth preserving, an adequate force for that purpose should have been provided.

Of his successor, besides the violence of his temper, which was quite notorious, little was known, except that he had long served with success under Radetzky, and that he was the general who had lately quelled the revolt in Brescia with a resolute but cruel hand. Beyond these, and the fact of his having put things in train at Mestre for the reduction of Venice, nothing was known of the military career of the man called suddenly to a task in which two predecessors, of vastly higher reputation for ability, had most signally failed.

HUNGARIAN PLAN OF DEFENSE.

When the Hungarian government became advised of a Russian invasion, at a cabinet council held on the 12th of May, the outlines of a plan for the defense of the country were agreed upon.

The leading idea of this plan was to divide the forces of the nation in such a manner as to make them equally efficient for a two-fold purpose—either, by a decisive blow, to hurry the war to a speedy close, or to extend its duration by avoiding a collision with the enemy's troops. Pursuant to this leading idea, it was resolved to make the fortress of Komorn the *point d'appui* of an intrenched camp for a garrison of thirty thousand men, and for the purpose of definitely impeding the advance of the main body of the Austrian army. The second and third corps (twenty thousand men), under General Anlick, were to take a position on the River Neutra, and communicate from thence, to the right with General Dembinski, and to the left with the garrison of Komorn. General Anlick was instructed to reconnoitre the hostile forces on the left bank of the Danube, to cover the mountain cities and districts, and, after ascertaining the enemy's intentions, to effect, by forced marches, a junction either with the garrison of Komorn, or the corps under the command of Dembinski, and thus to enable one of the two armies to leave the defensive, and to make an offensive

retreat in the sight of the enemy.* General Dembinski was ordered to keep the mountain defiles in Upper Hungary, with the assistance of General Aulick, to throw the bulk of his army against the Russian corps which advanced from Arva, and, after annihilating it in the narrow valleys of the mountains, to concentrate his forces against the other Russian army, which invaded Hungary by way of Dukla. Numerous detachments in the north eastern counties were, for this purpose, placed at the disposal of General Dembinski.

But if the Russians, instead of advancing by Arva, were to push the bulk of their army forward on the road of Eperies and Pesth, the forces of the Generals Dembinski and Aulick were to be concentrated at Miskolcz, and their line of retreat was in that case marked out toward the Theiss, in the direction of Füred.

The blockade of the fortresses of Arad and Temesvar, and the protection of the Banat and the Batsk country, were committed to General Perczel, who for these purposes was placed in command of one half of his own corps and of the whole of General Vécsey's corps; while General Bem was instructed to lead his troops and the second half of Perczel's corps against, and carry Tittel, and to complete the relief of the garrison of Peterwardein by dislocating the rest of the besieging army on the right bank of the Danube. This done, General Bem was to return, to advance along the banks of the Danube up the stream, to cross at a convenient place, to hoist the Hungarian colors on the right bank, to effect a junction with Colonel Kmetty, and to communicate with the garrison of Komorn. His line of retreat lay via Buda, in which direction he was to fall back on the great body of the Hungarian army, of which he was, in that case, to take the chief command. After the conquest of Buda, the division of Colonel Kmetty was to advance to the Platten Lake, to organize the insurrection in that part of the country, and to join the forces of General Bem.

The reserve corps were to assemble on the banks of the Theiss, where they were to wait for the orders of the War Office. The command of Transylvania was given to Colonel

* Klapka's War in Hungary.

Czecz, with instructions completely to suppress the Wallachian insurrection, to carry the fortified city of Karlsburg, and to prepare the defense of the defiles of the borders and of the mountains.

The Council of Ministers, as well as General Görgey, expressed their concurrence with the views laid down in this plan; and the necessary dispositions for its execution were immediately dispatched to the various commanders.*

The following were the forces which the Hungarians then held for carrying out this project:

First army corps (then around Buda), commander General Nagy-Shandor, ten battalions, ten squadrons of cavalry, and forty guns.

Second corps, commander General Aulick, ten battalions, fifteen squadrons, and forty guns.

Third corps, commander General Knezick, nine battalions, fourteen squadrons, and forty guns.

Colonel Kmetty's division, five battalions, six squadrons, and sixteen guns.

The following troops were in and around the city of Raab, in the island of Schütte, and in and around the fortress of Komorn:

Fourth corps, commanded by Colonel Pöltenberg; and the fifth corps, commanded by General Lenkey. The former consisted of eleven battalions, seventeen squadrons, and forty-five guns; and the latter of twelve battalions, four squadrons, and eighteen guns. Colonel Horvath's detachment of two battalions, three squadrons, and four guns was on the banks of the Neutra; and a flying corps of two battalions, one squadron, and six guns, commanded by Major Armin Görgey, garrisoned the cities in the Carpathians.

The army on the Upper Danube was under the immediate command of Görgey, and amounted to a total of sixty-one battalions, seventy-two squadrons, two hundred and nine pieces of artillery, fifty thousand men, and seven thousand two hundred horses. The rest of the Hungarians may be quoted as follows:

1st. The army of the Banat, under the Generals Perczel

* Klapka.

and Vécsey, and afterward under Lieutenant-general Vetter. It numbered thirty thousand men.

2d. Bem's army in Transylvania, thirty-two thousand men.

3d. Lieutenant-general Dembinski's corps at Eperies, twelve thousand men.

4th. Colonel Kazintsky's division, in the Marmorosh, six thousand men.

5th. The garrison of Peterwardein, five thousand men.

The joint number of all these corps amounted to a total of one hundred and thirty-five thousand men, with four hundred pieces of artillery.*

MOVEMENTS OF F. M. L. HAYNAU.

General Haynau, in command of the first army corps, then resting around Pressburg, made no alterations in the positions of the Austrian army, but only applied himself to reorganize and newly divide it.

The re-enforcements which arrived from Austria Proper, Moravia, and Bohemia increased this army to fifty thousand men. A Russian division of sixteen thousand men entered Pressburg at this time, for the purpose of acting as a reserve force to the main army of the Austrians on the Upper Danube. The first corps of this army was under General Schlick, and the second, third, and fourth corps were commanded by Generals Czoric, Bamberg, and Wohlgemuth. At a later period, the fourth corps was commanded by Prince Lichtenstein. The cavalry division was under General Beethold, and the Russian reserve troops under General Paniutine.

Besides these forces, which were placed under General Haynau, as commander-in-chief and plenipotentiary of the emperor,

* Klapka.

According to Kossuth's statement, the number and distribution of the Magyar forces at this time were as follows:

Görgey's corps (after all losses)	45,000 men.
In the Banat	30,000 "
In Transylvania	40,000 "
On the Upper Theiss (county of Saros).....	12,000 "
In the Marmorosh	6,000 "
In Peterwardein.....	8,000 "
Total.....	141,000 "

and which held an advantageous central position in and around Pressburg, another reserve corps was concentrating at Pettau, in Styria, under the auspices of General Nugent, who conducted this corps, at the end of June, to the county of Zala, and thence against a powerful and well-organized rising of the population around the Platten Sea.

A Russian corps, under General Grabbe, had meanwhile entered Hungary from Western Galicia, and advanced, though slowly and cautiously, from the Arva, through the county of Liptau, in the direction of the mountain districts.

The first engagement between the hostile forces took place on the 13th of June, on the Rabnitz, near Csorna, where a brigade of the Imperialists, under General Wyss, moving toward Raab to join the first division under F. M. L. Schlick, was surprised by the Hungarians, and, after a severe conflict, completely defeated. The accounts favorable to the Magyars represent this battle as one of great importance, lasting for a very long time, and ending in the slaughter of many thousands of Austrians and Russians; while the Austrian papers and bulletins make no mention whatever of the engagement. The truth, so far as could be ascertained from impartial sources, was, that the loss of the Imperialists, besides all their cannon, amounted to several hundreds in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Among the former was the commander, General Wyss. On the following days, viz., the 14th and 16th, several engagements took place on the island of Schütte (lying immediately below Pressburg, and formed by the junction of the Waag and Schwartzwasser Rivers with the Danube), at Kapovar, Szered, and Shintau, between the advanced posts of the two armies, which were attended with alternating success. The result, however, of these skirmishes was, that the Hungarians abandoned to the Imperialists the island of Schütte, and, crossing the Waag at Guta, slowly retired before the pursuing enemy.

By this time Görgey had reached the scene of action, and, after receiving intelligence of the defeat of the Hungarians on the 16th, he resolved to take the command in person, and to avenge the discomfiture of the Hungarian troops by a great and brilliant feat of arms. On the 20th of June, four days

later, when, after reconnoitering extensively, the Imperialists concluded to concentrate all their forces between the Waag and the Neuhäusel Danube, Görgey, with thirty thousand men and one hundred and eighty cannon, crossed these streams. The second and third corps of the Hungarians attacked the enemy between Szelly and Kiralyrev; while Klapka, with a part of the eighth corps, endeavored to take Nyarasd, so as to obtain command, if possible, of the passage over the Little Danube at Vásárut, and thus cut off the retreat of the Austrians. But the Imperialists were in such numbers at Nyarasd and its neighborhood, and several vigorous charges having been made by the Uhlans and cuirassiers, who proved themselves an overmatch for the hussars of Karolyi, Lehel, and Hunyadi (who saw fire for the first time that day), they retreated, leaving their cannons behind. Better success, however, attended the Hungarians in another part of the field. The second corps, which was to cross the "Neuhäusel arm" early on the morning of the 20th, and to attack the enemy at Zsigard, under cover of a dense fog, reached that point wholly unperceived by the enemy. This was the favorable moment for an attack upon Zsigard, when the enemy was unprepared and open to a surprise. But no attack was made, as Görgey had ordered them to wait for his arrival. In a short time the sun arose, the fog cleared away, and the Austrians beheld, to their great astonishment, the Hungarian forces drawn up in battle array at the distance of but one thousand yards. They hastened to regain the positions which they had occupied on the 16th. Their movements were precipitate, and evidently confused, and at that moment the roar of cannon sounded from the banks of the Waag. Major Rakovsky advanced with his troops against Zsigard and the adjoining forest. The Austrians, threatened in their rear, and believing that an overpowering force was marching against them, covered their retreat by a fight of thirty minutes' duration, abandoned their advantageous position at Zsigard, and came to a stand between Pered and Szelly.

At ten o'clock in the morning, Colonel Ashboth ordered the second corps to the charge without waiting for the arrival of the commander-in-chief, and by this force, together with that of Major Rakovsky, which had, in the mean while, joined the

main column, the enemy were driven from all the plantations on the Waag into Pered. The preparations of the enemy showed Pered to be the key of their position, and that the fortunes of the day were bound up in its occupation. Colonel Ashboth, therefore, arranged a front attack of five battalions and two batteries, while Rakovsky and his column advanced on the left side* with a firm and steady pace, in the midst of a furious fire of grape and grenades. The forty-eighth battalion had reached the church, when the Austrians uncovered a masked battery, and opened a raking fire of ball and cartridge upon them. The Hungarians were thrown back, but Colonel Ashboth, deeply sensible of the importance of the moment, rallied the retreating masses, and, placing himself at the head of three battalions, he again led them to the charge. The brave troops followed their intrepid leader. The main street was carried, every house, every garden, every court-yard was the scene of a desperate combat. Austrians, Bohemians, Poles, stood front to front, and breast to breast, with Magyars. The Imperialists wavered at length. They moved backward, slowly and in good order at first, but another charge dispersed them; and at two o'clock at night, the Hungarians were in sole possession of Pered, with its dead, wounded, and captives. At this moment, the third corps (nine battalions, fourteen squadrons, and forty guns), under the command of General Knezick, arrived. Görgey, who had come up at the same time, had no sooner made his appearance on the battle-field, than he took at once command of both corps, and ordered the troops to lie in bivouac at Pered.†

He sent no troops in pursuit of the enemy in their flight to Galantha and Deaki, which precaution might have been attended with important results; but Colonel Ashboth, notwithstanding the ability and gallantry he had that day exhibited, was displaced for having proceeded to the attack before the arrival of the commander-in-chief, and General Knezick met with a similar fate on account of his slowness and indecision, which had caused his late arrival on the scene of battle. General Knezick's place was given to Colonel Leiningen, and Ashboth's command was transferred to Colonel Kazony, the lead-

* Klapka.

† Ibid.

er of the cavalry of the third corps.* This change of commanders was imprudent; for it was difficult to replace the intimate knowledge of the peculiarities of their troops; and on the eve of a battle, against a vastly superior force, it was certainly altogether injudicious.

The following day (the 21st) the fight was renewed with increased violence at Pered. Görgey took his position in front of Pered. The Imperialists, strengthened by the arrival of their reserved force, which had marched up in the night, the Austrian brigade Polt and the Russian division Paniutine, under the immediate command of F. M. L. Wohlgemuth, advanced and commenced the attack. Although the Austrians had been joined in the course of the night by an important reinforcement of Russian troops, they were at first repulsed; but, by their superiority in numbers,† they at length succeeded in turning the flank of the Hungarians, assailing their rear, and forcing them to retire. The action lasted from early morning till eight o'clock at night. The retreat of the Hungarians was conducted in the greatest order, although cut off from the bridge, and the enemy had occupied Zsigard and Kiralyrev, through which their course lay, and which they were forced to carry by storm. The united loss of these two days, on both sides, was estimated at nearly five thousand, in killed and wounded.‡ The Hungarians retired to Komorn.

Immediately after this battle, the combined Austrian and Russian armies transferred all their disposable force to the right bank of the Danube, in order to begin their offensive operations there. On the 27th of the month, Raab§ was attacked by the allied forces, forty thousand strong. The Hungarian garrison there, only nine thousand, under Pöltenberg, Görgey failing to re-enforce him, held their position gallantly from eight in the morning until three in the afternoon, when,

* Klapka.

† Pragay estimated the Hungarians at twenty-two thousand, and the Austrians and Russians at ninety-five thousand.

‡ Klapka asserts the Hungarian loss on the 20th and 21st to have been two thousand five hundred.

§ Haynau commenced his brutality here, by ordering Bö-Sarkany, all except the church, to be burned to the ground, simply because the inhabitants sympathized with the Hungarians.

without any considerable loss of men and but two cannons, they retreated to Komorn.

This attack upon Raab occurred under the eyes of the Emperor of Austria, who was a witness of the whole engagement, and who entered the town in triumph as soon as it was abandoned by the enemy. After abandoning Raab, the Hungarians retired to the vicinity of Komorn, where, within the intrenched camp surrounding the head of the bridge, which led over to the fortress of Komorn, their army, consisting of the two corps under Görgey and Klapka and the garrison of Komorn, amounting to forty thousand strong, had concentrated. Hither the entire force of the Austrians and Russians, under the command of Haynau and the emperor, surrounded the enemy, with a view to throw them behind their intrenchments, and force them at length to submission.

Early on the morning of the 2d of July, the Hungarians were attacked on all sides. The Austrians, however, turned their main strength against the heights of Monosta, a position which commanded the entire Palatinal line, and from which the garrison itself could be annoyed by heavy ordnance. They carried the first four lines at the first charge. They then took the village of Szoney, into which the Hungarians had neglected to throw troops. The outer works being taken, the Austrian colors are hoisted on the walls, and the Hungarian battalions retreat to the inner line of fortifications. Again the Imperialists form, and prepare to attack the intrenchments, while a column, destined to operate against the rear, is pushed forward along the Danube, and protected by the high banks of that river. It was at this moment, when danger was most imminent, that the Hungarian staff appeared upon the field.

Görgey, contrary to his usual custom, appeared on this day in the splendid red and gold embroidered uniform of a general, and his tall white heron feathers were afterward seen at every point where any thing was to be disposed, ordered, or executed.* He took command of the right wing, committed the

* Görgey, having perhaps more to struggle against within himself than from the enemy, obviously sought death. With his conspicuous dress, he threw himself into the midst of the combat. He was wounded in the head by a cut from a sabre, but the balls seemed to avoid the general while they decimated those around

centre to Klapka, and the left to Leiningen. Encouraged by his presence, the retreating troops rallied, and the combat grew more violent as soon as these officers reached their respective posts.

Leiningen too soon prepared an unsuccessful cavalry charge, which cost the Hungarians their bravest horse battery. This battery accompanied the cavalry to the attack, and ventured beyond their protected position; and when the latter were, by the enemy's light horse, regiment Lichtenstein, suddenly repulsed, the battery also retreated at full speed, but, unhappily, in the direction of a ditch, which was not seen until it was too late to rein in, and one cannon after another pitched into it. The Imperialists, by superior force, took the guns, but it was not until after they had slain every gallant soldier who attended them.

The battle, with various success, had lasted until past noon, when one of Görgey's adjutants came to the centre with orders to Klapka to send help, if possible, to Leiningen, and to take Szoney at any price, for he, Görgey, had already forced the enemy from the lines on the heights, and driven their right wing back to the wood of Acs. Klapka faithfully obeyed the order, and in less than an hour, after two repulses, held Szoney in possession. The flying enemy were pursued in the direction of Todis. Görgey now, about six o'clock in the evening, came to the centre, took all the cavalry (twenty-nine squadrons) and six batteries, and charged upon the hostile centre, which he pursued till nightfall.

Haynau saw the danger. He advanced the Russian reserve, and sent to his right wing for his cavalry. The Austrian horse are beaten back, and the Hungarian squadrons sweep down upon the Russian columns at Csém, where the career of the bold horsemen is stopped by fifty guns from a covered position, hurling death and destruction into their ranks. The Hungarian horse-batteries advance at the top of their speed; they draw up, unlimber, and return the enemy's fire; but these batteries are soon silenced and forced to fall back.

him. The words he is said to have addressed to the Honvéds on this occasion would seem to imply that he expected that day to be his last. "Forward, my children; the ball to-day hits me alone!"

II.

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The last great attack was equally unsuccessful, for the Austrians displayed large masses of cavalry against the Hungarian flank; and Görgey, while fighting in the *mélée*, having been wounded in the head, was compelled to desist from his attempt to force the enemy's lines. Night came on, and at nine o'clock the last shots were fired on either side. The Austrians retired to their former positions, while the Hungarians again established themselves at the camp at Szoney, behind the intrenchments.

The victory remained undecided; but the Austrians suffered far greater losses than their enemy. Haynau had become convinced that Görgey's positions were unassailable, while the latter perceived that Haynau's masses of troops were too compact to be broken. In each party claiming the victory as they did, they were both right, and both wrong. Each had failed in the attack; each had made a brilliant defense.

The Hungarian loss in dead and wounded is estimated at fifteen hundred; that of the Austrians, whose force was much larger, at three thousand.*

This brilliant repulse of a greatly superior force, although reflecting the highest credit upon the Hungarian arms, was afterward considered by them as more disastrous to the Hungarian cause than the most total defeat could possibly have been; for it unhappily confirmed their confidence in Görgey, which he subsequently so basely betrayed.

When returning to the city at a late hour in the evening, after setting the necessary guard, Klapka was met by a staff officer, who handed him an important dispatch from the government.† Its purport was to the effect that Görgey, who had refused, at the frequent and pressing request of the government, to retire with his troops to Pesth, but persisted in uselessly remaining about Komorn, while the capital of the country, the seat of government and the Diet, was abandoned to the enemy, should be removed from the chief command, and his place supplied by Meszaros.‡ Official letters of the same

* Klapka. Pragay puts down the Austro-Russian force in this action at ninety-five thousand; Klapka estimates them at thirty thousand.

† Pragay. Klapka.

‡ Görgey had but a few days before very coolly sent word to the government

tenor were sent with this document for the commanders of the several corps, which Klapka was desired to deliver. The commanders of all the corps were assembled in the evening at Klapka's quarters. It was then concluded to say nothing to General Görgey, but to call a grand council of war the next day, at which this serious question should be discussed. The council met. At first there reigned a deep silence; all seemed penetrated with the solemnity and importance of the occasion. The fate of the country hung upon their decision. That suspense lasted but for a moment. Feeling prevailed over judgment. With the romantic enthusiasm and generous confidence so peculiar to the Hungarians, and which had so often proved fatal to the best interests of their country, the silence was broken by the passionate cry, "No! no! Görgey must remain. We can not now serve under Meszaros."

A most unfortunate conjunction of circumstances then existed, which they felt it impossible to resist, and which afterward brought about the ruin of Hungary.

First. Görgey had but the day before made a noble stand against twice his own numbers, commanded by the emperor himself.

Secondly. This success was to be ascribed almost entirely to his bravery, for he had conducted in person the charge upon the lines that the enemy had already taken. He led in person the great column of cavalry that charged the enemy's centre.

Thirdly. The hero had been wounded on the day of his triumph.

Fourthly. General Meszaros, though a most honest patriot and brave man, was an unfortunate soldier, and consequently did not enjoy the confidence of the troops.

To have discarded Görgey just at that time and under those circumstances, would have required more than Roman firmness. It was resolved that Klapka and Nagy-Shandor should go to Pesth, and convey to the government the wishes of the army with respect to retaining Görgey. This was done, and the authority of the government preserved by following the

at Pesth that he was unable to protect them, and that if they had any regard for their safety they should fly.

suggestion of Kossuth; the appointment of Meszaros as commander-in-chief was unrevoked, but, upon Görgey's consent to resign the ministry of war, he was to be made commander of the army of the Upper Danube, to which he assented, and the matter was thus arranged.

Thus was taken, through a misdirected confidence, the first step toward the overthrow of Hungarian independence. Had Kossuth come himself, had some other than Meszaros been appointed to the chief command, had the unlucky order arrived but one day sooner, Görgey's fall, perhaps, would have been accomplished, and Hungary saved.

From this time onward, Görgey paid but little attention to the government, which still called him several times to the protection of Pesth. He no longer considered himself appointed by the government, but chosen by the officers. For the future, all concert of action, so indispensable to success, was gone, and the downfall of the country assured.

After their repulse at Acs, the Austrians withdrew to a short distance, but still continued with the great body of the troops surrounding the Hungarians, who remained about their intrenched camps, in the vicinity of Komorn.

Before Görgey had recovered from his wound, he devised a plan for breaking through the Austrian army; then to move toward Croatia, make requisitions of arms there, raise the siege of Peterwardein, and either unite with the army of the south, or with the main army of Dembinski, if that had been forced so far down. The first part of this plan devolved upon Klapka to execute. At eight in the morning of the 11th of July, the troops were drawn up in the intrenched camp. At nine, the eighth corps began their march upon the wood of Acs; the seventh upon Puszta-Herkály; the third upon Csém; and the first upon Mocsá. The fighting also soon commenced at all points, and raged without intermission until three in the afternoon, without apparent advantage on either side.*

Klapka, in command of the third Hungarian corps, advanced on the Igmand road, until they met the enemy at noon, in front of Csém. This village, with its fenced farms, and the heights

* Klapka.

in its rear, was the key to the enemy's centre, who, when the Hungarians attacked, occupied it with a brigade. After a short fight, in which they silenced the enemy's artillery, the Hungarians carried the place at the point of the bayonet, and drove the enemy before them; but, before the Hungarian reserve columns could press to the charge and follow up their advantage, the gap in the enemy's battle-line was filled up by the whole of the Austrian reserve, and by the Russian division Paniutine, who received the fugitive brigade, rallied it, and sent it, with a strong support, back to the charge, while eighty field-pieces opened upon them from the neighboring heights. For an hour the earth trembled with the roar of the cannons, which, assembled on one point, were to decide the fate of the day. The effect on the Hungarian side was ruinous. The field was strewn with corpses. Batteries were dismounted; powder-carts exploded. The Hungarians kept their position. So did the Imperialists. Some of the divisions retreated for a time without the range of the fire; but they either returned or were replaced by fresh troops. If, according to the dispositions, Nagy-Shandor and Pigetti had advanced and joined the attack of the third corps, they might have secured the victory; for the enemy, wavering as they were, could not have resisted the impetus of their charge. But Nagy-Shandor advanced slowly, and Pigetti did not move at all. The favorable moment passed, and the Austrians, who were strongest in the centre, seemed to prevail. The Hungarians, thus finding it impossible either to drive the Austrians from their positions or to break through their ranks, ceased fighting, and withdrew behind their intrenchments.

MOVEMENTS OF THE RUSSIANS UNDER PRINCE PASKIEVITCH.

The Russian generals commenced the campaign against Hungary with great precaution. Before entering the country, they sent to Vienna, and, through the Russian ambassador, obtained from the imperial archives copies of the dispatches relating to the military operations in Hungary in former times, under Charles of Lorraine, Eugène of Savoy, and Montecuculli, against Rakoczy, Tököly, and the Turks.

From these documents it appeared that all the invading gen-

erals of former days avoided, as much as possible, the plains of the Theiss. The city of Kashau was at that time the *point d'appui* of the imperial army, whence they crossed the Theiss, and drove the Hungarians under Rakoczy into the Szatmar comitat, and there dictated conditions of peace. Eugène of Savoy alone was obliged to select Szegedin as his place of operation, on account of the position of the Turkish army, and hence encountered great difficulties.

After the Emperor of Russia, with his son the Grand Duke Constantine, had accompanied the army under Prince Paskievitch as far as Dukla, in Galicia, near the frontiers of Hungary, he there reviewed the troops, and, urging them to deeds of glory, bade them adieu. He returned to Warsaw, and the army of eighty-seven thousand men crossed the frontiers into Hungary on the 18th of June. The Russians entered in three divisions; the one under General Rüdiger from Neumarkt, over Ajal to Lublyo; another from Dukla, over Komarieck to Bartfeldt; and the third directly on Eperies, to which point the movements of the three corps were directed, and where they were to concentrate.

With but slight opposition from the Hungarians, the divisions of the Russian army met at Eperies about the 20th of June, and thence pursued their march without serious interruption—General Wisocki's corps in the Carpathians being unable to oppose them—and with the loss of a few Cossacks in their advanced guard, reached Kashau about the 25th; and, after leaving a garrison there, marched on, and arrived at Miskolcz about the 30th. That army then separated into two divisions; one to march upon Debreczin, and the other upon Pesth; and both were entirely successful. The division marching upon Debreczin took possession of that capital without resistance on the 7th of July (the Hungarian Diet having, after the late victories, removed its sittings to Pesth, and upon the second Austrian invasion to Szegedin); while the other division under General Ramberg, proceeding on Pesth, captured that city on the 11th, without encountering opposition.* On the 17th, the first army corps under F. M. L. Haynau, which

* When Kossuth and his ministers, who were at that time at Pesth, heard of the approach of the Russians to the capital, they took their departure for Szegedin.

since the battle of Acs had established their head-quarters at Nagy-Igmand, leaving the second army corps under F. M. L. Czoric to besiege Komorn, broke up from that point, proceeded down the right bank of the Danube to Buda-Pesth, and entered the Hungarian capital on the 19th.*

Dembinski, toward the end of the last campaign, after the brilliant succession of triumphs which distinguished its close, proceeded, with a body of troops newly raised during the months of April and May, to the northern frontier, for the purpose of guarding it against a new invasion from Galicia.

Of this force, numbering in the beginning about twelve thousand, Dembinski, toward the end of May, resigned the command, because, as was said, the government would not approve his plan of an irruption into Galicia.

His successor, General Wisocki, was not long able to hold out against the overwhelming force of Russians that entered under Paskievitch, and by the end of June was obliged to give up his position; and, constantly harassed by the daily advancing Cossacks, he gradually withdrew before them, and moved down toward Pesth, in order, if possible, to protect the capital.

On reaching Szolnok, he was joined by Perczel's reserve of fourteen thousand men, and to which, after the evacuation of Pesth in the middle of July, were added the troops who had been in that city, to the number of four thousand. Notwithstanding the want of confidence generally expressed by the corps of officers during the campaign of the previous winter, Kossuth still rested his boldest hopes on Dembinski, and conferred upon him the chief command of this army, now thirty thousand strong.

This appointment was made, not as some Austrian journals state, on account of the fear which Kossuth had of seeing Görgey aspire to a military dictatorship, but principally for the purpose of putting an end to the divisions and jealousies of the native chiefs; it was resolved to place the army under the supreme command of a foreigner, whose position was less likely to induce him to find fault with the measures of the Diet and the government, and who could confine his authority to the

* In the march of the Russians to the centre of the kingdom, General Grabbe, with a division of the army, occupied Cremnitz and Shemnitz, without resistance.

conduct of the war. But it was necessary also not to hurt the feelings of the Hungarian officers; for this purpose a great historical name was sought and found. Dembinski, the old Polish general, was placed at the head of all the Hungarian armies, and Görgey and all other Magyar officers were subjected to him.*

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH UNDER JELLACIC.

At the end of April, when the army of the Ban separated itself from the rest of the imperial forces in the centre of Hungary, he received instructions to form it into an army of the south by a junction with the divisions of Nugent and Puchner, and afterward with that of the Servian general, Knicanin. Events, however, only enabled the Ban to effect this junction with a few of the Servians and a portion of Nugent's corps. After a long march from Pesth to Eszek, and a halt of several days at the latter place, which delay was turned to account by the organization of new field batteries, clothing the troops, &c., he arrived, toward the end of May, in the vicinity of Peterwardein. Here the Ban determined to assume the offensive, and to cross the Danube, which was effected by the aid of steamers, from Szlankament to Tittel. He moved forward on the 5th, and found the Csaikisten circle, recently occupied by Perczel's army, abandoned, and the whole of that flourishing country laid waste. They had retired to Neusatz. On the 7th, Perczel's corps broke out unexpectedly from its intrenched camp near Neusatz, passed the Roman levies, and attacked the imperial army near Katsch. The Hungarians repulsed, returned to Neusatz. On the 10th, the Ban moved against Neusatz, and attacked the intrenched camp on the night of the 11th. Perczel abandoned his position at Neusatz; but owing to the heavy and continued fire from the fortress of Peterwardein, Jellacic could not take possession of the town.†

In relation to the operations in the southern part of Hungary but little information is obtainable, except through the dispatches of Baron Jellacic, and they are of so obviously partial

* Klapka.

† The cholera also raged terribly; all the wells filled with dead bodies, and the heat excessive.



J. Jellaij

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a character that entire confidence can not be reposed in them. He reports a great victory over the enemy under Perczel, between Tittel and Römershanze, on the 7th of June, in which the Hungarians had "five hundred killed, and two hundred and twenty wounded;" "whole battalions cut to pieces;" "the field covered with the dead;" while he again lost his favorite number of two men killed and twelve wounded. In another bulletin, he says he has obtained a victory over the garrison of Peterwardein, when making a sortie, but lost several pieces of ordnance.

Those two triumphs (in consequence of which the funds of the Vienna Exchange rose) are reduced to the fact that the first was but an insignificant skirmish, in which Ottinger's Walmoden cuirassier's had made one successful charge; and the second a perfect defeat of Jellacic; for the garrison of Peterwardein made a sally against Kamenitz, took two intrenchments by storm, entirely destroyed them, spiked all the heavy guns, and carried the light ones into the fortress. According to his own account, he had effected the conquest of Neusatz, the rescue of Temesvar, and the defeat of Perczel; but as the formidable fortress of Peterwardein, in the immediate neighborhood, remained still in the hands of the Hungarians, and as advices from that quarter, arriving about the same time, reported the contemplated junction of the forces under Bem and Perczel, for the purpose of operating against him, it might with more propriety be concluded that, at the very date of these great victories, the Croatian general had not only accomplished but little, but that his own situation had become critical in the extreme.

After the slight engagement at Tittel, Perczel retired toward Theresiopel, and Jellacic to the neighborhood of Neusatz, whence he commenced to bombard the fortress of Peterwardein, while Colonel Mamula continued to fire into it from the opposite side at Kamenitz.

A little later, owing to the frequent collisions between Perczel and his officers, he was removed, and his place supplied by the appointment of General Vetter, who, gathering up the scattered fragments of Perczel's army, immediately confronted the enemy. On the 14th of July, General Guyon, commanding

a wing of this army, attacked the Croats, and the very day that Jellacic had designed for an attack on him. Informed by spies of the position of the Magyars, he set out on the 14th of July, with the intention of surprising them in the darkness of the night; but the arrow recoiled upon the marksman. "Guyon, having received timely information that the Ban, whom he usually called 'The perjured Jack-Pudding,' contemplated honoring him with a visit, made his arrangements quietly, though hastily, to receive the uninvited guest in a becoming manner."*

At midnight, Jellacic set out from Verbasz, and advanced at daybreak, with full expectation of success, into the defile of Hegyes, without having even dispatched a side-detachment toward Fékétehegy or Szeghegy. He was already entrapped when the first cannon-shot thundered on the flanks of his troops. The shades of night were still struggling with the morning mists, when it became clear to the Austrians that every step in advance was one nearer to destruction. Now began the disastrous retreat through the cross-fire of the Hungarian batteries. The flight lasted without intermission to the Francis canal, to Verbasz, to Ruma; and even here, the Ban, not feeling secure, removed his head-quarters to Mitrovicz.

He there mustered his troops, not a third remaining of those whom he had led over the canal on that night of horror; the rest had fallen, been taken prisoners, or were scattered to the winds. To the undaunted valor of the Ottinger cavalry, which protected his retreat, as well as they were able, at the sacrifice of their own lives, the Ban of Croatia alone owed the remains of his boasted army of the south.

He attributed the failure of his enterprise to the "knavery of a traitor," and a captain whom he suspected of communicating intelligence of his movements to the enemy was arrested and executed.

This battle was one of the bloodiest during the whole contest, and the consequences of the victory to the Hungarians were most important. The Bacska was freed from the enemy, the Francis canal, Jellacic's most important line of operations, was lost; the army of the south decimated, its remains driven

* Schlessinger.

into a corner, scattered and demoralized; the fortress of Peterwardein, on the other side, was relieved, and supplied anew with provisions, ammunition, and men.*

Guyon, an Irishman by birth, enlisted as a volunteer in the expedition against Don Miguel; he afterward traveled on the Continent, and, by chance, met at Trieste with some officers of the second hussar regiment. He was pleased with the smart uniform, and the social, brotherly life of the Austrian officers, which, indeed, might serve as a model to all the armies in the world. In consequence, he applied for a commission in the imperial army, and entered the Archduke Joseph's hussar regiment as a cadet. In a very short time he was advanced to the rank of first lieutenant, and was much esteemed in his regiment as a true-hearted comrade, a brave officer, and a man of education. He afterward obtained the post of aid-de-camp to Baron Ignaz Splenyi, who was at that time commander of the regiment and captain of the Hungarian noble guard.†

Guyon subsequently married a Hungarian lady of the Splenyi family,‡ left the regiment after the death of the old baron, sold a portion of his property, and bought a small estate in Hungary. Here, engaged in agricultural pursuits, he passed a healthy and cheerful life in intercourse with the neighboring landed proprietors, among whom he soon became famed far and wide as the boldest of horsemen. Such was his mode of life at the outbreak of the great Revolution. Kossuth offered him a major's commission, and Guyon, who had become attached to the country with the whole energy of his character, did not hesitate to draw the sword in defense of her rights.§

* Austrian journals related falsely that the battle of Hegyes was planned by Bem. This erroneous statement was copied into most of the foreign journals.

† Schlessinger.

‡ Madame Guyon appears to possess much of the resolution of her husband. In the course of the war, she exhibited her courage in various ways. When Windischgrätz entered Pesth, every one who lived in Buda had to enter his or her name in a book, in order that the prince might know whom he had about him in the fortress. Among the rest, came the turn of Madame Guyon, who had remained behind with the old Baroness Splenyi, and her name is to be seen entered in the above-mentioned book, written in her own hand, with the description affixed—"Wife of a rebel chief."

§ Guyon is thirty-four years of age, of middle stature, bold and resolute features, elegant and winning manners. The chivalry of the Magyar and the nobility of the high-born Englishman are worthily represented in his person.—*Schlessinger*.

After his defeat, Jellacic finding his situation critical, marched up the Theiss, with a view of joining the army of Haynau, then advancing south, as well as with a view to reach Szege-din, and eventually complete the occupation of the whole line of that river before Kossuth and Görgey could cross it between the northern and southern armies.

OPERATIONS IN TRANSYLVANIA BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND BEM.

About the middle of June, and at the same period that Prince Paskievitch and Rüdiger, with their immense armies, were entering Hungary on the north, three Russian corps, under Lüders, Grotjenhelm, and Hasford, were penetrating the country on the south. After the mountain passes had once been opened, the united forces of the enemy poured in like a flood, and threatened to overwhelm the defenders of the country from all sides. Bem, although he had completely subdued Transylvania,* and declared martial law throughout the province, was unable to resist successfully the overwhelming force, consisting, as was said, of forty thousand Russians and fourteen thousand Austrians, who approached on three different sides, as well as an insurrection of about thirty thousand Wallachians in their midst.

On the 15th, General Clam Gallas, at the head of the Austrian corps lately commanded by General Puchner, entered Transylvania from Wallachia, and marched upon Kronstadt. On the 20th, the main body of the Russians, under General Lüders, stormed, and carried at the point of the bayonet, the Tömös Pass. General Bem had committed the defense of that pass to the Hungarian colonel, Kisz. The fighting must have been severe, as a colonel of Cossacks was killed and General Dyk mortally wounded, but the Russians, by their numbers, prevailed. Colonel Kisz was taken prisoner, the Hungarians fled, and General Lüders, passing the quarantine station, bivouacked near the custom-house, and at the entrance of a long, narrow defile, which was to be stormed on the following day. On the next day the defile was carried, and

* Bem was laying siege to Temesvar, in the Banat, when he heard of the entrance of the Russians, but he immediately raised the siege, and returned into Transylvania to oppose them.

General Lüders advanced, and occupied Kronstadt the same day. He then, leaving Clam Gallas, with his force, in charge of Kronstadt, marched upon Hermanstadt, which, defended only by two thousand five hundred men, could not resist the Russian force of thirteen thousand five hundred, and, after a short resistance, surrendered. At the same time, General Engelhardt had penetrated the country through the Törzburg Pass, while the third Russian column, under General Freitag, at a great sacrifice of life, was endeavoring to hold the Ojtos Pass.

While these successes were attending the Russians under Lüders, the corps under General Hasford, entering Transylvania on the north, took possession of Bistricz, the chief town of the Saxonland, and drove back the Szeklers to Reismark. The Szeklers, however, returned and carried the city; but General Grotjenhelm coming up with a superior force, they abandoned it and fled.

General Bem had in the mean time passed over into Moldavia by the Ojtos Pass, hoping by his presence to put in motion all the revolutionary elements which had been accumulating for years past in the Principalities. In this, however, he failed. His rapid advance to Romau, as well as his proclamations, were equally without effect, and he consequently had no alternative left him but to return as hastily as possible to Transylvania.

Thus had the Austrians for a second time, entering Hungary at the four cardinal points, marched without serious opposition (the battles of Acs and Komorn alone excepted) into the very heart of the country, subduing all opposition as they advanced, and finally planting their victorious standards in the very capital of the kingdom, as they had done in the months of December and January preceding. The general plan of the campaign seemed to be to form a complete circle of the whole kingdom, and rapidly converge, so as to compress the Revolution in a ring of armies.

And so far it appeared to have been successfully executed. Haynau and Wohlgemuth, as has been seen, with the Austrian and Russian force, occupying the immediate frontier of Lower Austria and Moravia; Nugent and Jellacic operating on the

Danube and along the southern frontier, and the Russians, under Lüders and Paskievitch, embracing the semicircle to the north and east from the Rothenthurm Pass to the highest peak of the Carpathians.

On the other hand, what was the plan of the Hungarians? The months of April and May were to them a career of almost uninterrupted victory. They crossed the Theiss; they passed the Danube; they relieved Komorn; they stormed Buda, and their van-guard reached to the very frontiers of Austria on the north, while the army of the south, under Bem, had driven every hostile foot from the soil of Transylvania.

Yet here they paused. They failed to follow up these remarkable successes with vigor; no attempt was made to force the Austrians to treat, though Vienna itself lay unprotected before them. In short, under circumstances the most favorable to their cause, the Magyars turned their success and the evident weakness of their antagonists to little profit. This delay was precisely what the Russians most required. The Emperor Nicholas refused to be hurried to the field, or to operate otherwise than on the largest scale, and with a very extensive plan of campaign.

These very circumstances could have been made to operate most powerfully in their favor. Their situation did not require delay; they not only had an army raised and organized, but with all the experience furnished by a campaign through which they had just passed, flushed with victory, and confident of their invincibility. The mode of attack even, especially in its inception, afforded advantages to the Hungarians—for the superiority of forces was lost by their extreme dissemination, while the weaker party had the advantage of concentration. A general of great activity, and perfectly acquainted with the country, might bring a larger force to bear against some divisions of the allied army, defeat it in successive portions, and break the ring which had been formed around Hungary.

With such external defenses as Hungary is naturally girded, the mighty Carpathians bounding the country on three sides, and penetrable only at certain passes, which could have been so easily fortified and defended by a few troops against formidable armies, it is difficult to conceive why these passes

or entrances to the enemy should have been left open or abandoned without a blow, except on the obvious ground of policy, and in connection with some settled plan of defense. It seemed idle to suppose that this coincident falling back, north, east, and west, of two hundred thousand men, elated with the indisputable successes that enabled them to clear their territory, at the outset, without any attempt at serious resistance, could be any thing but a strategic combination.

This mystery could only be explained on the ground of some well-digested plan of defense that had been adopted by the leaders, and the benefit of which would shortly be developed; or, on the more probable supposition that, owing to the jealousy and hatred which existed among the several commanders, no suitable system of defense could be agreed upon, and each was left to pursue such course as he might deem best, either for the welfare of his country or for the advancement of his own views.

Had the Hungarians not succeeded in so defending the passes of the Carpathians as to prevent the admission of the enemy, had they failed in so concentrating their forces on particular points as not to have destroyed him in detail, a better plan, it would seem, could not have been devised than to have retreated together to the Theiss. The pestilential marshes of that stream at that season would have been most disastrous to the enemy, while to them, from habit, the malaria would have proven innoxious. On its low and miry banks, the heavy artillery of the enemy, their principal arm of defense, would have been rendered useless, while the great surrounding plains were peculiarly adapted to the operation of cavalry, in which their own superiority consisted. The most warlike portion of the Magyars inhabited principally the banks of the Theiss, and the productive lands within this circle were still laden with the superabundant harvest of two years, which, in consequence of political troubles, had not found in Austria their accustomed mart. And finally, within this narrowed sphere, the Magyars could more fully enjoy the benefit of their concentric position, and each army would not only be nearer to the other, but better able to yield assistance at any point more seriously threatened by the external ring of its assailants.

OPERATIONS UNDER GENERAL GÖRGEY.

The repeated directions of Kossuth to Görgey, to leave Komorn and proceed south, not only for the protection of the government, but to prevent being cut off from all connection with the Hungarian armies of the south by the advance of the Russians, he treated, as he had recently all the orders of the government, with utter contempt. In explanation of his remarkable course, Prince Wittgenstein, a Russian diplomatist,* in a circular dispatch from Frankfort, bearing date the 21st of July, affords some light when he states, "It is but fair to presume that Görgey, with the bulk of the Hungarian army, remained in and around Komorn for the special purpose of not being compelled to co-operate with Kossuth and the Poles, and *with the intention of treating with the Imperialist generals as soon as his retreat is cut off, by the occupation of Pesth and the country on the banks of the Theiss.* At Vienna they have reason to believe that *Görgey will treat and surrender within the next fortnight.*"† Görgey's negotiations with Paskievitch are supposed to have commenced some weeks previously, and, as corroborative of the suspicion, Klapka, in his memoirs, mentions, that as early as the 7th of July, at Komorn, several of Görgey's officers, when conversing on the divisions in the Hungarian army, said that "they were resolved to prefer the result of honorable *negotiations* to dissensions among themselves, and to the dissolution of the army."‡

When Görgey, after the battle of the 11th of July at Komorn, became sufficiently convinced that the project (which he had entertained merely with a view to avoid a union with the other Hungarian troops) of breaking through the Austrian armies on the right bank of the Danube could not be executed, leaving a sufficient force to garrison the fortress, which under Klapka made a feigned attack, to attract the attention of the enemy during his departure, he marched from Komorn down

* The Russians are regarded as the shrewdest diplomatists in Europe. They are the first to know every event of importance which occurs any where on the continent. The Russian minister at Vienna could always apprise the English and French ambassadors of what was transpiring at London or Paris, and of which they had not the slightest conception.

† Pulszky. Appendix.

‡ Klapka.

the left bank, on the 13th of July, toward Waitzen, then held by a Russian division of Paskievitch's army under General Sass, which had come up from Pesth.

Görgey's army amounted to forty-five thousand men, divided into three *corps d'armée*, under Generals Nagy-Shandor, Count Leiningen, and Pöltenberg. They were the choicest troops of Hungary (some of them the heroes of thirty battles), provided with seven regiments of cavalry, mostly veteran, and one hundred and forty-nine cannons excellently served.

On the afternoon of the 13th, Görgey's van-guard reached Waitzen, and there engaged the Russian troops under Sass and Rüdiger. The fight was prolonged until evening, and the result was in so far favorable to the Hungarians, that they maintained their position throughout the day and during the night, while the Russians left the town and marched out to the heights lying toward Pesth.

On the following morning, Görgey's two other corps came up, and supported the van-guard in a general attack upon the Russian troops. "But I became convinced," as Görgey himself writes, "that the enemy too had, in the course of the night, received considerable re-enforcements from Gödöllő and Pesth, and that their artillery force especially was by far superior to the forces I could dispose of. This conviction, and a careful review of our strength, caused me (in the interest of my country) to resign all thoughts of breaking the Russian lines at Waitzen, and to proceed on a safe road to Losoncz, Putnok, and Miskolcz.

In pursuance of this design, Görgey, at evening, issued orders to begin the march, during the night, on the mountain road, in order to reach the line of the Theiss. In obedience to this order, the troops moved, at midnight, in perfect silence; but the great number of baggage-wagons impeded the march so seriously, that at four in the morning the rear-guard, with many wagons, was still in Waitzen. The Russians, about dawn, observing the retreat, attacked the rear-guard, dispersed several divisions, and seized all the baggage of the two corps, together with some dismounted cannon. When the tidings of this attack reached the commander-in-chief, he dispatched several divisions to the assistance of the rear, who, at six o'clock,

recaptured the baggage and expelled the Russians from the town.

But closely pursued by the corps under Rüdiger and Sass, and opposed in front by the Russian reserve under General Grabbe, that had just entered from Galicia into the passes of the Carpathians, Görgey, it was supposed, must be surrounded and cut off.

At Recsag, on the small lake formerly known by the name of "Ocellum Maris," an insignificant Russian corps made a stand against him; he was content to avoid it. At Vadkert he again fell in with the Russian troops; but here also, like a lion, he despised inferior prey, continued his march toward Balassa Gyarmath, and took up his head-quarters, on the 19th, in Ludany. He now stood on the River Ipoly, which rising a few miles to the north, in the Osztrosky Mountains, rushes, with impetuous force, through the valley; here, on the Rasos Pass, extending between the river and the wooded mountains, he had thought to gain a firm footing, but it was too late. Grabbe, who had preceded, drove him still further northward to Losoncz. Sass followed in his footsteps, and came up with his rear-guard at Losoncz, after the main corps had already marched out on the road to Gyöngyös. Nagy-Shandor, who commanded the rear-guard since the battle of Waitzen, withstood the shock bravely; and after a hot engagement, which spread into the streets of the town, was able to follow the main corps, united with which he, on the 25th, occupied the strong positions before Gömör.*

But the further Görgey proceeded eastward, and nearer he approached the Theiss, the more narrowed became the circle of the Russians, who were pursuing and awaiting him. Sass, who hung upon his heels, daily concentrating the scattered columns, was now in direct communication with Grabbe, and the two generals combined their maneuvers for a general chase in the mountains, while Tscheodajeff, in Miskolcz,† was waiting, like a sportsman at his post, until the noble prey was driven within shot.

* Schlessinger.

† It will be remembered that this general had gone back from Debreczin to Miskolcz.

Why Görgey, on his march, never once attempted to annihilate the inferior forces of Sass, and relieve himself of this disagreeable escort, is irreconcilable with honesty of purpose, and only consistent with the charge that he was keeping up negotiations, during the march, with the Prince of Warsaw.

The first visible negotiator between himself and the Russians appeared at Rima-Szombath, in the person of a nephew of General Rüdiger, who brought him a present of Russian arms; and, at the same time, desired to conclude an armistice of twenty-four hours. Görgey accepted the gift, and returned the courtesy with a present of arms, but declined the proposed armistice.*

His treasonable purposes became now daily more evident. At the very next station he removed the chief of his general staff, and substituted his own brother, Lieutenant-colonel Armin Görgey, that he might be able to operate with more secrecy. He intentionally and rapidly so weakened the physical and moral vigor of his forces, that he, a few days after, at Putnok, ventured to speak openly and with impunity of a surrender to the Russians. And still a few days later, at Szikszó, where the first army corps then was, an aunt of Görgey's was apprehended, and upon her person were discovered letters which she was conveying from him to Field-marshal Paskievitch, of a tenor that left no doubt as to his purposes of surrender. General Nagy-Shandor sent these letters by special carriers in all haste to the government, and Kossuth thereupon appointed a meeting for a conference with Görgey at Czibakháza, which the latter declined to accept.† When Nagy-Shandor, who was left by Görgey to protect his rear, and, as that brave officer declared to Kossuth, out of mere hatred, purposely exposed by Görgey to danger, had fought with his Honvéds, at Gömör and before Rosenau, against an enemy three times his superior in numbers, at length, with his battalions, hunted down, starved, and decimated, reached the main army at Miskolcz, he found Görgey engaged with Tscheodajeff.‡ Already, from afar, the thunder of the heavyartil-

* Pragay.

† Kossuth has assured the author of the correctness of the above statement.

‡ Schlessinger.

lery fell on his ear, and, with a last effort of his exhausted troops, he pressed forward to the field of battle. The Russians soon retired, and Görgey was enabled to take very favorable positions from Onod to Zsolcza, to destroy the Sajo bridge, and, protected by the stream, wood, and marsh, to undertake the defense of this line. Nagy-Shandor and Pöltenberg performed here prodigies of valor on the 25th, while Görgey conducted the engagement with the whole power of his genius. The battle lasted from morning until night. Görgey's superior tactics, and his keen perception in taking advantage of the natural features of the ground, saved his army from utter annihilation; and neither his officers nor the Russian generals that evening doubted that he would at once force the passage of the Theiss at Tisza-Füred. But Görgey, contrary to all expectations, both of friend and foe, crossed the Sajo and Hernad, and gave his troops a day's rest at Gesztely. In this position, Grabbe attacked him, and was driven back to Onod (on the 28th). Another Russian column, ordered at the same time to advance toward Tokay, was likewise arrested in its march at the Hernad. The head-quarters of the Russians were removed to Tisza-Füred, and Görgey at length crossed the Theiss.

About the 20th of July, when Görgey was at Putnok, the Russian army, under Paskievitch, occupied the great road from Miskolcz to Pesth, while Dembinski, with the new army of thirty thousand men intrusted to his command, was on the shores of the Theiss, near Szolnok.

A glimpse at the map of Hungary will show that Paskievitch at Miskolcz was just half way between Görgey at Putnok and Dembinski at Szolnok.

The situation of Paskievitch at this time between these two hostile fires was perilous indeed, and had there been any understanding or concert of action between Görgey and Dembinski, he must have been annihilated.

Nothing could have been better timed, or apparently more admirably conducted, than both these movements on the part of the Hungarian generals. Paskievitch's force, although immense, was stretched out along an extensive line from Miskolcz to Pesth, with thousands of his men dead or dying daily

of cholera and Theiss fever, were incapable of moving, notwithstanding the repeated orders of his emperor to hasten operations.*

Dembinski, from various sources, had raised up as by magic a large army on his front, while Görgey, by incredible forced marches, through a mountainous region and the bristling ranks of the enemy, had carved out for himself with the sword a way to his rear.† Could these generals but have understood each other, and have advanced upon Paskievitch, and then united upon the field of victory over the routed Russians, their combined army could easily afterward have demolished the Austrians under Haynau.

But, alas! for their unhappy country, the discussions and jealousies of these two leaders prevented either from asking or rendering assistance to the other, or in any manner co-operating, although the object to be advanced was the welfare of a common country.

After two unimportant engagements with the Russians,‡ Dembinski, having his mind more occupied with defeat than victory, and fearful of an attack upon his position at Szolnok by Haynau, who was at that period with his army at Pesth, or that Haynau's advance south would place him between two fires, left ten thousand of his men at Czegled, under Perczel and Wisocki, who still awaited Görgey, and started with his main forces for Kecskemet, in order to await there the further operations of the Austrian army. When Haynau, leaving Pesth, directed his course south in pursuit of the Hungarian armies, Perczel and Wisocki, following Dembinski, retired south by way of Kecskemet to Szegedin.§

* Paskievitch, in one of his dispatches, states that he was compelled at one moment to halt, by the circumstance that five thousand men of the Russian army had been attacked by cholera in three days.

† One of the most energetic and successful moves of the war, for it defeated the first strategical combination of the imperial armies, broke their line, and placed a formidable enemy in the rear of the Russians. To fight was imperative. To have maneuvered in co-operation with Görgey, and to have fought Paskievitch to effect the junction, was what was universally expected.

‡ The Cologne Gazette reports a brilliant victory gained by Dembinski over Paskievitch, at Hatvan, on the night of the 24th of July, in which sixteen thousand Russians were killed; but this report is unsupported by other evidence than the supposed official bulletin of Dembinski.

§ Pragay.

MOVEMENTS OF F. M. L. HAYNAU.

In the mean time Haynau arrived, as we have seen, in Pesth with his army on the 19th of July, and immediately commenced the same brutality which had marked his course in Pressburg. While at Pressburg, to the deep disgrace of the Austrian government, he ordered ladies of great respectability and high rank to be "publicly flogged for having held communication with the insurgents;"* and brave officers executed for no other offense than that of vindicating their country.

At Pesth his brutality found a new means of indulgence,

* The Hungarian commander of the fortress of Leopoldstadt (who surrendered unconditionally in the beginning of February to the Austrians), as well as the commander of the artillery at that place, were tried by court-martial and hung. The first of these gallant men, Baron Ladislaus Medniansky, belonged to a branch of one of the noblest families in Hungary. He had previously served in the Hungarian Noble Guards; but having retired from service, held no rank in the Austrian army. His father was privy counselor, president of the exchequer, and well known as an author and statesman. His imputed crime was that, in the council of war in which the surrender of the fortress was resolved, he voted for holding out to the last man. The second victim, Major Grube, who commanded the artillery of the fortress, was hanged for remaining with his regiment in the Hungarian army, having been an officer in the Austrian army. Haynau ordered him to be tried as a deserter. The commandant of the fortress, Lieutenant-colonel Ordody, in consideration of his having surrendered the place after the first bombardment, was sentenced to only eight years of close confinement in a fortress. Nor was Haynau satisfied with the execution of brave officers. He afterward ordered to be hanged the Protestant clergyman Razga, of Pressburg, a man of superior education, and one of the most celebrated preachers in Hungary. With true evangelical courage and devotion, at the foot of the gallows the noble victim harangued the crowd, telling them he forgave his enemies, and adjuring every one to love his country.

Madame von Udvarnoky, a "much respected, rich, and handsome Hungarian lady," was flogged at Pressburg. At Raab, Haynau had the daughter of a professor in the university (Geyer) flogged in the yard of the town hall; her offense was that she turned her back upon the emperor as he entered the city.—*Pulszky*.

At Ruskby, Madame Madersbach received the same treatment under most aggravating circumstances, and it was attended with most disastrous consequences, as the following extract from her letter shows: "I am not aware that any of us committed any fault. I was suddenly, without a previous trial or examination, taken from my husband and children. I was dragged into a square formed by the troops, and, in the presence of the population which had been accustomed to honor me, not because I was the lady of the manor, but because the whole tenor of my life deserved it, I *was flogged with rods*. You see I can write the words without dying of shame; but my husband took his own life. Deprived of all other weapons, he shot himself with a small cannon. A general cry of horror was raised. I myself was taken to Karansebes."—*Klapka*.

which was to inflict upon the Jews of Buda-Pesth contributions in money so exorbitant as to be utterly destructive of their fortunes. To this they were condemned nominally as Jews, but really as Hungarian patriots. The public and private feeling of every inhabitant of the capital was known, and Jews entertained no other political sentiments than their Christian brethren; but it seemed to be the opinion of this brutal commander that Jews had less right than Christians to be liberal and patriotic.

He no sooner arrived in Pesth than (on the 19th) he addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of the city, declaring, "Any individual who shall, either by word or action, or by wearing any revolutionary signs or emblems, dare to support the cause of the rebels—any individual who shall insult one of my soldiers or those of our brave allies, either by words or blows, or any individual who shall enter into any criminal relations with the enemies of the crown, or who shall seek to kindle the flame of rebellion by reports spread for a sinister purpose, or who shall be rash enough to conceal arms or not deliver them up within the time fixed by my proclamation, shall be put to death with the shortest possible delay, and on the spot where the crime was committed, without distinction of age or sex." This was addressed to the inhabitants of Pesth; a few weeks later, he addressed another proclamation to the people of the countries of the Theiss, still surpassing it in fiendish brutality, and of which the following is an extract: "Take care not to incur my vengeance by revolutionary movements. Not being able in such case to find out the guilty party, I shall be compelled to punish the whole district. If on the territory occupied by my army, or in its rear, any attempt shall be committed against my soldiers, or if any of the convoys should be stopped, or a courier, or the transport of provisions prevented, an immediate punishment shall be inflicted on the guilty commune—it shall become the prey to flames, and be leveled to the ground, to serve as a frightful example to other communes."

As soon as Haynau was advised of the appearance of Dembinski at Kecskemet, he immediately made every preparation to overtake him.

The Russian division under Paniutine was dispatched on the 23d of July from Pesth, on the road to Kecskemet; on the 24th, the great body of the Austrian army; and on the 25th, after issuing a proclamation, and threatening the inhabitants of Buda-Pesth with the same chastisement he had inflicted on Brescia,* if they should attempt any thing in his absence, he left himself, attended by his staff.

F. M. L. Haynau, with his army, reached Kecskemet on the 26th, and, after a short struggle, Dembinski, finding that it would be impossible for him to oppose successfully so superior a force, abandoned the town to the Imperialists, and retreated toward Szegedin.

On the 27th, Haynau took possession of Kecskemet, and the next day continued the pursuit of Dembinski toward Szegedin. Field-marshal Paskievitch on the same day (27th) crossed the Theiss at Tisza-Füred, and marched on Debreczin, took possession of that capital, and thus placed himself between the army of Görgey and that of Dembinski.

MOVEMENTS OF GÖRGEY.

On the 29th, after his engagement with Grabbe, Görgey crossed the Theiss at Tokay, and proceeded south in two columns, with the first corps under the command of General Nagy-Shandor toward Debreczin, and with the 3d and 7th himself to Vamaspercz and Grosswardein.

Görgey's motive at this time for dividing his army, when surrounded on all sides by the overwhelming forces of the Imperialists, has never been explained, and is difficult to be reconciled consistently with intelligence and honesty of purpose.

The first corps, eight thousand strong, with forty cannons, under General Nagy-Shandor, was attacked at noon, on the 2d of August, near Debreczin, by the main body of the Russians, consisting of eighty thousand men, under Paskievitch, and defeated.† The action lasted till evening. Meanwhile Görgey

* For his massacre at Brescia, see chapter viii.

† Görgey was well aware that Nagy-Shandor would be attacked that day. He said to his staff the preceding evening, "To-morrow Nagy-Shandor will get a dressing." And yet he took no measures to protect him from this "dressing." This was afterward told by his inferior tools, when they found that they also

was at Vamaspercz with the other two corps, at farthest a distance of not more than two hours' march from the field of battle, but did not come to the assistance of the first corps, who owed only to the darkness an escape from total destruction.*

Not remaining at Grosswardein, where he added some new troops to his army, Görgey hurried on with all possible haste to Arad, pursued by the Russians under Paskievitch and Rüdiger.

FINAL OPERATIONS IN TRANSYLVANIA.

Upward of a month expired, after the entrance of the Russians into Transylvania, before they ventured to take the offensive vigorously.

They had possessed themselves of the principal towns, being undefended, without difficulty; but they had in the former campaign suffered so severely from the skill and indomitable energy of Bem, that the Russian commanders seemed reluctant, notwithstanding their overpowering numbers, to enter the field against him.

An opportunity occurred however, on the 31st of July, when Bem, in order to prevent the junction of Lüders with Grotjenhelm (who was at Maros-Vasarhely), attacked the former at Shässburg. An important action took place between part of the fifth Russian *corps d'armée* and the Hungarians under Bem. The first shot on the part of the Hungarians killed the Russian general, and chief of general quarter-master's staff, Skariatin.

The engagement was on the point of terminating favorably for the Hungarians, when, at that moment, two divisions of lancers advanced against the infantry stationed before Weiskirchen, and attacked them, killing part on the spot and the rest as they fled. The lancers took sanguinary vengeance for the death of their general, and killed more than a thousand of the

were betrayed. "*Wicks*," the expression used by Görgey, and here translated *dressing*, is a low word used by the vulgar instead of *Schläge*, blows.—*Pragay*.

* Nagy-Shandor sent repeated couriers to Görgey, imploring him to advance as rapidly as possible; but Görgey, refusing to stir, with laconic brevity and coldness merely reminded the brave Nagy-Shandor of the orders he had received to evacuate Debreczin after an attempt at resistance.

enemy. Terror then seized the Hungarians, who proceeded in disorder to Kerefsten pursued by the Cossacks. Seven pieces of cannon, two flags, a great quantity of ammunition and baggage, the traveling carriage of General Bem, with important papers,* and the sword of honor presented to him by the inhabitants of Klausenburg, fell into the hands of the Russians, with five hundred prisoners. Bem escaped with difficulty to Mediastz, and, it was said, was wounded with a lance. The Russians had forty-four killed, and one hundred and six wounded, and among them six officers. On the same day in which the battle of Shässburg was fought, the Hungarians met with equally bad success in the neighborhood of Karlsburg, where General Hasford and Colonel Glebof put to flight the besieging force, and relieved the fortress. Seventeen hundred and seventy-five men laid down their arms, and seventeen officers and two cannons were taken.†

A few days only elapsed after these reverses, which were not sufficient to discourage him, when Bem, gathering the remnant of his forces, and with re-enforcements from Klausenburg, in all twelve thousand men, and seventeen pieces of cannon, attacked Hermanstadt on the 5th of August, then occupied by the divisions under Hasford, and, after a desperate struggle, Hasford, unable to sustain himself, was driven from the city as far as Talmacs.

Bem's triumph, like that of his enemy's, was short; for the following day (the 6th), Lüders, apprised of Bem's movements, appeared before the town, and another action ensued.

The Russians were posted on the heights of Gross-Scheurn. Bem had a portion of his troops before the city, and the remainder in reserve in the town; but he was greatly inferior in force, having dispatched a portion of his troops in pursuit of General Hasford. The engagement commenced about eight in the morning of the 6th, and lasted about four hours. General Hasford hearing the cannonade, advanced from Talmacs, and took Bem in the rear. Bem, forced to maintain a front against this second enemy, and Lüder's cavalry rendering it impossible for him to outflank their left wing, while the right was

* His correspondence with Kossuth and others.

† Austrian official bulletin.

sufficiently protected by the hilly nature of the ground, he was defeated at all points, and the result of the day's conflict was that he lost a thousand killed and wounded, and one thousand were taken prisoners, and fourteen out of seventeen pieces of cannon were captured. Even the general himself narrowly escaped being taken prisoner; he was seized by a Russian soldier, but rescued by a Hungarian, who cut the Russian down.

Bem having lost four successive battles and all his war *material*, and unable to sustain himself longer against such superior forces, fled, with a few horsemen, across the Maros; and, hurrying to the scene of war in Hungary, arrived on the field during the battle of Temesvar.

THE LAST MEETINGS OF THE HUNGARIAN DIET.

The Diet, driven from Pesth by the advance of the Imperialists, opened at Szegedin, on the 21st of July, the old and enthusiastic Paloczy presiding. At this sitting of the Diet, Szemere, with his usual ability, described the position of affairs, and the line of policy which the government had determined to pursue. He spoke of schemes of pacification with the hostile races, of past sufferings, and of sacrifices still to be made in the cause of liberty; but, although expressly interrogated by Hernfalvi, he skillfully avoided unvailing, or explaining in any manner, that which the Parliament desired most to know, viz., the open breach which appeared to exist between the government and their first general.

The last efforts of the Diet, instead of being directed to preparation for the impending dangers, by the necessary military dispositions, dismissing unfaithful or disobedient officers, marshaling all the forces of the kingdom to meet the final struggle which imminently threatened, were devoted to a task which should have been accomplished before the conflict had commenced, viz., conciliation of the several nationalities. After repeated secret conferences, held to discuss the great question how the hostility of the Slavic and Wallachian races might be appeased, the Diet in its last sitting, on the 28th of July, adopted the following resolutions:

1st. That an amnesty should be accorded to all the people of different races, who had taken part in the war against the

Magyars; that the liberty of language should be guarantied to them, but that the Magyar should be the diplomatic language.

2d. That a credit of sixty millions of florins should be opened to the government.

3d. That the seat of government should be removed to Grosswardein.

The exact object of the first resolution seems very naturally to be involved in doubt, and consequently to have been variously interpreted. Schlessinger, regarding it as a recognition of equal rights to all nationalities, declared it as not adapted to the times or circumstances. "The Magyar haughtiness, and the thirst for supremacy in the Hungarian nobility," he says, "never suffered a deeper humiliation than from the resolution passed at this sitting of the Diet—it was the last—the last great expiatory sin-offering of the representatives of the Hungarian nation for long years of injustice to the other races." Pulszky, on the contrary, pronounces this idea of Schlessinger as "incorrect," since "all the inhabitants of Hungary had, since March, 1848, possessed equal rights. The Diet only gave an amnesty to the Wallachs, Saxons, and Serbs, who were at this time all subdued by the Hungarians."

In the absence of further light upon the motives and objects which prompted the adoption of the resolution, the terms of the resolution would seem to sustain Pulszky's construction. The resolution certainly contains no "recognition of equal rights," but it does embrace an "amnesty to all the people of different races who had taken part in the war against the Magyars." It does declare that "the liberty of language should be guarantied to them," and that "the Magyar should be the diplomatic language;" but this is precisely the act of March, 1848, and not a new concession. This clause, which is the only one capable of misconstruction, was, as Pulszky explains, a mere declaratory act, passed in conformity with a treaty just entered into between the government and Janku, the Wallachian leader, then at Szegedin, and by which a full amnesty was granted to the Wallachians.

On the 1st of August, three days after the passage of the above resolutions, when Dembinski had determined to abandon Szegedin, and when, from the towers of the city, the Austrian

outposts were distinctly visible, the members of the Diet and the government left the town. The Diet was never again convened. The ministry met at Arad.

LAST BATTLE BETWEEN THE HUNGARIANS AND AUSTRIANS.

Dembinski, retreating before Haynau from Kecskemet, reached Szegedin on the 1st of August. His forces were here increased by the addition of ten thousand troops hastily raised, and the entire army of the south, numbering about twenty-five thousand, which was there incorporated with it. In a week the city itself was transformed, by the labors of one hundred thousand hands, into a strong tenable position, while the government, which, with the Diet, had for a few weeks past made their head-quarters at this place, had collected large supplies of provisions, as well as munitions of war, before they were compelled to leave for Arad.

Haynau, with the Russian division Paniutine, followed, and, after a dreadful march through the deep sand, in excessively hot weather and great suffering for water, as all the wells being filled with dead bodies, they were forced to exist on the scanty but almost putrid supply brought with them, they reached Szegedin on the day following (2d) that of the arrival of Dembinski.

Dembinski, for greater security, abandoned Szegedin, and, crossing the Theiss, took up a position at Szoreg, a few leagues to the south, and lying between the two rivers, near the confluence of the Maros with the Theiss. But notwithstanding the fortifications,* and although his front was covered by the Theiss, his right by the Maros, his left flank guarded by Peterwardein, and his rear by the army, which he might have supposed in good condition, in Transylvania, as well as by the blockading forces of Temesvar, and although he had between sixty and seventy thousand men at his disposal, Dembinski declared himself unable to hold his ground as Haynau approached. The Imperialists, as soon as they reached Szegedin, about four o'clock on the 3d, attempted to lay pontoon bridges over the Theiss, but were resisted by the Hungarians on the oppo-

* They had intrenched the whole dike leading from the Maros to Szoreg.

site side of the river. A terrible cannonading ensued. The bridges were destroyed, with all the brave men who had ventured upon them to gain the opposite shore. The yellow, muddy water of the Theiss, scarcely ever fit for drink, was dyed red with the blood of the slain, and for a great distance, even beyond Szenta, no dog would quench his thirst in those waters.* After an obstinate resistance the Hungarians were repulsed, and that night several pontoon bridges were extended across the river.

After crossing on the 4th and 5th, the Imperialists, on the afternoon of the latter day, attacked the Hungarian lines with three corps, and a battle ensued, in which the Imperialist cavalry attempted to turn the left wing of the enemy, while the whole of the artillery opened upon the Hungarian batteries, which were posted in the intrenchments on the dike, and the Imperialist foot advanced along the Maros to Szoreg. The battle lasted several hours, and, by sunset, the Hungarians were driven from all their positions, with a loss of five cannons and four hundred prisoners. The approach of night prevented the Imperialists from pursuing the enemy.

While this battle was going on at Szoreg, General Ramberg, with the third division, and whom General Haynau had sent around from Szegedin, forced the passage of the Theiss at Kanisa. On the following day, Jellacic, whose situation for some time past had been exceedingly critical, pressed as he was, and hedged in between the Danube and the Theiss, relieved by the march of Haynau, advanced toward the scene of action, and united his forces with those of Haynau, on the 6th, at Mokrin. On the same day the line of the Maros was forced, and Mako fell into the hands of the Imperialists.

By each of these successes, the imperial army, increased and strengthened, continued to follow up their advantages against the enemy, who retreated in the direction of Temesvar.† The imperial army continued its pursuit of the Hungarians during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of August; and it was

* Schlessinger.

† Dembinski was ordered by Kossuth, in case of defeat, to retreat to the fortress of Arad, which had he done, a junction with Görgey might have been effected, even against the will of the latter.

not until the latter day, not far from the fortress of Temesvar, that a decisive battle took place.

Haynau advanced on the enemy with the third army corps and the Walmoden cavalry division from Czatatad to Kis-Becskerek, and with the Russian division Paniutine from Lovrin by Sillet, also to Kis-Becskerek, while he ordered the reserve corps to proceed from Peszak by Knez to Hodony and Karany, to attack the enemy's right flank. In the action on the 8th, Dembinski was unfortunately wounded in the shoulder by a shot; he fell from his horse, and was carried into a peasant's cottage, and for twenty-four hours the Hungarian army was without a commander.

At this stage of the conflict, defeated in Transylvania, and summoned by Kossuth to the army of Lower Hungary, Bem appeared on the field of battle, and immediately assumed the command. On the morning of the 9th, the battle of Temesvar commenced. Until half past four in the afternoon, Bem, who pressed forward personally with his left wing and chief force of artillery, drove the enemy from position to position, almost to Kis-Becskerek. The last reserves of Austrian and Russian cavalry charged to retrieve the day. They were beaten back by the hussars. At this time the battle was thought to have been won, and Haynau, it is stated, was seven miles from the field, when suddenly Bem's cannons ceased. His ammunition was exhausted. At this critical moment in the battle, Prince Lichtenstein, who had come from Hodos, appeared with his corps on the Hungarian left flank; and about the same time, Schlick, advancing from Mezöhegyes, made his appearance at Vinga. These re-enforcements to the repulsed wing of the Austrians caused them to rally, and return to the attack. The charge of the artillery commenced, and no fire being returned from the Hungarian side (when Bem broke a collar-bone by a fall from his horse, over which he had for some time lost sufficient control, covered as he was with wounds), the fate of the battle was now decided. In vain Guyon, with his hussars, charged the enemy's artillery: men and horses, having been for twenty-four hours without food or forage, were unequal to the attempt. The confusion into which the Hungarians were thrown led to a dispersion and flight such as Hun-

gary had never before witnessed. Of the whole army, not one corps, with the exception of the Vécsey and Kmetty battalions (which, engaged in the siege of Temesvar, had taken no part in the battle), remained together. Instead of attempting to rally as they came up with the besieging corps at Temesvar, they fled by to the right and left, and the besieging force was quite too small to risk a battle with the Austrian army that was approaching to the relief of the garrison. The battalions dispersed in all directions, the smaller portions fleeing toward Orsova, and afterward reached Turkey; the larger number proceeded to Lugos.

Here they soon learned the resignation of Kossuth, the dissolution of the Diet and ministry, and the surrender of Görgey. Taking no further care of the bank-note press, the supplies of clothing, munitions of war, and the whole artillery, they dispersed entirely, each individual choosing what seemed to him the safest course. A few small bodies only remained united under Guyon and Kmetty. In the flight-like retreat from Temesvar to Lugos, the Hungarians left a large quantity of muskets, cannons, carriages, and munitions, and some thousands of the rear, in the hands of the pursuers. The Austrians estimate the loss of the Hungarians, after the battle of Szoreg, on the 5th of August, at eighteen thousand; a like number laid down their arms and returned home, so that the hostile infantry were completely dissolved.

The immediate result of the loss of this battle was the relief of the fortress of Temesvar. The uninterrupted bombardment of this fortress, during seventeen days and nights, had so demolished the city of Temesvar, that it presented an aspect of ruins which the most experienced soldiers had never before witnessed. As the numberless projectiles had been directed particularly against the arsenal, the neighboring houses were literally converted into piles of rubbish. Whether from accident or design, the black flag raised in such emergencies to excite the commiseration of the enemy, here fluttered in vain over the hospital crowded with sufferers. Every house bore marks of destruction, and threatened the lives of the exposed occupants. The bombs, which penetrated the roof and ceiling, were arrested only by the vaults of casemates; while the scour-

vy, typhus, hospital fever, and cholera, arising from the dampness, want of wholesome air and food, decimated the citizens and garrison. Of six thousand soldiers intrusted with the defense of the fortress during one hundred and seven days (the period of the siege), twenty-seven hundred died of different diseases, and three hundred only were killed by the balls of the enemy. Two thousand were found confined by sickness at the moment of liberation. Infantry and cavalry attended to the cannons, for want of gunners. Horse-flesh, upon which they had lived for eighteen days, had become scarce, and supplies of flour and wine sufficient for but a few days longer. The brave old commander, F. M. L. Rukowina, would in a short time have been compelled to yield from famine, although he remarked that the time for surrender would not arrive until they had gnawed the last bone of their horses, or when the handkerchief in his pocket should be set on fire. The sensation produced by the entrance of the imperial troops, and the consequent liberation of the garrison, exceeded all bounds. Young and old, soldiers and citizens, women and children laughed, wept, embraced each other, and kissed the hands and clothes of the liberator. But the most remarkable sight of all, as well as the most convincing proof of the touching nature of the scene, tears were absolutely seen to trickle down the long gray mustache* of the iron-hearted Haynau.

SURRENDER OF GÖRGEY.

The Hungarian cause, from the defeats of Bem and of Dembinski, which so rapidly succeeded each other, was almost hopeless, when the third and final blow soon followed in the surrender of Görgey.

Görgey, who, as we have seen, had left Grosswardein for Arad, was closely followed by General Rüdiger, who shortly after occupied Grosswardein without resistance, and, after being re-enforced by nine regiments of cavalry, had advanced toward Arad; while Paskievitch, at Debreczin, was hourly expected to make his appearance on the scene of action. Görgey reached Arad on the 8th of August, before Dembinski was

* F. M. L. Haynau wears a mustache of about eight or ten inches in length, and it is perfectly white.

defeated, and within half a day's march of the spot where his army was routed. Arriving, with his thirty thousand or forty thousand troops, at that opportune moment, when the combatants had been marching and fighting for several days previously, he might have turned the scale of victory, and rolled back the tide of war against the oppressors of his country. But that important day, when the destiny of the nation was suspended in the balance, as well as the following, were consumed in endeavoring to effect the dissolution of the government, and procuring for himself the appointment of dictator.

Surrounded by the enemy, and divided among themselves, the prospects of the Hungarians now rapidly declined. Reports having obtained circulation that the Russians were disposed to guarantee the Constitution of 1848, and to raise the Grand Duke Constantine to the throne of Hungary,* Kossuth dispatched two of the ministry, Szemere and Batthyányi, to the Russian camp; but they soon returned, and reported the fallacy of these rumors.† The Diet had now separated, and was never reassembled. The ministry, upon the approach of Haynau to Szegedin, had scaped with the bank-note press to Arad. In the last full cabinet council, whether from a consideration of the hopeless condition of the country, the terrorism he exerted, or the power he possessed, Görgey, whom each of the ministers knew or believed to be a traitor, "*received the commission to treat with Russia;*" "on the condition," however, as Casimir Batthyányi states, "that the legal autonomy of Hungary be maintained, and a general amnesty granted."‡

Whether Görgey, under the authority thus intrusted to him, made any effort toward carrying out the wishes of the ministry; or whether, as was more likely, aiming as he was at the position of *principal*, he wholly disregarded the office of *agent*, is a question it is yet impossible to decide.

To add to the embarrassments of the ministry, the tidings of the total defeat at Temesvar now reached Arad. Görgey, who, with his officers, for the last two days had been busily

* Wisocki, in his memoirs, states that Kossuth actually instructed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Casimir Batthyányi, to prepare a memorandum offering the crown to a Russian prince.

† Pulszky.

‡ For letters of Hungarian ministers, Szemere, C. Batthyányi, Esterhazy, &c., on the abdication, see Appendix, note No. 33.

engaged in intriguing with some and exercising a terror over others, "now called upon Kossuth to abdicate, as a general alone could save the country in such a crisis."*

"Görgey," as Szemere states, "caused Kossuth to be requested to abdicate," and a proposal to that effect was presented to the governor by three of his ministers, viz., Vukovitch, Horvath, and Czanyi.† Without consulting his other ministers, three of whom (viz., Szemere, Batthyányi, and Dushak) were present in Arad, without even the call of a cabinet council, he took the important step of dissolving the government, and conferring upon General Arthur Görgey the supreme civil and military power. The following proclamation was then issued:

"KOSSUTH TO THE NATION.

"After the unfortunate battles wherewith God, in these latter days, has visited our people, we have no hope of our successful continuance of the defense against the allied forces of Russia and Austria. Under such circumstances, the salvation of the national existence, and the protection of its fortune, lies in the hands of the leaders of the army. It is my firm conviction that the continuance of the present government would not only prove useless, but also injurious to the nation. Acting upon this conviction, I proclaim, that, moved by those patriotic feelings which, throughout the course of my life, have impelled me to devote all my thoughts to the country, I, and with me the whole of the cabinet, resign the guidance of the public affairs; and that the supreme civil and military power is herewith conferred on General Arthur Görgey, until the nation, making use of its right, shall have disposed that power according to its will. I expect of the said General Görgey—and I

* Görgey now asked the governor whether he thought it possible alone to save the country. When Kossuth replied, "that he now could not do it unsupported by Görgey." The general then declared, "that he could and would save Hungary, but only if Kossuth immediately resigned and had him appointed dictator."—*Pulszky*.

† Szemere, in his letter to the Cologne Gazette, states, "I do not think that those three ministers, said to have agreed to it (out of the seven comprising the ministry), were guilty of having originated the proposal, but that the governor of the country (Kossuth) was to blame—one who, without asking the concurrence of the other three, though they were present, gave the decision."

make him responsible to God, the nation, and to history—that, according to the best of his ability, he will use this supreme power for the salvation of the national and political independence of our poor country and its future. May he love his country with that disinterested love which I bear it! May his endeavors to reconquer the independence and happiness of the nation be crowned with greater success than mine were!

“I have it no longer in my power to assist the country by actions. If my death can benefit it, I will gladly sacrifice my life. May the God of justice and of mercy watch over my poor people!

“LOUIS KOSSUTH.

“S. VUCOVICS.

“L. CZANYI.

“M. HORVATH.”

That so important an act as the dissolution of the government, even if, as is stated in the proclamation, its “continuance was not only useless, but injurious to the nation,” should have taken place without a full cabinet, is indeed an event requiring explanation. But what is still more extraordinary, is, that Kossuth should have considered the supreme power intrusted to him by a vote of the Diet as transferable. This power, so confided to him, was not only a personal trust, and not transferable, but it was to be exercised by him conjointly with the ministry, who, by the vote of the Diet, received the power cotemporaneously with himself. Even then, had he chosen to resign the power which he held, and which he had a clear right to do, he could not resign that held by his ministry, and for the faithful exercise of which they were held strictly responsible. But what is by far the most inexplicable, as well as the most important aspect of the whole matter, was, that he should have thought proper to confide the power into the hands of one whom he had long had reason to regard as a traitor to his country.

Görgey, it is true, was at the head of the only army still unsubdued in Hungary; he was the only one possessed of power to serve the country; but this excuse will not avail, since, if the agent is unfaithful, the greater the power he possesses, the greater are his capacities for injury. But the mil-

itary power then at the command of Görgey could not have been regarded as an important consideration, from the fact that, in the very proclamation of transfer, it is averred, "we have no hope of a successful continuance of the defense against the allied forces of Russia and Austria." It is exceedingly unfortunate for the reputation of Kossuth that, having thought a resignation of his power necessary, he had not concluded to surrender it to the Diet, whence he received it, or, in the event of their dissolution, to the ministry who, with himself, were conjointly and contemporaneously empowered. Görgey accepted the supreme power, and issued the succeeding proclamation:

"GÖRGEY TO THE NATION.

"Citizens!—The Provisional Government exists no longer. The governor and the ministers have voluntarily resigned their offices. Under these circumstances a military dictatorship is necessary, and it is I who take it, together with the civil power of the state.

"Citizens! whatever, in our precarious position, can be done for the country I intend to do, be it by means of arms or by negotiations. I intend to do all in my power to lessen the painful sacrifice of life and treasure, and to put a stop to persecution, cruelty, and murder.

"Citizens! the events of our time are astounding, and the blows of fate overwhelming. Such a state of things defies all calculation. My only advice and desire is that you should quietly return to your homes, and that you eschew assisting in the resistance and the combats, even in case your towns are occupied by the enemy. The safety of your persons and properties you can only obtain by quietly staying at the domestic hearth, and by peacefully following the course of your usual occupations.

"Citizens! it is ours to bear whatever it may please God, in his inscrutable wisdom, to send us. Let our strength be the strength of men, and let us find comfort in the conviction that right and justice must weather the storms of all times.

"Citizens! may God be with us!

"ARTHUR GÖRGEY.

"Arad, August 11, 1849."

It was on the evening of the 10th, or the morning of the 11th, that Görgey received the full civil and military power; and what seems a strong corroboration of his guilt, or, at least, of a previous understanding with the enemy, is, that without the slightest attempt at resistance, or the least effort at negotiation, notwithstanding his assurance to Kossuth that he could, if possessed of dictatorial power, save the country, he immediately issued the foregoing proclamation, suppressing all opposition to the enemy, and advising the citizens to return to their homes, and to avoid assisting in any resistance or combats, even in defense of their own towns. That he had the surrender in view before he received the supreme power, and that it constituted the great object at which he aimed, is not only evident from the circumstances just mentioned, but is expressly admitted in his letters to Klapka and to Rüdiger.

On the same day (the 11th), at Alt-Arad he addressed a communication* to General Rüdiger, who had in the mean time advanced from Grosswardein to the neighborhood of Vilagos, announcing that, in consequence of the dissolution of the Provisional Government of Hungary, he felt called on to arrive at a solution, and he accordingly decided to submit without condition; and that he and all the officers of his *corps d'armée* were ready to lay down their arms before the army of his majesty the Emperor of Russia. He, at the same time, expressed the conviction that the other chiefs of the *corps d'armée* would follow his example, and offer their submission. By means of his subservient tools, he busily spread abroad the idea that he could not possibly hold out any longer, and that the Duke of Leuchtenberg, who had fully guaranteed the Constitution of 1848, would be placed, by the help of the Russians, on the Hungarian throne. He dispatched orders to all the armies and garrisons to yield to the Russians on the same conditions as those which he accepted for himself. He then left Arad, and maneuvered in the neighborhood until the 13th, when he surrendered to the Russians, whom he had daily apprised of his movements, that they might inclose his army, of which, in spite of its corrupted condition, he still stood in fear.

* For Görgey's letter in full, see Appendix, note No. 34.

Prince Paskievitch accepted the absolute submission of Görgey and his troops, in order, as he states, "to put an end to the effusion of blood, and to preserve a part of the states of the empire of Austria from the ravages of war." General Rüdiger received orders to disarm it.

As the bulletin of Prince Paskievitch declares, "Görgey, having left Arad with a *corps d'armée*, in conformity with the convention which he had formed with General Rüdiger, proceeded to Szöllös. On the 13th, at midnight, Görgey advanced toward our army at the head of his staff. He repeated to General Rüdiger that he submitted without conditions, and only solicited, as a grace, the intercession of Prince Paskievitch. At four o'clock in the afternoon the troops made their submission in the following manner: The Hungarian army was drawn up in two lines, in close columns, in the plains of the village of Szöllös. The infantry and cavalry on the two wings occupied the first line, the artillery the second.* The infantry, after presenting arms, laid them down, and the cavalry alighted from their horses, and attached their arms to the saddles. The men then left the ranks and proceeded toward the town of Zarand, under the escort of three regiments of the second division of light cavalry. The artillery and baggage were taken by a regiment. The regiment Jellecki was charged to convey all the arms to Grosswardein. Eleven generals, twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry, laid down their arms, and one hundred and thirty pieces of artillery were also given up. Görgey, in approaching our troops, cried 'What can not be undertaken with such troops!' Görgey then declared that he was disposed to cause the other divisions of the army to yield. Shortly after, two messengers from the fortress of Arad, presented themselves to General Rüdiger, and said they were authorized by the commandant, Damjanic, and by the officers, to propose the surrender of the fortress to the Russians. On the 14th, the troops of General Rüdiger

* As an eye-witness of the surrender states: "Görgey's proposition to yield, with his thirty-five thousand men, at first excited distrust, and some trick of war or treason was feared. He was required, accordingly, to blow up all that remained of his ammunition. This he did, and the giving up of arms took place afterward."

diger took up their previous positions; the advanced guard at Simand, and the principal *corps d'armée* at Kis-Jenö, where he will remain until new orders from Field-marshal Paskievitch; the corps of Görgey is proceeding under escort to Grosswardein."

The act of laying down their arms by the Hungarians took place on the fields between Kis-Jenö and Szöllös; but in the little village of Vilagos the final terms were arranged, and hence this act will be designated in history as *the surrender of Vilagos*.*

* On the 13th of August, the sun shone bright and hot; Görgey's army stood in regimental array, twenty-four thousand men strong, with one hundred and forty-four cannons. In the foremost ranks were the infantry, in the rear the artillery, on either side the regiments of cavalry. A death-like stillness pervaded the army, their looks were bent upon the ground. The soil was sacred—it was the grave of their honor.

From time to time the report of a shot broke the quiet of the scene. Some hussar fired the last charge of his carbine into the head of his faithful horse, determined that the brave animal, at least, should not survive the disgrace of its master and the fall of Hungary. Others of his comrades had unstrapped their saddles in the forest, and laid them aside with csiko and dolmany, as things which they could no longer call their own; they had then dashed off on their wild steeds over the plains, to resume their former course of life—the wild, free csikos of the heath. The hussars, too, in rank and file, took the saddles from their horses in silence, piled them in large heaps, together with their arms and standards, and stepped back to their horses. Here stood the Ferdinand regiment, with its brave colonel at its head, a picture of grief and despair: his sword was gone—he had flung it with a curse at Görgey's feet, when the latter succeeded in carrying his proposals of surrender in the last council of war. Beside them stood the Hanover hussars, Count Batthyányi, their commanding officer, at their head,¹ on foot: with his own hand he had killed his charger, the finest in the whole army, that it might never bear a Cossack on its back. Further on, the Nicolaus and Alexander regiments, Görgey's guardian angels in the Carpathians, Hungary's avenging angels in the victories of April—shadows of former greatness, remains of the old regiments, in which but a few still survived to serve as the frame-work of newly-organized battalions. Close at hand stood the Coburg and Würtemberg imperial hussars. The younger regiments of cavalry were distributed on the flanks; Lehel hussars, which had not yet had an opportunity of emulating the older regiments; the Hunyady corps, which had already won the respect of the veteran troops.

The generals stood gathered in a group, or rode slowly up and down between the battalions. Földvary approached the ninth battalion with tears in his eyes; under his command, in conjunction with the third, it had been the first to storm the ramparts of Buda. The men loved him as a father, and had rescued him from many a danger; for Földvary, one of the bravest of the brave, was short-sighted, and frequently rode into the very midst of the enemy, whence he had again and

¹ Now a private in the ranks.

Arthur Görgey was born in the year 1817, of noble and tolerably wealthy parents, at Busocz, in the county of Zips.

After finishing his studies at the Gymnasium of Késmark, he entered the Pioneer school at Tuln as a cadet, and from there an Austrian regiment, whence he was soon after transferred to a lieutenancy in the noble Hungarian body-guard.*

He was of an eccentric character, but greatly distinguished for his talents as well as his diligence as a scholar, and excelled especially in the mathematical sciences and chemistry.

In order to marry, he quitted the army, and occupied him-

again been extricated by his brave soldiers. At this moment, when they saw their former colonel up to bid a last farewell, as if electrified with one thought, they formed themselves unbidden into a large square; the standard-bearer hands the flag to his neighbor, and thus it passes from one to another up to the colonel. Every man kisses it: they then lay it upon a pile of fagots in the midst of the square, and look on in silence while the flag burns to ashes.

Nagy-Shandor—a Murat likewise in taste for costume—stands in conversation with Pöltenberg, dressed in a splendid uniform. The latter, undistinguished in outward appearance, with indolent features, concealing a spirit of true bravery, had always followed Görgey with blind devotion. The tranquillity of his countenance contrasted strongly with the visible excitement of Nagy-Shandor. Count Leiningen, Görgey's warmest friend, was pacing up and down near them; he was idolized by his comrades, but never made any pretensions to merit, content to assist in adding one stone to the temple of his friend's fame. Generals Löchner, Knezick, Kiss, Colonel Görgey, and others were on horseback, conversing on different subjects. Damjanic, the colossus in stature and courage, had remained as commander in Arad.

The new dictator appeared in the simple dress which he was accustomed to wear when on march. He endeavored to put on a cheerful face; but his features were more solemn, dark, and iron-bound than usual. He rode up and down before the hussars, murmuring here and there a word of encouragement, and slowly inspecting the Honvéd battalions, the scarred warriors of the former regiments, Schwartzemberg, Franz Karl, Prinz von Preussen, Don Miguel, Alexander, and Wasa. He then rode in front of the ranks, and declared himself ready to transfer the command to any one who believed himself capable of saving the army: this he was no longer able to do. A gray-headed hussar officer rode out of the ranks up to the staff, and declared that it was his and his comrades' determination to cut their way through the enemy. But Görgey warned him dryly against any "insubordination, which must be put down by musket-balls;" and so saying, he turned his back carelessly upon the officer.

From four o'clock in the afternoon until late that evening, continued the surrender of arms, the divisioning of the escorts, and departure of the troops. They were conducted to Sarkad, and from thence to Gyula, where they were transferred to the power of Austria.

At ten o'clock the fields before Vilagos were deserted.—*Schlessinger*.

* Other accounts state that he entered the regiment of Palatine hussars. He was a short time adjutant to Windischgrätz.—*Examiner*.

self in his favorite study of chemistry, which he was pursuing in Galicia, when the war broke out, and he immediately returned home. On arriving in Hungary, he was appointed a captain of Honvéds, soon after a major in the National Guard, and on the field of Schwechat, as has been seen, he was promoted to the post of general, and appointed commander of the army of the Upper Danube.

As to the character of Görgey, opinions are as opposite as they are on the merits of the struggle between Austria and Hungary, and if truth can scarcely be discovered in relation to the events which transpired, when the accounts purely Austrian and those purely Hungarian are found totally irreconcilable, some idea of the difficulties of the task may be conceived when it is attempted to approach the more delicate questions of demeanor, character, and motive. Whether Görgey was in fact a patriot or a traitor, is a question upon which the public mind is still divided, and in the consideration of which it would better accord both with justice and prudence, to review the leading circumstances which have induced such contradictory conclusions, than, by giving full credence to one set of statements and entirely rejecting another, to pronounce a definite opinion on the subject.

The following facts are apparently inconsistent with his treachery :

1st. His successful sally from Komorn, and desperate charge at Acs.

2d. His escape in the mountain districts from the toils with which Paskievitch endeavored to encompass him.

3d. His march from Waitzen to Arad, from the 17th of July to the 11th of August, a distance of nearly four hundred miles in twenty-five days, and fighting six battles and encountering no serious loss.

4th. His leaving that portion of Hungary above the Theiss, which was almost entirely free from the enemy, and penetrating south amid all the Austrian and Russian armies, amounting to five times his number.

5th. When at Arad, on the 11th of August, he learned that the corps of Bem in Transylvania, and Dembinski at Temesvar were completely routed ; that, while he could look for assist-

ance from no quarter, he was himself completely surrounded, by Paskievitch at Debreczin, Rüdiger at Vilagos, Schlick at Mako, Lichtenstein at Lippa, Haynau at Temesvar, and Lüders advancing from Transylvania.

On the other hand, the following circumstances are adduced to found against him the charge of treason :

1st. His proclamation from Waitzen on the 5th of January, that the Hungarian army were fighting for nothing else than the laws of 1848, and for their legitimate king, Ferdinand V., and that they would defend the fatherland independently of any other authority. In fact, repudiating Kossuth and the Committee of Defense.

2d. That, after leaving Waitzen, Görgey, during his retreat, made several attempts to enter into negotiations with the Russian generals, Rüdiger* and Tscheodajeff, and with Marshal Paskievitch.†

3d. He intentionally and rapidly weakened the physical and moral soundness of his forces by extraordinary marches and great privations, by frequent parleys with the enemy, and open discussion of the propriety of a surrender.

4th. The arrest of Görgey's aunt at Szikso, where the first army corps then was, carrying letters from him to Field-marshal Paskievitch, of a tenor that left no further doubt as to his purpose of surrender.‡

5th. Dividing his forces, after crossing the Theiss, and getting into the midst of the enemy. Sending Nagy-Shandor by Debreczin, where he told his staff, on the evening previous, that Nagy-Shandor would get a "dressing" the next day, which was literally true, while he was at Vamaspercz, a distance of less than two hours' march from the scene.

6th. After reaching Arad, he makes no effort to assist Dembinski, struggling for existence within a few hours' march,

* Pragay.

† But as his letters only spoke of a desire of mediation, and not of submission without reserve, they were sent back unanswered.—*Vienna Gazette*, 24th August, 1849.

‡ The first visible negotiation between them appears at Rima-Szombath, in the person of a nephew of Rüdiger, who brought him a present of Russian arms. Görgey accepted the gift, and returned the courtesy with some of his own arms.—*Pragay*.

but remained at Arad with the government and Diet, endeavoring to procure for himself the office of dictator.

7th. He surrendered to the enemy, without making or attempting to make any reservations for his country or terms for his army, while, in his own language, he "had, it is true, one line of retreat from Arad, over Radna, to Transylvania."

8th. He "induced them (the government) to resign. They gave all the powers of the state into my hands. Time pressed, and I took the resolution (rash though it seems, it was *maturely* considered) to make an unconditional surrender to the troops of his majesty the Czar of Russia."*

9th. The charge of treason has been openly made against him. Görgey, if innocent, has it in his power to prove himself so; yet upward of two years have elapsed, and he has not attempted a defense, or given to a deeply interested world the slightest explanation of his conduct.

Such are some of the considerations which may influence our determination as to the patriotism or treachery of Görgey; but, before arriving at any conclusion, there is still another view of the subject, differing from both, and which, perhaps, may more nearly approach the truth than either. It is, that Görgey was neither patriot nor traitor, but a mere professional soldier; that he was possessed, in a remarkable degree, both of skill and courage, but not one spark of nationality glowed within his bosom. His own illustration as a soldier, his own success, was evidently his first thought, and his country's safety or freedom a secondary consideration. Not to be beaten, or, when beaten, to take a speedy revenge; to keep his army together, not as constituting the defense and security of the country, but as illustrating the importance of the general, such were Görgey's aims. He cared not where he retreated or what he abandoned, provided he yielded not a flag and lost not a gun. And his last celebrated march (if not accomplished through the connivance of the enemy), a bold and martial achievement, seemed directed with infinite skill to the one great aim of surrendering *en masse*, with all his guns, troops, and arms, so as even if he thereby lost his country, he would gain credit with his enemies for the importance of his submis-

* Görgey's letter to Klapka. See Appendix.

sion, and retain in the face of the world the reputation of a still unconquered general.

However divided may be the opinion as to his guilt or innocence as a traitor, his last act of unconditional surrender at Vilagos stands forth without palliation on the pages of history. To use his own words, he had "still one line of retreat open to him." He could not have lost more had he fought out the war for thirty years, like John Zapolya, amid the Carpathians, and disputed before the enemy the last inch of ground and the last blade of grass on the Hungarian pusztos. All his faithful comrades, who had stood by his side in many a hard-fought field, and had messed at his table, were left to the gallows or the prison. The brave soldiers who had followed him through his long and weary retreat with unshaken confidence and love, believing that their Görgey would come out right at last, were abandoned to Austrian dungeons, or drafted into the imperial regiments.*

And what has he gained by it? He has saved nothing but his own miserable existence. Instead of rendering up his life to save his country, he has basely rendered up his country to save his life, a life to be passed under the surveillance of Austrian spies, followed by the curses of all those widows and orphans that his surrender had occasioned, the wrath of the whole Hungarian nation, and the universal execration of mankind. Better, far better, a thousand honorable deaths to one such execrable life.

Upon the surrender of Görgey, the fortress of Arad in the neighborhood immediately tendered its submission; and deputations of Russian and Austrian officers were immediately dispatched to all the armies and garrisons still holding out, with orders or solicitations from Görgey to yield to the Russians on the same conditions as those which he had accepted for himself.

To his friend Klapka, commanding the impregnable fortress of Komorn, something more than a mere verbal solicitation being necessary, he addressed a letter, not very flattering either to his head or heart, and remarkable only for involving in still greater doubt his own integrity of purpose.

* Brace.

“MY DEAR FRIEND KLAPKA,—Events which, though by no means unexpected, are still decisive, have happened since I saw you last. The jealousy and the selfishness of some members of the government have brought affairs to the crisis which I prophesied to you they would bring them to.

“When, after many an honest battle with the Russians, I had crossed the Theiss at Tokay, I found that the Parliament declared that they desired me to take the chief command.

“Kossuth appointed Bem. He did it secretly.

“The country believed that I was commander-in-chief, for Kossuth returned a jesuitical reply to the motion of the Parliament.

“This piece of knavery was the source of all the later events. Dembinski was beaten at Szoreg. Bem’s troops were routed at Maros-Vásárhely.

“Dembinski retreated to the walls of Temesvar. Bem hastened to the same place. He arrived on the field of battle at Temesvar, and succeeded in restoring the fight for a few hours; but afterward he was so fearfully beaten, that of fifty thousand men (according to Kossuth’s calculations) only six thousand remained in the ranks. Vécsey informed me that all the rest were dispersed.

“The Austrians advanced meanwhile between Temesvar and Arad. The War Office had instructed Dembinski to retreat, as of course he ought to have done, upon our own fortress of Arad, and not upon Temesvar, which was held by our enemies.

“Dembinski—Heaven knows why—acted in opposition to this order. There are a great many facts which make me believe that he acted from motives of jealousy. He was jealous of me.

“The consequence was that I stood alone with the forces which I took from Komorn (minus the serious losses I had at Waitzen, Recsag, Görömböly, Zsolna, Gesztely, and Debreczin). From the south I was threatened by the Austrians, and from the north by the *gros* of the Russian army. I might, indeed, have retreated from Arad by way of Radna into Transylvania; but my affection for my country, and my desire to restore it to peace at any price, induced me to surrender.

"But, before taking that step, I convinced the Provisional Government of their inability to save the country, and of the certainty of a still greater ruin if they continued to remain in office. I induced them to resign.

"They gave all the powers of the state into my hands. Time pressed; and I took the resolution (rash though it seems, it was maturely considered) to make an unconditional surrender to the troops of his majesty the Czar of Russia.

"My brave and gallant troops gave their assent. All the detachments in the vicinity of Arad volunteered to surrender with me. Damjanic commanded in Arad; he declared that he would follow my example.

"Up to the present, the treatment we have met with was such as a brave soldier has a right to expect from a fellow-soldier.

"Consider what you can do, and what you ought to do.

"ARTHUR GÖRGEY.

"Great Warasdin, 16th August."

After the surrender of his power to Görgey, Kossuth left Arad, and directed his course to the Turkish frontier, by way of Radna and Lugos; and when, as he thought, no hope remained of serving the cause of expiring Hungary, he escaped into Turkey, and delivered himself up to the Ottoman garrison at Widdin.

When Bem, after the defeat at Temesvar, reached Lugos, he found but a few feeble divisions in order, and these, as their commanders informed him, were so thoroughly demoralized that but little dependence could be placed in them; yet the hero of Iganie and Ostralenka, whose spirit no reverses could subdue, was actively engaged in rallying the scattered forces, with a view of breaking through into Transylvania, and sustaining himself there. Under the hope still of success, he wrote to Kossuth, begging him to return. Bem and Guyon directed their march toward Transylvania; but the Austrian main army pressed them on all sides, and when arrived at Dobra, where the news of Görgey's surrender reached them, their corps dispersed in all directions. The generals, left alone, fled together into Turkey, and bade farewell to a country en-

deared to them by many recollections, and whose cause, although not natives, they were the last to abandon.

The remnants of Stein's corps (he himself made his escape into Turkey), and the corps of General Count Vécsey and of Colonel Kazintsky, which, from having taken no part in the battle of Temesvar, were still a fine body of troops—following Görgey's example, or obeying his injunction to "unite with the Russians," marched along the Maros to meet the enemy, and lay down their arms; which was done on the 19th of August, without once inquiring into the nature of the pretended conditions. Kazintsky was shot; but Vécsey was hanged like a felon, notwithstanding his aged and highly respected father had saved the life, as it is said, of the Emperor Francis, in the French campaign, and was, for his gallantry on the field of Aspern, promoted by the Archduke Charles to the post of general, and is at this time Austrian general of cavalry, captain of the Hungarian noble guard, and one of the firmest props of the throne of Habsburg.*

HUNGARIAN SUCCESSES IN THE NORTH.

While these events, so disastrous to the Hungarian arms, were occurring in the southern part of the kingdom, quite a different fortune attended the efforts of the brave garrison left behind them in the fortress of Komorn. Komorn was, at this time, besieged by the second Austrian *corps d'armée*, under F. M. L. Czoric, who had his head-quarters in Acs; Major General Polt, who was posted on the left bank of the Danube; Major General Prince Collorodo on the right bank; and Major General Fiedler on the Schütte.

Such was the condition of things about the fortress, when it was observed that, owing to the long stay of the main army at Komorn, some of the provisions of the garrison began to fail. A sally was executed by Colonel Kosztolanyi, on the 24th of July, with entire success. They brought back the desired sup-

* Not content with this wound upon so worthy a family, the house of Habsburg, or its instruments, to palliate their brutal murder, have attempted to blacken the memory of their departed victim, true to the Jesuitical character which has ever distinguished it—"calumniare audaciter semper aliquid hæret."

For the number of victims that suffered in Hungary under the rigor of Austrian court-martials, see Appendix, note No. 35.

plies, several loaded baggage-wagons, an Austrian diligence with money, together with eleven officers and the entire detachment of infantry at Todis as prisoners.

Encouraged by this and a second sally, which took place a few days after, on the left of the Danube, to rescue some of Görgey's dispersed rear-guard, General Klapka now determined to attack the besieging Austrian army with his entire force.

Accordingly, breaking up from their intrenched camp at midnight, on the 3d of August, Klapka dispatched two columns of about six battalions each, and the requisite quantity of cavalry. One, under Asserman, about four in the morning, stormed Almas. The garrison was partly cut down, partly put to flight. Having left a small force at Almas and Neszmély, he marched against Dotis, and, finding it unoccupied, next upon Kömlöd.

At eight o'clock, the other column, under Kosztolanyi, advanced directly against Mocsá, and appeared before this place just as the flanking column became visible on the heights of Kömlöd, immediately behind Mocsá. The garrison of Mocsá, which had heard nothing of the action against Almas, fell into great confusion on seeing itself thus suddenly surrounded. They retreated from the village, after a short resistance, and endeavored to escape into the open country to the left, but, being already flanked by Asserman's hussars, laid down their arms.

Both columns now pursued the course marked out for them.* One moving on Nagy-Igmand, the other advanced against the great redoubt of the Austrians between Csém and Herkaly. The latter, and by far the most formidable point, Shultz was ordered to attack *en face*. His execution of the order was truly heroic. He and his handful of men secured the Hungarians the honor of the day. Forming in a battle-line, with artillery and horse on either wing, preceded by only a weak line of tirailleurs, and cheering *Eljen a Magyar!* he led his troops through a fearful fire of grape and musketry to the very parapet of the enemy's works. His boldness startled the Austrians, who, fearing, from the side attack of the other troops, that their position was about to be surrounded, turned and fled in disorder upon Acs. Rapidly pursued to this point, and

* Pragay.

flanked on the right and left, the retreat of the enemy became universal, and all who could not conceal themselves in the fields and vineyards hastened to the bridge over the Danube, and nothing but the approach of night saved them from total annihilation. The Hungarian loss was trifling, that of the Austrians severe. Besides the dead which strewed the plain, the Hungarians took three thousand prisoners, captured twenty-seven cannons, and an enormous supply of provisions intended for the Austro-Russian army.*

On the next morning, Klapka sent forward more troops to Gönyö, where they made more prisoners and captured more ammunition; in fact, so great became the panic among the Imperialists, that, deserting their strong intrenchments, they fled in every direction, and the Hungarians took Raab on the following day without firing a shot, and with it, supplies and ammunition to the value of several millions of dollars.

At Pressburg, the consternation produced by the report of these movements was so great, that the population commenced immediately to throw up barricades, to arrest the expected march of the victorious troops. At Vienna, the few remaining available battalions were hastily collected, and dispatched by rail-road to Pressburg. But the heart of the soldiers (they were raw recruits, and apparently mere children) fairly gave way under the terrors of waging war in a land from which no Austrian army had ever returned to give an account of their dreadful Parthian foe.

The whole country being now freed from the Imperialists, Klapka, after taking the necessary precautions for securing Komorn, marched on the 5th of August, with the greater part of his garrison, on Raab.

The Hungarian troops entered that city, says Klapka, amid the touching, though silent and saddened sympathies of the inhabitants. They had seen the enormous masses of Austrians and Russians marching through their town, and that sight seemed to have stifled all hopes for the future.

Despite the successes of the moment, they could not believe that the small army within their walls would suffice to save

* Two thousand seven hundred oxen, forty loaded baggage-wagons, and the cargo of thirty-five large vessels on the right shore of the Danube.

their ill-starred country. Wreaths of flowers were, indeed, showered upon the heads of hussars and Honvéds, not in a spirit of exultation, but of sadness ; it was a mark of affection to a doomed favorite—it was but adorning the devoted lamb for the sacrifice which awaited it.

But far different from the gloomy feelings of the townspeople was the temper of the population of the country districts. Proud of the successes of their brethren, glorying in the spectacle of an Austrian rout, they cared little for the enemy's numbers or artillery. All they asked was, whether now the time had come for the people to rise *en masse*. Gray-bearded peasants shook the hands of the soldiers, and said, with that tranquillity which characterizes the Hungarian peasant, "Don't you care, we will get the better of the Russians too. Hitherto we sent our sons only, but now we, the old ones, will take horse !" They meant well, and would have acted up to their word. There is a dogged sturdiness in the peasant's nature, which eminently fits him for the duties and the hardships of a campaign.

Six days had passed since the entry of the Hungarian troops into Raab ; the greater part of the stores had been conveyed to Komorn, the levy *en masse* was favorably proceeding on the right bank of the Danube, thousands of recruits had been raised, and the strong intrenchments which the enemy had thrown up at Acs, Aranyos, and Lel, were totally destroyed. Klapka now resolved to abandon his passive and protective position, and to concentrate his whole force for an offensive operation. There were three ways open for such an expedition : the first, to make a diversion into Styria ; the second, to attack and disperse the corps under Nugent ; the third, to advance into Austria and seize Vienna. The latter was by far the most brilliant, as well as hazardous undertaking, and, could it have been accomplished, would have produced by far the most important results ; but Klapka, considering "the limited nature of the powers at his disposal," regarded it as a Quixotic plan, and, after mature reflection, determined on an expedition through the Eisenburg county into Styria. Every arrangement was now made for carrying this determination into effect, the troops in the Schütte were ordered up by forced marches to Raab, the

enemy at Wieselberg, for the purpose of greater deception, to be attacked; and while this was proceeding, the other divisions were, by forced marches, to enter Styria before the enemy could possibly be advised of their movements. Ten o'clock that night (the 11th) was fixed upon for the departure of the expedition. During the day, Klapka reviewed his troops which were to accompany him. They were tried soldiers, full of hope and courage. After divine service had been held, Klapka addressed the troops, and distributed medals among those who had most distinguished themselves in the late battles. When the troops were informed that they were on the eve of another expedition, and of fresh battles and victories, their exultation vented itself in thundering *Eljens!**

This happened on the very day on which Görgey, as Dictator of Hungary, announced to the people *that the wise and inscrutable decrees of Providence had sentenced them to ruin!*"

After the review, the staff-officers dined at the head-quarters of their commander. It was a merry feast. They drank health and prosperity to Kossuth and Görgey, the liberation of the country, the downfall of Austria, and the future greatness of Hungary. They were still at table, when it was announced that a peasant insisted on seeing the commander on urgent business. He was introduced. The man came forward, and his peasant dress, worn and soiled, covered a face and figure not unfamiliar to the company. It was Almasi, late speaker of the Lower House. He soon told, in accents of grief, that he was a fugitive, and that all was lost; that Nagy-Shandor's troops were routed at Debreczin, Dembinski was defeated at Szoreg, Bem's troops were dispersed at Shässburg, the Diet routed, and the government in despair.

This news, and the reports of their own scouts, which reached them the same day that the corps of Nugent and the Russian division of Grabbe were returning from the pursuit of Görgey, that his late successes had enabled Haynau to send a large mass of disposable troops against Komorn, forced Klapka to renounce his intended enterprise, and, instead of advancing into Styria, to retire to Komorn.

Alas for the cause of the struggling Magyars! the brilliant

* Klapka.

successes which followed the sallies from Komorn were fruitless. They were the last glimmerings of the expiring flame, which shoots forth with more than wonted brightness the moment before it sinks forever in eternal gloom.

The operations in the south having been closed, the entire Austrian force was now centered around Komorn, and nothing remained for the brave garrison, alone and without hope, but either to bury themselves heroically under the ruins of the fortress, or to preserve themselves by an honorable military capitulation. After many debates, the council of war accordingly resolved upon the latter course, for the following reasons:

1st. To alleviate the fate of their captured brethren, and to put a stop to the frequent executions; for they were encouraged to believe that all military persecutions and trials would cease upon the surrender of Komorn.

2d. In order not to expose to utter ruin the city of Komorn with its twenty thousand inhabitants, which had already severely suffered by fire, and by the bombardment of the previous winter, that continued for five weeks.

3d. To save a numerous body of men, charged with political offenses, who had taken refuge in Komorn.

4th. To relieve the inhabitants of the surrounding country, already sufficiently impoverished, from the hardship of quartering Russian, and, still worse, Austrian soldiers.

5th, and lastly. To preserve twenty-seven thousand brave and zealous soldiers for their country at a more auspicious future.

With the surrender of Komorn terminated the military operations in Hungary.*

CHARACTER OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

The military operations of the late Hungarian campaign will receive, as they clearly merit, a closer and more complete examination than could be expected from one with no pretensions to a knowledge of military science, or than could be given to them during the rapid progress of the war, and with the imperfect and contradictory information which could alone be derived from that distant and unfrequented part of Europe. The

* Komorn surrendered on the 29th of September. Peterwardein had previously, on the 7th of the same month, opened her gates to the Austrians.

different plans of operations of attack on the one side, and of defense on the other, seem, to an uninstructed eye at least, to have been digested with great care and skill by both parties; but that there were failures in the execution of those plans, there can be no doubt; and the causes of those failures may be looked for in the deep jealousy of their respective leaders.

The plan of General Haynau for directing the movements of the army in Hungary was founded on that devised by Marshal Radetzky for overthrowing the Piedmontese on the plains of Novara.

The reason, it was thought, why the Hungarians had succeeded in the previous campaign, was the skill with which they had managed to baffle all the movements of Windischgrätz, until they succeeded in exhausting his strength and resources. The imperial commanders immediately saw that, in order to conquer the Hungarians, it was necessary to bring the scene of contest within a narrower circle, and to force them to come to a decisive battle by hemming them in on all sides.

In the prosecution of this plan, Haynau, with the bulk of the Austrian army, appeared to remain inactive on the banks of the Danube, until he learned that other Austrian and Russian corps, marching from opposite points toward the centre of Hungary, had effected a junction, and were ready to operate together. It was then that Haynau commenced his vigorous movements in accordance with this plan. But here the first error was committed in the prosecution of that plan, and which the Russian bulletin at that moment exposes, when it declares that here "the end assigned to the first part of the campaign was completely attained, and the whole of the upper course of the Danube became free." The Upper Danube was still commanded by the garrison of Komorn, and the *coup-de-main* of Klapka against Raab proved that even there the war was not terminated.

Neglecting Komorn, uncovering even Vienna, abandoning these lines of communication, with a hardihood seldom practiced in war, the Russians and Austrians hurried beyond the Theiss, determined to tread out at once, by their numbers, the brave and wary defenders of the soil, not so much in accordance with any skillful plan of co-operation, as an evident de-

sire of the different parties to outstrip each other and decide the war alone. So evident was this haste, that Görgey is not to be pardoned for neglecting to turn it to advantage.

Haynau was aware that Görgey was endeavoring to effect a junction with Dembinski, and he pressed forward to defeat the latter before their forces could be united, and which he effected on the 9th of August. At the same time, the other principal corps of the Austrian and Russian armies continued to advance, and to hem in the Hungarians into a square of which Arad was to be the centre. Görgey, outmarching the Russians, reached Arad first, and there, on the 11th of August, he found Dembinski and Bem both defeated, and his army surrounded. Encompassed on all sides by troops amounting to several times the number at his command, there was no alternative left him but a hopeless contest or a surrender,* and he adopted the latter.

On the other hand, the plan of defense adopted by the Hungarians was based upon the instructions of Kossuth to Bem.† His orders were never to hazard an action, but to limit efforts to harassing the enemy, cutting off his communication, and prolonging the war.

This was strictly obeyed. The campaign may be said to have lasted sixty days, from the entrance of the Russians to the capitulation of Görgey. During the whole of that time, it does not appear that one of those pitched battles in the open field, which have in modern times decided the fate of empires, was fought, unless Haynau's last action in the neighborhood of Temesvar deserves that name.

The Hungarians, whether from instruction or voluntary inclination, were obviously reluctant to stake the success of their cause on such an event. They probably dreaded the superiority of the disciplined infantry of the imperial armies, and they relied principally on their own artillery and light cavalry, which were their most effective arms.

This plan of defense was well adapted to, and succeeded ad-

* If we except the single line of retreat he mentions in his letter through Radna to Transylvania.

† Found in his baggage. See Klapka, about the disputes between commanders, disobedience of War Department, &c.

mirably in the first campaign against the hundred thousand men that Windischgrätz led into Hungary, but against an overwhelming force of four hundred thousand men, supplied with all the resources of the two great empires, a mere guerilla system was hopeless. The only parallel to the invasion of Hungary, by the combined forces of Austria and Russia, is to be met with in the Seven Years' War, when Frederick the Great was assailed on different sides by the armies of Russia, of Austria, of France, and of Sweden. Eight hundred thousand men menaced old Fritz, who had scarcely one hundred thousand to oppose to them. Had he adopted the purely defensive and dilatory system, the Prussian monarchy would have died in 1757 the death of Hungarian independence in 1849. But Frederick attacked his enemies in detail, and with the fierce determination of the soldier, eager to repel invasion or to perish in the attempt, he finally triumphed over all his foes. It was evidently a part of the Hungarian plan, that Görgey should remain about Komorn only long enough to strike the Austrians a severe blow as they entered, and then to retreat suddenly beyond the Theiss, and connect his forces with those of Dembinski and Bem.* But why he should have remained at Komorn for several weeks, until the Russians, entering on the north, had reached the centre of the kingdom, taken possession of both capitals, and cut him off completely from the Hungarian armies of the south, has never yet been satisfactorily explained.

Although Hungary could scarcely have been expected to hold out for any great length of time against the fearful odds

* Joseph Bem was born at Tarnow, in Galicia, in 1795. He pursued his studies at Cracow, and, at a later period, in the military school at Warsaw. On their completion, he entered the Polish artillery-service, in which he made the campaign of 1812, against Russia, in Davoust's corps, and then in Macdonald's. On the breaking out of the Polish insurrection, he hastened to Warsaw, where the government appointed him major and commander of a battery of flying artillery. After the action of Iganie, in which he distinguished himself, he was made lieutenant colonel; after the battle of Ostrolenka, a colonel; and soon following this, was promoted to the command-in-chief of the Polish artillery. In October, 1848, Bem repaired to Vienna, and undertook the organization of the Garde Mobile, and the management of the military arrangements. After Bem fled into Turkey, he received a command in the Turkish army, where he died, in the year 1850, of the wounds received in the Hungarian war.

by which she was opposed; taken by surprise, forced into a contest for which she was not prepared; without an army, without generals, without arms, and, worse than all, her sea-ports in the hands of the enemy; yet what she accomplished under these disadvantages—what a determined and energetic resistance she opposed to the united forces of the two empires, affords ample evidence of the internal resources, moral and material, which she possesses, and shows how firm a barrier Hungary, if independent, would have constituted against northern aggression, and how apt a guardian she would have proved of western civilization.

But no cause could hope for success when so little unanimity existed among its prominent supporters. So true as is the adage, that a house divided against itself can not stand, so true it is that Hungary has fallen under the weight of its own divisions.

Görgey, from the period of the first brilliant victory at Acs, when an attempt was made to displace him, gave but little heed to any order sent him by the government. The repeated directions given him by Kossuth to come south, and defend the Hungarian capitals, were treated with contempt; the injunctions to unite with Dembinski totally disregarded.

Nor does the whole blame of their failure attach to Görgey. When he at length quitted Komorn, and, after an engagement at Waitzen, he, by a most dextrous movement, threw himself upon the rear of Paskievitch at Miskolcz, and was rapidly marching upon him from Kaschau. Dembinski, as has been shown, was at Szolnok on his front, and nothing could have been more natural or feasible than, by a mutual advance, to have crushed the Russian general. But Dembinski, as we have seen, instead of advancing, retreated, thus diminishing his own chances of safety, as well as those of Görgey, whom he abandoned to his fate. And when he resolved upon retreat, had he, instead of proceeding south to Szegedin, marched an equal distance east to Grosswardein, a junction with Görgey, who was wending his way to the latter place, could have been effected, at least three days sooner than by the route which he took, and quite a sufficient time, as it proved, to have united their forces before Haynau could have overtaken them.

When again, after his defeat at Szoreg, Dembinski, instead of retreating on Temesvar, still in possession of the Austrians, had proceeded to Arad (then in possession of the Hungarians), as he was expressly ordered to do, a junction would then have taken place, even in spite of Görgey's intention, and Hungary perhaps have yet been saved.

CHARACTER OF LOUIS KOSSUTH.

The time has not yet arrived for a full, impartial, and satisfactory estimate of the character and abilities of Louis Kossuth; but any sketch of the Hungarian contest would be quite imperfect that omitted an attempt to do justice to the genius of this eminent man.

Many causes unite to render the task difficult besides those that usually interfere with contemporary judgments. The European movement of 1848 was singularly barren of great men. Individuals of talent, of courage, and of enthusiasm it undoubtedly produced; but no great social convulsion has ever before failed to evoke one or more master spirits, who to talent, courage, and enthusiasm have added the keen perception of character and resolute purpose which are indispensable to the character of a great leader. This absence of the highest order of ability has given increased prominence to him who, among the first to arouse the nations of Europe, was the last to surrender his post; who organized his country to resistance against one of the oldest governments of Europe, brought the ancient empire of Austria to the verge of destruction, and was at last overcome only by the inadequacy of his coadjutors and the colossal resources of Russia.

On the other hand, these achievements, their temporary success, and the consequences threatened by their ultimate triumph to the interests not only of Austria but of Europe, have tended to render his name more hated, because more feared, than that of any other leader in the movements of 1848, and therefore to raise up against him the greatest number of malignant detractors.

The situation of the country, also, to which Kossuth belonged, as well as its history and language, render it the more difficult justly to estimate his powers. Until the last revolution brought

Hungary into so conspicuous an attitude before the civilized world, she occupied scarcely any position on the theatre of European operations. Her language being that of no other continental people, and having no commercial relations with any other nation, less was known of her history and institutions than of almost any other civilized land.

In this conflict of passions, and absence of the means of reliable information, it might be expedient to pause; and, after faithfully recording those public acts of the Hungarian struggle which are of undoubted authenticity, to leave to later times the task of deciding upon the character and motives of the Hungarian leaders. But the impatience of the human mind rejects this dictate of wisdom, and will not permit the curtain to fall upon the exciting scenes explored without a brief glance at the career of the late executive of this afflicted nation. The epithet of great can in no proper sense be denied him, even by those who are least attached to his principles or course; he has been too steadfast in devotion to his cause, too conspicuous in his functions, too prominent in his woes to be refused an epithet that has been often lavished on inferior men.

The early parliamentary labors of Kossuth entitle him to an eminent place among the legislators of Europe. His temper, habits, and education seem, indeed, to have fitted him for parliamentary life, and, under a more free and enlightened government, he would doubtless have acquired the distinction of a great orator and politician. He seems, indeed, during all the early part of his career, to have been actuated by no other ideas than those of a parliamentary and constitutional opposition to the Austrian government, and only to have been driven into revolution by the faithlessness and treachery of the imperial cabinet. His incessant labors, his earnest struggles, and his noted sufferings between 1835 and 1848, entitle him to the esteem and sympathy of every admirer of genius and every lover of liberty. It is in 1848, however, that began the more complicated phase of his career, and here the obstacles to an impartial judgment commence.

It had become a struggle for existence when the Austrian government, in its effort to revoke the concessions of March, aroused and armed the Croats on one side and the Serbs on

the other, and there seemed no alternative left the Hungarians but unconditional surrender or desperate resistance. And if there be any good ground to question the sagacity of the policy of Kossuth during the year 1848, it was the tardiness with which resistance was commenced and the Declaration of Independence issued.

Had the declaration of Hungarian independence been made in the summer of 1848, when Austria evinced so openly her determination to revoke the concessions which she had granted in April, and when, to effect this object, instead of assuming, as was her duty, the province of *mediator* between Hungary and Croatia, she publicly announced her determination to become a *partisan*, and to enter the lists against the former and in favor of the latter, the result of the conflict might have been totally different.

The imperial aggressions at this time were amply sufficient to justify Hungary in throwing off her allegiance. The government of Austria had "become destructive of those ends for which it had been instituted," viz., "their safety and happiness," and "it was the right of the people" of Hungary "to alter or to abolish it." Besides, "when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it was their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security."*

Had the Hungarians declared their independence in the summer or fall of 1848, they would not, a few weeks later, when on the frontiers of Austria, have been deterred by any scruples of duty, or fears of the traitor's doom, from obeying the call of the Viennese, and marching upon the capital to their relief.

Had the Hungarian army of twenty-two thousand men, as soon as they appeared on the frontiers of Austria, instead of delaying there, marched immediately on Vienna, Prince Windischgrätz, with his immense army, not having yet appeared, there was no force to obstruct their passage. The hundred and forty thousand fighting men in Vienna, properly organized and officered by Hungarians, with the Magyar army as a nu-

* American Declaration of Independence.

cleus, would have been invincible before any force which Windischgrätz and Jellacic combined could have brought against them, and the emperor would gladly have relieved his capital at so slight a cost as the acknowledgment of Hungarian independence.

But, even had the Hungarians not chosen to have embraced that occasion of marching upon the capital, and dictating their own terms from the emperor's palace, a still more favorable opportunity yet awaited them upon the conclusion of the first campaign, when the Austrian army was driven by the triumphant Hungarians from the centre of the kingdom over the borders, completely defeated and routed, and no efficient force remained between them and the defenseless capital.

Had she but declared her independence *previously*, the noble manner in which she *subsequently* achieved it with the sword was all that would have been requisite for the full accomplishment of her wishes. The moral force which such a course would inevitably have brought to her cause would have been more effectual than all the bayonets which could be enlisted in her behalf. In that event, the Austrians would never have ventured to seek or Russia to yield the assistance of her myrmidons against a nation which had so gallantly, both by word and deed, established her claims to freedom. There is not a civilized government that would not have cheerfully volunteered to recognize her independence, and even Ferdinand of Austria might have imitated the magnanimity of George the Third of England, and been, as the latter was in the case of the United States, the first to acknowledge an independence which he had found himself unable to prevent.

Kossuth has often said that in 1848 he held the house of Habsburg in his hand. If so, why did he spare a dynasty whose cruelty and perjury, as he states, were of centuries' duration? Was it humanity, was it fear of consequences, or was it want of nerve that impeded the exercise of his power? In the spring of 1848 he might have thought the public mind unprepared for extreme measures; but if so, why did he lend his sanction to the use of Hungarian troops in Italy, and why, above all, did he, in the fall of that eventful year, permit Windischgrätz, unopposed, to subdue Vienna, and at a blow to

place the house of Habsburg in a position of impregnable authority?

If these acts of his public life do not indicate a want of that resolute and unflinching purpose so indispensable to revolutionary leaders, they at least seem strongly to evince that revolution was then far from his mind, and a parliamentary and constitutional opposition the only one in which he was at that time ready to engage.

But the die was cast, and the struggle—more pregnant in consequences to Europe than any that has taken place since the fall of the Roman empire—commenced. Had Hungary established her independence, Austria must inevitably have sunk into a third or fourth rate power. Had she been able to establish a free Constitution, and, absorbing Croatia, opened to herself the ports of the Mediterranean, the future consequences to the freedom of Europe can not be overrated. The struggle, when once commenced, was one worthy of the utmost effort; and this was not wanting. The labors of Kossuth were Herculean; and, assisted by the most gallant people of Europe, no contest more worthy of the poet and the historian has ever been waged between the opposing spirits of freedom and tyranny, of good and evil, that have immemorially divided the world.

The labors of Kossuth during this period were doubtless of the highest order of merit. His voice, his pen, his indefatigable industry, his mastership of detail, his vivid imagination, his lofty aspirations, all were employed. A highly sensitive and poetic temperament, a peculiarly active and laborious mind, exhibited themselves in his efforts in rare and striking union; he aroused and armed the people, and, thus aroused and armed, his spirit led them into conflict. It is absurd to deny, as it is impossible to underrate, his efforts during this period; and those who criticise and decry him, would find it difficult to show higher instances of genius, enthusiasm, and devotion to the cause of liberty.

Nor does there seem, in this portion of his public life, any ground for the attempt of inimical writers to identify his character with that of the demagogue, or fix upon him the motives of an unscrupulous ambition.

He had used every effort to conciliate the cabinet of Vienna; he had forbore to use the power of injury he possessed; he had permitted the Hungarian arms to be employed for the subjugation of Italy; he had looked on while the watch-fires of Windischgrätz and Jellacic encircled Vienna with the girdle of destruction; he had reached the utmost limit of forbearance, and perhaps, indeed, hesitated too long, before he threw down the gauntlet and defied the imperial power. But after that decisive act, all the others became a necessary consequence. It was the dictate of the clearest policy and of inevitable necessity to abolish the distinctions of rank and race, and to give to the movement a direction absolutely popular. It was natural that the supreme power should be vested in the hands of the most able and active of the revolutionary leaders; and, if he looked forward to the chief magistracy of the state by the universal suffrage of free and independent Hungary, it was the dream of an honorable and laudable ambition—and, alas! it was but a dream.

These efforts were vain: the struggles of the leader and his brave followers were fruitless; and, after proving what heroism, constancy, and skill could effect, after defeating the power of Austria, they were destined to fall before the overwhelming legions of Russia.

We approach the final catastrophe. The Hungarians slowly retreat to the extreme limits of their country. But they still numbered one hundred and fifty thousand men in arms; their two strongest fortresses, Komorn and Peterwardein, yet held out; and, on the banks of the Danube, at least, the gallant nation stood at bay.

In this position of affairs, it is true, every thing appeared hopeless; indeed, the cause of Hungary was desperate; but in such a position some men are capable of great and immortal deeds. Kossuth, without a convention of his cabinet, confided the supreme power to a general whom he had repeatedly declared unworthy of confidence, and fled precipitately over the frontier. This act was succeeded by the immediate surrender of the army, and thus ended the brief life of independent Hungary. It is deeply to be regretted that no detailed account of the closing transactions has been given us by Kossuth himself,

and that we are consequently obliged to grope our way amid conflicting statements of men all eager to shift both the responsibility and the disgrace on others. It appears certain that the trust of negotiating with the Russian commander was confided to Görgey by a full cabinet, and that the act of abdication was consented to only by three out of seven of the ministers, and without a formal council meeting. But the grant of power to treat shows the sense entertained by the whole ministry, not only of the hopelessness of their position, but of their dependence on Görgey. Why was the power to negotiate confided to an untrustworthy agent? Why, indeed, was not the faithless and insubordinate agent tried by court-martial months before?

The grant of authority to negotiate, given to a military leader, was in fact a practical surrender of the government; and, after this was acceded to by a united and unanimous cabinet, there is no reason to believe that the act of abdication would have been seriously opposed; and the endeavor, on the part of those members of the cabinet who were not concerned, to throw the blame on Kossuth and the remainder of the ministers, seems to be scarcely justifiable, and may, perhaps, be wholly attributed to that spirit of recrimination in which the partisans of a lost cause are too apt to indulge.

But if it is correct to ascribe to the entire government the responsibility of this transaction, what is to be said of Kossuth himself, who for years had been the soul of the resistance in Hungary, the martyr of the first struggles of the press in 1835, the leader of the parliamentary opposition for fifteen years, the prime mover of the revolution in 1848, and, finally, the first, the last, the only governor of Hungary? What explanation can be given of the act by which, at this essential climax of his country's fortunes, he abandoned his post, and, without any guarantee whatever, intrusted a power, which was not his to bestow, to a soldier whom he had repeatedly declared unworthy of confidence, and then sought his personal safety among the hereditary enemies of his country? Is there any new light to be thrown on this wretched termination; or is it to be inferred that the orator, the statesman, the man of genius, was unequal to the fierce conflict of arms, and that, overawed, subdued, and stunned by the storm he had himself aroused, he shrunk from

the blast, and was as unable to protect his own fame as to defend the fortunes of his country?

It is, after all, a personal question, affecting solely the character of the man, for there can be but little doubt that, when Kossuth fled into Turkey, the cause of Hungary was desperate, and that no object of public importance could be gained by his pursuing an opposite course.

Thus, for a time, Kossuth disappeared from the scene of Europe. If the testimony, that history has thus far furnished, leads to the conclusion that his highly nervous, sensitive, and poetical temperament has led him into conduct that a firmer heart and more deliberate judgment would have avoided, that his extraordinary powers of expression were not combined with a corresponding executive ability, and that his vivid imagination is better calculated to arouse the passions and kindle the aspirations of others, than to obtain for himself a dispassionate and practical view of events around him; still there remains more than enough of superiority in his character to justify the warm admiration of every lover of human freedom. His consummate oratory, his poetical fancy, his capacity for labor, his struggles and his sufferings in the great cause of civil liberty, will forever keep his name in the first rank of those who have magnanimously devoted their lives to extend the blessings of progress and equal rights, which are only the legitimate results of a free government.*

* The author has abstained from any observations on Kossuth's public efforts in England and the United States, since his release from exile. His conduct in his new position admits of varied interpretation; it is, however, quite independent of those events in the history of his native land to which this work is especially devoted.

APPENDIX.

Note No. 1.

ACT OF THE DIET OF THE CONFEDERATION OF FRANKFORT, PASSED JUNE 28, 1832.

1st. Whereas, according to the fifty-seventh article of the final act of the Congress of Vienna, 1820, the powers of the state ought to remain in the hands of its chief, and the sovereign ought not to be bound by the local Constitution to require the co-operation of the Chambers, except as to the exercise of certain specified rights, the sovereigns of Germany, as members of the confederation, have not only the right of rejecting the petitions of the Chambers contrary to this principle, but the object of the confederation makes it their duty to reject such petitions.

2d. Since, according to the spirit of the said fifty-seventh article of the final act and its inductions, as expressed in article fifty-eight, the Chambers can not refuse to any German sovereign the necessary means of fulfilling his federal obligations, and those imposed by the local Constitution; the cases in which the Chambers endeavor to make their consent to the taxes necessary for these purposes depend upon the assent of the sovereign to their propositions upon any subject, are to be classed among those cases to which are applied the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth articles of the final act, relating to resistance of the subjects against the government.

3d. The internal legislation of the states belonging to the Germanic Confederation can not prejudice the object as expressed in the second article of the original Act of Confederation, and in the first article of the final act; nor can this legislation obstruct in any manner the accomplishment of the federal obligations of the state, and especially the payment of the taxes necessary to fulfill them.

4th. In order to maintain the rights and dignity of the confederation, and of the Assembly representing it, against usurpations of every kind, and at the same time to facilitate to the states which are members of the confederation the maintenance of the constitutional relations between the local governments and the Legislative Chambers, there shall be appointed by the Diet, in the first instance for the term of six years, a commission charged with the supervision of the deliberations of the Chambers, and with directing their attention to the propositions and resolutions which may be found in opposition to the federal obligations as to the rights of sovereignty guaranteed by the compacts of the confederation. The commission is to report to the Diet, which, if it finds the matter proper for further consideration, will put itself in relation with the local government concerned. After the lapse of six years, a new arrangement is to be made for the prolongation of the commission.

5th. Since, according to the fifty-ninth article of the final act, in those states where the publication of the Chambers is secured by the Constitution, the free expression of opinion, either in the deliberations themselves or in their publication through the medium of the press, can not be so extended as to endanger the tranquillity of the state itself, or of the confederation in general, all governments belonging to it mutually bind themselves, as they are already bound by their fed-

eral relations, to adopt and maintain such measures as may be necessary to prevent and punish every attack against the confederation in the local Chambers.

6th. Since the Diet is already authorized, by the seventeenth article of the final act for the maintenance of the true meaning of the original act of the confederation, to give its provisions such an interpretation as may be consistent with its object, in case doubts should arise in this respect, it is understood that the confederation has the exclusive right of interpreting, so as to produce their legal effect, the original act of confederation and the final act, which right it exercises by its constitutional organ the Diet.

Note No. 2.

TABLE OF THE MONASTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE.

Among which are included that of the Somaskers, the 14 Basilian Monasteries of the Greek Church, and the 3 of the Mechitarists, with their Dependencies. Hungary has 175 Monasteries, and 11 Nunneries of the Romish Church. Among the Nunneries are, 1 of Armenian Nuns, and 2 of the Basilian Order.

	Monasteries.			Nunneries.		
	No.	Priests.	Clerks and Laymen.	No.	Nuns.	Novices.
Province of Lower Austria.....	49	562	336	7	186	119
Province of Upper Austria.....	19	174	69	8	137	79
Styria.....	22	145	140	3	67	19
Carynthia and Carniola.....	11	88	34	4	95	28
Coast Land.....	18	87	77	4	65	19
Tyrol.....	57	488	341	19	237	215
Bohemia.....	75	541	312	6	125	26
Moravia and Silesia.....	34	502	147	4	48	18
Galicia.....	73	307	289	15	143	49
Dalmatia.....	54	231	118	8	38	6
Lombardy.....	10	63	97	19	420	236
Venice.....	27	284	324	15	286	164
Military Frontiers.....	11	63	35			
Transylvania.....	40	155	53	1	20	
Total.....	500	3390	2372	113	1867	978

The Monasteries may be divided among the following orders:

No. of Monasteries.	No. of Monasteries.
Augustines.....13	Crusaders.....1
Charitable Brethren.....20	Mechitarists.....4
Barnabites.....7	Minoritists.....36
Basilians.....15	Piarists.....36
Benedictines.....19	Philippinists.....7
Regular Canons.....14	Præmonstratenists.....7
Dominicans.....7	Redemptorists.....6
Regular Hermits.....30	Reformatists.....11
Franciscans.....3	Servitists.....18
Jesuits.....6	Terzianists.....6
Capucins.....86	Cistercians.....11
Carmelites.....8	Maltese.....1

TABLE SHOWING THE ARCHBISHOPS AND BISHOPS IN THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE.

Archbishops.	Bishops.
Vienna	St. Pölten, Linz.
Salzburg	Seckau, Leoben, Gurk, Lavant, Brixen, Trient.
Prague	Budweis, Königgrätz, Leitmeritz.
Olmütz	Brünn.
Lemberg	Przemisl, Tarnow.
Görz	Laiback, Trieste and Capo d'Istria, Parenzo and Pola, Veglia.
Milan	Bergamo, Brescia, Como, Crema, Cremona, Lodi, Mantua, Pavia.
Venice	Adria, Belluno and Feltre, Ceneda, Chioggia, Concordia, Padua, Treviso, Udine, Verona, Vicenza.
Zara	Spalato and Macarsca, Ragusa, Sebenico, Lesina, Brazza and Lissa, Cattaro.
Gran	Fünfkirchen, Wesprim, Waizen, Raab, Neutra, Neusohl, Stein and Anger, Stuhlweissenburg, Siebenbürgen.
Colusca	Grosswardein, Csanad, Agram, Diakowar, Zengg and Modrusz.
Erlau	Kaschau, Rosenau, Zathmar, Zips.

The vicar-generalships are those for Vorarlberg at Feldkirch, and for the Breslau diocese in East Silesia.

Note No 3.

THE EIGHT UNIVERSITIES IN THE AUSTRIAN DOMINIONS ARE THOSE AT

	Professors.	Students.	Pensioners.	Pension Money in Florins.	Total Cost in Florins.
Vienna	84	4,991	233	21,706	186,479
Prague	63	3,479	36	1,988	72,355
Olmütz	26	526	104	6,811	28,171
Leopol	42	1,375	50	3,839	59,210
Innsbruck (No Faculty of Theology) ..	23	314	70	3,993	27,853
Gratz	28	864	46	2,067	26,866
Pavia	60	1,362	17	2,975	75,331
Padua	36	1,433			99,131
Total	362	14,344	556	43,379	575,396
Cost in English Money, £57,539.					

THE PRINCIPAL SCHOOLS OF UTILITY (REAL SCHULEN) IN THE AUSTRIAN DOMINIONS ARE:

	Number.	Professors.	Students.	Pensioners.	Pension Money in Florins.	Total Cost in Florins.
Polytechnic Institution at Vienna	1	30	1104	4	150	59,628
" " at Prague	1	21	599			15,934
Mathematical School at Linz	1	1	50			300
School of Forestry at Marienbrunn	1	4	50			21,052
Schools of Utility at Trieste, Leopold, Brody, Rakonitz, and Reichenberg	5	44	235	2	253	30,419
Schools of Agriculture and Rural Economy at Olmütz, Brünn, and Kraumau	3	10	218			5,390
School of Practical Chemistry at Milan	1	3	19			2,260
Schools of Languages at Linz and Salzburg	3	3	54			1,058
Schools of Mathematics on Military Frontiers	8	34	386			2,200
Mining School at Schmnitz	1	7	178	55		11,500
Total	25	157	2893	61	403	149,741

The general establishments enumerated in the first table include the Theresarium and the noble school at Innspruck, the Academy of Oriental Languages, the Institute for Church Singing at Salzburg, the College for Rabbins at Padua, and for Unitarians at Klausenburg.

The female establishments include the schools of the Ursulines, and Sisters of Charity, those of different convents, and those for the education of the daughters of officers and *employés*.

The mixed schools for both sexes embrace the Deaf and Dumb Institutions, Orphan Houses, and the School of Music, at Milan, &c.

Among the special institutions in the second table are the Josephenian Academy for military surgeons, the Schools of Midwifery and Veterinary Surgery, and the Institution of Pious Ladies, at Chioggia.

Note No. 4.

PAY AND ALLOWANCE OF A REGIMENT IN GERMANY, HUNGARY, AND TRANSYLVANIA.

	PEACE.										WAR.					
	Germany.				Hungary and Flat Country.				Transylvania and Galicia.		Monthly.		Daily.		Bread.	Horse.
	Monthly.		Daily.		Monthly.		Daily.		Monthly.	Daily.	Pay.	Field allowance.	Total.	Pay.	Field allowance.	Total.
	fl.	kr.	fl.	kr.	fl.	kr.	fl.	kr.								
Inhaber.....	316	32	0	0	289	52	0	0	289	52	0	0	326	40	0	0
Colonel Commandant.....	149	33	0	0	138	24	0	0	145	12	0	0	154	19	0	0
Lieutenant Colonel.....	110	9	0	0	102	23	0	0	107	14	0	0	113	40	0	0
Major.....	79	49	0	0	73	2	0	0	77	10	0	0	91	39	0	0
Chaplain.....	23	25	0	0	22	11	0	0	23	2	0	0	24	9	0	0
Auditor and Secretary.....	34	43	0	0	32	33	0	0	33	53	0	0	35	49	0	0
Paymaster.....	25	31	0	0	24	4	0	0	25	2	0	0	26	20	0	0
Adjutant.....	19	42	0	0	18	14	0	0	19	13	0	0	20	20	0	0
Surgeon.....	25	31	0	0	24	4	0	0	25	2	0	0	26	20	0	0
Surgeon, Upper Assistant.....	19	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	20	0	0	0
Surgeon, Under Assistant.....	14	0	0	0	14	0	0	0	14	0	0	0	15	0	0	0
Cadets.....	7	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	7	0	0	0
Fourier.....	14	0	0	0	13	45	0	0	13	45	0	0	15	0	0	0
Regimental Drummer.....	5	5	0	0	3	33	0	0	3	33	0	0	5	36	0	0
Oboist.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Master of Band.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Provost.....	25	31	0	0	24	18	0	0	25	17	0	0	26	20	0	0
Captain.....	71	42	0	0	65	33	0	0	69	31	0	0	74	18	0	0
Captain Lieutenant.....	39	23	0	0	36	14	0	0	38	11	0	0	40	39	0	0
First Lieutenant.....	26	48	0	0	25	9	0	0	26	22	0	0	27	40	0	0
Second Lieutenant.....	22	37	0	0	21	9	0	0	22	7	0	0	23	20	0	0
Ensign.....	19	42	0	0	18	14	0	0	19	13	0	0	20	20	0	0
Sergeant.....	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	17	0	0	0
Corporal.....	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	10	0	0	0
Fourier, Grenadiers.....	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
Fourier, Fusileers.....	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
Drummer, Grenadiers.....	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
Drummer, Fusileers.....	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
Exempt.....	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	7	0	0	0
Barrackman, Grenadiers.....	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
Barrackman, Fusileers.....	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
Private, Grenadiers.....	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
Private, Fusileers.....	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	5	0	0	0

In garrison service the pay also varies in peace and war.

Note No. 5.

LIST OF THE AUSTRIAN AND HUNGARIAN MINISTERS IN THE COURSE OF THE YEARS
1848 AND 1849.*In Vienna, in March, 1848, previous to the Revolution.*

Prince Metternich, Chancellor of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and President of the Council.

Count Kollowrat, Minister of Home Affairs.

Count Sedlnitzki, Minister of Police.

Baron Kübeck, President of the Treasury.

Count Taaffe, President of the Board of Justice.

Count Hardegg, President of the Board of War.

After the Revolution in March.

Count Fiquelmont, Foreign Affairs.

Count Kollowrat, Home Affairs.

Baron Kübeck, Finances.

Count Taaffe, Justice.

General Zannini, War.

Baron Pillersdorf, Public Instruction.

In May.

Baron Wessenberg, Foreign Affairs.

Baron Pillersdorf, Home Affairs.

Baron Kraus, Finances.

Baron Sommaruga, Justice.

Count Latour, War.

Baron Dobblhof, Trade.

M. Baumgarten, Public Works.

In June.

Baron Wessenberg, Foreign Affairs.

Baron Dobblhof, Home Affairs.

Baron Kraus, Finances.

Dr. Bach, Justice.

Count Latour, War.

Mr. Hornbostel, Trade.

Mr. Schwartzner, Public Works.

In November.

Prince Schwartzenberg, Foreign Affairs.

Count Stadion, Home Affairs.

Baron Kraus, Finances.

Dr. Bach, Justice.

General Cordon, War.

Mr. Bruck, Trade.

Mr. Thienfeldt, Public Works.

Baron Kulmer, Croatian Minister without Portefeuille.

In May, 1849.

Prince Schwartzberg, Foreign Affairs.
 Dr. Bach, Home Affairs.
 Baron Kraus, Finances.
 Mr. Schmerling, Justice.
 Count Gylay, War.
 Mr. Bruck, Trade.
 Mr. Thienfeldt, Public Works.
 Count Leo Thun, Public Instruction.
 Baron Kulmer, Croatian Minister without Portefeuille.

In Hungary during the same Period, from March till September, 1848.

Count Louis Batthyányi, Prime Minister.
 Bertalan Szemere, Home Affairs.
 Louis Kossuth, Finances.
 Francis Deak, Justice.
 General Lazar Meszaros, War.
 Gabor Klauzal, Trade.
 Count Stephen Széchényi, Public Works.
 Baron Josef Eötvös, Public Instruction.
 Prince Paul Esterhazy, Minister around the person of the King, and intrusted with the regulation of international concerns between Hungary and the Austrian provinces, and therefore called Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In September.

Count Louis Batthyányi, alone.

From October to April, 1849. The Committee of Public Defense.

Kossuth, President.
 Szemere.
 Meszaros.
 Baron Sigmund Perenyi.
 Paul Nyary.
 Count Michael Esterhazy.
 Baron Nicholas Iosika.
 John Palfy.
 Francis Duschek.
 Ladislav Madarasz.
 Pazmándy, Pulszky, Zsembéry, and Patay, were only from October to January Members of this Committee.

In April Kossuth was elected Governor-President, and formed the following Cabinet:

Szemere, President of the Council, and Minister of Home Affairs.
 Count Casimir Batthyányi, Foreign Affairs.
 Sabbas Vucovics, Justice.
 Francis Duschek, Finances.
 Ladislav Csanyi, Public Works.
 Bishop Michel Horvath, Public Instruction.
 General Görgey, later General Aulick, War.

Note No. 6.

TRUCE ENTERED INTO BETWEEN RADETZKY AND THE KING OF PIEDMONT ON THE 9TH OF AUGUST, 1848.

Head-quarters, Milan, August 9th, 1848.

1st. The demarcation between both armies shall be the frontiers of the respective states.

2d. The fortresses of Peschiera, Rocca D'Anfo, and Osopo, are to be evacuated by the Sardinian and allied troops, and surrendered to the Austrian troops. The surrender will take place three days after the publication of the present convention. The materiel of war belonging to the Austrians is to be restored to them. The withdrawing garrison shall take with it all the materiel of war, arms, ammunition, and regimentals, which it has brought thither, and shall return to the Sardinian states by the shortest route.

3d. The states of Parma, Modena, and the city of Placenza, are to be cleared of the troops of his majesty, the King of Sardinia, in three days after the publication of this convention.

4th. This convention extends even to the city and to the whole province of Venice; therefore the Sardinian forces by water and land will leave Venice the forts and ports, and return to the Sardinian states.

5th. Persons and property in the above-mentioned cities shall be put under the protection of the imperial government.

6th. This truce will continue for six weeks, to enable arrangements of a peace to be completed. After the expiration of this time, the truce will be lengthened by a mutual agreement, or otherwise to be revoked at least eight days before the commencement of hostilities.

7th. Commissioners are to be nominated by both parties, to effect the execution of the above-mentioned articles in the best and most friendly manner.

Note No. 7.

SCHEDULE OF TAXES PAID IN THE DIFFERENT PROVINCES OF AUSTRIA.

	Austrian sq. Miles.	Inhabitants.	Income in Gulden Conv. Money.	Per Head.	Per M ^{le} .
				Fl. Kr.	Florins.*
Austria below the Enns.....	344	1,456,925	18,056,024	12 24	52,490
Austria above the Enns.....	333	866,836	11,280,503	13	33,875
Styria.....	391	1,001,401	6,323,075	6 19	16,172
Carinthia and Carniola.....	354	780,329	4,498,973	5 45	12,709
Littorale.....	139	498,357	4,222,763	8 29	30,379
Tyrol.....	500	851,924	3,751,061	4 24	7,502
Bohemia.....	902	4,341,152	18,498,288	4 15	20,508
Moravia and Silesia.....	476	2,254,658	9,311,398	4 8	19,562
Galicia.....	1,545	5,192,445	14,086,416	2 43	9,117
Dalmatia.....	222	407,792	1,134,267	2 47	5,109
Lombardy and Venetia.....	789	4,901,369	37,376,946	7 37	47,373
Hungary, Trans., Milit. front..	5,600	13,885,328	22,320,683	1 36	3,986
Total.....	11,596	36,438,516	150,860,397	4 8	13,010

* The Florin or Gulden is about equal to forty-eight cents American currency.

Note No. 8.

CAPITULATION OF THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT IN VENICE.

The municipality of Venice invited, in its official paper of the 22d of March, 1848, some of the most influential citizens to assist it in this critical moment.

The Assembly, consisting of the podestà and six municipal assessors, the secretary and Messrs. Giuseppe Reali, Luigi Revedin, the lawyer Gio. Francesco Avesani, Leone Pincherle, Giacomo Castelli, and Costi, were discussing upon the state of matters and the measures to be taken, when a communication was received, that the abhorred Colonel Marinovich had been killed by the working-men in the arsenal, and that Fr. Olivieri, the valorous chief of the Civic Guard belonging to the district of the Castel, had entered the arsenal with his troop, and caused another troop to take possession of the guard-ship.

Soon afterward, the Av. Angelo Mengaldo, commander of the National Guard, who, having been instructed previously by the municipality to demand from the civil and military governors, Counts Zichy and Palfy, the evacuation of the arsenal by the Croats, presented himself, reporting the result of his interviews. It was remarked to him by these two gentlemen, in presence of the Council of the government and the Vice-admiral Martini, that the number of demands were increasing rapidly, and that, even if that last should be admitted and granted, like the precedents, quietness and order would not yet be restored. Therefore, they desired to know the real intentions of the city. He answered, that order would not be restored until all means of offense and defense were put into the hands of the citizens. This was refused, as being almost the same as an abdication; and he stated further, that he was instructed to invite the municipality to present itself before the government and to explain the wishes of the people. The Assembly proceeded to elect a deputation of some of its members, who were authorized to repeat the demand to the two governors, for the purpose of saving the city from bloodshed. The deputation consisted of the Podestà Correr, the two assessors, Luigi Michiel and Dattacio Medin, Avocate Avesani, Leone Pincherle, and Fabris. Mengaldo arrived during the negotiations. They were introduced into the apartments of Count Palfy, governor of the Venetian provinces, who was surrounded by his government Council. He took the floor, beginning with a long complaint, and severely reproaching the false imputations against the government, which were tending only to produce dissatisfaction and excitement among the population. Avesani interrupted him, saying, "Are we called here to be reproached, according to old custom, or to negotiate?" upon which his excellency grew still more angry, asserting that his words were not directed to the Advocate Avesani, but to the podestà and the other gentlemen. He terminated his speech, complaining that order was promised after having obtained the granting of the people's wishes, but that, on the contrary, the excitement and the demands were still increasing; his Council was assembled to hear the demands, and to decide if they were such as to be admitted to a conference.

The podestà replied, stating that the municipality had selected a deputation, consisting of the present individuals, for the purpose of communicating to his excellency what was believed necessary to prevent bloodshed, and invited M. Avesani to take the floor.

The Advocate Avesani said that the governor must be aware that no demand belonging to the attributions of the Council of the government would be made to

him, that all dissimulation was useless, that there was no time to be lost, and for this reason the deputation would not enter into any discussion about the inconvenient speech of his excellency, nor would any discussion be admitted upon the rights or the motives of the discontent of the people, and the tardy concessions of the government. A conclusion was urgent, and this conclusion is, "The Austrian government has to renounce its power." "If that is your demand," replied the governor, with great indignation, "I give up all my power as governor, to put it into the hands of the military governor, and thus the city will have to negotiate only with him." The Advocate Avesani then said that, a few moments ago, by the accidental opening of a door, he had seen his excellency the Count Zichy, and requested the Count Palfy to have him called immediately to hear the demands, and to give a final answer. The Count Palfy went himself, and, addressing him in a few words, explained the intentions and demands of the deputation, and gave all his powers as governor into the hands of the commander of the city and forts of Venice, ceasing from this moment to be governor. He recommended him to save, as much as possible, during the execution of his rigorous duties, this beautiful and monumental city from destruction, for which he professed a great affection. His excellency said he could not grant such demands; that he, too, loved Venice, but that his duty was dearer to him than his affection. Signor Avesani replied, that he took this answer for a refusal, and that his excellency would be responsible for all consequences when this should be announced to the people. Count Zichy requested him to act with moderation. Avesani replied, that moderation was impossible, and proposed the following conditions:

1st. The German troops will evacuate the city, and the Italian troops will—"Impossible," said the field-marshal lieutenant, "we will fight." "Well," replied Avesani, going to the door, "we shall fight." He was recalled by Count Zichy, who represented to him that it would cost him his head if he should consent to such a measure; to which Avesani replied, that on similar occasions the lives of all were equally in danger, and that already too much time had been lost. At last the first point was agreed upon, in the manner as already stated. Avesani further demanded,

2d. The troops will start immediately for Trieste. His excellency refused, for the reason, that he could not prevent the troops from rejoining their respective corps, and that they must depart protected by the forts. To which Avesani replied, that the forts must also be evacuated, and that the Venetians would not make a present to their Italian brothers of the troops driven out from Venice. He asked most peremptorily to be only answered Yes or No. The answer was, Agreed.

3d. The materiel of war remains in Venice.

4th. The chests remain in Venice.

The same refusal and the same final settlement.

Agreeable to the observation, that the salaries and the passage of the troops must be paid, it was stipulated that the necessary sum for that purpose should be provided for. Finally, the speaker of the deputation, Avesani, proposed that the two governors should remain as hostages for the faithful execution of the convention. Palfy complained of that measure, for the reason that, having already resigned before the conclusion of the treaty, and not having taken any part in it, he did not deserve such treatment, and called upon the whole deputation to testify, that he had always acted as a man of honor. "Yes, it is true," observed Avesani, "you have always been a man of honor, and affectionate toward the country; only the last three months you have committed many faults, beyond those ordered

to you by that great man, who boasted of being the Nestor of diplomacy, and who has ruined the Austrian monarchy. Count Zichy complained, in the same manner, and, upon his promise to leave the city only after the departure of the troops, it was stipulated that a steamer should be kept at the disposal of his excellency and his suite. It was also stipulated that the necessary means should be provided for the departure of the troops, civil officers, and their families. The deputation then went away, proclaiming to the people the capitulation, and the end of the Austrian government in Venice.

Signed,

CORRER, Podestá.

MEDIN, Assessor.

FABRIS.

LUIGI MICHIEL.

MENGALDO.

FRANCESCO AVESANI.

His excellency Count Palfy, desirous to prevent bloodshed, and having been informed by Count Correr, podestá, and other citizens, that this could not be done without fulfilling the conditions proposed by them, has recommended to Count Zichy all possible regard for that beautiful and monumental city, to which he is deeply attached. In consequence of his recommendation, and in consideration of the urgent circumstances, and to save the city from the horrors of bloodshed, he and the undersigned have agreed upon the following treaty:

1st. From this day the Austrian military and civil government has ceased, both on land and sea, and is surrendered to the Provisional Government, consisting of the undersigned citizens.

2d. The regiment Kinsky, the Croats, the artillery, and the corps of engineers, will evacuate the city and the forts; the Italian troops and Italian officers will remain.

3d. All materiel of war will remain in Venice.

4th. The evacuation by the troops will take place immediately, and they will direct themselves to Trieste.

5th. The families of all the officers will be protected by the Provisional Government, and they will be provided with the necessary means.

6th. All the civil officers, their families, and property, will be protected by the Provisional Government.

7th. His excellency Count Zichy gives his word of honor to remain in Venice till after the execution of the above conditions. A steamer will be kept at the disposal of his excellency, his suite, and the last soldiers.

8th. All the chests remain in Venice, and the necessary sum for the transport and the salaries of the troops will be paid. The salaries will be paid for three months.

COUNT ZICHY,
Commander of the City and Forts.

GIOVANNI CORRER.

LUIGI MICHIEL.

DATARIO MEDIN.

PIETRO FABRIS.

FRANCESCO AVESANI.

ANGELO MENGALDO.

LEONE PINCHERLE.

FRANCESCO D. BETRAME,

ANTONIO MUZZANI,

COSTANTINO ALBERTI,

} Witnesses.

Note No. 9.

TERMS OF THE SURRENDER OF VENICE.

“Minutes of the conference held at the Villa Pappadopoli, near Mestre, the head-quarters of the second *corps d'armée* of reserve, on the 22d of August. Present: his excellency the cavalry general Chevalier Gorzkowski, commanding the second *corps d'armée* of reserve; his excellency the artillery general Baron de Hess, quarter-master of the imperial army; Count Marzani, attached to his excellency the cavalry general for civil affairs. There appeared Messrs. Nicolo Priuli, Count Datario Medin, and Advocate Calucci, all three representing the municipality; Engineer Cavedalis, representing the army; and Signor Antonini, representing the merchants, who, having explained the determination of their constituents and of the population of Venice to make their submission to his imperial and royal apostolic majesty, and to come to an understanding concerning the surrender of the city and its dependencies, the following has been mutually agreed upon: 1st. The submission shall take place according to the precise terms of the proclamation of his excellency Field-marshal Count Radetzky, dated the 14th of August instant. 2d. The surrender of all that is mentioned in the said proclamation of the 14th instant shall be effected in the course of four days, from the day after to-morrow, in the manner to be agreed upon by a military commission, composed of their excellencies the cavalry general Chevalier Gorzkowski and the artillery general Baron de Hess, Colonels Schlitter, adjutant-general of his excellency Field-marshal Count Radetzky, and Chevalier Schiller, chief of the staff of the second *corps d'armée* of reserve, on one side, and Engineer Cavedalis on the other, assisted by a superior officer of marine. And whereas the gentlemen deputed by Venice have pointed to the necessity of some explanations concerning the measures contemplated by articles four and five of the above-mentioned proclamation, it is declared that the persons who are to leave Venice are, in the first place, all imperial and royal officers who have borne arms against their legitimate sovereign; in the second place, all foreign military of whatever grade; and, in the third place, the civil persons named in the list, which will be given to the Venetian deputies. With respect to the circumstance that there is at present exclusively in circulation at Venice a large quantity of paper-money, of which the poorer class of the numerous population could not be deprived without serious consequences for their subsistence, and owing to the necessity of regulating this point before the entrance of the imperial and royal troops, it is agreed that the paper-money in circulation under the name of ‘communal paper,’ shall be reduced to half its nominal value, and shall have a forced currency only in Venice, Chioggia, and the other places of the estuary for the said diminished amount, till it shall have been withdrawn and another substituted in its stead, in consequence of measures to be agreed upon with the Venetian municipality, which operation shall take place in a short time. The city of Venice and the estuary shall bear the whole charge of redeeming the said new paper-money by the annual tax of twenty-five centimes for every livre, and with other subsidiary measures, which may be calculated to hasten the operation. In consideration of this charge, no war-contribution shall be imposed, and those already inflicted upon the continental possessions of some inhabitants of Venice shall be reconsidered. As to the paper called patriotic, which is to be entirely withdrawn from circulation, and other certificates of the public debt, they shall be taken under consideration at a future pe-

riod. Done in duplicate, and signed *manu propria*, on the day and in the place hereinbefore mentioned.

GORZKOWSKI, M. P., Cavalry General;
 HEP, M. P., Artillery General and Quarter-master;
 MARZANI, M. P.;
 NICOLÒ PRIULI, M. P.;
 DATARIO MEDIN, M. P.;
 GIUSEPPE CALUCCI, M. P.;
 ANDREA ANTONINI, M. P.;
 E. CAVEDALIS, M. P."

The minutes of conference farther add: "On the 24th and following days, the surrender of the place and estuary will take place as follows: 1. Departure from Venice of the Venetian and Lombard battalions, commanded by Meneghetti by land, *viâ* Fusina. 2. Occupation of the forts on the 25th, namely, S. Secondo, Piazzale, S. Giorgio, S. Angelo, and the one on the rail-road station. 3. Departure of the corps of the Euganei and the Sile on the 26th, *viâ* Fusina. 4. Occupation of the city, surrender of the arsenal and fleet on the 27th; assembly of the officers at the fort of the Lido. 5. Departure of the corps of the Friuli, Brenta, and Galateo, on the 28th; dissolution of the two regiments. 6. Occupation of Chioggia, Burano, and respective districts on the 29th. 7. Departure on the 30th of the Neapolitans by sea; occupation of S. Niccolo and the coast. 8. Departure on the 31st of the officers, and surrender of the fort of the Lido.

Note No. 10.

DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE RECOGNITION OF FERDINAND I., 1526, OF HIS FREE ELECTION TO THE BOHEMIAN CROWN.

RECOGNITIO FERDINANDI I. IMPERATORIS DE LIBERA ELECTIONE BOHEMICA, DE ANNO 1526.

Nos Ferdinandus Dei gratia Bohemiæ Rex, Infans Hispaniarum, Archidux Austriæ, Marchio Moraviæ Dux Lucemburgiæ, Silesiæ, et Marchio Lusatiae, etc. Notum facimus tenore præsentium universis: Quemadmodum Barones, Nobiles, et etiam Civitates, al sota communitas Regni Bohemiæ ex sua libera et Cona voluntate juxta libertates Regni elegerunt nos in Regem Bohemiæ, quapropter recognoscimus quod hoc ipsum ab Oratoribus ipsorum abunde intelleximus, et re ipsa cognovimus et comperimus, quod præfati status et communitas illius Regni; non ex aliquo debito, sed ita prout supra scriptum est, eam *electionem eligentes nos in Regem Bohemiæ ex libera et bona voluntate hoc fecerunt.* Harum testimonio literarum sigilli nostri quo hactenus tanquam Archidux Austriæ usi sumus, appensione roboratarum. Datum in civitate nostra Vienna, die tertia decima mensis Decembris, Anno Domini Millesimo, Quingentesimo, Vicesimo Sexto, Regni vero nostri Anno Primo.

Note No. 11.

GOLDEN BULL OF ANDREW II.

The *Bulla Aurea* of King Andreas the Second was given in the year 1222. The preamble to this bull sets forth "that the liberties of the nobility, and of certain other natives of these realms, as founded by King Stephen the Saint, having

suffered great detriment and curtailment by the violence of sundry kings, who were impelled by their own evil propensities, and by the advice of certain malicious persons, and partly by the cravings of their own insatiable cupidity, the nobles of the country had preferred frequent petitions for the confirmation of the Constitution of these realms, to such an extent that, in utter contempt of his (the king's) royal authority, violent discussions and accusations had arisen." The king declares further that "he is now willing to confirm and maintain, for all times to come, the nobility and the freemen of the country in all their rights, privileges, and immunities, as provided by the statutes of St. Stephen." In specification of these rights, privileges, and immunities, it is enacted,

1. That the nobility and their possessions shall not for the future be subject to taxes and impositions.

2. That no man shall be either accused or arrested, sentenced, or punished for a crime unless he have received a legal summons, and until a judicial inquiry into his case shall have taken place.

3. The nobles and franklins shall be bound to do military service at their own expense, but it shall not be legal to force them to cross the frontier of the country. In a foreign war, the king is bound to pay the knights and the troops of the counties.

4. The king has no right to entail whole counties and the high offices of the kingdom.

5. The king is not allowed to farm to Jews and Ismaelites his domains, the taxes, the coinage, or the salt-mines.

In conclusion, the king declares "that if he or any of his successors should ever be found to transgress the provisions of this bill, that the bishops, the high dignitaries, and the whole of the nobility for all times to come, shall, by virtue of this bill, be entitled and empowered, jointly or severally, to oppose and contradict the king and his successors after him, as the case may be, without for so doing incurring the penalties of high treason."

These provisions, and those which we have quoted above, were embodied into thirty-one chapters, and in the form of a *Bulla Aurea*; seven copies were made and delivered "in the keep and trust of the Papal archives, of the Knights of the Hospital of St. John, of the Knight Templars in Hungary and Slavonia, of the king, of the Archbishops of Gran and Kalotsa, and of the palatine and his successors, with strict injunctions to the latter "to be very mindful of the said Golden Bull, even so that neither he in his own person shall transgress its articles, nor shall he allow either the king, or the nobility, or others to transgress the same. But he ought to watch that every man was left in the full enjoyment of his legal liberties, and that, in return, due respect and loyalty were paid to the king and his successors after him."

Note No. 12.

OATH OF CORONATION TAKEN BY FERDINAND THE FIRST, KING OF HUNGARY.

We, Ferdinand, by the grace of God, of Hungary, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, etc., apostolic king, Archduke of Austria, etc. We swear, as king of the first said kingdom of Hungary, and other kingdoms and parts annexed to it, by the living God, by his holiest mother the Virgin Mary, and by all saints, to conserve the churches (*ecclesias Dei dominos*), prelates, barons, magnates, nobles, free cities, and all inhabitants in their immunities and liberties, rights, laws, privileges, and in all former good and approved customs, and so do justice to all; we

shall observe the decrees of the most serene King Andreas, with the exclusion, however, and withdrawment (*semota*) of the thirty-first article of that decree, commencing from *Quod si vero nos*, etc., to the words, *in perpetuam facultatem*. We shall never abalienate neither diminish the frontiers of our kingdom, Hungary, and those parts which belong to it by whatever right or title, but in as much as we shall, can, increase and extend them, and do all that what we can justly do for the public welfare, honor, and increment of all states, and of the whole Hungarian kingdom; so God help us and all saints.

Note No. 13.

SANCTIO PRAGMATICA.

CAROLUS VI., IMPERATORIS ET REGIS HUNGARIÆ III.

DECRETUM II. ANNI 1723.

ARTICULUS I.

Status et Ordines Regni, Partiumque eidem annexarum, Sacræ Cæsareæ, et Regiæ Majestati, pro Libertatum et Prærogativarum Eorundem Paterna et Clementissima Confirmatione; et Suae in medium Statuum Sacratissimæ Personæ adventu; gratias quam maximas referunt.

Paternam sane, et Clementissimam Sacratissimæ Cæsareæ, et Regiæ Majestatis erga Status et Ordines Regni in præsentī Diæta, felicissime, et in frequentissimo, vix aliquando viso numero congregatos propensionem; et ad permansionem Eorundem, ac incrementum publici Status Regni Hungariæ, Partiumque eidem annexarum, proque stabilienda in omnem casum, etiam contra Vim externam, cum vicinis Regnis, et Provinciis Hæreditariis Unione, et conservanda domestica tranquillitate directam curam et sollicitudinem, ex benignis Ejusdem Sacratissimæ Cæsareæ et Regiæ Majestatis, ad Status et Ordines Regni, Partiumque eidem annexarum Clementissime emanatis Literis Regalibus ac novissime factis Propositionibus; devoto sane homagialis Fidelitatis Eorundem zelo, et constanti fervore humillime intelligentes; pro hoc erga Eosdem Clementissime exhibito Paterni affectus Gratiarum singulari voto, quodve non obstantibus in adversum quibusvis gravissimis, Sacrum Romanum Imperium, et Europæam quietem tangentibus curis et laboribus, in medium fidelium Suorum Statuum semet conferre; et Eosdem in Altissima, iisdem summe Veneranda Persona sua, paterne consolari; et primum ac ante omnia, nullaque prævia fidelium Statuum et Ordinum eatenus præmissa humillima Supplicatione, ex puro erga Eosdem paterno affectu, universos Status et Ordines Regni sui Hæreditarii Hungariæ, Partiumque, Regnorum, et Provinciarum eidem annexarum, *in omnibus tam Diplomaticis, quam aliis quibusvis Juribus, Libertatibus, Privilegiis, Immunitatibus, Consuetudinibus, Prærogativis, et Legibus*, hactenus concessis, et conditis, ac in præsentī Diæta, et in futurum etiam Diætali-ter condendis, conservaturam offerre; et eosdem, ac earundem singulas, clementissime confirmare dignata fuisset; humillimas, et quam possunt, maximas Sacratissimæ Cæsareæ ac Regiæ Majestati ideo etiam gratias referunt;

§ 1. Quod Fœmineum quoque Sexum Augustissimæ Domus Suae Austriacæ usque ad Ejusdem, et ab Eodem Descendentium defectum, ad Regiam Hungariæ Coronam, Partesque, Regna, et Provincias, ad eandem Sacrum Coronam pertinentes, unanimi Universorum Statuum et Ordinum Regni, Partiumque eidem annexarum libero voto proclamatum; et per solennem Eorundem Statuum et Ordinum ad Sacratissimam Cæsaream et Regiam Majestatem, Viennam expeditam Deputationem vocatum;

§ 2. Et ejusmodi oblationem, tam pie, et clementer gratoque animo acceptare; et fidelium Statuum et Ordinum suorum piis, ac salutaribus Votis, non tantum annuere dignata asset;

§ 3. Sed ejusmodi in Sacra Regni Hungariæ Corona, et Partibus, Regnis, et Provinciis eidem annexis Successionem, eodem quo Masculorum Primogenituræ Ordine, secundum normam in reliquis Suae Majestatis Sacratissimæ Regnis, et Provinciis Hæreditariis, in, et extra Germaniam sitis, jam per Eandem ordinatam, stabilitam, publicatam, et acceptatam, inseparabiliter, habitaque in graduum æqualitate ejusdem Lineæ, Prærogativæ Masculorum ratione, dirigi, servari, et custodiri vellet;

§ 4. Ita, ut illa, vel Masculus Ejusdem Hæres, qui, vel quæ, præmissorum Augustæ Domus Austriacæ Regnorum et Provinciarum Hæres, juxta memoratam normam Primogenituræ in Augusta Domo Austriaca receptam, existet; eodem Successionis, pro his et futuris quibuscunque casibus, Hæreditario Jure, etiam pro infallibili Rege Hungariæ, Partiumque, Regnorum, et Provinciarum eidem annexarum, æque *indivisibiliter intelligendarum*, habeatur et coronetur.

ARTICULUS II.

De Regiæ Hæreditariæ Sacratissimæ Cæsareæ et Regiæ Majestatis Sexus Fæminei Augustæ Domus Austriacæ in Sacra Regni Hungariæ Corona, et Partibus eidem ab antiquo annexis, continua Successione.

Tametsi Suae Sacratissimæ Cæsareæ et Regiæ Majestatis Fideles Status et Ordines Regni Hungariæ, Partiumque eidem annexarum, vividam et florentem, optimeque constitutam Ætatem, Vires, et Valitudinem conspicientes Divinæque Benedictioni quam optime confisi, Eandem Magnis, et gloriosis Sexus Masculini Successoribus, ad præces quoque fidelium suorum Statuum eo fine ad DEUM Ter Optimum fusas, et incessanter fundendas, largissime benedicendam, et indefinenti Masculorum Hæredum suorum ordine fideles Status Regni consolandos fore, vel maxime confiderent;

§ 1. Quia vero apprime etiam perspectum haberent; Reges pariter, et Principes, æquali aliorum hominum mortalitatis sorti subjectos esse; mature proinde, et consulto perpendentes, tot et tanta, cum Prædecessorum Suae Sacratissima Cæsareæ et Regiæ Majestatis, Divorum olim Leopoldi Genitoris, et Josephi fratris, Gloriosissimorum Hungariæ Regum; tum vel maxime propria Clementissime Regnantis Suae Sacratissimæ Cæsareæ et Regiæ Majestatis, pro incremento Boni Patrii publici, prove fidelium Civium suorum perenni salute, Bello æque ac Pace, exantlata Gloriosissima Acta, et Facta; dum non modo Hæreditarium Regnum hoc suum Hungariæ, Partesque, Regna, et Provincias eidem annexas, in statu per præattactos gloriosos Prædecessores suos positum, conservavit; sed occasione etiam novissimi Ottomanici Belli, contra ferventissimos ejusdem impetus, idem animose tutata; victricibus, felicibusque Armis, in annexa eidem Regna, et Provincias, cum immortalis sui Nominis Gloria, Statuumque et Ordinum, ac privatorum Regni Civium perenni securitate protenderit: ut successivis quibusvis temporibus, ab omnibus externis, et etiam domesticis confusionibus et periculis preservari; imo in alma, et continua tranquillitate, ac sincere animorum unione, *adversus omnem Vim etiam externam felicissime perennare possit*;

§ 2. Quosvis præterea etiam *internos Motus*, et facile solita, ipsis Statibus et Ordinibus Regni ab antiquo optime cognita *Interregni mala*, sollicitè præcavere cupientes;

§ 3. Majorum suorum laudabilibus Exemplis incitati;

§ 4. Volentesque erga Sacratissimam Cæsaream, et Regiam Majestatem, Dominum Dominum Eorum Clementissimum, gratos, et fideles semet exhibere;

§ 5. In defectu Sexus Masculini Sacratissimæ Cæsareæ et Regiæ Majestatis (quem defectum DEUS clementissime avertere dignetur), Ius hæreditarium succedendi in Hungariæ Regnum, et Coronam, ad eandemque Partes pertinentes, Provincias, et Regna, jam Divino auxilio recuperata, et recuperanda; etiam in Sexum Augustæ Sux Domus Austriacæ Fœmineum, primo loco quidem ab altesata modo Regnante Sacratissima Cæsarea et Regia Majestate;

§ 6. Dein in hujus defectu; a Divo olim Josepho;

§ 7. His quoque deficientibus; ex Lumbis Divi olim Leopoldi, Imperatorum, et Regum Hungariæ Descendentes, Eorundemque legitimos Romano-Catholicos Successores utriusque Sexus Austriæ Archiduces, juxta stabilitum per Sacratissimam Cæsaream et Regiam Regnantem Majestatem in aliis quoque suis Regnis et Provinciis Hæreditariis, in et extra Germaniam sitis, Primogenituræ Ordinem, Jure et Ordine præmisso, *indivisibiliter, ac inseparabiliter, invicem, et insimil, ac una cum Regno Hungariæ, et Provinciis, Partibus et Regnis eidem annexis, hæreditarie possidendis*, regendum et gubernandam transferunt;

§ 8. Et memoratum Successionem acceptant;

§ 9. Taliterque eandem *Successionem Fœmineam*, in Augusto Domo Austriaca introductam, et agnitam (extensis ad eam nunc pro tunc Articulis 2 et 3, 1687, et pariter 2 et 3, Anni 1715) juxta ordinem supradictum *stabiliunt*;

§ 10. Per præattactum Fœmineum Sexum Augustæ Domus ejusdem, prævio modo declaratos Hæredes, et Successores utriusque Sexus Archiduces Austriæ, *acceptandam ratihabendam*, et una cum præmissis, æque modo prævio per Sacratissimam Cæsaream et Regiam Majestatem clementissime confirmatis *Diplomaticis*, aliisque prædeclaratis Statuum et Ordinum Regni, Partiumque, Regnorum, et Provinciarum eidem annexarum *Libertatibus, et Prærogativis*, ad tenorem præcatorum Articulorum, futuris semper temporibus, occasione Coronationis *observandam determinant*;

§ 11. Et nonnisi post omnimodum prædicti Sexus defectum *avitam et veterem, approbatamque, et receptam Consuetudinem* Prærogativamque Statuum et Ordinum, in *Electione, et Coronatione Regum*, locum habituram: reservant intelligendam.

ARTICULUS III.

Jura, Prærogativæ, et Libertates Statuum et Ordinum Regni, Partiumque eidem annexarum confirmantur.

Sacratissima Cæsarea et Regia Majestas, universorum fidelium Statuum et Ordinum Regni, Partiumque eidem annexarum, omnia tam *Diplomatica*, quam alia quævis *Jura, Libertates, et Privilegia, Immunitates, Prærogativas, Legesque conditas, et approbatas Consuetudines* (in conformitate Articulorum 1 et 2 modernæ Dietæ, in sensu Articulorum 1, 2, et 3, Anni 1715. Formulæque Juramenti ibidem contentæ, intelligendorum) clementer *confirmat, et observabit*:

§ 1. Pariterque *Successores*, legitime *coronandi* Hungariæ et Partium eidem annexarum Reges; in iisdem Prærogativis, et præmissis Immunitatibus et Legibus, Status et Ordines Regni Partiumque eidem annexarum *inviolabiliter conservabunt*;

§ 2. Quas et quæ, præterea sua Majestas Sacratissima, per suos *cujuscunque Status gradus et conditionis subditos, observari faciet.*

LEOPOLDI II. IMPER. ET REGIS HUNGARIÆ.

DECRETUM I. ANNI 1790-91.

ARTICULUS X.

De Independentia Regni Hungariæ, Partiumque eidem annexarum.

ERGA demissam Statuum et Ordinum Regni Propositionem, Sua quoque Majes-

tas Sacratissima benigne agnoscere dignata est, quod licet Successio Sexus foeminei Augustæ Domus Austriacæ per Articulos 1 et 2, 1723, in Regno Hungariæ, Partibusque eidem adnexis stabilita, eundem, quem in reliquis Regnis et Ditionibus hæreditariis, in et extra Germaniam sitis, juxta stabilitum successionis Ordinem inseparabiliter ac indivisibiliter possidendis, Principem concernat, Hungaria nihilominus cum Partibus adnexis, *sit Regnum liberum*, et relate ad totam legalem Regiminis formam (huc intellectis quibusvis Dicasteriis suis) *independens*, id est nulli alteri Regno aut populo obnoxium, sed *propriam habens Consistentiam, et Constitutionem*, proinde a legitime coronato hæreditario Rege suo; adeoque etiam a Sua Majestate Sacratissima, Successoribusque ejus Hungariæ Regibus, *propriis legibus, et Consuetudinibus, non vero ad normam aliarum Provinciarum*, dictantibus id Articulis 3, 1715, item 8 et 11, 1791, *regendum et gubernandum*.

Note No. 14.

ROYAL PROPOSITIONS PRESENTED TO THE DIET OF HUNGARY IN 1847-8.

1st. To elect a Palatine in conformity with the Dietal Act 3, 1608; and to take into consideration various important measures specified in the following propositions, viz.:

2d. The manner of provisioning and quartering the troops stationed in Hungary; the royal rescript of November 10, 1844; and the bill annexed to these propositions, to serve as the basis of their deliberations.

3d. The claim of the royal free towns to exercise the right of voting at the Diet, and the expediency of extending this constitutional right to the ecclesiastical corporations (chapters of cathedrals) and the free districts.

4th. The co-ordination (*i. e.*, the reform of the corporations) of the royal free towns; a bill for which object is annexed to the propositions, and submitted to the Diet.

5th. The laws and usages relating to mortgages of manorial estates; for the amendment of which a bill is annexed to the propositions, its chief feature being the introduction of a system of registration (hypothecary registers).

6th. The urbarial laws (*i. e.*, the laws relating to the lords of manors and their peasant tenantry), with a view of abolishing the roboth (*covée*); the Dietal Acts 8, 1836, and 7, 1840, which permit this roboth to be commuted into a money rent, or to be redeemed for perpetuity, by mutual agreement of the parties concerned, not having been found effective.

7th. The regulation of the commercial relations of Hungary and Austria in a manner conformable to the interests of both countries; his majesty being, moreover, of opinion that nothing would be more conducive to these interests than the removal of the intermediate customs' line. Such a measure, he states, will require the most mature deliberation, on account of the peculiar circumstances connected with it and the questions it involves, as well as in respect to its bearing on the Austrian states and the royal revenue. His majesty, therefore, wishes the Diet to inquire into the means by which so desirable a result may be obtained, and to submit their views to him as soon as possible; for which purpose his majesty has been graciously pleased to order that the official data respecting the trade of Hungary be laid before them.

8th. In this proposition his majesty states that all the efforts for extending the trade of Hungary have hitherto been unavailing, on account of the want of roads and other facilities for the conveyance of merchandise; he has deemed it expedient

to form a special section, or board of public works, in the vice-regal council; and has, moreover, assisted, by loans and money, several private undertakings, as, for instance, the Central Hungarian Rail-way Company, and the company for the regulation of the Theiss. His majesty, therefore, wishes the Diet to take the important question of public works into their serious consideration; and, among other matters, to direct their attention to the representation (bill) presented by the last Diet, respecting a rail-way to Fiume, in which neither a satisfactory estimate of the cost, nor the sources from which is to be derived the sum that would probably be required to cover the guarantee of interest to a company, are sufficiently specified.

9th. His majesty recommends the states (3) to take into their consideration the documents which will be laid before them respecting the reincorporated Transylvanian counties (4).

10th. His majesty expresses a hope that the states will resume their labors on the criminal code, the code presented by the last Diet, and for which that drawn up by a Dietal commission appointed for the purpose in the year 1844 served as bases, not being sufficiently complete to receive his majesty's sanction.

11th. His majesty requests the payment of £53,828, advanced by the royal treasure for national purposes.

Note No. 15.

ADDRESS OF THE HUNGARIAN DIET TO THE EMPEROR, 1847-8.

1. Your majesty's faithful states summoned to the present Diet enter with pleasure on the laborious task of legislation, incited by the hope of their efforts leading to a favorable result.

2. With pleasure, because this has been the first time for centuries that the Hungarian nation has had the happiness of hearing from the lips of its crowned sovereign the cherished tones of its native tongue.

3. With the hope of their efforts leading to a favorable result, from the consideration of your majesty having presented the Archduke Stephen to the nation, and by this pledge of mutual affection strengthened that tie by which we are indissolubly attached—by law, by interest, and by predilection—to the imperial dynasty, and through this dynasty to the entire monarchy.

4. May your majesty therefore be graciously pleased to accept the ardent thanks of the nation.

5. We also can not refrain from mentioning that, by the royal propositions read to us on the 11th of November, several questions have been submitted to our consideration, the decision of which has long formed one of our most ardent desires. We trust that this may be regarded as a proof that between the nation and its ruler no misunderstanding subsists.

6. Having succeeded in responding to the first of the royal propositions in a manner strictly conformable to the interests both of the government and the nation, there is nothing we more ardently desire than to acquire the conviction that in treating the other questions contained in the propositions, as well as the ulterior measures which the necessities of the country imperatively demand, this fortunate coincidence may not be wanting: that the views of the monarch and the wishes of the nation may have the same tendency.

7. While we, therefore, joyfully embrace this opportunity of conveying to your majesty the expression of our sincere thanks and our unshaken loyalty, we also

regard it as our duty frankly to make mention of those obstacles without the removal of which we can perceive no guarantee for the future.

8. The chief obstacle to our social progress consists, in our opinion, in the Dietal Act 10, 1790, not having hitherto been fully realized; for the government of our country does not yet possess that independence which, according to law, it ought to possess.

9. This obstacle is the more serious on account of the very essential difference that exists in the fundamental principles of our legislative and administrative systems. It is owing to this circumstance that, in considering the questions submitted to us at our Diets and called for by the wants of the age, we can not calculate with any degree of certainty how far the views of the government and those of the nation may coincide.

10. Our preliminary and other grievances (*gravamina*) which we have repeatedly laid before the throne from Diet to Diet, still remain unredressed, which increases the doubt that we must necessarily entertain of the operation even of the most wholesome laws that may be enacted, a doubt which is justified by the fact that the execution and promulgation of our laws is not fully guaranteed. It is thus that the Dietal Act 20, 1836, has not yet been put in execution; and that the acts on religious affairs and on bills of exchange have not even been promulgated in the districts constituting the military frontiers.

11. To this must be added that, along with a tendency to set aside the influence of the Legislature, a tendency to increase the power of the administration is also clearly apparent. As a proof of what we here advance, we may cite those recent measures for reducing into a system the hitherto exceptional employ of county administrators, as well as those respecting the county congregations; measures which are at variance with our comital administration, as established by the Dietal Acts 56, 1723, and 36, 1536.

12. The special cases herein mentioned will serve to give your majesty a general idea of our present position. We shall hereafter venture to submit our views also respecting the details, with the remark that we regard the removal of these obstacles as an essential condition of the organic reform of our social institutions.

13. We are convinced that the expediency of removing these obstacles, and equitably adjusting the conflicting interests they give rise to, will not escape your majesty's paternal solicitude, solely directed to the welfare of your people. With this hope we enter willingly into the consideration of the questions contained in the royal propositions, and which have been called for by the exigencies of the nation. We shall also not neglect to lay our grievances before your majesty, in conformity with the Dietal Act 13, 1790.

14. We have no hesitation in stating that we are willing to pass such measures as may lead to an equitable adjustment of the conflicting interests of Hungary and the hereditary states; the more so as we are convinced that the difficulties in the way of this adjustment do not proceed from the nature of the relations themselves.

15. Great and arduous is the task of the coming times! It is ours to develop to the utmost extent our social institutions, grounded on constitutional rights, as well as our material resources. It is that of your majesty to make these coincide with the intellectual development and the material interests of the entire monarchy swayed by your sceptre, in conformity with the principles of justice and the exigencies of the age.

16. Taking into consideration the numerous and important measures that will

have to be submitted to us, it appears to us an object of paramount necessity that a Diet should be held annually in the city of Pesth.

17. We have to beg that your majesty may be graciously pleased to give the nation the assurance beforehand that its wishes in this respect may be complied with.

18. We trust that in this manner, and with the aid of the infinite goodness of the Almighty, some steps may be taken toward the end we have in view.

Note No. 16.

ACTS PASSED BY THE HUNGARIAN DIET IN THE SESSION OF 1847-8.

ACT 1.

Is a mere record of services of the late Palatine.

ACT 2.

Records the election of the Archduke Stephen as Palatine, and the fact that the letter of candidature was returned unopened.

ACT 3.

It was this act that gave rise to such frequent conferences at Vienna. It is regarded by the Hungarians as a second "Golden Bull" or "Magna Charta," as it has rendered Hungary, to all intents and purposes, an independent kingdom, merely connected with Austria by the circumstance of the two countries being still under the sceptre of a common sovereign. (See Appendix, note No. 27, for Article Third in full.)

ACT 4.

A Diet is to be held annually at Pesth. The members of the Lower House, who, of course, will no longer be bound by instructions, to be triennially elected.

The king has the right to prorogue the Diet, and may dissolve it before the expiration of the three years; but, in the latter case, he is obliged to summon another Diet within three months after the dissolution of the former one.

This right is, however, virtually annulled by the next clause, which expressly states that the annual session of the Diet can not be closed, nor the Diet dissolved, before the accounts of the past year and the budget for the ensuing year have been laid before the Diet, and a decision thereon been taken by that Assembly.

The president and vice-president of the Upper House are appointed by the king, the other officers by the House. The Lower House elects by ballot its president, vice-presidents, and all its officers. The presidents of both Houses are appointed for the whole duration of the Diet, three years, the other officers only for a session.

ACT 5.

As this is a mere provisional law, it was deemed expedient to leave the so-called half-spurred nobles in possession of the elective franchise.

Thus, § 1 states that the Diet, not feeling itself authorized to deprive any one of a political right, leaves all who have hitherto enjoyed the elective franchise in possession of it. It is needless to observe that this class of nobles will be disfranchised by the next Diet.

The qualifications for electors are,

§ 2. To have attained the age of twenty years; Hungarians by birth or naturalized; not under guardianship, nor in domestic service, nor convicted of fraud, theft, murder, &c.

a. To possess, in towns, real property in houses or lands to the value of £30; in the country, real property equal in value to a quarter session of the former urbarial laws; *i. e.*, property equal in value to a plot of ground varying in extent in the different counties, but, in general, from eight to ten English acres.

b. The elective franchise is also given to manufacturers and tradesmen who have a manufactory, work-shop, or shop; also to artisans domiciled in a place, and who have a fixed employment, and work with at least one assistant.

c. Also to those who, not possessing any of the above qualifications, have a fixed income of £10 yearly, derived from land or investments.

d. And unconditionally, or irrespective of their income, to all physicians, surgeons, lawyers, engineers, academical artists, professors, members of the Hungarian academy, apothecaries, clergymen, chaplains, public notaries, and school-masters.

Burgesses of free towns not having any of the above qualifications, but who have hitherto enjoyed the elective franchise, are still to retain it (*i. e.*, until the next Diet).

Every one who is an elector may be elected; or, in other words, the qualification for a deputy is the same as that for the enjoyment of the elective franchise, except that the deputy must have attained the age of twenty-four years, and be conversant with the Hungarian (Magyar) language.

There are to be in all four hundred and forty-six deputies; viz., three hundred and seventy-seven for Hungary and the annexed territories, and sixty-nine for Transylvania, when the union is effected. Buda and Pesth will return seven deputies; the county of Pesth, ten; the three Croatian counties, eighteen; the Croatian, Slavonic, and Banat military frontiers, fifteen.

A deputy is to receive a daily allowance of 10s., besides £40 annually to pay for his lodgings in Pesth.

ACT 6.

An act for the *de facto* reincorporation of the three Transylvanian counties.

ACT 7.

Decrees the union of Hungary and Transylvania; for the purpose of effecting which a Transylvanian Diet is to be summoned as soon as possible. Transylvania to send sixty-nine deputies to the Lower House, and a certain number of Transylvanian nobles to be members of the Upper House. But it is expressly stated that the act is provisional; and that an equitable adjustment of the interests of both countries, and other ulterior measures, are left for the consideration of the first united Diet of Hungary and Transylvania.

ACT 8.

Establishes the principle of general taxation for all classes without distinction. The minister to lay before the next Diet a plan of equitably adjusting the rates to be levied, which are to commence from the 1st of November, 1848; the amount of taxation to be of course decided by the next Diet.

ACT 9.

Abolishes the roboth, the tithe of one ninth of the produce to the landlord, and all other urbarial services whatsoever, from the day on which the Act is published (April 11). Manorial courts are also abolished. The landlords are to receive an indemnification—rather vaguely expressed by a high-flown Magyar phrase, viz., “The Legislature places the indemnification of the landed proprietors under the protecting shield of the national public honor.” (A nemzeti Közbesület véd-paizsa ala helyezi.)

ACTS 10, 11, AND 12.

Acts passed as supplementary to the preceding act, respecting certain urbarial rights enjoyed by the peasants—such as that of cutting wood in the manorial forests, etc.; also respecting urbarial lawsuits, and suits brought before the manorial courts.

ACT 13.

Abolishes tithes to the clergy without compensation, or, according to the words made use of, simply records the fact of the clergy having voluntarily renounced taking tithes without claiming a compensation.

The poorer clergy, whose incomes were principally derived from tithes, to be duly provided for.

Lay persons, who have acquired possession of tithes by contracts, etc., to receive a compensation

ACT 14.

Respects the establishment of a bank of credit, particularly with a view to afford pecuniary assistance to the landed proprietors, a bill respecting which is to be prepared by the ministry, and submitted to the next Diet.

ACT 15.

Virtually abolishes the Aviticity laws, the ministers being empowered to make the necessary modifications in the civil code, to be submitted to the next Diet for their complete and final abolition; all Aviticity lawsuits to be meanwhile suspended.

ACTS 16 AND 17.

The so-called autonomic rights, hitherto enjoyed by the counties, being incompatible with the present Constitution, and with an executive power exercised by a responsible ministry; these acts place the management of county affairs in the hands of permanent comitat committees, for the turbulent county congregations.

ACT 18.

Provisional law on the press, which has been severely criticised, and caused great dissatisfaction, especially III., § 30, 2, which requires the proprietor of a daily paper to deposit £1000 as caution money. (The sum was originally fixed at £2000; but after the bill had passed both Houses, it was again taken into consideration, in consequence of the remonstrances of the Committee of Public Safety of Pesth, and the sum reduced to £1000). Also IV., § 37, which requires a person establishing a printing or lithographic press to deposit £400 as caution money.

ACT 19.

Places the university under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Public Instruction; the said university to be henceforward conducted on what are generally termed liberal principles.

ACT 20.

Reorganizes the Unitarian religion; that is to say, Unitarianism is declared to be in Hungary what it has long been in Transylvania, one of the legally recognized Christian sects.

§ 2. Places all the legally recognized religions (Roman Catholic, Greek Church, Calvinist, Lutheran, and Unitarian) on a footing of perfect equality. The money required for ecclesiastical and educational purposes to be furnished by the state, which implies that the clergy of all the recognized religions are to be paid by the state. None of the schools to be exclusively confined to any particular sect, but open to all without distinction. Bills for carrying out these principles to be prepared by the ministers, and submitted to the next Diet.

ACT 21.

Respects the national colors; Hungarian vessels to bear the Hungarian flag. The Hungarian flag has three horizontal stripes of the same colors as the Italian, only in a reversed order; the Hungarian being red, white, and green; the Italian green, white, and red.

ACT 22.

Respects the organization of the National Guard, the most important clauses of the act are:

§ 1. All persons, from the age of twenty to fifty, are to serve in the National Guard, who are: 1st, not in domestic service; 2d, who possess real property—in towns, of the value of £20; in the country, of the value of half a session (equivalent to from sixteen to twenty English acres). Thus, by a strange anomaly or oversight, the qualification of a National Guard is higher than that for an elector (see Act 5); also those who possess an annual income of the value of £10.

§ 3. Magistrates are empowered to admit persons not possessing these qualifications, but who are otherwise worthy of the honor, into the ranks of the National Guard, whenever they may deem it expedient.

§ 8. Optional for a person to serve in the cavalry or infantry; but those who do not choose the former must serve in the latter.

§ 9. The National Guard elect their officers up to the rank of captain. The field officers, *i. e.*, all above the rank of captain, are appointed, in Hungary, by the Palatine-vicegerent, on the proposal of the Minister of War; in the annexed territories, by the Ban (of Croatia).

§ 11. The commander-in-chief of the National Guard is, in Hungary, the Palatine; in the annexed territories, the Ban; in the Hungarian Littoral, the governor.

ACTS 23, 24, 25, 26, AND 27.

Provisional acts—until the next Diet—for the co-ordination (municipal reform) of the free towns and free districts.

ACT 28.

The Palatine was *ex-officio* Lord Lieutenant of the county of Pesth, and Cap-

tain General of the Jászygians and Cumanians; but these offices being under the control of the Minister of the Interior, are not deemed compatible with his present high functions as vicegerent of the kingdom. The present act was, therefore, framed to place the county of Pesth under the authority of an administrator, and the free districts Jászygia and Cumania under that of a Palatinal captain general; the said administrator and captain general to have the rank of lords lieutenant, and, as such, seats and votes in the Upper House.

ACT 29.

Declares judges to be the only officers of the crown that are not removable.

ACT 30.

Empowers the ministry to raise £1,000,000; of which sum £800,000 is to be employed for rail-roads, and £200,000 for the regulation of rivers.

ACT 31.

A provisional act respecting theatres.

 Note No. 17.

(*Translation from the Illyrian.*)

DEMANDS OF THE CROATIANS.

DEMANDS OF THE NATION WHICH WERE UNANIMOUSLY RESOLVED UPON AT A NATIONAL MEETING OF THE THREE KINGDOMS, DALMATIA, CROATIA, AND SLAVONIA, CALLED TOGETHER BY THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE, AND HELD AT THE CAPITAL, AGRAM, IN THE TOWN-HALL, ON THE $\frac{13}{23}$ TH OF MARCH, AND WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED, THROUGH AN INFLUENTIAL DEPUTATION, TO THE IMPERIAL THRONE FOR SANCTION.

The nations of the United Kingdoms, animated by the desire of continuing, as heretofore, under the Hungarian crown, with which the free crown of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia was voluntarily united by their ancestors; animated by the desire of remaining true to the reigning dynasty, which at present rules the land according to the Pragmatic Sanction; and, finally, animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity of the Austrian monarchy, and that of the kingdom of Hungary, while they at the same time are anxious to uphold those great boons which were obtained for the whole Austrian empire during the three bloody and important days of the 12th, 13th, and 14th of March, make the following demands upon the king's sense of justice:

1. The extraordinary position in which the nation finds itself, as well as the restoration of its legal order, requires an authorized head; and with this view it has unanimously elected Baron Joseph Jellacic principal magistrate of the three united kingdoms, a man who possesses the confidence of the whole nation, and wishes that the command of the frontier troops, and the right of calling together the Diet, may also be granted to him.

2. That the Diet of these kingdoms be summoned to meet at Agram by May the 1st of this year at latest.

3. A strong and new union, in every respect of the kingdom of Dalmatia, which by tradition and by law belongs to us, with the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia, as well as the annexation of the military frontiers, as regards their political administration, and the incorporation of all other parts of our country, which in the

course of time have become lost to us and united with the Hungarian counties and Austrian provinces.

4. Their national independence.
5. Their own independent ministry, responsible to the Diet of these kingdoms, whose members shall consist of men of popular opinions, and devoted to the more modern tendencies toward freedom and progress.
6. The introduction of the national language into the interior and exterior administration of these kingdoms, as well as into all establishments for public instruction.
7. The foundation of a university at Agram.
8. Political and intellectual development on the principles of a free national spirit.
9. Freedom of press, creeds, instruction, and speech.
10. A yearly Diet at Agram, Eszeg, Zara, and Fiume, in turns.
11. The representation of the people on the principle of equality, without reference to rank, for the approaching as well as all future Croatian, Dalmatian, and Slavonian Diets.
12. Equality of all in the sight of the law, as well as publicity in law proceedings, together with a jury and responsibility of the judges.
13. Proportionate taxation upon all classes, without regard to rank.
14. Exemption from all compulsory labor and "corvée."
15. Establishment of a national bank.
16. Restoration of our national funds, which hitherto have been under Hungarian management, as well as of all properties and funds belonging to the finance department. The above to be managed by a responsible finance minister.
17. A National Guard, the command of which to be vested in the "lands captain," chosen by the Diet, according to the old custom.
18. The national troops of every description, in times of peace, to remain in the country; the officers to be natives, and the word of command to be given in the national language; in times of war, or of observation of a foreign enemy, viz., upon frontier duty, the troops to receive food, pay, and clothing. All foreign troops to leave the country, and the "military colonists" who are now in Italy to be sent home.
19. The national troops to swear fidelity to the common Constitution, their king, and the freedom of their nation, and of all other free nations composing the Austrian monarchy, according to the principles of humanity.
20. All political prisoners, whether in the United Kingdoms or in other free provinces of Austria, and especially our distinguished author and worthy fellow-countryman, Tomasseo, to be set at liberty.
21. Right of association, assembly and petition.
22. Abolition of all custom-houses upon the frontiers of our country, and Slavonic-Italian-Austrian states, and proclamation of reciprocal free trade.
23. Free entry of sea salt, according to our old rights.
24. The abolition of all imperial and public "corvée" on the military frontier, as is proposed in case of private individuals in the provinces, and a restoration to the communes of their forest and pasturage rights.
25. The frontier funds shall be managed by our own ministry, instead of the War Department, as heretofore.
26. Every frontier man to enjoy equal rights and liberties with the other inhabitants of the United Kingdoms.
27. The town and country communes of the country to be organized upon the principles of liberty, with the right of self-government and freedom of speech.

28. The old names for the lieutenants of counties, "zupanie," to be resumed, and they themselves to be organized according to old customs, but in the spirit of modern freedom.

29. All offices, without exception, temporal as well as spiritual, to be vested exclusively in natives of the United Kingdoms.

30. Abolition of celibacy in the Church, and the use of the native language in Church service, according to the old Croatian rights and customs.

Note No. 18.

IMPERIAL MANIFESTO ANNOUNCING TO THE CROATIANS AND SLAVONIANS THAT THE BAN, BARON JOSEPH JELLACIC, IS SUSPENDED FROM ALL HIS DIGNITIES AND OFFICES.

We, Ferdinand I., Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, the Fifth of that name, &c., assure you, inhabitants of our kingdoms Croatia and Slavonia, of our sovereign grace, and issue the following manifesto, viz.:

Croatians and Slavonians!

Our paternal heart found great satisfaction in the hope that, while complying with the wishes of our faithful nations, we extended the benefits of constitutional freedom to all our subjects, we thus bound the nations which Providence intrusted to our care, in gratitude to ourselves and our throne. We trusted, at the same time, that an equalization of rights and liberties would urge our people to brotherly union in the effort for a general improvement, for which we had opened the widest field. Relying as we did on these our intentions, we were painfully struck by the sad discovery that by *you*, in particular, our expectations were frustrated.

You, Croatians and Slavonians! who, united to the crown of Hungary for eight centuries, shared all the fates of this country; you, Croatians and Slavonians! who owe to this very union the constitutional freedom which alone among all Slavonic nations you have been enabled to preserve; you disappointed our hopes—you, who not only have shared in all the rights and liberties of the Hungarian Constitution, but who besides—in just recompense of your loyalty, until now stainlessly preserved—were lawfully endowed with peculiar rights, privileges, and liberties, by the grace of our illustrious ancestors, and who, therefore, possess greater privileges than any of the subjects of our sacred Hungarian crown. You disappointed our hopes, to whom the last Diet of the kingdom of Hungary and its dependencies, according to our own sovereign will, granted full part in all the benefits of the enlarged constitutional liberties, and equality of rights. The legislation of the crown of Hungary has abolished feudal servitude in Croatia as well as in Hungary; and those among you who were subjected to *roboth*, have, without any sacrifice on their part, become free proprietors. The landed proprietors receive for their loss an indemnification, which your own means could never provide. That indemnification will be entailed on our Hungarian crown estates with our sovereign ratification, and without any charge to you.

The right also of constitutional representation was extended to the people in your case no less than in Hungary; in consequence of which no longer the nobility alone, but likewise other inhabitants and the military frontier, take part by their representatives in the legislation common to all, as much as in the municipal congregations. Thus you may improve your welfare by your immediate co-op-

eration. Until now, the nobility contributed but little to the public expenses; henceforward the proportional repartition of the taxes among all inhabitants is lawfully established, whereby you have been delivered from a great burden. Your nationality and municipal rights, relative to which vain and malicious reports have been spread, with the aim of exciting your distrust, are by no means in danger. On the contrary, both your nationality and your municipal rights are enlarged, and secured against all encroachments; not only is the use of your native language lawfully guaranteed to you forever in your schools and churches, but it is likewise introduced in the public assemblies, where the Latin language has been until now in use.

Calumniators sought to make you believe that the Hungarian nation desired to suppress your language, or at least to prevent its further development. We ourselves assure you that such reports are totally false, and that we see with pleasure that you exert yourselves to develop and establish your own mother tongue, in preference to the dead Latin language. The Legislature is willing to support you in your efforts, by providing livings for your priests, to whom the spiritual care of the soul and the education of your children is intrusted. For eight centuries you have been united to Hungary. During the whole of that time the Legislature has always had due regard for your nationality. How could you, therefore, believe that the Legislature, which has guarded your mother tongue for eight centuries, should now be opposed to it?

And notwithstanding all this, whereas the guarantee of your nationality, and the enlargement of your constitutional liberties, ought to have been greeted with ready acknowledgment, persons have been found among you who, instead of the thankfulness, love, and loyalty which they owe to ourselves, have hoisted the standard of fanatical distrust; who represent the Hungarians as your enemies, and who use every means to sever the two nations, namely, the very same who persecuted your fellow-citizens, and by intimidation which endangered personal safety forced them to leave their country, because they had attempted to enlighten you as to the real truth. Our deep concern respecting these troubles was heightened by our anxiety, lest perhaps the very man had given up himself to this criminal sedition whom we have overwhelmed with tokens of our royal bounty, and whom we appointed as guardian of the law and security in your country. Our deep concern was heightened by the apprehension lest this man, abusing the position to which our bounty raised him, had not corrected the notions of the falsely-informed citizens, as he ought to have done; but, animated by party hatred, had still more inflamed their fanaticism; yes, lest, unmindful of his oath as subject, he dared to conspire against the union of Croatia with Hungary, and hereby against the integrity of our holy crown and our royal dignity.

Formerly, in Hungary and its dependencies, we administered the executive powers by our Hungarian Chancery and Home Office, and in military concerns by our Council of War. To the orders issued in this way, the Bans of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia were obedient, just as they were bound, in more remote times, to obey the orders of our Hungarian authorities, issued in a different manner and in different forms, according to the mode of administering our executive power arranged by the Parliament with our ratification.

In consequence of the request addressed to us by our faithful states, and guided by our own free will, in the last Hungarian Parliament we graciously sanctioned a law, according to which our beloved cousin, His Imperial Highness the Archduke Stephen, Palatine of Hungary, was, during our absence from Hungary, declared our royal lieutenant, who, as such, had to administer the executive pow-

er by the hands of our Hungarian ministers, whom we simultaneously appointed, intrusting them with all authority, which before was vested in the Royal Chancery, the Home Office, the Treasury, and the Council of War.

In spite of this, Baron Joseph Jellacic, whom we graciously favored with the appointment of Ban of our kingdoms of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, is accused of having the temerity to refuse this due obedience.

We, the King of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, we, whose person is sacred to you, we tell you, Croats and Slavonians, the law too is sacred, and must be considered so! *We have sworn to the Eternal King of all kings, that we ourselves will preserve the integrity of our Hungarian crown, and of our Constitution, and that we will no less ourselves obey the law than we will have it obeyed by others.*

We will keep our royal oath. We are gracious to our loyal subjects, forbearing to the guilty who repent, but inexorably severe toward obstinate traitors. And we mean to give over to avenging justice those who presume to trifle with our royal oath. He who revolts against the law revolts against our royal throne, which rests upon the law, and Baron Jellacic is accused, with his notorious adherents, of not only opposing the law, but of persisting in his disobedience, regardless of the paternal exhortations which we have addressed to him.

The first care of our beloved cousin, the Archduke Palatine, and of our Hungarian ministry, was, to call upon Baron Jellacic to explain himself in respect to your nationality, your rights, and your liberties; so that, as soon as possible—besides other measures—the Croatian Congress might be assembled, and those laws might thus be published, whose blessings we never intended to withhold from you, and that after this the Ban should be publicly invested with his dignity; since before this installation, he could not be considered as a legitimate dignitary.

Notwithstanding our repeated orders, the baron is accused of having disobeyed, and of having by this disobedience exposed you to the dangers of anarchy. But as though it were not enough that the Ban himself did not obey, he is accused of having seduced the lawful authorities to the same disobedience, and of having *forced* them, no less than the people themselves, *by violent means*, to hostile demonstrations against Hungary.

All of you must have witnessed the acts of which he is accused; all of you must have seen whether he persecuted those who wished to preserve the union of Croatia with Hungary, whether he deposed them arbitrarily from their offices, whether he brought a trial by court-martial upon all those who refused to do homage to his political views, and by this means compelled many to flight and emigration; all of you must have seen whether the Ban prevented the legally-appointed lord lieutenants from entering upon their duties; whether he violently seized the funds belonging to the treasury, and even employed our own troops to perpetrate such arbitrary actions.

You must know whether he arbitrarily charged you with new taxes, *and without any authority* forced the people to take up arms—an act which we ourselves can not authorize without the consent of the legislative power. You must be able to bear witness too, if he allowed, that his notorious adherents incited the populace by false reports relative to the Hungarians, as if they threatened your nationality; if he allowed, that sedition was preached in illegal assemblies; that arbitrary appointments were made; and that in consequence of the excitement occasioned by these proceedings, bloody conflicts, and plunder, and murder have taken place in Hungary. You know the personal affront which has been offered, under the very eyes of the Ban, to an illustrious member of our royal house, viz.,

our lord lieutenant, the Archduke Palatine, in the public square of Agram,* a town which of late has repeatedly been the scene of riots. You must know it, if the Ban punished the perpetrators of such deeds. It can not be unknown to you, if he really refused obedience to our royal commissioner, Baron Hrabowszky,† our privy counselor and field-marshal lieutenant, who has been appointed to re-establish public order and security.

Moved by paternal care for the welfare of our perhaps misled subjects, we tried the last means—to grant opportunity of personal defense to the accused, before we listened to the complaints against him. We summoned Baron Jellacic to dissolve the Croatian Congress, which, without our sanction, and therefore in defiance of the law, he illegally convoked for the 5th of June of this year; and we ordered him to appear personally before us, in order to effect the conciliation which is needed for re-establishing order in Croatia.

But Jellacic has as little obeyed this our present command as our former regulations, and has neither dissolved the Congress, nor has he appeared before us at the appointed time. Thus, obstinate contempt of our own sovereign command was added to so many complaints against Baron Jellacic. No other means was left, to protect our royal authority against the injury of such conduct, and to uphold the laws, than to send our faithful privy counselor, L. F. M. Hrabowszky, as our royal commissioner, to inquire into those unlawful proceedings, and to indict the Baron Jellacic and his accomplices; and, lastly, *to deprive the Baron Jellacic of his dignity as Ban, and of all his military offices.* I sternly exhort you to renounce all participation in seditions, which aim at a separation from our Hungarian crown; and under the same penalty, I command all authorities to break off immediately all intercourse with Baron Jellacic, and those who may be implicated in the accusations against him, and to comply unconditionally with the orders of our royal commissioner.

Croatians and Slavonians! We guarantee your nationality and your liberties, and the fulfillment of your just requests, with our royal word; do not, therefore, credit any seducing insinuations, by which your country is to be given up to oppression and infinite misery.

Listen to the voice of your king addressing you, as many as still are his faithful Croats and Slavonians.

Herewith we summon every one to publish and spread this manifesto, according to his loyalty to our sovereign authority.

Given in our town of Innspruck this day, the 10th day of June, 1848.

FERDINAND.

Note No. 19.

LOUIS KOSSUTH'S SPEECH OF THE 11TH JULY, 1848.

Gentlemen,—In ascending the tribune to demand of you to save our country, the greatness of the moment weighs oppressively on my soul. I feel as if God had placed into my hands the trumpet to arouse the dead, that—if still sinners and weak—they may not relapse into death! but that they may wake for eternity, if any vigor of life be yet in them. Thus, at this moment, stands the fate of the nation!

* The portrait of the Archduke Palatine was, in the spring of 1848, publicly burned in Agram, under the windows of the Ban Jellacic, who did nothing to prevent or to punish this disorder.

† Baron Hrabowszky was arrested by the Austrian authorities at the entrance of Windischgrätz into Pesth.

Gentlemen, with the decision on my motion, God has confided to your hands the decision affecting the life or the death of our people. But it is because this moment is most important, that I am determined not to have recourse to the weapons of rhetoric ; for, however opinions in this house may differ, I find it impossible not to believe—impossible not to feel the conviction—that the sacred love of our country, and such a feeling for her honor, independence, and liberty, as to render this assembly ready to sacrifice its last drop of blood, are common to us all in an equal degree. But where such a feeling is common, there no stimulus is required: cool reason alone has to choose among the remedies. Gentlemen, the country is in danger! Perhaps it would suffice to say thus much; for, with the dawn of liberty, the dark veil has dropped from the nation. You know what the condition of our country is; you know that besides the troops of the line, a militia of about twelve thousand men has been organized; you know that the authorities have been empowered to place corps of the National Guard on a war footing, in order to establish an effective force to defend the country, and to punish sedition, which is rife on our frontiers. This command found an echo in the nation. How could this have been, unless the nation felt that there is danger? This in itself is an evident proof that the presentiment of danger is general. Nevertheless, gentlemen, I think I ought to give you a general, if not a detailed sketch of the state of our country.

At the dissolution of the last Parliament, and when the first responsible cabinet entered on its functions with an empty exchequer—without arms, without means of defense—it was impossible not to see, and to grieve in seeing, the terrible neglect which the interests of the country had suffered. I myself was one of the many who for years have called upon the executive power and the nation to be just at length to the people, for the day would come when it would be too late for justice. The feeling for justice, of patriotism perhaps, and general enthusiasm, may yet avert from our heads the full force of the fatal word, “Too late!” Thus much is certain, that the nation and the executive power have retarded justice; and that by this very delay, the moment when first they became just to the people caused the overthrow of all existing institutions.

Under such circumstances we took the reins of government, menaced by treachery, rebellion, reactionary movements, and by all those passions which the policy of Metternich leagued to us as a cursed inheritance. Scarcely had we assumed the government—nay, not all of us had even assembled—when we already received the most authentic information that the Panslavonic agitation had no other object than to excite the whole of the upper provinces to open rebellion, and that even the day had been fixed when the outbreak should take place in Schemnitz. But I would only furnish outlines—I desist therefore, and will only add, that for the present the upper province is tranquil. This quiet, however, is by no means a safe tranquillity; it is a fire that smoulders under the ashes. In the heart of the country, even among the Hungarian race itself—which on the banks of the Drave, and in the vicinity of the O-Kérer camp, gives proofs of its vitality with such soul-elating readiness for sacrifices—it was by no means an easy task, after so long a slavery, to familiarize the people with the idea of liberty, and to lay down its first principles; for agitators were not sparing in their efforts to excite the people's fears concerning those—I can not find words—gifts, but rights, which the last Parliament had granted them. Nine weeks have since elapsed. In the interior prevails quiet, and the Hungarian race is prepared for sacrifice, and voluntarily—not from compulsion—it carries its life where it is needed.

Croatia is in open rebellion! Many years have elapsed, gentlemen, when not

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only one or the other, but numbers, called the attention of the government to the fact, that in encouraging—I say not forgiving, but *encouraging*—the Illyric agitation, it would nourish a serpent in its bosom which would compass the ruin of the dynasty. And since the revolutionary state in which we find Europe shaking on her foundations, the gentlemen in those parts fancied they might with impunity break out in open rebellion. Had Hungary given any cause whatever for this rebellion, she would, without considering the fact that there is a revolution, ask you to be just to Croatia, and to subdue the revolt, not with the force of arms, but with the sacred name of justice.

Entertaining as I do such sentiments, I am obliged to throw a transient glance on the relations between Hungary and Croatia. Gentlemen, you are aware that the nation has granted all its rights and privileges to Croatia, and that already at a time when it only conferred its own rights on the most favored nationalities. Since Arpad, Hungary possessed no right whatever in which Croatia, from the date of her alliance with us, did not participate. But besides having shared with us every right, Croatia obtained in addition, and at our expense too, particular privileges. I find in history, that the large parts of great empires have reserved for themselves certain rights—that Ireland, for instance, possesses less than England; but that the greater part of a whole nation should deny itself rights in favor of a small minority, is a fact which stands isolated, but not the less glorious, in the relations of Hungary with Croatia. Where is a reason to be found that, even if we take up arms to quell the disturbance, we should feel in our own hearts the conviction of having ourselves provoked the disturbance? In the past no such reason exists; nor has, perhaps, the last Parliament, which opened a new epoch in the life of the nation, caused any change whatever in the late and so particularly favorable circumstances of Croatia. I say, no! The rights we have acquired for ourselves, we have likewise acquired for Croatia; the liberty that was granted to the people, was likewise granted to the Croats; we extended the indemnity allowed by us to our nobility, at our own expense, to Croatia—for that country is too small and powerless to raise herself the indemnity.

With regard to nationality, Croatia entertained apprehensions—though produced by various conceptions and by erroneous ideas—for the Parliament has expressly decreed that in public life the Croats should have the fullest right to make use of their own language in accordance with their own statutes; and thus their nationality has been sanctioned, by this public recognition. Their municipal rights the Parliament has not only not impaired, but extended and augmented.

Is there a greater privilege than that of regulating the election of representatives, which representatives are convoked to frame laws, to grant and to protect liberty? And the Parliament has said: “You, our Croatic brethren, shall decide among yourselves how to elect your representatives.” By this measure, the last Parliament has consolidated the municipal independence of Croatia. If, therefore, in the past, no reason can be found to excuse this rebellion, surely the acts of the last Parliament offer none.

Or does the fault lie with the ministers? We have taken a step, gentlemen, for which we are responsible. Had we succeeded in pacifying the excited minds, I should feel glad indeed to mention it; as it is, I must refer to it with the confession, that the cabinet in this instance has somewhat exceeded the limits of the law; it exceeded the limits, for it deemed it impossible to allow the natural consequences of the law to prevail. If the Parliament has recognized the right of the Croats to conduct their own affairs in their own language, the cabinet, on account of such circumstances, believed itself justified to extend this recognition of their

nationality likewise to their relations with the government, and decreed to correspond with Croatia in the Hungarian language, with the addition of a Croatian translation, and in this manner to issue all decrees. The Croats attach much importance to the power of their Ban: the last Parliament has not only preserved this Ban's power inviolate, but at the same time insured his influence upon the whole government, by framing a law for the Ban to take part in the councils of the state. The cabinet, therefore, considered nothing of greater importance than immediately to invite the Ban (whom the power that has fallen under the lash of truth and liberty, in the last moment of its existence, forced upon us like a curse, that he might essay whether the demon of diabolical reaction could not again be raised!) to take his seat in the councils of state of the Palatine Stephen, and to confer with the cabinet how tranquillity, peace, and order might best be re-established in Croatia, and to state the just demands of the Croats, to a compliance with which the cabinet expressed its ready assent, provided it should be in its power to obtain their sanction; if not, it would bring before you, the representatives of the nation, a motion, and stake its own existence on the carrying of the measure. The Ban did not appear: obstinately he refused the invitation, confiding not in the law, but in a rebellion, at the head of which he has placed himself, while he pronounced his secession from the Hungarian crown.

I will not deny that Croatia has to complain of special grievances which, up to this day, remained without redress; but neither the cabinet nor the nation have occasioned them—they are simply an heir-loom which the old government left behind. The nation, however, has always made these grievances its own, and left nothing untried to amend them, as it would have done if they had indeed been its own. And this was certainly one of the causes why we invited the Ban, on his nomination by his majesty, to co-operate with the cabinet in accomplishing the speedy removal of the grievances, for we were conscious not only of our authority, but of our duty to re-establish the law where it is injured. But by his revolt the Ban has prevented the cabinet from communicating its decree to the Croats respecting their petition laid before his majesty in the Provincial Diet, in 1845. Under all these circumstances, the cabinet, nevertheless, has not omitted to do what it considered necessary to pacify Croatia and its fellow-citizens. The past Parliament conferred the franchise on the military frontier, and thus gave them a right which they never had possessed. To effect its realization, the cabinet has not only made such arrangements as were in its power, but has left no means whatever untried by which the population of the frontiers might be gained. It authorized and empowered the commander, Baron Hrabowsky, as royal commissioner, to make the land of the inhabitants of the frontiers their own property, in the same manner as the Hungarian urban subjects have received theirs, and to cause the crown-socage there to be abolished; it authorized him to confer on them the new privilege of exerting themselves in commerce, trade, and arts; it empowered him to facilitate in every possible way the free choice of domicile; it empowered him to introduce into the so-called free communities the communal system which exists in the localities, provided with a regular magistracy, on a civic basis, and with free power of the people of electing their own authorities. At the same time, it decreed that the people themselves should elect, according to communities and districts, men to come to this house, and impart and explain to the cabinet the wishes of the people, that we might, without delay, grant whatever could lawfully be granted. But they—these unfortunate, deluded men—replied with sedition, with rebellion, so that no further opportunity offered itself to realize the benefits which, weeks ago, we felt inclined to bestow.

Of their nationality I have already spoken. Concerning its official duties, the cabinet, from the very outset, selected a number of individuals from the provinces, without making any party distinction—nay, for the Croatian affairs it has, in various branches of the administration, formed distinct sections, which are not yet filled up, because the tie between us has been forcibly torn. One of the loudest complaints was, that in the Litorate, which supplies Croatia up to the Save with sea salt, the importation of common salt is prohibited. We have allowed the importation of common salt, and lowered the price considerably.

In one word, we have not neglected any thing whatever which, within the limits of integrity, of liberty, and of the rights of the people, we could do to pacify their minds. We, gentlemen, can not, therefore, admit that on the part of the cabinet the slightest cause has been given to provoke the Croatian rebellion.

If a people think the liberty they possess too limited, and take up arms to conquer more, they certainly play a doubtful game—for a sword has two edges. Still I can understand it. But if a people say, Your liberty is too much for us, we will not have it if you give it us, but we will go and bow under the old yoke of Absolutism—that is a thing which I endeavor in vain to understand.

The case, however, stands nearly thus: In the so-called petition which was sent to his majesty by the Conventicle of Agram, they pray that they may be allowed to separate from Hungary—not to be a self-consistent, independent nation, but to submit to the Austrian ministry. This, gentlemen, is the part of the old Vendée, which no terrorism on our side has provoked, and which, under the mask of sham loyalty, spins reactionary intrigues. Or is it loyalty, I ask, that they refuse to belong to the Hungarian crown, which, as the symbol of the people of these realms, is not only the most powerful, but also the sole reliance of his majesty and the dynasty? Or is it a proof of fidelity, not to obey the Hungarian, but the Austrian ministry, which receives its commands from the whims of the Aula,* and which possessed not even the power to protect its lord and king, who was compelled to flee from the house of his ancestors? Or do they, perhaps, give proof of greater fidelity by expressing the will of depending of the Viennese ministry, which, if it were a ministry (for at present it is no such thing), and if it were to be asked, “Who is your master—whose orders do you obey?—the emperor’s, the Aula’s, the Diet’s at Vienna, or the regent’s at Frankfort?” would be unable to make a reply; a ministry which not even knows whether its prince will be subject to the Frankfort Assembly, whether Austria will be drowned in great Germany, or whether the small Vienna will swallow Germany? But they allege that from a sentiment of loyalty they oppose King Ferdinand V.! I do not, indeed, ascribe to the sentiment of freedom so great an influence on the masses, as not to be persuaded that even this sham loyalty, in its awkward affectation, is but an empty pretext under which other purposes are concealed. On the part of the leaders it covers the reactionary tendency; but on the other hand, this idea is connected with the plan of erecting an Austro-Slavonian monarchy. They say: “Let us send deputies to Vienna; let us procure the majority for the Slavonian element, and Austria will cease to be a German empire; and what with the Bohemians, and our people down here, a new Slavonian empire will rise.” This is a rather hazardous game, and Europe will probably soon decide on the question; for if we should not master these affairs, they will become a European question. Thus much is certain, that this combination (if of any consequence at all) will doubtless involve the ruin of the Austrian dynasty. There can be no doubt about it.

* *Viz.*, the Academic Legion of Vienna.

His highness the Archduke John, named Regent of Germany, took his departure for Germany the day before yesterday. In a few days he returns, and then we shall see whether there is any hope of an arrangement. That insane demand, however, of the Croats, that, on the part of Hungary, if an arrangement is contemplated, all preparations for war shall cease, we have "*indignato pectore*" rejected; and we have considered it to be our duty to declare that the Hungarians, come what may, will arm! that the government will concentrate all its power, and has, therefore, convoked the Parliament, to be enabled to make more mighty preparations. It would not be advisable, and you will not, indeed, demand that I should demonstrate by figures those forces which are concentrated on the Drave by the energy of our commissioner, Czányi. But thus much I can say, that of the importance of those forces sufficient proof is afforded by the circumstance that up to this moment the Croats, though long since desirous of the bread and the wine of our beautiful Hungarian land, have not dared to enter our territory; they could not have attempted it without being repulsed, although they were prepared, while we had to make our preparations.

Another affair is the Servian rebellion in the lower countries. Words can not trace its motives! Croatia, although a land bound to the Hungarian crown, which can not loose the binding tie without committing high treason, is nevertheless a distinct land. But he that wishes to establish on the territory of Hungary a distinct power, is so great a traitor, so arrant a rebel, that he can only be answered with the rope of the "Statarium." But, gentlemen, the shedding of blood is, even in case of guilt, a matter of great importance. While the government, therefore, took into consideration that to force the misguided masses into the horrors of a civil war, merely on account of the faults of some ambitious criminals, would, in these excited and revolutionary times, be an act for the omission of which we should deserve the approbation of God and man—we have, even in this respect, left nothing untried. We have, therefore, made preparations for the realization of all those wishes which in this case could possibly present themselves. But I believe that, without an injury to the integrity of the country, no other wish could here transpire except the convocation of the congress for the benefit of the religious creed of the Hungaro-Servians, which the old government had not convoked for many years.

This decree has been issued, but the Archbishop Rajacic has thought proper to convene at Karlowitz a meeting of the people, and to proclaim it as the Servian National Assembly, upon which the assembled multitude, amounting, with the hordes of robbers who had intruded from adjoining Servia, to several thousands, usurped a national position, declared the Banat, the Batska, Syrmia, and Baranya their property, and elected for themselves a patriarch and vayvode.

Upon the first signs of these disturbances we dispatched royal commissioners, while we endeavored to collect our armies. But, under existing circumstances, to collect troops on which we can rely, is by no means an easy task. It is therefore, I believe, to be considered a great advantage for the country that we have obstructed this rebellious insurrection in its upward progress; that we have repulsed it from the frontier, and have thus preserved the country from an inundation up to the moment when we shall have collected a sufficient force to swoop down like eagles, and to crush the robber-hordes.

While we were concentrating our forces, the royal commissioner, P. Czernovics, deemed it prudent to try peaceful negotiations, and, after having opened a correspondence with the leaders of the rebellion, concluded an armistice of ten days, in which time the leaders have to dismiss their hordes, and they are not only

themselves to return to their allegiance, but they have likewise to lead back to obedience the unfortunate and deluded people. This armistice expires on the 4th of July, and the royal commissioner has concluded it on his own responsibility, without being specially authorized thereto; but having been empowered, as royal commissioner, by all requisite means to re-establish peace, he was of opinion that this measure would have that effect; and this, then, is one of those measures the approbation or condemnation of which depends on its result. At this moment a considerable military force stands under the command of a general, as expert, and as great a tactician, as he is courageous and brave. His plan of operation has been drawn on the spot, and has been communicated to the Minister of War, who approves of it. The actions of a general on the field of battle, being purely strategic, ought, in my opinion, to be exempt from publicity—for we will not go back to the time when the Imperial War Council in Vienna directed from its easy chair the Hungaro-Turkish field-battles, and in consequence of which we were either defeated, or, if such was not the case, it only originated in the fact of a commander being present who pocketed the order of battle, and thus beat the Turks. (Cheers.)

I will only allude to one topic more. Since yesterday a rumor is current that a renewed armistice had been concluded with the Servian rebels. I and the whole of the cabinet know nothing of this. Our last reports, up to the 6th, contain not the remotest intelligence respecting it, nor do they warrant any such conclusions; on the contrary, instead of an armistice, we look hourly forward to reports of battle and victory. I will not say how many soldiers we have in those parts, or how great our power is; but I rejoice in being able to state that the readiness of the Hungarian nation for the defense of the country has by far exceeded my hopes and confidence. A few years ago I said despondingly, I wished God would vouchsafe to give me one point only, relying on which I could say, this nation knows to feel for liberty, and I would not despair of its future. The Almighty has granted me life to see that day, and I doubt no longer the future of the nation! (Loud cheers.)

The third of the circumstances, gentlemen, which exhort us to place the country in a state of defense, is the position of the countries on the Lower Danube. As I exact from every nation, with regard to Hungary, not to interfere with her internal affairs, so the Hungarian will not meddle with the internal affairs of those nations. I only mention that on the banks of the Pruth a mighty Russian army has appeared, which can turn to the right and to the left, which can act as a friend and as an enemy; but even because either one and the other is possible, the nation must be prepared.

The fourth circumstance is the Bosnian frontier, where, according to the latest intelligence, the Bosnian vizier establishes a camp of from forty to fifty thousand men, to observe with attention the disturbances in Servia, and to be enabled to act in the interest of his government as his duty commands. It has happened that Bosnian rajahs, in great numbers, and armed, entered Croatia, and pleaded for so doing, persecution by the Turks and a desire of finding an asylum. According to Turkish custom, some oppressive acts have certainly taken place; but this much I can say, that on the part of the Sublime Porte no new hostile steps have been taken against the Christian rajahs, who, therefore, have only arrived for the purpose of participating in the robberies and disturbances here in the country. To prevent the passing of the frontiers is the second cause of the Bosnian vizier's armament; and at present we have no reason to doubt that the position of the Seraskier of Bosnia is friendly toward us.

Finally, gentlemen, I must allude to our relations with Austria. I will be just, and therefore I find it but natural that the government of Vienna feels aggrieved at its inability further to dispose over Hungary. But even if natural, grief is nevertheless not always just; still less does it follow, that from sympathy with grief, the nation should incline to permit any of its rights to be alienated. (Cheers.)

Yes, gentlemen, most undoubtedly such movements take place, which have for their objects to restore to the Viennese government, if not all, at least the departments of War and Finance; the rest will soon follow. If, then, they once have the power of the purse and sword, they will soon have power over the whole nation. The Croatian movement is evidently connected with this scheme, for Jellacic has declared that he cares not for liberty, and that it is all the same to him whether or not the government at Vienna again obtains possession of the departments of War and Finance. And in the last days the veil of these public secrets has been lifted without reserve. The Viennese ministers have thought proper, in the name of the Austrian emperor, to declare to the cabinet of the King of Hungary, that, unless we make peace with the Croats at any price, they will act in opposition to us. This is as much as to say, that the Austrian emperor declares war to the King of Hungary, or to his own self. Whatever opinion you, gentlemen, may have formed of the cabinet, I believe you may so far rely on our patriotic feelings and on our honor, as to render it superfluous on my part to tell you that we have replied to this menace in a manner becoming the dignity of the nation. But just when our reply was on its way, a second note arrived, which clearly stated what a horrible man the Minister of Finance must be to refuse a grant of money to the rebel Jellacic; for, since Croatia has broken out into open rebellion, I have of course suspended the remittance of money to the commander-general at Agram. I should not be worthy to breathe the free air of heaven—nay, the nation ought to spit me in the face—had I given money to our enemy. But the gentlemen of Vienna hold a different opinion; they considered my refusal as a disgusting desire to undermine the monarchy. They have put their shoulders to the wheel, and transmitted to the dear rebel one hundred thousand, so they say, but in reality one hundred and fifty thousand florins in silver. This act, gentlemen, might excite the whole House to an angry spirit—to national indignation; but be not indignant, gentlemen, for the ministry, which by adopting such a miserable policy believed for a time to prolong its precarious existence, exists no longer. The Aula has crushed it. And I hope, whoever the men may be that compose the next ministry, they will understand that, without breaking their oath of allegiance to the Austrian emperor, who is likewise King of Hungary, and without siding with the rebels against their lord and master, they can not in future adopt that policy without bidding also defiance to Hungary, which, in that case, would throw the broken alliance at the feet of Austria, which feeds rebellion in our own country, and that we would look for friends in other quarters!

Gentlemen, I have no cause to complain of the Austrian nation; I wish they had power and a leader, both of which have hitherto been wanting. What I have said refers to the Austrian ministry. I hope that my words have also been heard at Vienna, and that they will exert some influence on the policy of the new ministers.

The Austrian relations, the affairs of the countries on the Lower Danube, the Servian disturbances, the Croatian rebellion, Pansclavonian agitators, and the reactionary movements—all these circumstances, taken together, cause me to say the nation is in danger, or rather, that it will be in danger unless our resolution be firm! And in this danger, where and with whom are we to look for protec-

tion? Are we to look to foreign alliances? I will not form too low an estimate of the importance of relations with foreign countries, and I think that the cabinet would be guilty of a dereliction of duty, if, in this respect, we were not to exert ourselves to the utmost of our power.

In the first moments of our assuming office, we entered into correspondence with the British government, and explained that Hungary has not, as many have attempted to promulgate, extorted rights and liberties from her king, but that we stand on common ground; with our lord and king we have further entered into an explanation of the interests we have in common on the Lower Danube. On the part of the British government we have received a reply, such as we might have expected from the liberal views and from the policy of that nation. In the mean while, we may rest convinced that England will only assist us if, and as far as she finds it consistent with her own interests.

As for France, I entertain for the French, as the champions of liberty, the most lively sympathy, but I am, nevertheless, not inclined to see the life of my nation dependent upon their protection and their alliance. France has just seen a second 18th Brumaire. France stands on the threshold of a dictatorship; perhaps the world may see a second Washington: it is most likely that we shall see a second Napoleon rising out of the ashes of the past. This much is certain: France can give us a lesson that not every revolution is for the interest of liberty, and that a nation *striving for liberty can be placed under the yoke of tyranny most easily when that liberty exceeds proper limits*. It is, indeed, a most lamentable event for such a nation as the glorious French nation undoubtedly is, that in the streets of Paris the blood of twelve thousand citizens has been shed by the hand of their fellow-citizens. May God preserve us from such a fury in our own country! But whatever form the affairs of France may assume—whether that man whom Providence has placed at the head of that nation becomes a second Washington, who knows how to reject the crown, or a second Napoleon, who, on the ruins of the people's liberty, erects the temple of his sanguinary glory, one thing is certain—that France is far from us. Poland relied on French sympathy; that sympathy existed, but Poland is no more!

The third is the German empire. Gentlemen, I say it openly, I feel that Hungary is destined to live with the free German nation, and that the free German nation is destined to live with the free Hungarian nation, in sincere and friendly intercourse, and that the two must superintend the civilization of the German East. From this point of view, then, we have thought of a German alliance, and as soon as Germany made the first step toward her unity, by convoking the Frankfort Parliament, we considered it to be one of our first duties to send two of our countrymen (one of whom has now been elected president by this House) to Frankfort, where they have been received with the respect which is due to the Hungarian nation. But just because the Frankfort Assembly was still struggling for existence, and because that body had not developed itself, with which negotiations could have been brought to a result (this can only be done with the ministry to be constituted after the election of the regent); there is even now one of our ambassadors in Frankfort to negotiate, as soon as official relations can with propriety be opened, respecting the league which we desire to enter into with Germany—though with the proviso that we will not abate a hair's-breadth from our rights, from our consistency, from our national freedom, for the sake either of liberty or of menaces, from whomsoever they may proceed. The danger, therefore, is great, or rather, a danger threatening to become great gathers on the horizon of our country, and we ought, above all, to find in ourselves the strength for its re-

moval. *That nation alone will live which in itself has sufficient vital power; that which knows not to save itself by its own strength, but only by the aid of others, has no future.** I therefore demand of you, gentlemen, a great resolution. Proclaim that, in just appreciation of the extraordinary circumstances on account of which the Parliament has assembled, the nation is determined to bring the greatest sacrifices for the defense of its crown, of its liberty, and of its independence, and that, in this respect, it will at no price enter with any one into a transaction which even in the least might injure the national independence and liberty, but that it will be always ready to grant all reasonable wishes of every one. But in order to realize this important resolution, either by mediating, if possible, an honorable peace, or by fighting a victorious battle, the government is to be authorized by the nation to raise the effective strength of the army to two hundred thousand men, and for this purpose to equip immediately forty thousand men, and the rest as the protection of the country and the honor of the nation may demand. The expense of raising an army of two hundred thousand men, its armament, and its support for one year, will amount to forty-two millions of florins; but that of raising forty thousand men from eight to ten millions of florins. Gentlemen, if you assent to my motion, I propose within a few days to lay before the House a detailed financial plan; but I here mention beforehand, that nothing is further from my thoughts than to ask of the nation a taxation of forty-two millions of florins; on the contrary, my plan is that every one shall contribute according to his means, and if that will not cover the expense, we shall be obliged to let our credit make up the deficiency. I rejoice at being able to declare that the plan which I mean to propose is based upon an estimate which agrees with the rates of taxation, as fixed a century ago by Maria Theresa for Transylvania, and which in reality is much more moderate. Should my plan be adopted, and should the House make an especial proviso that the readiness for the sacrifice on the part of the representatives of the nation shall not dwindle away without result, the nation will be able to bear the burden, and to save the country. In case the imposed taxation should not suffice for the establishment of a military power, such as circumstances urgently demand, I claim the power for the executive to open a credit to any amount which the representatives may deem necessary. This credit shall supply the deficiency either as a loan, or by the issue of paper-money, or by some other financial operation.

These are my proposals. (Cheers.) Gentlemen, I am of opinion that the future of the nation depends on the resolution of the House on my motion; and not alone on that resolution, but in a great measure on the manner in which we form it. And this is the reason, gentlemen, why I refrained from mixing this question with the debate on the address. I believe, if a nation is threatened on every side, and if it feels in itself the will and the power to repel the danger, that the question of the preservation of the country ought not to be tacked to any other question.

This day we are the ministers of the nation; to-morrow, others may take our place: no matter! The cabinet may change, but thou, O my country! thou must forever remain, and the nation, with this or any other cabinet, must save the country. But in order that this or any other set of men may be able to save it, the nation must develop its strength. To avoid all misunderstanding, I declare solemnly and expressly, that I demand of the House two hundred thousand soldiers, and the necessary pecuniary grants. (Cheers.)

* These words of 1848 are a prophecy and a condemnation of what Austria did in 1849.

Gentlemen, what I meant to say is, that this request on the part of the government ought not to be considered as a vote of confidence. No; we ask for your vote for the preservation of the country! And I would ask you, gentlemen, if any where in our country a breast sighs for liberation, or a wish waits for its fulfillment, let that breast suffer yet a while, let that wish have a little patience, until we have saved the country. (Cheers.) This is my request! You all have risen to a man, and I bow before the nation's greatness! If your energy equals your patriotism, I will make bold to say, that even the gates of hell shall not prevail against Hungary!

Note No. 20.

ADDRESS MADE TO THE EMPEROR BY THE HUNGARIAN DEPUTATION, WITH HIS
REPLY.

"May it please your majesty to order: 1. That all the Hungarian regiments who are not actually before the enemy may return immediately into Hungary, to receive the orders of the Hungarian ministry. 2. To order the army which is in Hungary, under pain of punishment, to act against the insurgents, whatever name or whatever standard they may usurp, and to do its duty for the defense of the country and the maintenance of the integrity of Hungary. 3. The Hungarian nation wishes to regulate the question of nationality and administration between it and the Croatian nation, according to the basis of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Croatia is now under military despotism, and its inhabitants can not express their wishes or their desires to the Hungarian Legislature. Your majesty is, in consequence, entreated to order that the Croatian nation may be delivered from this despotism, in order that they may freely manifest their wishes, and that Fiume, which has been occupied in a perfidious manner, and the Slavonian consulate, may be immediately given up. 4. The Hungarian nation feels no doubt but that your majesty will not only oppose the efforts of the reactionists, who have only their own interests in view, but will punish them. 5. The Hungarian nation demands, in fine, that your majesty will sanction the laws voted by the Hungarian Diet, will come to Pesth, and support by your royal presence the authority of the Legislature and of the constitutional government. We the more anxiously desire that your majesty should accede to our prayer, as a refusal would shake the confidence, and make it impossible for the ministry to maintain internal tranquillity and public order."

His majesty replied in the following terms:

"It is painful to me not to be able to respond to the desire expressed by the deputation of Hungary relative to my journey, in consequence of the delicate state of my health. I will carefully examine the laws presented, as it can not be imagined that I can have any intention to infringe on existing ones. I repeat that it is my firm wish to maintain the laws, the integrity, and the rights of the kingdom of my Hungarian crown, conformably to my royal oath. As to the other points mentioned, they are in part settled, conformably to the wish of the nation; with regard to those which are not so, I will make known my decision, through the medium of my ministry, as promptly as possible."

Note No. 21.

LETTER OF THE EMPEROR TO THE ARCHDUKE PALATINE OF HUNGARY, JULY 31, 1848.

Dear Cousin Archduke Stephen!—My ministry in Vienna have explained to me in a writing, which I communicate to you herewith, the disasters which seem to have come upon the whole monarchy by obedience to the direction of the Hungarian ministry since the last Diet in Pressburg; and that it is of the greatest necessity to come to a mutual explanation, to prevent dissension, and to cause the Pragmatic Sanction to be considered on all sides as of full force and efficacy. My Austrian ministry addressed itself, on the 10th of May, 1848, as you know from my writing directed to you on the 12th of May, 1848, with the offer to the Hungarian ministry to enter into negotiation upon some questions concerning the whole monarchy. My ministry propose to you again the same mode of uniting yourselves, on one hand, upon the definitive Constitution, which may assure the union of the governments on this and on the side of the Seitha; but, on the other hand, to come soon to a decision as to the differences between Hungary and the states belonging to it.

As to the last point, I had the hope that my uncle, the Archduke John, would carry into successful operation the function of mediator, granted to him on the 19th of June, 1848; but the dignity granted to him as Regent of the German Empire has not only interrupted the negotiations between Hungary and Croatia, but rendered the recommencement of them difficult. On the alarming increase of the civil war on the Lower Theiss and Danube, I can not longer delay to recommend the peaceful efforts of my ministry at Vienna to the immediate consideration and reflection of the Hungarian ministry, to stop by that, this bloody fight. According to the proposals presented to me, and to which I can not refuse my approbation, some members of the Hungarian ministry should come to Vienna as soon as possible, to enter into negotiation upon the above-mentioned objects with the Austrian-German ministry. But as it is to be hoped that the pacification of the Hungarian questions will only take place if the Hungarian ministry must expect that the Austrian-German ministry will enter into negotiations only under the following conditions:

1st. The Ban Jellacic, or a plenipotentiary sent by him and by the respective counties, will assist at the negotiations at Vienna.

2d. All attacks and hostilities of Hungary against Croatia, Slavonia, and the military frontier against Hungary are immediately to cease.

3d. The personal measures taken against the Ban are to be stopped.

4th. The provisional superintendence of the military frontier will be undertaken by the Minister of War in Vienna.

As I promise myself the utmost readiness on the part of my Hungarian ministry to assist in stopping as soon as possible the cruelties of a civil war, I hope that it will come to Vienna in the course of eight or fourteen days, for the above-mentioned negotiation. In order that no time may be lost, I advise Baron Jellacic to make the necessary preparations for his journey, and to take precaution that the negotiations of my ministry may not be delayed by his neglecting to fulfill the above-mentioned conditions.

FERDINAND, M. P.

Schönbrunn, August 31, 1848.

Note No. 22.

THE PALATINE'S LETTER TO THE EMPEROR.

Your Majesty,—The state of Hungary is at this moment so critical that the most violent outbreak is to be expected daily. Anarchy reigns in Pesth. The authorities are displaced from their sphere of action by a Committee of Public Safety; and while the Council of the Lieutenancy, under the strong guidance of Count Zichy, maintains, at least outwardly, its consideration, the Hofkammer (Exchequer) is almost a nullity. The nobles also have risen in masses to secure rights *de facto*.

In this anomalous and critical state of things, every one expects preservation by the immediate formation of a responsible ministry.

Even if we consider this plan as a calamity, yet the question must be put in this shape, "Which is the least calamity?"

I shall at present attempt, in a few words, to bring forward the three measures by which alone I hope to be able to attain any result in Hungary. The first measure would be to withdraw the whole armed force from the country, and to leave it a prey to total devastation; to look passively upon the disorders and fire-raising, and also the struggle between nobles and peasants, &c.

The second measure would be to recall the Palatine and send a royal commissary to Pressburg, invested with extraordinary power, and accompanied by a considerable military force, who, after dissolving the Diet there, should proceed to Pesth, and carry on the government there with an iron hand, as long as circumstances should permit.

From the first measure, I openly confess, I myself shrink. It is immoral, and it is, perhaps, not becoming in a government utterly to desert subjects, of whom a part, at least, are well disposed, and to allow them to fall a sacrifice to all the cruelties of an insurrection. Besides, this would have a most prejudicial effect in the other provinces, from the example given by it to the ungovernable, uncultivated masses.

The second measure, on the contrary, is a good one; and although it has, at the first moment, the appearance of a separation, it is nevertheless, for the present period, the only measure to preserve this province, supposing always that the gentlemen now to be appointed are able to exercise full influence upon the interior defense, which certainly can not be asserted with full confidence beforehand. With the arrival of a more favorable time, much can be arranged otherwise, which at present might seem to occasion a separation.

I do not know whether something might be gained by negotiation with Batthyányi and Deak, but I know that the negotiation can be carried only through them, for if things come to debate at Pressburg, every thing is to be apprehended. Relative to this, however, as a faithful official of the state, I take the liberty to call your majesty's attention to a highly important circumstance. What will happen if Count Batthyányi, in case of the negotiation's not coming to a successful termination, should be ready to risk every thing, and resign his office? Here I consider it to be my duty, without exaggeration, but only in conformity with truth, to observe that we ought to be prepared, in such an event, with an armed force along the Danube, and on the road leading from Pressburg to Pesth, to oppose a demonstration likely to be called forth by the young men of Pressburg, and by a part of the nobles. In this case, the third measure would remain.

Supposing that the means are not wanting for its execution, this third measure would have to be carried into execution with great haste.

But here arise some questions.

(a) Is there not a want of sufficient money? Consequently, is it not impossible to send to Hungary a large military force, by which I understand at least forty or fifty thousand men?

(b) Is this force at hand, and ready to be employed quickly?

Is there, further,

(c) A commissary to be found who is willing and qualified to undertake this employment? But, lastly,

(d) Is there no doubt as to whether this measure would be sufficient to obtain the wished-for end? Will there not be a necessity for a greater force in Galicia or Italy?

If a favorable answer can be given to these questions, which, in my position, I am unable to answer myself—such an answer that the execution is possible without delusion, and without calculations which may afterward prove inaccurate—I have no further remarks to the former observations; supposing that a compromise is attempted with Count Batthyányi, and that, moreover, the opinion is taken of the great officers of the realm, who, in any case, are to be summoned to Vienna.

I confess openly that, in the present state of affairs, I should pronounce myself in favor of the second measure; and I doubt not that all the great dignitaries (although I have not yet consulted them) would be of the same opinion. I have only certainty as to the views of the *Judex Curiae* (Chief Justice) Mailath.

If, however, your majesty, according to your wise insight, should consider the first or third measure more suitable, your majesty will doubtless issue your commands in conformity with the existing laws and the usage hitherto observed, and give me notice whether I am at present to remain in Vienna, or whether I may set off in any other direction.

STEPHEN.

March 24, 1848.

Note No. 23.

RESCRIPT OF THE EMPEROR FERDINAND TO THE BAN OF CROATIA.

My dear Baron Jellacic,—The unquestionable proofs of fidelity and attachment to my dynasty, and to the interests of the collective monarchy, which, since your appointment as Ban, you have repeatedly given, as well as the readiness with which you endeavored to carry out the recommendations I issued respecting an understanding with my Hungarian ministry, assured me that it could never have been your intention to oppose yourself in a treasonable way to my commands, or to endeavor to bring about a dissolution of that connection which has united the dependencies of Hungary for centuries with my Hungarian crown, and which will also hereafter tend more firmly to consolidate and promote their common welfare. It is with peculiar satisfaction to my paternal heart to revoke the judgment pronounced in my manifesto of the 10th of June last—that an investigation should take place with regard to your conduct, and that in the mean time you should be suspended from your dignity of Ban, and from all your military offices and functions, in consequence of representations which find the most entire contradiction in your faithful devotion, attested by deeds. Having transmitted to my cousin, the Archduke Palatine of Hungary, all that is necessary in

this respect, I expect further from your sense of duty and loyalty that, in the position to which my confidence has raised you, you will always and solely labor to promote the welfare of the collective monarchy, to maintain the integrity of the Hungarian crown, and aid the beneficial development of the Hungarian dependencies.

FERDINAND.

Schönbrunn, September 4th, 1848.

Note No. 24.

MANIFESTO OF THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA TO THE PEOPLE OF HUNGARY.

A few days ago I made known to my faithful Hungarian subjects how much I have at heart the prompt and complete re-establishment of peace and legal order in the country. Unhappily, the state of things has become worse, and civil war threatens every part of Hungary. The danger of this state of things, and my desire to prevent an effusion of blood, and the propagation of anarchy and terror, have induced me to confide to Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Francis Lamberg the command of all my troops in Hungary. I have ordered him to take upon himself, in my name, this command, and that he make it his first task to bring about the pacification of all parts of the country. I have a firm confidence that all the authorities, civil and military, will promptly and implicitly follow his orders, and render him every efficacious support. I have taken all the necessary measures for suppressing the disturbances which have broken out in the north of Hungary, by sending a military force from Moravia. I expect from my people of Hungary a concurrence full of confidence in the extraordinary commissioners invested with my powers; the more so as I have already adopted means for reconciling their internal divisions to the satisfaction of all parties, and to establish between the Hungarian and non-Hungarian states of my empire that complete unity which existed for ages to the general safety, and which is guaranteed by the Pragmatic Sanction. Given at my capital and residence of Vienna this 25th of September, 1848.

FERDINAND.

Note No. 25.

PROCLAMATION OF THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA TO HIS HUNGARIAN ARMY.

As I determined to suffer, under no circumstances, a conflict between my troops under the command of the Hungarian ministry, and those commanded by the Ban of Croatia, I have ordered my F. M. L. Count von Lamberg, in the quality of an imperial plenipotentiary commissioner, to repair without delay to the headquarters of the Hungarian army-corps, and to stop all hostilities, which order I sent at the same time to the Ban. I expect from the commanders of both forces, as also from the troops commanded by the former, that they will obey immediately my royal orders, and conclude this unnatural contest between troops who have sworn allegiance to the same flag, and who have to fight only for a mutual purpose, that is, the defense of the fatherland. I hope, at the same time, that those soldiers who have been seduced to desert their standards, will follow my royal call and return to them, to fulfill, under their lawful officers, in accordance with their oath, their duties to their king and country. Given at my capital, Vienna, 25th of September, 1848.

FERDINAND.

Note No. 26.

ADDRESS OF THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA TO THE HUNGARIAN DIET.

Ferdinand I., constituted Emperor of Austria, salutation to the representatives and magnates of Hungary, Transylvania, etc., etc., assembled in the Diet at Pesth. To our profound grief and indignation, the Chamber of Representatives has allowed itself to be led by Louis Kossuth and his partisans into great illegalities; it has even put into execution, against our royal will, several illegal resolutions, and very recently has adopted, against the mission of our royal commissioner, Count von Lamberg, charged to restore peace, and before he had even shown his full powers, a resolution of the 27th ult., in consequence of which our royal commissioner was attacked by a furious populace, and assassinated in the most cruel manner. Under these circumstances our royal duty forces us to adopt the following measures for the maintenance of security and the laws: 1. We dissolve the Diet. In consequence, as soon as our royal rescript shall have been published, it is to close its sittings. 2. We declare illegal and without effect, all the resolutions and decrees of the present Diet, which have not been sanctioned by us. 3. We submit all the troops and armed corps in Hungary, in the annexed countries, and in Transylvania, to the command in chief of our Ban of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, the Lieutenant Field-marshal Baron Jellacic. 4. Until tranquillity and order shall be established in the country, the kingdom of Hungary is subjected to the law of war, and in consequence the authorities can not convoke assemblies of comitats, towns, and districts. 5. Our Ban of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, Baron de Jellacic, is sent, by the present decree, as commissioner plenipotentiary of our royal majesty. In consequence of these full powers, we declare that all that the Ban of Croatia may order, decree, or resolve, must be considered as having been ordered and resolved in virtue of our royal power. For that reason, we order all civil and military authorities of our kingdom of Hungary and Transylvania, and the annexed countries, to obey all the orders of the Baron de Jellacic, our royal commissioner, as they are bound to obey ourselves. 6. We particularly recommend our royal commissary to see that the aggressors and murderers of our royal commissary, Count Lamberg, and the authors and accomplices of that revolting act of cowardice shall be punished, in conformity with the laws. 7. The other current affairs of the civil administration shall be treated in conformity with the laws of the *employés* of the different ministries. Representatives of all parts shall deliberate and settle, in a legal way, how the unity of conversation and direction of the common interests of all the monarchy, and the guarantee of all nationalities, shall be re-established in a lasting manner, and to fix on that basis the relation of all countries and nations united under our crown. Given at Schönbunn, 3d of October, 1848.

(Signed) FERDINAND.

(Countersigned) RECSEY.

Note No. 27.

ARTICLE III. OF THE HUNGARIAN DIET, IN THE SESSION OF 1847-8.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE HUNGARIAN MINISTRY.

- § 1. The person of the king is sacred and inviolable.
- § 2. In the absence of the king, the executive power, limited by the laws and by the Constitution, is administered in the kingdom and its dependencies by the

Palatine-vice-roy, with full powers, save the unity of the crown and the maintenance of its alliance with monarchy; and under these circumstances, the person of his royal highness, the Archduke Palatine Stephen, is equally inviolable.

§ 3. His majesty, and in his absence the Palatine-vice-roy, are to exercise the executive power, in accordance with the laws, through the organ of the independent Hungarian ministry; and their decrees, orders, and judgments, whatever they may be, shall not be valid, until they have been countersigned by one of the ministers residing at Buda-Pesth.

§ 4. Each member of the ministry is responsible for his official acts.

§ 5. The ministry resides at Buda-Pesth.

§ 6. Whatever has been, or ought to have been, up to the present time, under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Chancery, the Council of Lieutenancy, the Aulic Chamber (including the mines), and all affairs civil, military, and ecclesiastic, as well as every thing that concerns the finances and defense of the country, shall for the future be regulated and directed by the Hungarian ministry; and his majesty shall exercise the executive power exclusively through his ministry.

§ 7. The appointments of archbishops, bishops, priors, abbés, as well as those of barons of the kingdom, the right of pardon, the granting of titles of nobility and orders of knighthood, are reserved directly to his majesty.

§ 8. The employment of the Hungarian army beyond the frontiers of the kingdom, as well as the appointment to military offices, shall also be ordered by his majesty, under the counter-signature of a responsible Hungarian minister, who, according to § 13, shall be always in communication with the king.

§ 9. All those matters which, before the proclamation of the present law, ought to have been submitted to the decision of his majesty, by the high administrative courts hereinbefore mentioned, shall henceforth depend, in the absence of his majesty, on the decision of the Palatine-vice-roy, with the exceptions of the cases pointed out in § 6, 7, 8.

§ 10. The ministry shall be composed of a president and, if he does not hold a portfolio, of eight other members.

§ 11. The prime minister shall be named, in the absence of his majesty, by the Palatine-vice-roy, reserving to his majesty the power to ratify or annul the appointment.

§ 12. The other ministers shall be presented for the approval of the king by the prime minister.

§ 13. One of the ministers shall always reside near the person of the king, and charged to take part in those affairs which concern at the same time his own country and the hereditary states; he shall be the responsible representative of his kingdom.

§ 14. In addition to the minister residing near the king's person, according to § 13, to watch over interests hereinbefore mentioned, the ministry shall be composed of the following departments:

A. The Home Department.

B. Finance.

C. Public Works, Roads, Canals, and Navigation.

D. Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.

E. Public Worship and Instruction.

F. Justice and Grace.

G. Defense of the Country (War).

§ 15. The ministry presides over the affairs of each department. Each department is divided into several sections, each section under the direction of a chief.

§ 16. The administration of the affairs of each department shall be regulated by the ministry itself.

§ 17. In the absence of his majesty, or the Palatine-vice-roy, the prime minister presides over the cabinet council; having the right to convoke the council whenever he thinks it necessary.

§ 18. Each minister is responsible for the ordinances that he has countersigned.

§ 19. To protect the public interests of the kingdom, a Council of State shall be established at Buda-Pesth, under the presidency of the king, the Palatine-vice-roy, or the prime minister: the definite organization of this council shall be settled at the next session.

§ 20. To the usual members of the ministry of foreign affairs attached to his majesty's person shall be added two counselors of the Royal Hungarian Chancery, upon the proposition of the minister.

§ 21. The affairs mentioned in § 7, and reserved to the king, shall be intrusted to the responsible Hungarian minister residing near the person of the king, together with the state counselors and heads of sections.

§ 22. The other referendary counselors of the Royal Aulic Chancery shall be transferred to the before-mentioned Council of State.

§ 23. The members of the Royal Council of Lieutenancy and of the Aulic Chamber shall be placed in the sections of the ministerial departments; conforming in this respect, as well also as to the Council of State, to Article 58, of the year 1791.

§ 24. The presidents of the high courts, mentioned in § 6, shall be members of the Council of State established by § 19; and they shall preside in the absence of the king, the Palatine-vice-roy, and the ministers.

§ 25. All the functionaries and officers of the high courts of administration and of the councils of government before mentioned in § 6, consequently not only those who have obtained a new office, but those who shall not have been able to be placed in the ministerial sections, shall receive their salaries.

§ 26. The permanent organization of the tribunals' jurisdiction (counties, towns, etc.), shall henceforward be preserved in its full extent.

§ 27. The tribunals shall be maintained in their legal independence, and according to their present system, until further decisions.

§ 28. The ministers have seats in both Chambers of the Diet, and are to be heard whenever they think proper.

§ 29. The ministers are to obey the summons of each of the Chambers, and are obliged to give all the information asked of them.

§ 30. The ministers are obliged, on the demand of each of the Chambers, to produce all their official documents, either to the Chamber itself, or to the committee charged by the Chamber with the investigation of them.

§ 31. The ministers have no vote in the Diet, unless they be members of the Upper Chamber, or have been elected deputies in the Chamber of Representatives.

§ 32. The ministers may be impeached:

A. For any acts or decrees prejudicial to the independence of the country, to her constitutional guarantees, to existing laws, to individual liberty, or to private property, which may have been published by them in their capacity of ministers.

B. For dereliction of duty, fraud, or misapplication of the money which may be intrusted to them.

C. For neglect in the execution of the laws, or in the maintenance of the public tranquillity and security, as far as the powers which have been intrusted to them are sufficient.

§ 33. The impeachment of ministers shall be tried by a committee of the Upper Chamber of Representatives.

§ 34. The ministers shall be tried by a committee of the Upper Chamber, elected by scrutiny by the Chamber itself, the committee determining the punishment in proportion to the crime. For this purpose, thirty-six members shall be chosen, among whom twelve may be refused by the commission of the Chamber of Representatives, charged with the conduct of the trial, and twelve others by the accused ministers. The court formed of the twelve remaining members shall judge the ministers.

§ 35. The right of pardon can not be exercised relative to condemned ministers, but in case of a general amnesty.

§ 36. The ministers are subject to the common law, with regard to crimes committed by them not in their official capacity.

§ 37. The ministers are obliged to present annually, for the discussion and decision of the Diet, the budget of the receipts and expenditure of the kingdom, and to give an account of all the public funds intrusted to their administration.

§ 38. The salaries of the ministers shall be provisionally fixed by the Palatine-vice-roy, until the final decision of the next session.

Note No. 28.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN KOSSUTH AND W. H. STILES, AND THE REPORT OF THE SAME BY THE LATTER TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AS PUBLISHED IN EXECUTIVE DOCUMENT NO. 43, 31ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION.

Mr. Stiles to the Secretary of State.

Legation of the United States, Vienna, December 12, 1848.

Sir,—A short time since, a personal application was made to me by a friend of Mr. Kossuth, formerly Minister of Finance, but of late chief of the government of Hungary, inquiring, on behalf of that gentleman, whether I would undertake an intervention for the settlement of the differences now existing between the imperial government and the kingdom of Hungary. I frankly stated, on that occasion, the difficulties which such a step suggested to my mind, arising from the fact that it was a domestic quarrel between the government of the Austrian empire and one of its dependencies, and with which no foreign power could properly have any concern; that it was a subject which the United States had ever regarded with peculiar jealousy, and that I could not, therefore, reconcile it to myself to be in any manner instrumental in committing her; that, besides, so extensive, as I understood, had been the preparations made by the imperial government for the subjugation of Hungary, that it was scarcely to be expected that it would, at this eleventh hour, listen to any proposals of settlement short of the unconditional submission to imperial authority. To this it was answered, that commissioners had repeatedly been sent to apprise the imperial government of the anxiety which the Hungarians felt for a settlement of their differences, but that, as these commissioners had never returned, or even made a report of their proceedings, they had reason to apprehend that the imperial government was still unadvised of the desire which the Hungarians entertained for reconciliation; that, as at present all intercourse was cut off between the two countries, there seemed no other means of bringing their views to the knowledge of the imperial authorities except through the aid of some foreign representative at this court; and, further, that the armies now arrayed against each other, upon their respective frontiers,

amounted to at least two hundred thousand men on either side, and it was only to be concluded, from the spirit which animated them, that great bloodshed must ensue unless some arrangement could be effected. I then inquired whether the object for which the interposition was sought was the separation of Hungary from Austria; or, if not, whether it was to gain time in order to make a more successful resistance; that if either of these objects were in contemplation, I could not listen for one moment to the application. On being solemnly assured to the contrary, and that no other end was in view but an amicable adjustment of the impending difficulties, I stated that the only ground upon which I could consent to interfere was that of humanity, and to save the useless effusion of blood; that such an appeal I should not consider myself justified in resisting; but that even in that event, my interference, if approved by the imperial government, would simply go to the extent of opening the door of reconciliation between the opposing parties, and by which the unhappy differences which distract the two countries might be, between themselves and through the instrumentality of their respective authorities, peaceably and satisfactorily arranged. Immediately after this interview, I called upon Prince Schwartzberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and communicated to him frankly all that occurred, the application which had been made to me, and the reply which I had given; that I had no disposition to interfere between the Austrian government and one of its provinces, and that I would only take such action or pursue such a course in the matter as might be agreeable to the imperial government. He appreciated my motives, commended the consideration with which I had acted, and advised that, in case I should receive any communication from that quarter, I would have an interview with Prince Windischgrätz upon the subject, who was fully charged by the emperor with the proceedings determined on in relation to Hungary; but at the same time expressed the opinion that matters had progressed too far—that they could enter into no negotiation with rebels, and that nothing short of unconditional surrender could now be submitted to by the government. A week after these occurrences had transpired, I received, by means of a stratagem which enabled it to pass through the lines of the Austrian army, the communication herewith inclosed, marked document A, signed by L. Kossuth, president of the Committee of Defense, and countersigned by Francis Pulszky, the state secretary. Upon the receipt of this communication, I called, as directed by Prince Schwartzberg, on Prince Windischgrätz, and found that he was absent from the city. On his return the next day, however, I had an unofficial interview with his highness; explained to him fully, as I had done previously to Prince Schwartzberg, the motives by which I was prompted, and the views which I entertained in the matter, and the manner in which I was received by him. His answer to the application, and, in short, all that occurred on that occasion, you will find detailed in my replies to Mr. Kossuth, copies of which are inclosed, marked documents B and C. Since then I have heard nothing from either side, and presume the matter of intervention, as well as all hopes of reconciliation, are at an end. The imperial forces have proceeded to Hungary, and the affair will be decided on the battle-field—a conclusion to be deplored, not only from motives of humanity, but policy; since, if Hungary is subdued (which will most certainly be the case, from the superior strength and discipline of the imperial army), such a result will only aggravate the feelings of hostility which now exist; and as a country determined to be free can not, in these days, be held in subjection for any length of time by mere military force, this very conclusion may lead eventually to the liberation of Hungary and its total separation from the Austrian empire. Before closing this communi-

cation, I have only to add, sir, that as in this (to me) entirely novel situation, I have endeavored to act with all the circumspection which the delicate nature of the subject so imperiously required; as I have studiously avoided the least step which I thought could in any manner compromise my country; and as, if any error has been committed, it has been done for the sake and in the cause of humanity, I trust that the course which, without time for special instruction, I have thought proper to pursue in this matter, will not meet the disapprobation of my government.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. STILES.

HON. JAMES BUCHANAN, Secretary of State.

Document A, accompanying W. H. Stiles's Dispatch No. 46.

Pesth, November 29, 1848.

Informed of your not being unwilling to negotiate a truce between Austria and Hungary in the interest of humanity, we gladly avail ourselves of this opportunity to call upon the feelings of justice of the representant of the United States, inviting you to initiate the negotiation of an armistice for this winter between the two armies standing on the frontiers of Austria and Hungary, and so to stop the calamities of a war so fatal to the interests of both countries.

Accept, likewise, the sincere assurance of our feeling most happy at every occasion which brings us in friendly intercourse with the United States, those natural supporters of freedom and civilization.

The President of Committee of Defense,

L. KOSSUTH, M. P.

The State Secretary,

FRANCIS PULSZKY, M. P.

To Mr. STILES, Ambassador of the United States.

Document B, accompanying W. H. Stiles's Dispatch No. 46.

Vienna, December 2, 1848.

Sir,—Your communication bearing date Pesth, November 29, 1848, and desiring me, for the interest of "humanity," and "to stop the calamities of a war so fatal to both countries," to endeavor "to negotiate a truce between Austria and Hungary," was this evening received.

Aware of the importance of time in the matter, I proceeded, immediately after perusing your note, to the residence of Prince Schwartzenberg, Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, but found that he was absent at Olmütz. I then drove out to Schönbrunn, the head-quarters of Prince Windischgrätz, and was informed that he, also, had gone to Olmütz. I shall at once address Prince Schwartzenberg upon the subject of your communication, and, upon the return of Prince Windischgrätz (who is hourly expected here), shall seek, at the earliest moment, a personal interview with him; but, in the mean time, as the matter is attended with great difficulties arising from the facts, first, that the controversy is a domestic one, and Austria may, consequently, be unwilling to permit of any foreign interference; and, second, that as the preparations for the attack of Hungary on the part of the imperial government are said to be very extensive, and any delay in their operations they may conceive detrimental to their interests, I can hold out to you but little hopes of success in obtaining the desired armistice. For the cause of humanity, however, and to prevent the useless effusion of blood, the only grounds upon which I can consent to take any step toward opening the door of reconciliation between Austria and Hungary, and by which the difficulties which now un-

happily distract the two countries may be adjusted between themselves, you may rest assured that no exertion on my part shall be spared which may be calculated to effect so desirable an object.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. STILES,

Chargé d'affaires of the United States of America.

Mons. L. KOSSUTH, President of the Committee of Defense, Hungary.

Document C, accompanying W. H. Stiles's Dispatch No. 46.

Vienna, December 3, 1848.

Sir,—In my note of last evening, I advised you that Prince Windischgrätz was absent from Vienna, but that I would embrace the earliest opportunity, after his return, of having an interview with him upon the subject of your communication. Informed this morning of the arrival of the prince, I immediately repaired to Schönbrunn, had an interview with his highness, and have just returned. I opened to him the subject of your communication; stated the difficulty which I understood the Hungarians had labored under in bringing their views to the knowledge of the government, now that all communication between the two countries was cut off, and the ground upon which you had appealed to me for my interference. He received me with the utmost kindness, thanked me for my efforts toward reconciling the existing difficulties; but replied, in substance, as follows: "I can do nothing in the matter;" "I must obey the orders of the emperor." "Hungary must submit." "I will occupy Pesth with my troops, and then the emperor will decide what is to be done." "I have received orders to occupy Hungary, and I hope to accomplish this end—I can not, therefore, enter into any negotiations." "I can not consent to treat with those who are in a state of rebellion." He deplored the necessity which compelled him to move against Hungary; recited the forbearance which had distinguished his course in the recapture of Vienna, and added that similar motives would govern his future conduct. Nothing further of importance occurred during the interview, except that, in reply to a statement which I made to the effect that the Hungarians had attempted previously, as I had understood, an arrangement of their differences with the imperial government, he replied that it was the first application of the kind which had come to his knowledge.

Unwilling to detain longer the person who awaits this answer, and begging you to be assured of the deep regret which I feel at the unsuccessful result of my efforts to bring about the pacification of the two countries,

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. STILES,

Chargé d'affaires of the United States of America.

Mons. L. KOSSUTH, President of the Committee of Defense, Hungary.

P. S.—It will not be uninteresting to you to learn that the Emperor Ferdinand has abdicated the throne in favor of his nephew; that the Archduke Francis Charles has renounced his right of succession; and that the Archduke Francis Joseph has been proclaimed Emperor of Austria, under the name of Francis Joseph I.

W. H. STILES.

Secretary of State to Mr. Stiles.

Department of State, Washington, February 2, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 46, which reached the department on the 15th ultimo.

You were placed in a novel and embarrassing position by the application made to you in behalf of Mr. Kossuth, to "undertake an intervention for the settlement of the differences existing between the imperial government and the kingdom of Hungary;" and I am gratified that your prudence and ability were equal to the occasion. In our foreign policy, we must ever be governed by the wise maxim not to interfere with the domestic concerns of foreign nations; and from this you have not departed. You have done no more, in your own language, than to attempt to open the door of reconciliation between the opposing parties, leaving them to adjust their differences without your intervention. Considering there was reason to believe that the previous offers of the Hungarian government for a reconciliation had never reached the imperial government, and that no other practicable mode of communicating these offers existed, except through your agency, you acted wisely in becoming an intermediary for this purpose alone. Had you refused thus to act upon the request of Mr. Kossuth, you might have been charged with a want of humanity, and been held, in some degree, responsible for the blood which has since been so profusely shed in the war. The president entirely approves your conduct.

It may be remarked that the request of Mr. Kossuth to yourself, in his letter of the 29th of November, 1848, does not seem to be confined to the single object which alone you had informed his friend you would attempt to accomplish.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

WM. H. STILES, Esq., &c., &c., Vienna.

Note No. 29.

GÖRGEY'S DECLARATION TO HIS ARMY.

The Hungarian army of the Upper Danube, of which the essentials once formed part of the Austrian military establishment (that is to say, before the sanction of the Hungarian War Office placed the Hungarian regiments under the sole and exclusive direction of that office), took, obedient to the will of the constitutional king of Hungary, their oaths to the Constitution of that country. In the first instance, this corps was placed under the command of the Archduke Palatine, and opposed to the imperial and royal* troops under Jellacic.

Notwithstanding the most melancholy political troubles, they have since remained faithful to their oaths, by yielding their obedience only to the commands of the Hungarian responsible Secretary at War, or of the Committee of Defense, whose legality has received that secretary's recognition and sanction.

Leaning on this incontrovertible fact, the corps of the Upper Danube makes the most decided protest against any insinuations of its having served to promote the private interests of any party in Hungary, and the corps brands all such rumors as disgraceful calumnies. But this very incontrovertible fact of the unshaken loyalty with which the corps on the Upper Danube has, in the combat for the maintenance of the Hungarian Constitution, cheerfully submitted to all orders of the Committee of Defense, in spite of the most unspeakable deprivations and disappointments, justifies this corps in its expectation that the Committee of Defense will conscientiously avoid one thing—to wit, the placing this corps in any equivocal position.

After the corps of the Upper Danube, obedient to the orders of the Committee

* Imperialist troops.

of Defense, had, with the rarest self-denial, and by a most fatiguing outpost service, protected the frontier of the country; after having, in the battle of Wieselburg, prevailed against the superior numbers of the enemy; after dauntlessly maintaining its hopeless position at Raab, until, outflanked by the enemy's superior power, they had to make their retreat (which was necessary for the protection of the capital), by an obstinate fight with the enemy's flanking column; after this corps, without having found among the population of the country on the other side of the Danube the promised sympathies, and without having been assisted by any preparations of the Committee of Defense for preventing the enemy's advance on the highways and lines of Dotis, Banhida, Neszmély, Csakvar, Zamoly, Ondod, and Sarkany, remained partly in front and partly in the rear of the said places in battle array, until the victorious advance by more of the enemy's right wing caused us, in our turn, to take the offensive by way of Mártonvásár; and having, at the express command of the Committee of Defense, exchanged this offensive attitude for a defensive position in front of Buda, the corps has but one comforting prospect left to it, viz., the prospect of a decisive contest in the immediate vicinity of and in the capitals of Hungary.

The peremptory tone of the orders of the Committee of Defense, and the proclamations which that body addressed to the people, justified the expectation that, in the long-wished-for and at length approaching decisive moment, an enthusiastic energy would be displayed by it.

Instead of all that ought and might have been done, dispatches were on the 1st of January, 1849, received at the head-quarters at Promontorium, containing,

Firstly. The news that the Committee of Defense had left the capital.

Secondly. An order from the committee instructing us to accept a decisive battle on the so-called first line—Buda, on the height of Zeteny, Bia, &c.—without, however, sacrificing the corps, or exposing the two capitals to a bombardment; that is to say, in case of a defeat, the corps was instructed, regardless of the sole safe transit, and of the pursuing enemy, to make its escape to the left bank of the Danube, without defending the town.

Thirdly. An order to allow a deputation to pass to the chief commander of the hostile army.

Each of these three facts would alone suffice to shake the confidence of the corps in the members of the Committee of Defense; but coming together as they did, they were calculated to create a suspicion of the corps having hitherto been (to use the most lenient expression) a useful but a dangerous instrument in an unpracticed hand.

In order, therefore, amid the political intrigues which are likely to prey upon our unfortunate country, to maintain an unshaken and legal position, the corps of the Upper Danube makes the following public declarative profession:

Firstly. The corps of the Upper Danube, faithful to its oath for the maintenance of the Constitution of Hungary, as sanctioned by King Ferdinand the Fifth, intends to defend that Constitution against all foreign enemies.

Secondly. But the corps of the Upper Danube intends likewise to oppose all those who, by untimely republican agitations in the interior of the country, would endeavor to overthrow the constitutional kingdom.

Thirdly. The terms Constitutional Monarchy, which the corps on the Upper Danube proposes to defend to the last man, imply in themselves that the corps can not and will not obey any orders, except those which reach it in a legal form from the responsible Secretary at War, or from the deputy appointed by that functionary (at present General Vetter).

Fourthly. The corps of the Upper Danube, mindful of its oath to the Constitution of Hungary, and mindful of its honor, has a perfect consciousness of its duties and its intentions; and it declares, in conclusion, that it will not submit to the results of any negotiations with the enemy, unless such negotiations guarantee the Hungarian Constitution on the one side, and the military honor of the corps on the other.

GÖRGEY, Major General.

Waitzen, January 5, 1849.

Note No. 30.

TEXT OF THE CIRCULAR OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO ITS FOREIGN AGENTS,
ON THE ENTRANCE OF ITS TROOPS INTO TRANSYLVANIA, FEB. 9, 1849.

The news of the entrance of our troops into Transylvania being likely to give rise to false interpretations, we send you some explanations on the matter. It is notorious that great cruelties were committed in Transylvania by the Hungarian insurgents, who, headed by the Polish refugee Bem, have been recently repulsed by the Austrian army. The terror which, in consequence of such revolting excesses, was occasioned in the environs of Hermanstadt and Kronstadt, and the temporary absence of military forces, which rendered the Austrian generals unable to defend from pillage those towns (placed, as it were, before the eyes of our advanced posts), caused the inhabitants to invoke, through the authorities, the assistance of the general-in-chief of our troops. The Austrian generals on their part had, for the same reason, expressed a desire to ascertain to what extent they could calculate, if necessary, on support from us. General Lüders, who referred the matter to the emperor, received, by order of his majesty, the reply, that in case the towns of Hermanstadt and Kronstadt should be seriously threatened by an invasion of the Hungarian insurgents, at a time at which the Austrian government should not possess the means of protecting them against such great disorder, he was authorized to send a sufficient force into these two towns; that, however, he ought only to do that in the event of inevitable necessity, and only on the express demand of the Austrian military authorities. When, after the granting of this authorization, the danger of the towns became more imminent, in consequence of an advantage obtained by the insurgents at Mediafels, and when the inhabitants had renewed their earnest prayers to our general, with an invitation in due form from the Austrian generals Puchner and Schurter, General Lüders did not think it right to leave long unaccomplished wishes so expressed. He consequently caused the two towns to be occupied by detachments of troops, the effective of which had been previously indicated by the Austrian generals. The inhabitants, especially the Germans, who justly feared the barbarous cruelty of the Szeklers, saluted the arrival of these troops with the liveliest marks of joy. Our soldiers were received with open arms, the population went out to meet them, and gave them bread and salt; and a number of German and Wallachian families, who had been preparing to cross the frontier, abandoned their intention as soon as they saw that their lives and properties were assured. Such are the facts in all their simple truth; they prove that the emperor, in authorizing the entrance of some troops into Transylvania, was only influenced by motives of humanity, and that the matter was exclusively local, without any sort of connection with armed intervention in the interior affairs of the empire of Austria. This empire has gloriously and recently proved, by the energy with which it has crushed four successive insurrections, that it is too powerful to require our material assistance in Transyl-

vania Austria is already victorious in Hungary, and the insurrectional domination will soon be at an end. Even if Bem, owing to the insufficiency of the Austrian forces, had succeeded in taking Hermanstadt and Kronstadt, that would not have saved the insurrection from the complete defeat which awaits it. But, however brief such an occupation might have been, it would have sufficed to give up those two flourishing towns to pillage and murder, and it was this misfortune that, in accordance with the Austrian authorities, we were desirous to prevent. Such was the object of the entrance of our troops; it must, consequently, be well understood, that their presence will be only temporary. Already, indeed, have our generals received orders to recross the frontier as soon as the dangers which threatened the country shall have ceased to exist.

Note No. 31.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY THE HUNGARIAN NATION.

We, the legally-constituted representatives of the Hungarian nation assembled in Diet, do by these presents solemnly proclaim, in maintenance of the inalienable natural rights of Hungary, with all its appurtenances and dependencies, to occupy the position of an independent European state; that the house of Lorraine-Habsburg, as perjured in the sight of God and man, has forfeited its right to the Hungarian throne. At the same time, we feel ourselves bound in duty to make known the motives and reasons which have impelled us to this decision, that the civilized world may learn we have taken this step out of overweening confidence in our own wisdom, or out of revolutionary excitement, but that it is an act of the last necessity, adopted to preserve from utter destruction a nation persecuted to the limit of the most enduring patience.

Three hundred years have passed since the Hungarian nation, by free election, placed the house of Austria upon its throne, in accordance with stipulations made on both sides, and ratified by treaty. These three hundred years have been, for the country, a period of uninterrupted suffering.

The Creator has blessed this country with all the elements of wealth and happiness. Its area of one hundred and ten thousand square miles presents, in varied profusion, innumerable sources of prosperity. Its population, numbering nearly fifteen millions, feels the glow of youthful strength within its veins, and has shown temper and docility which warrant its proving at once the main organ of civilization in Eastern Europe, and the guardian of that civilization when attacked. Never was a more grateful task appointed to a reigning dynasty by the dispensation of Providence than that which devolved upon the house of Lorraine-Habsburg. It would have sufficed to do nothing to impede the development of the country. Had this been the rule observed, Hungary would now rank among the most prosperous nations. It was only necessary that it should not envy the Hungarians the moderate share of constitutional liberty which they timidly maintained during the difficulties of a thousand years with rare fidelity to their sovereigns, so that the house of Habsburg might long have counted this nation among the most faithful adherents of the throne.

This dynasty, however, which can at no epoch point to a ruler who based his power on the freedom of the people, adopted a course toward this nation, from father to son, which deserves the appellation of perjury.

The house of Austria has publicly used every effort to deprive the country of its legitimate independence and Constitution, designing to reduce it to a level

with the other provinces long since deprived of all freedom, and to unite all in a common sink of slavery. Foiled in this effort by the untiring vigilance of the nation, it directed its endeavor to lame the power, to check the progress of Hungary, causing it to minister to the gain of the provinces of Austria, but only to the extent which enabled those provinces to bear the load of taxation with which the prodigality of the imperial house weighed them down; having first deprived those provinces of all constitutional means of remonstrating against a policy which was not based upon the welfare of the subject, but solely tended to maintain despotism and crush liberty in every country of Europe.

It has frequently happened that the Hungarian nation, in despite of this systematized tyranny, has been obliged to take up arms in self-defense. Although constantly victorious in these constitutional struggles, yet so moderate has the nation ever been in its use of the victory, so strongly has it confided in the king's plighted word, that it has ever laid down arms as soon as the king, by new compacts and fresh oaths, has guaranteed the duration of its rights and liberty. But every new compact was as futile as those which preceded it; each oath which fell from the royal lips was but a renewal of previous perjuries. The policy of the house of Austria, which aimed at destroying the independence of Hungary as a state, has been pursued unaltered for three hundred years.

It was in vain that the Hungarian nation shed its blood for the deliverance of Austria whenever it was in danger; vain were all the sacrifices which it made to serve the interests of the reigning house; in vain did it, on the renewal of the royal promises, forget the wounds which the past had inflicted; vain was the fidelity cherished by the Hungarians for their king, and which, in moments of danger, assumed a character of devotion; they were in vain, because the history of the government of that dynasty in Hungary presents but an unbroken series of perjured deeds from generation to generation.

In spite of such treatment, the Hungarian nation has all along respected the tie by which it was united to this dynasty; and in now decreeing its expulsion from the throne, it acts under the natural law of self-preservation, being driven to pronounce this sentence by the full conviction that the house of Lorraine-Habsburg is compassing the destruction of Hungary as an independent state; so that this dynasty has been the first to tear the bands by which it was united to the Hungarian nation, and to confess that it had torn them in the face of Europe. For many causes a nation is justified, before God and man, in expelling a reigning dynasty. Among such are the following:

When it forms alliances with the enemies of the country, with robbers, or partisan chieftains to oppress the nation. When it attempts to annihilate the independence of the country and its Constitution, supplied by oaths, attacking with an armed force the people who have committed no act of revolt. When the integrity of a country, which the sovereign has sworn to maintain, is violated, and its power diminished. When foreign armies are employed to murder the people, and to oppress their liberties.

Each of the grounds here enumerated would justify the exclusion of a dynasty from the throne. But the house of Lorraine-Habsburg is unexampled in the compass of its perjuries, and has committed every one of these crimes against the nation; and its determination to extinguish the independence of Hungary has been accompanied with a succession of criminal acts, comprising robbery, destruction of property by fire, murder, maiming, and personal ill treatment of all kinds, besides setting the laws of the country at defiance, so that humanity will shudder when reading this disgraceful page of history.

The main impulse to this recent unjustifiable course was the passing of the laws adopted in the spring of 1848, for the better protection of the Constitution of the country. These laws provided reforms in the internal government of the country, by which the commutation of servile services and of the tithe were decreed; a fair representation guaranteed to the people in the Diet, whose Constitution was before that exclusively aristocratical; equality before the law proclaimed; the privilege of exemption from taxation abolished; freedom of the press pronounced; and, to stem the torrent of abuses, trial by jury established, with other improvements. Notwithstanding that, as a consequence of the French February Revolution, troubles broke out in every province of the Austrian empire, and the reigning dynasty was left without support, the Hungarian nation was too generous at such a moment to demand more privileges, and contented itself with enforcing the administration of its old rights upon a system of ministerial responsibility, and with maintaining them and the independence of the country against the often renewed and perjured attempts of the crown. These rights, and the independence sought to be maintained, were, however, no new acquisition, but were what the king, by his oath, and according to law, was bound to keep up, and which had not in the slightest degree been affected by the relation in which Hungary stood to the provinces of the empire.

In point of fact, Hungary and Transylvania, with all their possessions and dependencies, never were incorporated into the Austrian empire, but formed a separate independent kingdom, even after the adoption of the Pragmatic Sanction, by which the same law of succession was adopted for Hungary which obtained in the other countries and provinces.

The clearest proof of this legal fact is furnished by the law incorporated into the act of the Pragmatic Sanction, and which stipulates that the territory of Hungary and its dependencies, as well as its independence, self-dependence, Constitution, and privileges, shall remain inviolate and specially guaranteed.

Another proof is contained in the stipulation of the Pragmatic Sanction, according to which the heir of the crown only becomes legally King of Hungary upon the conclusion of a coronation treaty with the nation, and upon his swearing to maintain the Constitution and the laws of the country, whereupon he is to be crowned with the crown of St. Stephen. The act signed at the coronation contains the stipulation that all laws, privileges, and the entire Constitution, shall be observed, together with the order of succession. But one sovereign, since the adoption of the Pragmatic Sanction, refused to enter into the coronation compact, and swear to the Constitution. This was Joseph II., who died without being crowned; but for that reason his name is not recorded among the kings of Hungary, and all his acts are considered illegal, null, and void. His successor, Leopold II., was obliged, before ascending the Hungarian throne, to enter into the coronation compact, to take the oath, and to let himself be crowned. On this occasion, it was distinctly declared, in Art. 10, 1790, sanctioned upon oath by the king, that Hungary was a free and independent country with regard to its government, and not subordinate to any other state or people whatever; consequently, that it was to be governed by its own customs and laws.

The same oath was taken by Francis I., who came to the throne in the same year, 1790. On the extinction of the imperial dignity in Germany, and the foundation of the Austrian empire, this emperor, who allowed himself to violate the law in innumerable instances, had still sufficient respect for his oath publicly to avow that Hungary formed no portion of the Austrian empire. For this reason, Hungary was separated from the rest of the Austrian states by a chain of customs' guards along the whole frontier, which still continues.

The same oath was taken on his accession to the throne by Ferdinand V., who, at the Diet held at Pressburg last year, of his own free will sanctioned the laws that were passed, but who, soon after breaking that oath, entered into a conspiracy with the other members of his family, with the intent of erasing Hungary from the list of independent nations.

Still the Hungarian nation preserved with useless piety its loyalty to its perjured sovereign, and during March last year, while the empire was on the brink of destruction, while its armies in Italy suffered one defeat after another, and he, in his imperial palace, had to fear at any moment that he might be driven from it, Hungary did not take advantage of so favorable a moment to make increased demands; it asked only that its Constitution might be guaranteed, and those abuses rectified—a Constitution to maintain which fourteen kings of the Austrian dynasty had sworn a solemn oath, which every one of them had broken.

When the king undertook to guarantee those ancient rights, and gave his sanction to the establishment of a responsible ministry, the Hungarian nation flew enthusiastically to his support, and rallied its might around his tottering throne. At that eventful crisis, as at so many others, the house of Austria was saved by the fidelity of the Hungarians.

Scarcely, however, had this oath fallen from his lips, when he conspired anew with his family, the accomplices of his crime, to compass the destruction of the Hungarian nation. This conspiracy did not take place on the ground that any new privileges were conceded by the recent laws which diminished the royal authority. From what has been said, it is clear that no such demands were made. The conspiracy was founded to get rid of the responsible ministry, which made it impossible for the Vienna cabinet to treat the Hungarian cabinet any longer as a nullity.

In former times, a governing council, under the name of the Royal Hungarian Stadtholdership, the president of which was the Palatine, held its seat at Buda, whose sacred duty it was to watch over the integrity of the state, the inviolability of the Constitution, and the sanctity of the laws; but this collegiate authority not presenting any element of personal responsibility, the Vienna cabinet gradually degraded this council to the position of an administrative organ of court absolutism. In this manner, while Hungary had ostensibly an independent government, the despotic Vienna cabinet disposed at will of the money and blood of the people for foreign purposes, postponing its trading interests to the success of courtly cabals, injurious to the welfare of the people, so that we were excluded from all connection with the other countries of the world, and were degraded to the position of a colony. The mode of governing by a ministry was intended to put a stop to these proceedings, which caused the rights of the country to molder uselessly in its parchments; by the change, these rights and the royal oath were both to become a reality. It was the apprehension of this, and especially the fear of losing its control over the money and blood of the country, which caused the house of Austria to resolve the involving of Hungary, by the foulest intrigues, in the horrors of fire and slaughter, that, having plunged the country in a civil war, it might seize the opportunity to dismember the lands, and to blot out the name of Hungary from the list of independent nations, and unite its plundered and bleeding limbs with the Austrian monarchy.

The beginning of this course was by issuing orders during the existence of the ministry, directing an Austrian general to rise in rebellion against the laws of the country, and by nominating the same general Ban of Croatia, a kingdom belonging to the kingdom of Hungary. Croatia and Slavonia were chosen as the seat

of military operations in this rebellion, because the military organization of those countries promised to present the greatest number of disposable troops; it was also thought that, since those countries had for centuries been excluded from the enjoyment of constitutional rights, and subjected to a military organization in the name of the emperor, they would easily be induced to rise at his bidding.

Croatia and Slavonia were chosen to begin this rebellion, because in those countries the inhuman policy of Prince Metternich had, with a view to the weakening of all parties, for years cherished hatred against the Hungarian nation. By exciting in every possible manner the most unfounded national jealousies, and by employing the most disgraceful means, he had succeeded in inflaming a party with rage, although the Hungarians, far from desiring to oppress the Croats, allowed the most unrestrained development to the provincial institutions of Croatia, and shared with their Croatian and Slavonian brethren their political rights, even going the length of sacrificing some of their own rights, by acknowledging special privileges and immunities in those dependencies.

The Ban revolted, therefore, in the name of the emperor, and rebelled openly against the King of Hungary, who is, however, one and the same person; and he went so far as to decree the separation of Croatia and Slavonia from Hungary, with which they had been united for eight hundred years, as well as to incorporate them with the Austrian empire. Public opinion and undoubted facts threw the blame of these proceedings on the Archduke Louis, uncle to the emperor, on his brother, the Archduke Francis Charles, and especially on the consort of the last-named prince, the Archduchess Sophia; and since the Ban, in this act of rebellion, openly alleged that he acted as a faithful subject of the emperor, the ministry of Hungary requested their sovereign, by a public declaration, to wipe off the stigma which these proceedings threw upon the family. At that moment affairs were not prosperous for Austria in Italy; the emperor, therefore, did proclaim that the Ban and his associates were guilty of high treason, and of exciting to rebellion. But while publishing this edict, the Ban and his accomplices were covered with favors at court, and supplied for their enterprise with money, arms, and ammunition. The Hungarians, confiding in the royal proclamation, and not wishing to provoke a civil conflict, did not hunt out those proscribed traitors in their lair, and only adopted measures for checking any extension of the rebellion. But soon afterward the inhabitants of South Hungary, of Servian race, were excited to rebellion by precisely the same means.

These were also declared by the king to be rebels, but were nevertheless, like the others, supplied with money, arms, and ammunition. The king's commissioned officers and civil servants enlisted bands of robbers in the principality of Servia to strengthen the rebels, and aid them in massacring the peaceable Hungarian and German inhabitants of the Banat. The command of these rebellious bodies was further intrusted to the rebel leaders of the Croats.

During this rebellion of the Hungarian Servians, scenes of cruelty were witnessed at which the heart shudders; the peaceable inhabitants were tortured with a cruelty which makes the hair stand on end. Whole towns and villages, once flourishing, were laid waste. Hungarians fleeing before these murderers were reduced to the condition of vagrants and beggars in their own country; the most lovely districts were converted into a wilderness.

Thus were the Hungarians driven to self defense, but the Austrian cabinet had dispatched some time previously the bravest portion of the national troops to Italy, to oppress the kingdoms of Lombardy and Venice, notwithstanding that our country was at home bleeding from a thousand wounds, still she had allowed

them to leave for the defense of Austria. The greater part of the Hungarian regiments were, according to the old system of government, scattered through the other provinces of the empire. In Hungary itself, the troops quartered were mostly Austrian; and they afforded more protection to the rebels than to the laws, or to the internal peace of the country.

The withdrawal of these troops, and the return of the national militia, was demanded of the government, but was either refused, or its fulfillment delayed; and when our brave comrades, on hearing the distress of the country, returned in masses, they were persecuted, and such as were obliged to yield to superior force were disarmed, and sentenced to death for having defended their country against rebels.

The Hungarian ministry begged the king earnestly to issue orders to all troops and commanders of fortresses in Hungary, enjoining fidelity to the Constitution, and obedience to the ministers of Hungary. Such a proclamation was sent to the Palatine, the viceroy of Hungary, Archduke Stephen, at Buda. The necessary letters were written and sent to the post-office. But this nephew of the king, the Archduke Palatine, shamelessly caused these letters to be smuggled back from the post-office, although they had been countersigned by the responsible ministers, and they were afterward found among his papers when he treacherously departed from the country.

The rebel Ban menaced the Hungarian coast with an attack, and the government, with the king's consent, ordered an armed corps to march into Styria for the defense of Fiume; but this whole force received orders to march into Italy. Yet such abominable treachery was declared by the Vienna cabinet.

The rebel force occupied Fiume, and disunited it from the kingdom of Hungary, and this abominable deception was disavowed by the Vienna cabinet as having been a misunderstanding; the furnishing of arms, ammunition, and money to the rebels of Croatia was also declared to have been a misunderstanding. Finally, instructions were issued to the effect that, until special orders were given, the army and the commanders of fortresses were not to follow the orders of the Hungarian ministers, but were to execute those of the Austrian cabinet.

Finally, to reap the fruit of so much perfidy, the Emperor Francis Joseph dared to call himself King of Hungary, in the manifesto of the 9th of March, wherein he openly declares that he erases the Hungarian nation from the list of the independent nations of Europe, and that he divides its territory into five parts, dividing Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, and Fiume from Hungary, creating at the same time a principality (*vayvedeschaft*) for the Servian rebels, and having paralyzed the political existence of the country, declared it incorporated into the Austrian monarchy.

Never was so disgraceful a line of policy followed toward a nation. Hungary, unprepared with money, arms, and troops, and not expecting to be called on to make resistance, was entangled in a net of treachery, and was obliged to defend itself against this threatened annihilation with the aid of volunteers, National Guards, and an undisciplined army levy *en masse*, aided by the few regular troops which remained in the country. In open battles, the Hungarians have, however, been successful; but they could not rapidly enough put down the Servian rebels, and those of the military frontier, who were led by officers devoted to Austria, and were enabled to take refuge behind intrenched positions.

It was necessary to provide a new armed force. The king, still pretending to yield to the undeniably lawful demands of the nation, had summoned a new Diet for the 2d of July, 1848, and had called upon the representatives of the nation to

provide soldiers and money for the suppression of the Servian and Croatian rebellion, and the re-establishment of public peace. He, at the same time, issued a solemn proclamation in his own name, and in that of his family, condemning and denouncing the Croatian and Servian rebellion. The necessary steps were taken by the Diet. A levy of two hundred thousand men, and a subsidy of forty millions of florins, were voted as the necessary force, and the bills were laid before the king for the royal sanction. At the same moment, the Hungarians gave an unexampled proof of their loyalty, by inviting the king, who had fled to Innspruck, to go to Pesth, and by his presence tranquillize the people, trusting to the loyalty of the Hungarians, who had shown themselves at all times the best supporters of the throne.

This request was proffered in vain, for Radetzky had in the mean time been victorious in Italy. The house of Lorraine-Habsburg, restored to confidence by that victory, thought the time come to take off the mask and to involve Hungary, still bleeding from past wounds, in the horrors of a fresh war of oppression. The king from that moment began to address the man whom he himself had branded as a rebel, as "dear and loyal" (*Lieber Getreuer*); he praised him for having revolted, and encouraged him to proceed in the path he had entered upon.

He expressed a like sympathy for the Servian rebels, whose hands yet reeked from the massacres they had perpetrated. It was under this command that the Ban of Croatia, after being proclaimed as a rebel, assembled an army, and announced his commission from the king to carry fire and sword into Hungary, upon which the Austrian troops stationed in the country united with him. The commandants of the fortresses, Eszek and Temesvar Gynlaschervar, and the commanders of the forces in the Banat and in Transylvania, breaking their oaths taken to the country, treacherously surrendered their trusts; a Slovak clergyman with the commission of colonel, who had fraternized at Vienna with the revolted Czecks, broke into Hungary, and the rebel Croat leader advanced with confidence, through an unprepared country, to occupy its capital, expecting that the army in Hungary would not oppose him.

Even then the Diet did not give up all confidence in the power of the royal oath, and the king was once more requested to order the rebels to quit the country. The answer given was a reference to a manifesto of the Austrian ministry, declaring it to be their determination to deprive the Hungarian nation of the independent management of their financial, commercial, and war affairs. The king at the same time refused his assent to the laws submitted for approval respecting the troops and the subsidy for covering the expenditure.

Upon this the Hungarian ministers resigned, but the names submitted by the president of the council, at the demand of the king, were not approved of for successors. The Diet then, bound by its duty to secure the interests of the country, voted the supplies, and ordered the troops to be levied. The nation obeyed the summons with readiness.

The representatives of the people then summoned the nephew of the emperor to join the camp, and as Palatine to lead the troops against the rebels. He not only obeyed the summons, but made public professions of his devotion to the cause. As soon, however, as an engagement threatened, he fled secretly from the camp and the country, like a coward traitor. Among his papers a plan, formed by him some time previously, was found, according to which Hungary was to be simultaneously attacked on nine sides at once—from Styria, Austria, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia, and Transylvania.

From a correspondence with the Minister of War, seized at the same time, it

was discovered that the commanding generals in the military frontier and the Austrian provinces adjoining Hungary had received orders to enter Hungary, and to support the rebels with their united forces.

This attack from nine points at once really began. The most painful aggression took place in Transylvania, for the traitorous commander in that district did not content himself with the practices considered lawful in war by disciplined troops. He stirred up the Wallachian peasants to take up arms against their own constitutional rights, and, aided by the rebellious Servian hordes, commenced a course of Vandalism and extinction, sparing neither women, children, nor aged men; murdering and torturing the defenseless Hungarian inhabitants; burning the most flourishing villages and towns, among which, Nagy-Igmand, the seat of learning for Transylvania, was reduced to a heap of ruins.

But the Hungarian nation, although taken by surprise, unarmed and unprepared, did not abandon its future prospects in any agony of despair.

Measures were immediately taken to increase the small standing army by volunteers and the levy of the people. These troops, supplying the want of experience by the enthusiasm arising from the feeling that they had right on their side, defeated the Croatian armaments, and drove them out of the country. One of the leaders abused the generosity of the victors, after a battle in which the rebels were defeated, and a truce was granted to them to decamp by night. Another body of ten thousand men were surrounded, and the whole, to a man, taken prisoners.

The defeated army fled in the direction of Vienna, where the emperor continued his demoralizing policy, and nominated the beaten and flying rebel as his plenipotentiary and substitute in Hungary, suspending by this act the constitution and institutions of the country, all its authorities, courts of justice, and tribunals, laying the kingdom under martial law, and placing in the hand of, and under the unlimited authority of, a rebel, the honor, the property, and the lives of the people; in the hand of a man who, with armed bands, had braved the laws, and attacked the Constitution of the country.

But the house of Austria was not contented with this unjustifiable violation of oaths taken by its head.

The rebellious Ban was taken under the protection of the troops stationed near Vienna, and commanded by Prince Windischgrätz. These troops, after taking Vienna by storm, were led as an imperial Austrian army to conquer Hungary. But the Hungarian nation, persisting in its loyalty, sent an envoy to the advancing enemy. This envoy, coming under a flag of truce, was treated as a prisoner, and thrown into prison. No heed was paid to the remonstrances and the demands of the Hungarian nation for justice. The threat of the gallows was, on the contrary, thundered against all who had taken arms in defense of a wretched and oppressed country. But before the army had time to enter Hungary, a family revolution in the tyrannical reigning house was perpetrated at Olmütz. Ferdinand V. was forced to resign a throne which had been polluted with so much blood and perjury, and the son of Francis Charles, who also abdicated his claim to the inheritance, the youthful Archduke Francis Joseph, caused himself to be proclaimed Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. But, according to the family compact, no one can dispose of the constitutional throne but the Hungarian nation.

At this critical moment the Hungarian nation demanded nothing more than the maintenance of its laws and institutions, and peace guaranteed by their integrity. Had the assent of the nation to this change in the occupant of the throne been asked in a legal manner, and the young prince offered to take the customary oath

that he would preserve the Constitution, the Hungarian nation would not have refused to elect him king in accordance with the treaties extant, and to crown him with St. Stephen's crown, before he had dipped his hand in the blood of the people.

He, however, refusing to perform an act so sacred in the eyes of God and man, and in strange contrast to the innocence natural to youthful breasts, declared in his first words his intention of conquering Hungary, which he dared to call a rebellious country, although he himself had raised rebellion there, and of depriving it of that independence which it had maintained for a thousand years, to incorporate it into the Austrian monarchy.

And he has but too well labored to keep his word. He ordered the army under Windischgrätz to enter Hungary, and, at the same time, directed several corps of troops to attack the country from Galicia and Styria. Hungary resisted the projected invasion, but being unable to make head against so many countries at once, on account of the devastation carried on in several parts of the interior by the excited rebels, and being thus prevented from displaying its whole power of defense, the troops were, in the first instance, obliged to retire. To save the capital from the horrors of a storm like that to which Prague and Vienna had mercilessly been exposed, and not to place the fortunes of a nation—which deserved better—on the die of a pitched battle, for which there had not been sufficient preparation, the capital was abandoned, and the Diet and national government removed in January last to Debreczin, trusting to the help of a just God, and to the energies of the nation, to prevent the cause from being lost, even when it should be seen that the capital was given up. Thanks be to Heaven, the cause was not lost!

But even then an attempt was made to bring about a peaceful arrangement, and a deputation was sent to the generals of the perjured dynasty. This house, in its blind self-confidence, refused to enter into any negotiation, and dared to demand an unconditional submission from the nation. The deputation was further detained, and one of the number, the former president of the ministry, was even thrown into prison. The deserted capital was occupied, and was turned into a place of execution; a part of the prisoners of war were there consigned to the ax, another part were thrown into dungeons, while the remainder were exposed to fearful sufferings from hunger, and were thus forced to enter the ranks of the army in Italy.

The measure of the crimes of the Austrian house was, however, filled up, when, after its defeat, it applied for help to the Emperor of Russia; and, in spite of the remonstrances and protestations of the Porte, and of the consuls of the European powers at Bucharest, in defiance of international rights, and to the endangering of the balance of power in Europe, caused the Russian troops, stationed at Wallachia, to be led into Transylvania, for the destruction of the Hungarian nation.

Three months ago we were driven back upon the Theiss; our just arms have already recovered all Transylvania; Klausenburg, Hermanstadt, and Kronstadt are taken; one portion of the troops of Austria is driven into the Bukowina; another, together with the Russian force sent to aid them, is totally defeated, and to the last man obliged to evacuate Transylvania, and to flee into Wallachia. Upper Hungary is cleared of foes.

The Servian rebellion is further suppressed; the forts of St. Thomas and the Roman intrenchment have been taken by storm, and the whole country between the Danube and the Theiss, including the county of Bacs, has been recovered for the nation.

The commander-in-chief of the perjured house of Austria has himself been defeated in five consecutive battles, and has with his whole army been driven back upon and even over the Danube.

Founding a line of conduct upon all these occurrences, and confiding in the justice of an eternal God, we, in the face of the civilized world, in reliance upon the natural rights of the Hungarian nation, and upon the power it has developed to maintain them, further impelled by that sense of duty which urges every nation to defend its existence, do hereby declare and proclaim, in the name of the nation legally represented by us, the following :

1st. Hungary, with Transylvania, as legally united with it, and the possessions and dependencies, are hereby declared to constitute a free, independent sovereign state. The territorial unity of this state is declared to be inviolable, and its territory to be indivisible.

2d. The house of Habsburg-Lorraine—having, by treachery, perjury, and levying of war against the Hungarian nation, as well as by its outrageous violation of all compacts, in breaking up the integral territory of the kingdom, in the separation of Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, Fiume, and its districts, from Hungary—further, by compassing the destruction of the independence of the country by arms, and by calling in the disciplined army of a foreign power, for the purpose of annihilating its nationality, by violation both of the Pragmatic Sanction and of treaties concluded between Austria and Hungary, on which the alliance between the two countries depended—is, as treacherous and perjured, forever excluded from the throne of the united states of Hungary and Transylvania, and all their possessions and dependencies, and are hereby deprived of the style and title, as well as of the armorial bearings belonging to the crown of Hungary, and declared to be banished forever from the united countries and their dependencies and possessions. They are, therefore, declared to be deposed, degraded, and banished forever from the Hungarian territory.

3d. The Hungarian nation, in the exercise of its rights and sovereign will, being determined to assume the position of a free and independent state among the nations of Europe, declares it to be its intention to establish and maintain friendly and neighborly relations with those states with which it was formerly united under the same sovereign, as well as to contract alliances with all other nations.

4th. The form of government to be adopted for the future will be fixed by the Diet of the nation.

But until this point shall be decided, on the basis of the foregoing and received principles which have been recognized for ages, the government of the united countries, their possessions and dependencies, shall be conducted on personal responsibility, and under the obligation to render an account of all acts, by Louis Kossuth, who has by acclamation, and with the unanimous approbation of the Diet of the nation, been named Governing President (Gubernator), and the ministers whom he shall appoint.

And this resolution of ours we proclaim to make known to all the nations of the civilized world, with the conviction that the Hungarian nation will be received by them among the free and independent nations of the world, with the same friendship and free acknowledgment of its rights which the Hungarians proffer to other countries.

We also hereby proclaim and make known to all the inhabitants of the united states of Hungary and Transylvania, their possessions and dependencies, that all authorities, communes, towns, and the civil officers, both in the counties and cities, are completely set free and released from all the obligations under which they

stood, by oath or otherwise, to the said house of Habsburg; and that any individual daring to contravene this decree, and by word or deed in any way to aid or abet any one violating it, shall be treated and punished as guilty of high treason. And by the publication of this decree, we hereby bind and oblige all the inhabitants of these countries to obedience to the government, now instituted formally, and endowed with all necessary legal powers.

Debreczin, April 14, 1849.

Note No. 32.

ARMISTICE ENTERED INTO AFTER THE BATTLE OF NOVARA, BETWEEN THE KING OF PIEDMONT AND FIELD-MARSHAL RADEZKY.

The King of Sardinia gives his positive and solemn assurance to cause to be concluded, so far as depends upon his honor, a treaty of peace, on the basis of the following articles:

Art. 1. The King of Sardinia will disband the Hungarian, Polish, and Lombard corps, reserving to himself the right of retaining certain officers of other corps as he may think fit.

Art. 2. Count Radetzky will interpose with the emperor, in order to obtain a complete amnesty for the Hungarian, Polish, and Lombard soldiers subjects of his said majesty.

Art. 3. The King of Sardinia admits that eighteen thousand Austrian infantry and two thousand cavalry may occupy the territory which lies between the Po, the Ticino, and the Sesia; and that one half the garrison of the citadel of Alexandria shall be composed of Austrian troops. This occupation shall not exercise any influence over the civil and judicial administration of the division of Novara. One half of the garrison of the town and citadel of Alexandria to be composed of three thousand Austrians, and the other half of the troops of his Sardinian majesty. The Austrians shall have free communication between Alexandria and Lonellina, by Valenza. A mixed military commission shall be named for regulating the conduct of the Austrian troops. The Duchies of Modena, Piacenza, and Tuscany, that is to say, the territories which did not belong to Piedmont before the war, shall be evacuated by the Sardinian troops.

Art. 4. The entrance of the Austrian moiety of the garrison of the citadel of Alexandria not being capable of taking place for three or four days, it is guaranteed by the Sardinian government.

Art. 5. The Sardinian fleet shall retire from the Adriatic, with all the steamers, within a fortnight, and return to their own ports, and the Piedmontese who shall be in Venice shall receive orders to return to their own states within the same period.

Art. 6. King Victor Emmanuel engages to conclude promptly a durable peace, and reduce his army to the peace footing.

Art. 7. The King of Sardinia holds as inviolable all the conditions above stipulated.

Art. 8. Plenipotentiaries from both parties shall be sent to some town, to be hereafter named, for the purpose of concluding a definitive peace.

Art. 9. The peace shall be made independently of the stipulations of this armistice.

Art. 10. Should not a peace be concluded, the renunciation of the armistice shall be made ten days before the recommencement of hostilities.

Art. 11. All prisoners of war shall be promptly and reciprocally delivered up.

Art. 12. All the Austrians who have already passed the Sesia shall be bound to return within the limits above traced.

(Signed)

CHRZANOWSKY,
RADETZKY.

March 24, 1849.

Note No. 33.

LETTER OF GÖRGEY TO GENERAL RÜDIGER.

General,—I presume you are familiar with the melancholy history of my country. I will not, therefore, enter into a detail of events which are so ominously connected, and which involved us in a desperate struggle for our legal liberties, in the first instance, and for our existence in the second. The better—indeed, I may say, the larger part of the nation, did by no means carelessly brave the chances of such a contest; but once engaged (and enjoying the support of many honorable men, who, though not Hungarians by birth, came, by the force of circumstances, to be parties in the conflict), they have honestly, manfully, and victoriously held out to the last.

But the policy of Europe compelled his majesty, the Czar of Russia, to league with Austria for our overthrow, and for the termination of our war for the Hungarian Constitution. Many of our true patriots had foreseen and prophesied the event. History will one day unfold what it was which induced a majority in the Provisional Government to close their ears against the voices of our patriots.

The Provisional Government exists no more. The hour of danger found them most weak. I, who am a man of action (though not of a vain action), I saw that all further effusion of blood was useless—that it was fatal to Hungary. I knew this from the commencement of the Russian invasion.

I have this day called upon the Provisional Government to make an unconditional resignation; for their continuing in office can not fail still further to cloud and to jeopardize the fortunes of my country. The Provisional Government became convinced of this truth; they resigned, and gave the power of the state into my hands.

I make use of this circumstance for the purpose of preventing a further sacrifice of human life; and since I am too weak to defend my peaceable fellow-citizens, I will, at least, liberate them from the miseries of war. I make an unconditional surrender. This act of mine will, perhaps, induce the leaders of other Hungarian armies to follow my example. I place my reliance on the notorious generosity of his majesty the Czar, trusting that he will consider the case of numbers of my brave comrades, who, as former officers in the Austrian army, are seriously compromised; and that he will not sacrifice them to a melancholy and uncertain fate. I trust that his majesty will consider the case of the unfortunate people of Hungary, who rely on his love of justice; and that he will not hand them over, helpless and unarmed, to the blind thirst of their enemies. Perhaps it is enough, if it is *I* who am the only victim.

General! I address this letter to you, because it was you who gave me marks of respect which have gained my confidence.

If you wish to put a stop to further and useless sacrifice of human life, I entreat you to take measures that the melancholy act of surrender may take place at your earliest convenience, but in such a manner that our arms be surrendered *only* to

the troops of his majesty the Czar of Russia. For most solemnly do I protest, I would rather see my corps engaged and annihilated in a desperate battle, no matter against what odds, than make an unconditional surrender to Austrian troops!

To-morrow, on the 12th of August, I intend to march my troops to Vilagos. On the 13th, I proceed to Boros Jenő; and on the 14th, to Béd. I inform you of these movements, because I wish that you should lead your force between the Austrian troops and mine—that you should surround me, and cut me off from the Austrians.

In case this maneuver were to prove unsuccessful, and in case the Austrian troops were to pursue ours, I mean to oppose an effective resistance to their attacks, to turn upon Great Warasdin, for the purpose of meeting the army of his majesty the Czar; for it is to his army alone that my troops are prepared to make a voluntary surrender.

I expect your reply at your earliest convenience: and I remain, with my assurances of unlimited respect,

ARTHUR GÖRGEY.

Old Arad, August 11, 1849—9 o'clock, P.M.

Note No. 34.

LETTERS OF HUNGARIAN MINISTERS ON THE ABDICATION OF KOSSUTH.

Esterhazy on the Hungarian Revolution.

The following letter from Prince Esterhazy, member of the Hungarian cabinet, was published in the London Times of the 1st of December last:

My dear Lord,—I sincerely regret my absence from town and other unavoidable causes have delayed forwarding the present letter.

I am principally induced to address you these lines by the report of what takes place in England relative to Hungary, and the strange confusion of ideas which seems to prevail there at this moment in several quarters, mixing up actions of an essentially revolutionary character with constitutional and patriotic principles.

Before entering more fully on the subject, a retrospective glance at the crisis of the spring of 1848 becomes necessary.

It is impossible to deny that, owing to the overwhelming circumstances of that period, the political existence of the Austrian empire was exposed to the greatest danger, and that the maintaining of the Hungarian crown on the head of the Emperor Ferdinand was a condition of absolute necessity to the salvation of the empire.

But the different concessions consecutively extorted from the government in a moment of surprise and feebleness had already lessened the power of resistance in its hands. Underhand dealings had succeeded in blinding and corrupting public opinion in general, and particularly that of the Hungarian Diet, which, notwithstanding the benevolent and constitutional intentions of the government, set forth in the royal propositions of the Diet of 1847, and the respect constantly shown, since the Diet of 1825, to the fundamental principles of the Hungarian Constitution, had taken a direction of a most dangerous character, heightened by the general excitement of Europe after the events in France, in February, 1848.

A virtual separation was fast approaching. Under such circumstances, nothing could be of higher importance than to maintain the principle of the union and the rights of the crown. I may fairly state, that a pure and simple refusal of the petitions presented by the deputation which arrived here shortly after the sad scene in March would have seriously compromised this first-rate interest.

The only way to avoid complications of a dangerous character for the monarchy and pernicious for Hungary itself, was to consider the concessions already obtained from the emperor in a legal form, although by violent pressure from without, as the *final term*, but not as the *starting-point* for renewed agitation.

It was the false view taken of this important point, and the tendency of a violent party to employ these concessions, not for the legal consolidation of the rights of their country, but for the annihilation of the royal power and of the union, which hastened the untoward development of the Hungarian disturbances.

One of the petitions of the aforesaid deputation was the creation of a Hungarian ministry, from which Count Batthányi and M. Kossuth could not be excluded, exercising as they did a preponderating influence over public opinion in Hungary; and such was the calamity of that epoch, that the value of their influence was in reverse proportion to the value of their principles. With the former I had, up to that period, but a slight, with the latter no social relation whatever.

The formation of such a ministry, granted by his majesty, was perhaps at that moment, and among different other combinations, not the most prejudicial step for supporting monarchical interests and the principle of the union, because the absolute maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction was thus formally confirmed, and a positive engagement taken to that effect.

The insuring of this vital interest induced me to put aside every personal consideration. In consequence of urgent and reiterated solicitations from persons whose loyalty and devotedness to the reigning dynasty were above all doubt, having besides powerful motives to believe that my accepting the place especially designated by a recent law as that of *a minister to reside near the person of the emperor*, would be as conducive to smooth the difficulties in the transaction of affairs of so delicate a nature, as to suit the personal convenience of his majesty the emperor, I yielded at last, and accepted the proposed office.

In order to form an opinion of this administration, it is not only necessary to replace one's self in the period and in the peculiar circumstances of its formation, but also to enter into an analysis of the nature of its composition.

If, on one side, it contained undoubtedly elements, which by their precedents gave rise to mistrust and repugnance, there were in it, on the other hand, elements of a less alarming character, men of pure reputation, who in their opposition never went beyond the line of parliamentary decency and privilege.

Under this head, I put in the first rank the Count Stephen Széchényi, a man equally well known in England, with whom I am connected by the ties of old-standing friendship, whose loyalty could not more be doubted than his patriotic feelings, and whose exertions for the material welfare of Hungary are as meritorious as the political impulse, of which he was almost the first to give the signal, proved to be calamitous.

There were at the head of several departments, as I mentioned before, men of trustworthy character, who labored under no illusion as to the political tendency and the clandestine plans of their colleague, and endeavored, although unsuccessfully, to counteract them.

I may dispense with pointing him out. His name is but too much heard in England, where the would-be friends of Hungary have prepared for him a reception, showing a striking contrast to the evidence of high treason, and to the calamities and misfortune which, by subversive schemes, he brought on his country, as well as to the state in which he left it at the moment of his flight.

It is evident that two ways were open to the pursuit of those patriotic views which he boasted of. One of them was the path of legality, in devoting his un-

deniable ability to the task of effacing the means employed in extorting concessions from the crown.

But the secret motives which guided him, his vanity, and the party to which he was devoted, drove him into the opposite path, and, following this direction, he brought on the catastrophes of which his country has been the theatre, and was himself led to acts of treason, with their just consequences. This result of the proceedings, of which he was at once the moving power and the instrument, the frequent difference between his words and his deeds, and his reluctance to act manfully in case of need, by courageously exposing his life, have now, I think, blotted out, among the majority of the nation, the phantasmagoria of his unpropitious influence. To that the last blow was given, when, seeing the end of his ephemeral power fast approaching, he resorted to republican utopias, more intended, I apprehend, for exportation to foreign markets than for home consumption in our own, as I can hardly think him capable of such an egregious mistake as really to indulge in the hope of making such a scheme palatable to a population, whose genius, traditional history, feelings, and habits, are so eminently monarchical and aristocratic.

It was for the purpose of guiding the destinies of the kingdom of Hungary in so desirable a direction as the first of the above-mentioned two roads was leading to, that I devoted all possible efforts of my co-operation, opening thus the door for an honorable retreat to those who had already seriously committed themselves in following the opposite direction.

The affording to Louis Kossuth the opportunity of carrying out, in the capacity of a minister of the emperor as King of Hungary, the patriotic intention he pretended to profess, was to offer him a sphere of activity, and a situation which he could hardly ever have dreamed of obtaining, and which would have been thought glorious enough, had not the violence of his passion carried him away.

Nothing appeared, therefore, more urgent than to support the loyal fraction of the administration in exercising a salutary influence over the spirit of the Diet, and the nation in general; for I maintain that the majority of both was corrupted and paralyzed by the system of subordination, seduction, and terrorism practiced by a fanatical minority, which considered all means to be lawful, and gave itself up to the dictates of agitation and its leader.

The events of the month of May, 1848, brought on the departure of the imperial family to Innsbruck. I followed there with so much the more zeal, as the circumstances afforded me an opportunity for demonstrating my feelings of loyalty, respect, and devotedness. During the four weeks I remained there, the affairs relating to Hungary were brought forward in conference under protocols. I never placed before his majesty any subject not previously discussed in this way. If I mention here the complication between Hungary and Croatia, it is only to allege the motives for the delay in giving my resignation; for I felt the strongest desire to contribute to the success of a reconciliation which, although possible, was from the first moment surrounded with difficulties, owing to the signal want of good faith on the part of the extreme fraction of the Hungarian ministry, residing at Pesth, in publishing a document (the manifesto of the emperor against the Ban of Croatia), which, according to an agreement solemnly entered into by their president at Innsbruck, in open conference, ought not to have been published but on a certain eventuality, which, not having taken place, could give no right whatsoever to break so solemn an engagement.

Following the successive periods, we arrive at the untoward one when the revolutionary faction began to lift the mask, yet without openly throwing it off.

One part of the ministry, which was still honest in its intentions, was paralyzed and counteracted by the decisions of the Hungarian Diet, contrary to the intentions of its real majority, and of the country itself.

This situation became more and more dangerous as the hope of seeing the financial regulations and those concerning the army carried out in a spirit less at variance with the fundamental principles of the union and the royal prerogative faded away; and as the intended solution of these questions, in vain opposed by my strongest efforts, was contrary to those principles, and equivalent in its results to a total separation (as the troops levied and the money raised were to be applied exclusively to Hungarian purposes), I could no longer hesitate in my determination to resign.

If any circumstance could have added more weight to this resolution, it was the shameful and treasonable attempt to shake the fidelity of the army. In the state of moral and physical intoxication in which the deluded instruments of treason were previously placed, all sorts of means were resorted to, from inducements held out to ambitious pretensions down even to the most contemptible pecuniary bribes. On my arrival at Vienna, I tried once more to tender my good offices in the affairs of Croatia, the Ban being at that time present, as likewise the Count Batthányi, and the Archduke John acting as mediator. Seeing, however, that this negotiation would not lead to a satisfactory result, I only awaited the arrival of the Emperor Ferdinand, in order to tender my final resignation.

Among the sad and shameful events which have at a later period branded the Hungarian insurrection, the atrocious and cowardly murder of Count Lamburg was the first dreadful scene. This bloody termination of a mission of peace and conciliation gave the last stamp to the increasing revolutionary character of the Hungarian events. It was rendered the more infamous by the false and hypocritical pretenses under which the fury of the mob had been excited against the unhappy victim of his loyal and patriotic zeal, and by the criminal impunity of the principal perpetrators of that revolting act, who remained unpunished by the authorities, while the perpetrator of it, far from hiding himself, openly boasted of the bloody deed.

At the end of September, I left Vienna and its environs, which for the moment had become uninhabitable through the excesses of the revolted mob, and a state of things bordering upon anarchy.

Having retired to my castle of Eisenstadt, situated only two miles from the frontiers, calculating thus on my personal freedom, I found myself, the very day after the battle of Schwechat, surrounded and watched by a set of spies, and a turbulent body of armed peasants called "Landsturm," and thus prevented from leaving the place without endangering the safety of my family. It was at that time confidentially stated to me that I should be transported by violent means into the interior of the country upon the least attempt to leave my residence. This was the way in which the principle of personal liberty and independence was practically carried out.

At last, in December, the imperial troops relieved me from so painful a position.

To sum up: I feel it to be a duty toward my sovereign, my country, and myself, to point out the difference which exists between the period of fruitless efforts, made by upright and honorable men, to stop the revolutionary torrent, and to reconcile the constitutional changes introduced into our ancient Hungarian Constitution with the fundamental principle of the Pragmatic Sanction, and that period during which the extreme party succeeded in exercising an exclusive and pernicious influence over the country.

Whatever faults may have been committed in the course of events so momentous, whatever may be the opinions entertained and the judgment passed on that head, of one thing you may rest assured, and take my word for it, that if the sympathies of the revolutionary and subversive party can not assuredly be denied to its Hungarian leader, he is by no means entitled to the sympathy of the friends of order and of real constitutional liberty, for of these he had undermined the basis in Hungary by inflaming the public mind instead of promoting that gradual progress, the country would else undoubtedly have made the improvements in its moral and material interests which it stands so much in need of.

P. ESTERHAZY.

Vienna, Nov. 13, 1851.

Casimir Batthiányi on Kossuth and the Fall of Hungary.

The following communication from Casimir Batthiányi, in comment upon the preceding, appeared in the London Times of the 30th ult.

Sir,—In *The Times* of the 1st of December appeared a letter from Prince Paul Esterhazy, and shortly afterward an answer, or, rather, echo to it, which has only the relative importance to myself of having the name of Batthiányi appended to it. The Batthiányi family is, as you are probably aware, a not less numerous one than the Esterhazy and several other Hungarian families. No member of these families has an exclusive right to the family name; but, for the sake of distinction, it is customary for each member to place his Christian name to his signature, or at least such distinctive name or title as he alone has a right to claim. Having been literally assailed by questions on the subject, I beg leave, in order to prevent all further mistakes, to declare, once for all, that I am not the writer of that letter; and in making this declaration, I trust that your sense of justice will induce you to find space in your columns for some further observations which I should wish to make, not on the letter in question, but on that of Prince Esterhazy.

The prince's letter, clouded as it is in a sort of diplomatic halo, seems more adapted to involve the events of the Hungarian Revolution in obscurity than to throw any light on "the strange confusion of ideas" of which the prince complains, and which certainly do prevail. Although it presents a clear view of the feelings and impressions under which the prince entered the Hungarian ministry, and remained in it up to its dissolution, we look in vain in it for a clew to the motives which, consistently with the high character of a statesman, induced the prince to enter a ministry from the majority of whose members he differed so materially, as he himself admits, both in opinions and principles. What could have been his object in coalescing with men "the value of whose influence was in reverse proportion to the value of their principles?" For what purpose could he have associated himself with men for whom he entertained so little consideration? How are we to understand his meaning when he informs us that his principal motive for doing so was not owing to any sympathy he felt for those men, or any political or social connection he had with them, but to the "reiterated solicitations" of other men "whose loyalty and devotedness to the reigning dynasty were above all doubt?" How, under such circumstances, could he hope to counteract the policy of those who had such "a preponderating influence over public opinion in Hungary?" What result could he have anticipated from such a delicate and important mission, when he disagreed with and stood aloof from his fellow-ministers? Was it fair to intrude into the secrets of a council that trusted to his honor and discretion when he did not mean to identify himself with its policy? What would you say in England of a statesman who entered a ministry under such conditions,

and with the express design of following a totally different policy from his colleagues? What would you say of the member of an administration who, years after the death of its chief—in whose general policy he must, ostensibly at least, in accepting his offer of a seat in the cabinet, have acquiesced—should apologize for the share he had taken in that administration, and whitewash himself before another party in office by alleging that he had remained inactive, or steered a different course than his colleagues, slandering, at the same time, the memory of one who rests in his grave, accusing of misdemeanors and want of loyalty one whose voice can no longer indignantly repel such aspersions?

It was not thus that the late Count Louis Batthiányi acted when he asked Prince Esterhazy to enter the administration of which he was the head. It was owing to his high station—to the respect in which his character, though but little known in Hungary at that period, was generally held—to his long diplomatic career, which it was supposed had afforded him the best opportunities of studying constitutional life in all its intricacies and in its most perfect state of development, that Prince Esterhazy was deemed peculiarly adapted for the important but delicate mission of the minister of the Hungarian crown, who had to remain near the person of the sovereign, and thus form the link between the Hungarian and Austrian governments; and on whom, therefore, chiefly devolved the task of maintaining the rights of the nation, of smoothing any difficulties that might arise, and of maintaining, in conformity with the Pragmatic Sanction, the connection between Hungary and the Austrian hereditary states.

The principal motives, however, that induced Louis Batthiányi to select such men as Prince Esterhazy for his colleagues, were precisely those put forward by the prince himself, viz.: 1st. The firm determination of “maintaining the Hungarian crown on the head of the Emperor Ferdinand, as well as the laws which had received the royal sanction.” 2d. The conviction that the formation of a Hungarian ministry “was not the most prejudicial step for supporting monarchical interests and the principle of the union, because the absolute maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction was thus formally confirmed;” and, 3d. The impression that “the concessions already obtained from the emperor in a legal form,” whatever may have been the “pressure” under which they were obtained, should be regarded “as the final term, but not as the starting-point for renewed agitation.”

In following up these very principles, Louis Batthiányi called into his administration not only Prince Esterhazy, but Count Stephen Széchenyi, and other equally enlightened, patriotic, and honorable men, whom the prince slurs over in his letter, but who have acquired a well-merited reputation in their own country, either as practical statesmen, equally distinguished for firmness of principle and for wisdom and moderation in their views, like Mr. Francis Deaki; or as men of highly-cultivated minds and profound knowledge, like Baron Joseph Eötvös and Mr. Bartholomew Szemere; or as independent men and brilliant orators, with liberal, though moderate tendencies, like Mr. Gabriel Klauzal; or, finally, as the representatives of military honor and bravery, like General Meszaros. Their combined influence secured a large majority in the Diet, as well as in the municipal corporations throughout the country, and this influence was entirely and exclusively exercised in the maintenance of the *status quo*, that would unquestionably have settled down into a permanent order of things had it not been for the events that intervened. I am not going to recapitulate these events. They are historical facts which can not be denied. Suffice it to say, 1st. That the financial regulations, and those concerning the army, to which the prince alludes, were clearly designated by the acts of the Diet of 1847–8, as belonging exclusively to

the functions of the Hungarian government; 2d. That Kossuth was appointed Hungarian Minister of Finance with the express consent of his majesty; and, 3d. That the Hungarian troops were placed by a royal decree under the orders of the Hungarian Minister of War, who was empowered to administer to them the oath on the Constitution. It was no wonder, therefore, that "the troops levied and the money raised" were "applied exclusively to Hungarian purposes," at a period, too, when rebellion had broken out, which, supported as it was by a power at first unknown and scarcely suspected, but soon divined and fully unmasked, threatened to engulf the country and sweep away its Constitution, which, old and time-honored in its origin and practice, had, in the opinion of all honest men, been invigorated by the recent reforms. And it was this reformed Constitution that had been guaranteed by the oath of the king—a king who was no longer under the trammels of an insurgent mob at Vienna, but who had repaired a month afterward, of his own free will, to his good city of Pressburg, where he was surrounded by a loyal nation full of gratitude and reverence for the throne.

The statement of Hungarian troops and money being reserved exclusively for Hungarian purposes is not, moreover, strictly correct. The grant of troops for Italy was made conditionally, it is true, because Hungary had then no troops to spare; but was made with the view of keeping up the integrity of the Austrian empire, according to the spirit of the Pragmatic Sanction, and, at the same time, of conferring the blessing of constitutional liberty on the Italian subjects of his majesty, and thus consolidating the empire upon the only principle that could thenceforward secure its existence—that of a confederation of autonomic states.

This grant, which has lately been the subject of discussion in the English press, is the best proof of the loyal policy of Louis Batthiányi's ministry, as well as of the conciliatory spirit that pervaded the majority of the Diet. And this same policy was pursued by Louis Batthiányi until the last moment, notwithstanding all the disappointments and deceptions he was doomed to experience. To this policy he sacrificed even his popularity; and while he spurned on one hand the threats of the inconstant masses, and on the other braved death itself in the consciousness of his integrity and patriotism, he was subjected to the taunts of detractors during his life, was executed by those he had faithfully served, and now disavowed after his death, and mixed up with the scum of unprincipled demagogues and political *condottieri*, by one of those whom he had selected to stand honorably by his side, and aid him in his efforts to save the crown and extricate the Austrian empire from the abyss into which it had been plunged by the temporizing and wavering policy which this government had so long pursued. And Louis Batthiányi followed this policy until the atrocious murder of Count Lamberg. This foul deed so disgusted him, that he went to Vienna and resigned his office into the hands of his majesty, showing thereby his disapprobation of popular justice exercised in a summary manner, as well as his dissent from a measure which, whatever may be its ultimate result, was illegal both in its form and its principle.

How Prince Esterhazy during this interval fulfilled the duties he had assumed, what part he acted, what share he took in furthering the patriotic endeavors of the premier, in what direction he used his authority and influence, are facts which probably lie concealed in his letter. Hungary knows very little of his doings. Neither does he give us himself the least information on this point, nor offer any explanation of the principal, and the only special accusation which he brings against the prime minister, under whom he consented to take office, and to remain in office long after the fact alluded to was accomplished. The accusa-

tion is, that Louis Batthiányi published the decree of the emperor, by which the Ban of Croatia was deprived, as a traitor, of all honors, titles, and dignities before a certain eventuality took place; whereas, according to the prince, a solemn agreement was entered into, at a conference at Innspruck, that the decree should not be published until this eventuality had actually occurred. Strange as this story sounds, and trifling as the circumstance is in itself, even on the supposition that Louis Batthiányi had, in the interest of his own country, taken such a liberty toward a set of men whose influence predominated at court, and who had already, in several instances, shown their want of good faith, and had moreover constantly exercised a direct, and therefore illegal influence on the internal affairs of Hungary; still, in order to give it the least semblance of truth, the public had a right to expect that his highness would have shown what the eventuality alluded to really was. Then, and then only, would the public have been able to form a correct judgment respecting the statement, and to examine whether the eventuality had not actually taken place, or whether the Hungarian premier had not also, on his part, laid down certain conditions before he consented to receive the royal decree—such as, for instance, the quiet removal of the Ban, or a severe rebuke from the king, with a peremptory order to desist from his military preparations. What is certain, is the historical fact of the brilliant reception which the Ban met with immediately afterward, and before Louis Batthiányi could have ever had time to publish the document at that same court of Innspruck, whither he had been summoned to appear *ad audiendum verbum regium*. It is also certain, that at the same time as this decree was drawn up, manifestoes were addressed by the emperor to the Croatsians themselves, warning them not to suffer themselves to be led astray by the maneuvers of the Ban, but to adhere steadily to the Hungarian ministry.

That the Ban, in despite of these proceedings, continued his preparations, and soon invaded Hungary in the name of the emperor, and that, at the very moment he was doing so, the decree in question was not only revoked, but fresh honors showered on him; that he was successively made lieutenant field-marshal, commander-in-chief of all the forces in Hungary, and royal plenipotentiary commissary, are so many proofs that Louis Batthiányi regarded the king's word and signature as sacred and irrevocable, and acted in conformity with this conviction, while the counselors of his majesty at Vienna and Innspruck did not scruple to compromise the dignity of the sovereign, by persuading his majesty to affix his signature first to one document, and then to another of a totally opposite tendency. The whole transaction was, in fact, a trick practiced on the good nature and faith of Louis Batthiányi and the Hungarian nation, in order that the nation might be lulled into a fatal security, and the way smoothed for the Ban, that he might be enabled quietly to proceed to Pesth, and there place himself in possession of power and full executive authority. Is not such a proceeding in itself sufficient to justify—nay, even command such an indiscretion on the part of Louis Batthiányi as is here imputed to him? There is, moreover, one circumstance that must always be borne in mind when these events are made the subject of discussion, which is, that this proceeding, as well as every other of the same kind, was not taken, and could not have been taken by Louis Batthiányi, without the consent and authorization of his imperial highness the Archduke Stephen, the Palatine and vicegerent of the kingdom. It will thus appear that the decree in question was published, and sent in the name of the Palatine to all the authorities under his jurisdiction. It was the same in respect to the indictment issued against the Ban, in virtue of the royal decree, and to the commission by which General Wrabowsky and two royal attorneys were empowered to institute legal proceed-

ings against the Ban, if he persisted in his refusal to obey the royal commands. All these documents I repeat, were issued in the name of, and signed by the Palatine.

It can not be denied that there was a faction in the country, and even in the Diet, that was daily increasing in numbers, and that Kossuth was weak enough to countenance, whose object was to keep up a perpetual agitation, not for the purposes of maintaining the laws and liberties of the country, but with the view of hurrying the country into revolution. This faction was kept down by Louis Batthiányi so long as he was able to maintain his position. If, without getting precisely the upper hand, this faction finally succeeded in spreading terror in the ranks of all other parties, and forcing the country into extreme measures, it was merely because it was enabled to gain a firm footing through the policy pursued by the Austrian ministers. The urgent necessity of placing Hungary in a state of defense against the machination of the Austrian cabinet served as a good pretext to cloak the real designs of the faction. The tortuous policy pursued toward Hungary from the very beginning, and the strange spectacle of his majesty's Hungarian and Austrian troops fighting on both sides during the Servian insurrection and the Croatian inroad, first shook the confidence which the nation had so long placed in the throne, and eventually forced the Batthiányi ministry to resign. The manifesto of the Austrian ministers against the Hungarian Constitution; the rehabilitation of the Ban; the manifestoes of September, October, and December, by which the Diet was dissolved, the Constitution destroyed, and the country placed under martial law; the abdication of Ferdinand, and the assumption of the crown of Hungary by the Emperor Francis Joseph, in contempt of legal forms, and the compact by which all his predecessors had ascended the Hungarian throne, which stood open to him in a legal way, if he had chosen to avail himself of it; and, finally, the dogged and stubborn refusals of Prince Windischgrätz to listen to any compromise with "rebels"—all these circumstances combined drove the nation to have recourse to arms, and to rely exclusively on its own resources. The Austrian Constitution of March the 4th, 1849, by which the political existence of Hungary was blotted out, and Hungary treated as a mere province of the Austrian empire, gave the strongest hold to that insatiate party, and served as a welcome argument for breaking the ties that attached Hungary to the Habsburg dynasty. The blind and unscrupulous policy of the faction that had seized the reins of government in Austria soon made the most moderate men in Hungary regret that the defense of the country had been so long neglected, and obliged even those (and they formed a majority in the country) who were averse to the extreme measure of the deposition of the Habsburg dynasty and the declaration of complete independence, to acquiesce in this measure, when it was accomplished, rather than to withdraw from the service of the country.

And in asserting that, with the exception of a contemptible faction, it was, at the commencement, the loyal intention of every one in Hungary to maintain the union with Austria, I do not—whatever he may have done since—exclude Kossuth himself.

The very versatility of his mind and temper, which makes him embrace every novelty with so much ardor and such sanguine expectations, is the best proof that, although stamped by nature for an agitator, he was honest and sincere in this respect, and would have remained so had Austria kept her side of the bargain. Besides, what could have induced any man of common sense in Hungary, at that period, to overstep the bounds of constitutional legality, the attainment of which had been the constant aim of so many Diets, and which was for the first

time fully sanctioned and supported by guarantees by which, it was fondly hoped, would render such a desirable state permanent; at a time, too, when he who had provoked a struggle would have been left alone, because the country had every thing to lose and nothing to gain by it? Yes, I repeat, Kossuth himself was sincerely desirous of keeping up the connection with Austria on the terms that had been agreed to. But when the underhand practices that had been constantly carried on could no longer be concealed; when unexpected blows were dealt in the dark, with the intention of wearing Hungary out, and exhausting her strength and patience in fruitless struggles, then it was that Kossuth's impetuous and restless temper, and the inherent weakness of his character and laxity of principle, predominated over his better feelings. Ambition, and a hankering after notoriety, and the suppleness with which he always yielded the most pressing and least scrupulous, placed him first in contradiction with himself, and then involved him—and it may be said, also, the other ministers—in an inconsistent policy, and finally led him to the self-willed and arbitrary measures which accelerated the fall of the Batthiányi ministry. It is unnecessary to charge a man with more failings and follies than he has been guilty of. Kossuth has already enough to answer for before the tribunal of public opinion respecting his political conduct, which was unquestionably the main cause of the ruin and downfall of his country.

Deficient in the knowledge of men and things, in the steadfast bearing, cool judgment, and comprehensive mind of a statesman, and without the firm hand of a ruler; setting at naught all sound calculation, while he played a game of chance, and staked the fate of the nation on the cast of a die; encountering danger with hair-brained temerity when distant, but shrinking from it when near; elated and overbearing in prosperity, but utterly prostrate in adversity; wanting that strength and intrepidity of character that alone commands homage and obedience from others, while he suffered himself to be made the tool of every intriguer he came in connection with; mistaking his manifold accomplishments and natural genius for an aptitude to govern a country in times of trouble; and setting, in the flights of fancy, no bounds to the scope of his ambition, Kossuth hurried away the nation into a course of the most impolitic measures, and grasped the highest power in the realm by dubious means; but, when scarcely in possession of it, suffered it to be wrested from his hands by the man whom he had himself most injudiciously raised to a high station, and against whom, although he had received repeated warnings, as well as proofs of his treachery and worthlessness, he never dared openly and boldly to proceed; by the man whom he had hoped to ensnare, while he crouched beneath him in abject fear, but by whom he was finally outwitted.

The generous sympathy of the English nation can not be quashed by being told that Austria was the benefactor of Hungary, while the Hungarian Diet was a factious assembly, and the majority of the Hungarian ministers a set of rebels. In doing honor to Kossuth, the English people have shown their sympathy for the cause of an unfortunate country that has been bereaved of its chartered rights and liberties; and in fomenting this sympathy, Kossuth has been obliged to pay a tribute to the feelings of legality that animates even the humblest classes in England, by eschewing in his speeches the demagogical rant in which he had indulged only a week before at Marseilles. The applause of the English people was not given to the revolutionary character of the man, but to the able manner in which he brought the grievances of his country before them. Several unprejudiced and impartial English journals have already begun to inquire how far Kossuth has a right to the distinction that has been accorded to him, and the *Examiner*, in par-

ticular has cast a sharp glance on his past career, and on the presumption with which he launches into his new one. It is not, however, for the English people to settle his right as to the position he is to hold among his own countrymen. The right belongs exclusively to the latter, and not to those who are scattered over the world in exile, but to those in whom reposes the will of the nation at home.

Meanwhile, my own decided opinion on the subject is this, that Kossuth has not the least right to set himself up as the sole and exclusive representative of his country—not the least right to reassume the title of governor and the functions of dictator, as he does in his address from Brussa to the citizens of the United States; and that it is a most unwarrantable, as well as most illogical, proceeding on his part, to contend, as he does in the same document, that the Hungarian nation could not legally enter into any engagement, or adopt any measure that would be incompatible with the act by which he was raised to the dignity of governor; it being obvious, even if he had not resigned this dignity, that when the nation was reconstituted on its former constitutional basis, its legal representatives in Diet assembled would have the right to act in whatever way they might deem the most conducive to the welfare of the country. I am also of opinion that, so far from following a sound policy in wishing, as he does, to remodel the reformed Constitution of 1848, and ingraft on it principles of republicanism and unleavened democracy—principles which are at variance with our national laws and institutions, as well as with the manners, customs, and genius of the people—he would have acted more wisely, and rendered a more essential service to his country, if, after his liberation from the thralldom of detention, he had appeared before the world in the simple character of a private individual. The conspicuous part which he took in the affairs of his country, and his subsequent misfortunes, would have secured him general respect, while the modesty of his demeanor, by effacing from the minds of his countrymen the recollection of the faults and errors he committed, and through which Hungary has been brought to her present state of misery and servitude, would have given him a precedence by courtesy among his companions in exile, and placed him in a position to receive that useful advice and assistance which they would have gladly offered him, for the purpose of hereafter repairing by a course of sound and moderate policy the injuries inflicted on the land of their birth. But instead of acting in this manner, he has set himself up as the dictator of his countrymen. It is, therefore, the sacred duty of those who, although far from wishing to fetter his activity, are not disposed to admit his claims, publicly to protest against his proceedings. Without dwelling any longer on the weighty motives for caution which may be deduced from his past career, I will merely observe that his pretension to be still regarded as governor is the more barefaced from the circumstances attending his resignation. The circumstances are these: He was summoned by Görgey and three members of the ministry to resign. He instantly complied, and resigned the governorship without convening the Council of State, that he was bound by law to consult on every important occasion. He resigned without intimating his intention of doing so to the three other ministers (of which I was one), and who were, consequently, quite unaware of the fact. He did not resign his authority into the hands of the ministers, as under such circumstances he was bound to do, but into the hands of Görgey. He even invested Görgey with a power and authority with which he had not been invested himself, viz., the dictatorship. He delegated a power which he only held himself personally, and, in fact, provisionally, by a direct mandate of the Diet. He resigned in the name of the ministry, which he had no right whatever to do.

Although it may be safely affirmed that he was in a state of moral and physical coercion when he gave in his resignation, it must be borne in mind that he voluntarily confirmed this act when he was free from all restraint, and could never be persuaded to reassume his abandoned power, neither at Lugos, in the midst of General Bem's army, nor subsequently at Mehadia, when Bem urgently requested him to do so, and try the last chance that remained of success, to which request he again returned a negative answer in writing. By thus acting, he abandoned Hungary to her fate, and exposed all those who had taken a part in the war to the vengeance of Austria. He confirmed his avowed intention of retiring into private life, by crossing the frontier and entering the Turkish dominions before the capitulation of Vilagos could possibly be known to him, and while there were still fortresses and armies in Hungary by which the national cause could have been sustained. In his letter of refusal to General Bem, he in fact suggested the expediency of calling together some eminent men in order to form a Provisional Government. On his arrival at Widdin, he again publicly declared (in a letter since published) his resolution of retiring into private life—a resolution which for a short time he acted upon.

Leaving the public to judge how far those facts are reconcilable with his present pretensions, I have the honor to remain your obedient, humble servant.

COUNT CASIMIR BATTHIANYI.

Paris, Hôtel de Ville, Place Ville l'Evêque, Dec. 10.

Letter of Count Casimir Batthiányi to the Editors of the Allgemeine Zeitung.

Respected Editors,—I have read, in a number of the Allgemeine Zeitung, an article signed by M. M. Vukovics and Horvath, concerning the act of abdication of Louis Kossuth, late Governor of Hungary, which had originally appeared in the Cologne Gazette. Against the truth of that article I have nothing to say in general; although, to avoid any misconstruction, I deem it necessary to make some remarks concerning myself. I must observe, in the first place, that, even according to the statements of both those gentlemen in the last Ministerial Council, there was no question about the dissolution of the government. Görgey merely received the commission to treat with Russia on the conditions that the legal autonomy of Hungary be maintained, and a general amnesty be granted.

At Arad, also, the government was threatened on all sides by enemies; not only by external, but even more by internal ones. There was no possibility of its existing then. But no cabinet meeting had been appointed in advance, and it was scarcely necessary to do so, as the posts of the ministers were properly at the side of the governor. It was by accident that I heard of a meeting of a Ministerial Council. While I was about to go to Csanyi's dwelling, in order to satisfy myself of the truth of the information, the council, or, rather, a private conference of ministers (for no summons had come either from the governor or from the president of the ministry) had already terminated. I met M. Vukovics under the gate, who told me what had taken place as an accomplished fact. Both the above-mentioned gentlemen (Vukovics and Horvath) venture to apply to me the maxim *qui tacet consentire videtur*, since I then made no strenuous objection to the steps that had been taken. One reason of my not doing this is, that I considered that step as being merely personal in reference to the ministers who signed it. In the second place, my objections would not have availed effectively, in being made in the street, in a private conversation. Thirdly, I wished to hasten home, feeling fully convinced that I would be probably called by the governor to a regular Ministerial Council without delay, as he could not properly effectuate, either for himself

or for the government, the act of abdication without the assent of the members of the government

When I at last learned that the governor was no more in the fortress, and that he had probably already departed, I repaired, in company with Szemere, chairman of the ministry, to Lugos. We found the governor at Radna, where he showed us the document, signed by the three ministers. To our inquiry as to his reply to them, he answered us, "Well, I said they might have their will;" without, however, reading to us his written answer to them.

After reaching Lugos, we learned that General Bem cared so little about the fracture of his shoulder that he had gone to Arad, where the troops, scattered near Temesvar, were reassembling, and amounted already to the number of thirty thousand men.

Had I been present, even accidentally, in the conference held at Csanyi's house, I should in no case have signed that document addressed to the governor by the three ministers, as I had then already the full conviction of Görgey's being at heart a traitor; but I had still a hope that he would save his army, if nothing else. Moreover, Görgey was at this time all-powerful at Arad. Wherefore the propriety of increasing his power? At Lugos I imparted to Governor Kossuth my views of the irregularity and invalidity of his act of abdication, and I sought to induce him to await the return of General Bem, which was expected every moment. I had not the least doubt of his (General Bem's) intention to break through into Transylvania, in order to maintain himself there. When General Bem returned, Governor Kossuth had already fled to Turkey, and refused to return, though the general dispatched a request to him to do so.

On the flight of the governor becoming known, the army of Bem dissolved itself. He himself was forced to fly over the Transylvanian mountains and through Wallachia to Widdin, where I arrived about the same time, with several thousand of the troops, which had held the passes of Mehadia, Aravitza, and Arsova, as long as it was possible to do so, and who left those positions only when they saw there was no doubt our cause was utterly lost.

In requesting the respected editors to give a kind insertion in their paper, I sign myself, respectfully,

COUNT CASIMIR BATTHIANYI,
Late Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary.

Kuttahia, April 27, 1850.

Letter from B. Szemere to Messrs. Vucovics and Horvath.

I have heretofore but said what I did not do, namely, that I took no part in the surrender of the dictatorship to Görgey, and given my motives for my course. You, not being able to deny your signatures, and feeling yourselves touched by the disclosure of my motives, ought to have given the grounds for your action. The question stood simply historical, and not personal. You, however, instead of stating the motives for your action, deemed it better to make me a partaker in it, which of course could not be accomplished. Not being able on such basis to argue from facts, you used mere suspicions against me. This I have not done toward you, and never shall do. Read attentively my article of the 24th of March, and you will not find in it one word casting suspicion merely upon you. It was written with that feeling excited by the unexpected and unjust attack upon me, and which I had a right to repel without making unnecessary accusation. And behold there appears your second reply in Nos. 117 and 118 of the Cologne Gazette of this year, in which I find trifling word-pickings and lawyer-like special pleading, instead of the views of statesmen, who look to what is im-

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portant and general. I see in it a dark ground on which you have embroidered offensive allusions and phrases of suspicion. Frankly, I must say that I regret having given you an opportunity for writing that offensive article. I had a higher conception of your love of justice and impartiality; and it is probable that I am not the only person who has been deceived. I will not follow you into that field of petty and trifling lawyer-like word-fencing, nor am I inclined to imitate your arrow shooting of suspicions. Nay, your conduct in writing that reply will not even influence my judgment as to your former political course. Your mode of treating me can not release me from the obligation I owe to truth. Nor do I desire to prolong this contest, which, by this trifling imparted to it by your reply, has become unpalatable to the public. I regret that you have not endeavored to clear up the chief point, *i. e.*, to point out the motives for the surrender of the dictatorship; for, though you always believed Görgey to be disposed to treachery, I will not doubt that you might assign plausible motives for your conduct. Nay, I will express myself more explicitly, and say that I do not think that those three ministers said to have agreed to it (out of the seven comprising the ministry) were guilty of having originated the proposal, but that the governor of the country (Kossuth) was the guilty one, and who, without asking the concurrence of those three, though they were present, gave the decision. Gentlemen, he who loves the fatherland more than persons can not now or ever justify that conduct. How strange is man! While we were yet fighting the battles of freedom in the fatherland, many of us thought our cause was badly conducted, and that we should perish. But it was urged, union is paramount—let there be no discord, and we were consequently silent. Now in exile, it would be well to clear up fully the Hungarian question, not so much for the sake of the past as for the sake of the present, and still more for the future. It is a vital question to ascertain the errors of the past, but yet it is now urged that particular individuals and certain errors, though these errors can be proved to have been fatal, should be spared. As for me, I say, “the country, liberty, and the future before all.” Nations need not hereafter certain names—that time is passed by. What patriot in this era clings to any name but the holy name of liberty? He who does is an idol worshiper. I do not belong to that class. BARTH. SZEMERE.

Paris, May 21, 1850.

The Public Letter of M. Szemere.

Mr. Editor,—In the number of the 20th of December, 1851, of your journal, *The Semi-weekly Courier and New York Enquirer*, in its morning edition, an article is inserted, with the heading “Governor Kossuth.” In it is embodied the authentic act of abdication of the government by Kossuth, and among the names of the subscribers thereto, I find also my own.

I did indeed, take part in the business of the war, which we were compelled to wage, for our constitutional liberty and independence, against the Austrian dynasty. I have, indeed, participated in that holy war, but, in so doing, I only fulfilled my duties as a citizen and man, and consequently I have done nothing which could entitle me to lay claim to any particular glory; yet, on the other hand, I must insist that I have done nothing which could, by any means, bring shame upon me, or soil a clear conscience.

I feel myself therefore constrained, for the sake of truth, for my own honor and political character, to make the following declarations:

1. That I never subscribed that act of abdication.
2. That I never saw the same.

3. That neither my sense of duty as a citizen nor as a patriot would ever have allowed me to put my signature to that act, had I ever seen it, or had its existence ever been made known to me, which never was the fact.

Since it is undoubtedly the fact, that Mr. Kossuth neither was, nor could have been compelled to that abdication by any moral or physical force whatever, and, as besides Mr. Kossuth himself had for weeks, or even months before, spoken of General Görgey as a traitor, I can not see how his abdication and transfer of the supreme power into the hands of a traitor, can be consistent with his so-much-praised heroism and love of country. In war and in revolutions, the hero and superior mind is manifested not by words, but by deeds. In the controversy between Kossuth and Görgey in Arad, on the 11th of August, 1849, one or the other must have sunk, and we see that neither of them appears to have been a hair the worse. Görgey caused Kossuth to be *requested* to abdicate, and Kossuth *hastened* to do it, and immediately thereafter *fled across the Turkish boundary*.

It is important to remark here, that at this moment there were still in the hands of the nation *four* fortresses, and two of these the strongest in the whole country, namely, Komorn and Peterwardein, as well as an army of one hundred and thirty-five thousand men, and three hundred field officers. I believe that never before in the history of the world has the head of a nation turned his back on so powerful a military force.

Görgey laid down his arms only with twenty-six thousand men. The rest of the army surrendered only because they heard, not only that Mr. Kossuth had abdicated, and, by so doing, had declared the hopes of the nation as forever lost, but that he had himself fled the country, giving himself no thought for the fate of his party, his friends, the army, the fortresses, and the nation. He went over the boundaries entirely alone; he avoided carefully his friends and acquaintances, especially all those who assembled on the boundaries, in order that he might the more certainly secure his own safety.

Mr. Kossuth was chosen governor on the 14th of April, 1849, not directly by the people, but by the National Assembly, *provisionally*, and not by votes, but by acclamation, and under the condition of ruling in connection with the ministry, which was also made responsible for every thing.

It is true that Mr. Kossuth could resign his office. In this case, if the National Assembly were in session, new dispositions of authority could have been made; in the absence of the Assembly, the government must of necessity remain in the hands of the ministers.

It is not necessary to remark that the nation had the sovereign right to delegate executive power, but that the person to whom the same had been delegated could never transfer his right to a third party.

Mr. Kossuth, however, on the 11th of August, 1849, in Arad, not only resigned, which he had the power to do, but not only did not assemble the ministry, which had received powers of government contemporaneously with himself, but he transferred to another the power which had been intrusted to his own person.

He did more, he appointed a dictator, which he was not himself.

Mr. Kossuth can no longer consider himself, either in law or in right, as the Governor of Hungary,

Because he *voluntarily* surrendered this power:

Because he transferred this power to another, which he had no right to do:

Because he also abdicated in the name of the whole ministry, without having previously consulted them:

Because he immediately transferred the power of the state to Görgey, a man whom he, and he more than all others, had long before considered a traitor.

Finally, because he did all this without consulting with, and without the knowledge of, that ministry, which had been appointed with him, and consequently even, so far as mere form is considered, acted contrary to the law.

It is not my intention to dissect the unfortunate and ever fluctuating policy of Mr. Kossuth; yet as I am obliged to exculpate myself from any inferences to be drawn from that act, which, nevertheless, though done *in my name*, was done *without my knowledge* and *without my consent*, it is impossible for me on this occasion not to declare, that Mr. Kossuth has no claim, either in law or of right, to the character of Governor of Hungary. *Not in law*, because he so hastily surrendered the office, without even observing the legal forms; *not of right*, because, while on the 14th of April, 1849, when our troops were every where victorious, we saw him stand forward as governor, yet afterward, on the 11th of August, 1849, when we were suffering continual defeat, we saw him hastily and precipitately free himself from the same office; that is to say, in the day of victory and glory he accepted the office; in the day of danger, *he surrendered it* to the first who demanded it of him.

And now he steps forward, weakly and unconsciously forgetting all this, before the world as the Governor of Hungary, and as the dictator among his fellow-exiles, demanding from us unconditional obedience, and asks a second time for a power for which he showed himself before partly incapable, and part of which he misused.

However much I pity the political want of conscience shown in his public character, however much we may rejoice, if he should succeed by his rhetorical agitation to obtain money and sympathy for the cause of Hungary, in order that he may in some measure restore what he has injured by his uncalculating, feverish, vacillating, unprincipled policy; yet, on the other hand, every sensible-minded Hungarian must be convinced, that to recognize Mr. Kossuth as governor, or, as he earnestly claims to be acknowledged, the absolute dictator, would be equivalent to devoting the cause of Hungary for a second time to a severe downfall. We welcome him, therefore, to our ranks, only as a single gifted patriot, perhaps even the first among his equals; but as governor we can not acknowledge him, we who know his past career, and we value divine liberty and our beloved fatherland above every personal consideration.

While I respectfully request you, Mr. Editor, to receive these lines, I take, at the same time, the liberty to make the following remarks: Criticise, examine, condemn, as much as you will, the actions of those persons who have appeared in the late Hungarian War of Independence, we deserve it all; each of us has more or less been wanting; only touch not with contemptuous hand the cause itself, for that cause was, at least, as pure and holy as the war of the American Revolution; in a word, we were the defenders of right and law against the efforts of faithlessness and anarchy; we were the heroes, the apostles, the martyrs of freedom under the persecutions of tyranny. Consider Mr. Kossuth as a rhetorical advocate of the Hungarian cause; he may be its pleader, he never was its *hero*, because at the *first* approach of danger he was the *first* to shrink. In forming an opinion upon his career and his political character, this is all the more important and decisive test, since he (who is beyond all doubt a man the most avaricious of glory that ever lived) always, in every way, by every possible means, endeavored to concentrate confidence in his own person; and hence it was natural enough, that by his weakness in the day of danger the cause of the nation fell with him.

The people, however, remained steadfast, while he had become a fugitive, and, with his crossing the boundaries of Hungary, he filled no longer that high place to which the confidence of a brave people had elevated him.

BARTHOLOMÆUS SZEMERE,

Formerly President of the Hungarian Ministerial Council.

Paris, 4th Jan., 1852, No. 12 Rue Boursault.

Letter of S. Vucovics, late Minister of Justice of Hungary.

Sir,—In *The Times* of December 30, 1851, appeared a letter from Count Casimir Batthiányi, which met, I do not doubt, with the unanimous approbation of our countrymen in that part of it which vindicates the first Hungarian ministry, and more particularly that immortal patriot, Count Louis Batthiányi, against the unpatriotic and groundless aspersions of Prince Esterhazy. The noble count, however, in the latter part of his letter, turns suddenly to another subject, and undertakes to discuss some principles and events of our Revolution in a manner which has placed him in direct antagonism to the advocates of the cause of Hungary. I must confess that it is with great regret that I feel myself compelled to combat the assertions of a man who, by his patriotism, his intelligence, and his great sacrifices on the altar of his native country, has taken so distinguished a place in our ranks.

It is true that, after the close of the Diet of 1847–8, and after the royal sanction given to the reforms carried by it, the whole country, with scarcely the exception of a small faction, was sincerely attached to the maintenance of the union with the house of Austria. This circumstance is of paramount importance, because Hungary, with its constitutional and independent ministries of war and finance, was then thoroughly in a condition in a short time to have created a power sufficient to cope with, and even to overturn the house of Austria, shackled as it then was by the critical state of Vienna and Italy. The nation, however, held to the unhappy delusion that the lately sworn oath of the king was taken in good faith. The more, therefore, I agree with the noble count as to the prevailing sentiment and opinion of the country at the close of the Diet on the 11th of April, 1848, the more decidedly must I combat his assertions that the nation, after so many clandestine and open attacks of the court on the ancient Constitution, and even after the imposition of the Austrian Constitution of the 4th of March, 1849, which annihilated the autonomy and independence of Hungary, felt compelled to have an ultimate recourse to the force of arms; but, nevertheless, remained permanently averse to a deposition of the dynasty, and that it accepted the resolution of the Diet to that effect—stated to have been carried by a minority—merely as a *fait accompli*.

I shall disprove this assertion by a simple narrative of those events which widened the chasm between the people and the dynasty.

So early as the commencement of the Serbian insurrection, the popular suspicion gained ground that the insurrection had been stirred up by the secret intrigues of the court, and confidence in the truth and good faith of the king disappeared accordingly. The nation, however, still indulged the hope that a weak king, though betrayed into ambiguous proceedings, would not permit himself to be carried away into a flagrant breach of the Constitution. This was the time when the king, in the opinion of the people, was kept distinct from the Camarilla. But when the Austrian ministry openly attempted to deprive Hungary of its ministries of war and finance, when the base game of the degradation and restoration of Jellacic was played, and when the Hungarian army, fighting in the name of the

king against the insurrections of the Servians and Croats, became aware that the balls of that same king thinned their ranks from the hostile camp, the nation arrived at the universal conviction that the Habsburg dynasty were only pursuing their old absolute tendencies, and that they wanted to force Hungary into self-defense, in order, under the pretext of rebellion, to deprive it of all its constitutional rights and guarantees. It needs no proof that a loud indignation and even hatred of the dynasty spread far and wide in the country in consequence of these intrigues and proceedings. In spite of this natural excitement, and of the war itself carried on by the nation with an increasing enthusiasm of hatred of the house of Austria, no party in the country urged a declaration of *déchéance* or forfeiture against the dynasty. Even all the faithless acts recorded in the letter of Count Casimir Batthiányi, and the cruelties committed in the name of that court in Lower Hungary and Transylvania, did not turn the scales in this direction. The Pragmatic Sanction was still considered as good in law; and the many precedents of our history, when the nation and its kings went to war with each other, and ultimately settled their disputes by solemn pacts confirming the Constitution of the land, conveyed the notion that a reconciliation was even then not impossible.

Without these precedents and reminiscences of history, and only guided by the universal feeling of the country against the dynasty, the Hungarian Parliament would have pronounced the forfeiture of the house of Austria so far back as October, 1848, when Jellacic was appointed absolute plenipotentiary of the king in Hungary, with discretionary power of life and death; or in December, 1848, when, in Olmütz, the succession to the Hungarian throne was changed and determined, without the concurrence of the nation, through the Diet. To force the nation and its Parliament to the last step in its momentous crisis, the court itself broke the dynastic tie.

This was done by the imposition of the Constitution of the 4th of March, 1849, by which the house of Austria itself annihilated the Pragmatic Sanction, treating free and independent Hungary with the arrogance of a conqueror. The nation, more irritated by this act than by any preceding event, saw that the hour was come, beyond which further to defer the dethronement of the dynasty would be alike incompatible with the laws and the honor of Hungary. All the channels of public opinion, the public press, the popular meetings, and even the headquarters of the army, resounded with emphatic declarations of the impossibility of reconciliation with the dynasty. The garrison of Komorn, the most important fortress of the country, petitioned the government for the declaration of forfeiture. Most assuredly no party maneuvers were wanted in this universal excitement, caused by the Constitution of the 4th of March, to carry a parliamentary resolution of forfeiture.

When the proposition of forfeiture was made, on the 14th of April, 1849, in the House of Representatives, only eight members voted against it, in a house never attended by less than from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and forty members. The House of Magnates adopted this resolution without opposition. The press, of all shades of opinion, though enjoying the most unlimited freedom, also declared for the resolution of the Diet. It was, moreover, received throughout the whole country with patriotic assent and determination. If there was a party opposed to the forfeiture, how came it that it did not hold it to be a duty to declare its opposition in the Diet or through the Press?

What were the views of that party? What measures would they have desired to be taken in consequence of the Constitution of the fourth of March? I find nothing to meet these questions in the letter of Count Casimir Batthiányi

Still less can the act of forfeiture be considered as the work of a party, because the so-called Madaraz party, to which, perhaps, the noble count alludes, was at that very moment vanquished, and the elected governor, in consequence, chose his ministry from the ranks of its opponents.

I must also differ from the noble count with regard to the actual legality of the act of forfeiture and Declaration of Independence of the 14th of April, 1849. I consider this act completely valid in every respect. The noble count supports his view by remarking on the subsequent transfer of power to Görgey. It is necessary, therefore, that I should narrate the whole circumstances of that event.

When the intelligence of the unfortunate battle of Temesvar reached Governor Kossuth, who was then in the fortress of Arad, he immediately summoned a council of the ministry to deliberate on measures of public safety still possible. At this council, in which all the ministers took part, it was resolved to invest Görgey, who stood alone at the head of an unconquered army, with full powers for negotiating a peace. It was, moreover, resolved to dissolve the government, which could not be carried on in any fixed place of safety under the existing circumstances. We did not, however, insert in the instrument investing Görgey with full power (and dispatched to him immediately) the abdication of the government. On the same day (it was the 11th of August, 1849), Görgey declared, in the presence of some of the ministers who had assembled at Csanyi's (who was one of them), that he could not accept the commission because the resignation of the government was not contained in it, while he was sure that the enemy would enter into no negotiations with him so long as Kossuth and his ministry were thought to be behind him. The ministers who were present, after a short deliberation, considering it to be their duty not to stand in the way of the negotiation which had been resolved on as necessary, accordingly sent their resignation to the governor, whom they requested to resign as well. The governor soon after sent his abdication for counter-signature by those members of the ministry, and accordingly the government formally dissolved itself, after having done so *de facto* in the previous council of ministers. I must mention the circumstance that in the governor's instrument of abdication conditions were prescribed by Görgey which were not inserted in the original instrument of authorization issued by the full council. These conditions were the preservation of the nationality and the autonomy of Hungary. Four ministers took part in this resignation of the governor, as above stated—Aulick, Csanyi, Horvath, and I. Two of the ministers, Szemere and Batthiányi, were absent when the formal declaration of the abdication was discussed at Csanyi's residence. I have not mentioned among the ministers our late colleague, the finance minister Dushek, because his treachery, which was afterward brought to light, excludes him from our ranks. From all these circumstances, it will be manifest how unjust the reproaches of Count Casimir Batthiányi are, that no new cabinet council was held.

It is notorious that Görgey abused the full powers with which he was intrusted, instead of procuring the preservation of Hungary by a negotiation for peace, by an ignominious treachery to his native country. From that very moment the power conferred on him by the above-mentioned instrument, and the conditional abdication of the government consequently and legally reverted to him who had invested him with it. To deny this would be to recognize, in the foreign rule which crushed Hungary in consequence of that treachery, legitimate right and lawful power.

The noble count himself answers the question why Kossuth, before crossing the Turkish frontier, did not resume power again. He states that Kossuth could not

know, before crossing the frontier, the catastrophe of Vilagos, and therefore left the country in the belief that Görgey would faithfully fulfill his commission; a belief which was the more natural because Görgey had an unconquered army under him, and almost all the fortresses at his disposition—a power more than sufficient to carry on the negotiations, and even to menace the enemy with a continuation of the war. The noble count did not take his present view of this question when, after the treachery of Görgey became known, he countersigned the order written at Widdin by Kossuth, as Governor of Hungary, to the fortress of Komorn.

I, however, perfectly agree with the noble count, that the nation, once more restored to its constitutional existence, and free from foreign yoke, will have the unlimited right to dispose of all the affairs of the country, and consequently of the executive power. To assert a contrary opinion would be a crime against the nation. Not of a liberated nation, which, of course, would have the right to choose whom it will, but of a nation crushed by a usurping power, the claims of Kossuth as elected Governor of Hungary are, I submit, lawful.

I also concur with the noble count, that Kossuth is not the exclusive representative of our native country, and of our war of liberty and independence. Hungary is historically represented by all those who took part in the constitutional and military vindication of its rights, and more especially, and side by side with the governor, by the constitutionally chosen members of the House of Representatives. I consider, however, Kossuth to be the chief representative of the interests of our native country, on account of his deeds as well as his position; but I am far, indeed, from seeing in him a dictator. A dictatorship would find in all those who, like me, hold firmly to the republican principles pronounced by him, the most determined opposition.

Republican principles have not been proclaimed at Kossuth's dictation, as the aim of our national exertions. They were, during our struggle, the well-ascertained and deep-rooted sentiment of the country, and Kossuth could only faithfully represent the proclaimed will and feeling of the nation by inscribing them on his banner. Immediately after the Declaration of Independence, all the manifestations of the national will were unanimous in the desire for a republic. The ministry, which was nominated by the governor as a consequence of that legislative act, declared in both Houses of the Diet that its efforts would be directed to the establishment of a republic. Both Houses joined in this declaration, and in the government no opposition whatever was manifested against it. One of the first acts of the new government was to remove the crown from all national escutcheons, and from the great seal of Hungary. The press, in all its shades, developed republican principles. The new semi-official paper bore the name of *The Republic*. It is true that the government was only provisional, for the war continued, and the definitive decision of this question depended on unforeseen circumstances. We should have preferred almost any settlement to the necessity of a subjection to the Austrian dynasty; and at the price of emancipation from that detested power, the nation would ever have been prepared, for the sake of aid, to choose a king from another race; but certainly, if it had been the unaided victor in the struggle, never. Monarchical government would have been for us the mere resort of expediency. The government of our wishes and principles was the republic.

I do not feel at all convinced, as the noble count asserts, that the institutions and habits of Hungary are incompatible with a democratic republic. I find, on the contrary, traits in them which lead me to an opposite conclusion. The ag-

gregate character of the numerous nobility which resigned its privileges in the Diet of 1847-48, of its own accord, and which was in its nature more a democratic than an aristocratic body, because neither territorial wealth nor rank interfered with or disturbed the equality of its rights; the national antipathy to the system of an Upper House, which was considered as a foreign institution, because it had been introduced under the Austrian dynasty; the immemorial custom of periodically electing all officials, and even the judges; the detestation in which bureaucracy and all the instruments of centralization were held in all ages, while the attachment to the municipal self-government was irradicable; the fact that, in consequence of the laws which had been sanctioned in April, 1848, the county authorities, formerly only elected from the nobility, were democratically re-constituted, and exercised their functions in this form till the catastrophe of Vilagos, without the slightest collision between the different classes of society—the peaceful election of the representatives of the last Diet, conducted almost on the principle of universal suffrage—all these facts unmistakably prove that the germ of democracy lay in our institutions, and that these could receive a democratic development without any concussion. Those characteristic traits of our nation which have been so often misrepresented as signs of an aversion to a republic, and which may be more properly called civic virtues; as, for example, our respect for law, our antipathy to untried political theories, our attachment to traditional customs, and our pride in the history of our country, are no obstacles to, but rather guarantees, and even conditions of a republic, which is to be national and enduring. It would be, indeed, an unprecedented event in history, if staunch royalism could be the characteristic of a country which, like Hungary, has found in its kings, for three hundred years, the inexorable foes of its liberties, and which in that time, for its defense, had to wage six bloody wars against its dynasty.

As to the criticisms by the noble count of the personal character of Kossuth, I take leave to assert that a great majority of the Hungarian nation do not share his opinion. It is not my task to appear as a personal advocate, and I wish, therefore, to advert only to one point of his attack, which may seem to be based on facts. The noble count asserts that Kossuth has attained to power by doubtful means. I am amazed at this assertion, knowing, as I do, that Kossuth was proposed by Count Louis Batthiányi, and nominated by the king, with the universal applause of the nation, to the Ministry of Finance. After the resignation of the first Hungarian ministry, he was freely and unanimously elected by the Diet to the presidency of the Committee of Defense, and, after the declared forfeiture of the dynasty, to the governorship of the country. I know no more honorable means by which a man can be raised to power.

I am unable to guess at the motives of the patriotic count which have prevailed on him to publish the latter part of his letter, and I must believe that its consequences will be pernicious to our common cause, if an irreconcilable division between our countrymen should be the unhappy result.

I trust, sir, that your friendly sentiments for the welfare of Hungary will prevail on you to give these lines a place in your esteemed journal, and I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

S. VUCOVICS,

Late Minister of Justice in Hungary.

London, January 17, 1852.

Note No. 35.

LIST OF THE VICTIMS UNDER THE AUSTRIAN COURT-MARTIAL, AND ACCOUNT OF THEIR EXECUTION.

Eleven Generals and two Staff-officers shot or hanged at Arad, on the 6th of October, 1849.

1. Lous Aulick.
 2. Charles, Count Leiningen-Wessenberg.
 3. Ernest Kiss, of Ellemer and Ittebe, shot.
 4. John Damjanic.
 5. Joseph Nagy-Shandor.
 6. Ignatz Török, shot.
 7. George Löhner.
 8. Charles, Count Vécsey.
 9. Charles Knezick.
 10. Ernest Pölt von Pöltenberg.
 11. Joseph Schweidel, shot.
 12. Aristides Dessewffy, shot.
 13. William Lazar.
- Colonel Kazintsky, shot a few days after.

Ministers and other Civil Officials.

Louis Batthiányi, President of the Ministry.
 Ladislaus Czanyi, Minister of Public Works.
 Baron Perenyi, late Septemvir, Lord Lieutenant and President of the Upper House.
 Prince Woroniski, } Aides-de-camps of Dembinski.
 Charles Abancourt, }
 Peter Gisoro, Commander of the German Legion.
 Emerick Szacs vay, Secretary of the Diet.
 Baron Jessenak, Government Commissioner in Upper Hungary.
 Csernys, Member of the Treasury Board.
 Fékéte, the Guerilla leader

An immense number of inferior officers were sent to fortresses to be imprisoned for life or a term of years; and about seventy thousand Hungarians, who had taken part in the combat, were forcibly enlisted in Austrian regiments.

On the 6th of October, thirteen generals and staff-officers were executed. Four of these heroic men met their end at daybreak, the commutation of their sentence to "powder and lead" exempting them from the anguish of witnessing the death of their companions in arms. Among the rest was Ernest Kiss. His brother had become insane after Görgey's treachery; his cousin had fallen, a second Leonidas, in the defense of the Rothenthurm Pass; he himself, the richest landed proprietor in the Banat, whose hospitable castle was all the year round filled with Austrian cavaliers and officers, was on the 6th of October sentenced to death by the Austrian court-martial, on which sat many of the partakers of his hospitality. His friends at Vienna had interceded to save his life, but in vain. He died a painful death: the Austrian soldiers who were ordered to carry the sentence into effect, and who for a whole year had faced the fire of the Hungarian artillery, trembled

before their defenseless victim; three separate volleys were fired before Kiss fell: his death-struggles lasted full ten minutes.

The report of the firing was heard in the castle, where those officers sentenced to be hung were preparing for death. Pöltenberg had been in a profound sleep, and startled, as he told the Austrian officer, by the first volley, he had jumped out of bed. The unhappy man had been dreaming that he was in the face of the enemy, and heard the firing of alarm signals at his outposts: it was the summons from the grave.

At six o'clock in the morning the condemned officers were led to the place of execution. Old Aulick died first; he was the most advanced in years, and the court-martial seemed thus to respect the natural privilege of age. Distinguished by his zeal and efforts in the cause of his country, more than by the success which attended them, Aulick was inferior to many of his comrades in point of talent, but in uprightness and strength of character none surpassed him.

Count Leiningen was the third in succession, and the youngest. An opportunity had been offered him, late on the preceding evening, of escaping by flight; but he would not separate his fate from that of his brother-in-law, who was a prisoner in the fortress. His youth, perhaps, inspired him with a desire of giving to his elder companions in sorrow around him an example of heroic stoicism in death; and, on reaching the place of execution, he exclaimed, with melancholy humor, "They ought at least to have treated us to a breakfast." One of the guard of soldiers compassionately handed him his wine-flask. "Thank you, my friend," said the young general; "I want no wine to give me courage; bring me a glass of water." He then wrote on his knees, with a pencil, the following farewell words to his brother-in-law:

"The shots which this morning laid my poor comrades low, still resound in my ears, and before me hangs the body of Aulick on the gallows. In this solemn moment, when I must prepare to appear before my Creator, I once more protest against the charges of Kmetty, at the taking of Buda, which an infamous slanderer has raised against me. On the contrary, I have on all occasions protected the Austrian prisoners. I commend to you my poor Liska and my two children. I die for a cause which always appeared to me just and holy. If, in happier days, my friends ever desire to avenge my death, let them reflect that humanity is the best political wisdom. As for"—Here the hangman interrupted him: it was time to die.

Török, Lahner, Pöltenberg, Nagy-Shandor, Knezick, died one after the other; Vécsey was the last. Perhaps they wished, by this nine-fold aggravation of his torment, to make him suffer for the destruction caused by his cannon at Temesvar. Damjanic preceded him. The usual dark color of his large features was heightened by rage and impatience. His view had never extended further than the glittering point of his sabre; this was the star which he had followed through life; but now he saw whither it had conducted him, and impatiently he exclaimed, when limping up to the gallows, "Why is it that I, who have always been foremost to face the enemy's fire, must here be the last?" The deliberate slowness of the work of butchery seemed to disconcert him more than the approach of death, which he had defied in a hundred battles.

This terrible scene lasted from six until nine o'clock. Nine gibbets stood in a line; for all there was only one hangman and two assistants. All the victims died with the calmness and composure worthy of brave but conquered soldiers, without a trace of cowardice, without a sign of that enthusiasm which they had

sufficiently manifested in life; they could well afford to disdain any outward expression of it in the face of death.

Many miles distant from Arad, on the morning of this day—one rendered forever memorable for infamy in the annals of Austria—the sun dawned upon a silent circle of spectators who had been disappointed of an exhibition. Count Louis Batthiányi, the former president of the Hungarian ministry, had been sentenced to terminate his career on the gallows, and in the very centre of the metropolis that had idolized him. The count had wounded himself slightly with a small poniard, and, “from considerations of humanity,” he was shot at sunset, on the spot where, according to the express orders of Haynau, he was to have suffered the most ignominious of all deaths. His execution had been determined on for five weeks, but there was a dread at Vienna of the desperate feeling which such horrifying intelligence might strike into the garrison at Komorn. This fortress had capitulated on the 27th of September; on the 3d of October, the Austrians took possession of it with the usual formalities; that very same day Haynau hurried to Pesth, signed the death-warrant of Count Batthiányi, and returned the next morning. His task was accomplished. Within the same hour the sentence of death was announced to the unhappy nobleman.

“To be hung! Was this their mercy in mitigating my imprisonment? To be hung! Oh, base and dastardly revenge! Yes, the person who has sworn to my death—my death—” These were the words Batthiányi spoke, at short pauses, when he heard his sentence. At the last word he broke off abruptly, bearing with him to the grave a secret which had long found its interpretation in the aristocratic circles of Vienna.—*Schlessinger*.

THE END.

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Stiles, William Henry

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